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
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
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
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
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
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


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"... The Soviet socialist state is a mighty bulwark of peaceful forces. The strengthening of peace has always been the lofty aim of the foreign policy of our state. We speak out firmly against military adventure, we do not need other people's territories. We have everything to enable us to advance along the path of socialist construction. We have a well-developed industry. We have the wonderful collective farming system. We have the unbreakable unity of the Soviet people, the fraternal friendship of all peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the mighty alliance of the working class and collective farmers. We have a great party of Communists, hardened in battle, which overcomes all obstacles and difficulties and skillfully leads our people along the Lenninist path . . ."

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev
January 1957

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REPLY TO
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FOREWORD

This 1976 pamphlet of bibliographic material is the fourth edition prepared on the Soviet Union by research analysts of the United States Army Library in response to requests for sources of current information on the subject. The publication includes research material which describes the many facets of Soviet military objectives, programs, external relations, and its interaction with other nations on a wide range of political, military, economic, technological, and other issues. There is also a substantial variety of documentary material in the appendixes which will be useful to all who follow Soviet developments and the US-USSR relationship.

No relationship more vitally affects the peace and security of the world than that of the two major continental and nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. A stable relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is essential for the peace and security of the world. The foreseeable future cannot be expected to bring an end to the differences between the Soviet and American political systems or to the competition between us. In a period of detente, nothing could better serve the cause of peace than the relaxation of tension between our two countries.

The source material in this publication provides a significant glimpse into Soviet society, its military capabilities, and the many complexities of its international policy and foreign relationships. By highlighting the direction of Soviet policy in this particularly important period of detente, it is hoped that this will enhance the reader's knowledge and lead to a fuller appreciation of the complex issues in the US-USSR relationship which must be resolved, if our search for peace is to be achieved.

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John W. Vessey, Jr.
JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans



ANALYSTS' NOTE

This unclassified analytical survey of literature was prepared at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army. It updates the previous pamphlet in the series on the USSR which was prepared in 1969 and published as DA PAM 550-6.

The 1,000 selected and abstracted items in the current publication are reflective of the political, military, economic, and sociological changes, shifts and trends that have taken place within the Soviet Union since 1969. These materials are located for the most part in the open holdings of the Army Library, Pentagon.

In selecting the materials from several thousand monographs, books, and periodical articles, the Analysts attempted to present a balanced picture of problems and prospects and of the forces that influence and shape the various courses being taken by the Soviet Union as one of the two super powers of the world.

The table of contents is very extensive by design and affords the user a simple tool for locating quickly the desired subject area. The main body of the manuscript is supported by appropriate charts and maps in appendixes.

No effort has been made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent endorsement of the views expressed.

Grateful acknowledgement is extended to the specialists in various Federal agencies, as well as private organizations for their assistance and cooperation. To the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center for their excellent Maps; to T. N. Dupuy Associates, Dunn Loring, Virginia, for permission to reprint extracts from their 1974 edition of The Almanac of World Military Power; to Ray S. Cline and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., for permission to reprint extracts from World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift, by Ray S. Cline, Georgetown University, 1975; to TIME, Inc., for permission to reprint TIME chart on grain from the September 1, 1975 issue of TIME, The Weekly News magazine; and to The AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Committee, for permission to reprint their "GULAG"—Slavery, Inc., documented map of forced labor camps in Soviet Russia.

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- *—Not available at Time of Listing
- LI—Library of the Institution

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HEADQUARTERS
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USSR: ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE

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USSR: ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE

PART I

NATIONAL POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OBJECTIVES

I. Whither USSR

A NEW RUSSIA? A NEW WORLD?, by Robert Conquest, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 53, no. 3 (April 1975) 482-497.

"There is a growing feeling, in the West as well as in the Soviet Union itself, that there are prospects, growing prospects, of a 'New Russia.' There is a feeling, whatever the immediate state of Brezhnev's health, that the fairly near future must see a breakup of the logjam created by a top leadership all of whose members are aged around 70. But the impression, one feels, goes deeper than this. Russia is seen to be at a social and economic dead end. Forthcoming political changes must, in this view, lead to radical and beneficial change over the whole field. In examining the possibilities, our own first thought in the West is naturally in what way developments in the U.S.S.R. of which there are any real prospects could affect the international scene; and in particular, of course, whether they might contribute to a firm and lasting peace. It is quite true that the internal and international attitudes of the Soviet leadership are closely interlinked—indeed, are aspects of a single worldview. And this again is bound to make us consider what actions, or policies, on the part of the West can best help to turn Moscow in a favorable direction."

(LI)—RUSSIA IN THE SEVENTIES, by Col. Arthur B. Carroll. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1970. 7 p. (Professional Study No. 4060.)

"The past decade in Russia is reviewed in terms of the successes and failures of her foreign policy, space and technology, military posture, and her attempts to advance the span of Moscow's control throughout the world. The author suggests that Russia's determined drive for absolute military superiority has already netted nuclear parity with the United States, and that she will be relentless in pursuit of domination of the Eu-

rasian land mass in the decade ahead. Her ability to reduce the threat posed to her by Red China, and the determination of the United States in support of her allies, will dictate the outcome of Russia's ambitious plans."

THE SOVIET UNION: THE SEVENTIES AND BEYOND, ed. by Bernard Eissenstat. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975. 356 p.

The Ideological Background; Diplomacy and Strategy; Elements of Philosophy, Ideology, and Theology; Soviet Agriculture—Some analysis and Interpretation; Changes and Perspectives in Soviet Culture; Education, Literature, and Censorship; War and Peace; Regional Politics and Influence; The Unity of Opposites (Russo-American Détente). With tables.

II. Soviet Military Posture

A. General

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

DEFENSE DILEMMA: INFLATION AND THE SOVIET THREAT, by L. Edgar Prina, in *The National Guardsman*, (February 1975) 2-9.

"Mr. Prina asserts that latest US intelligence reports indicate that Russia has significant new military strengths: increased manpower; new ICBMs equipped with MIRVs (including a mobile land-based, solid-fuel nuclear rocket); a 4,500-mile undersea ballistic missile; a swinging jet bomber (BACKFIRE) and a delta winged bomber; important R&D advances in electronics, lasers, command-and-control; increased tactical airlift capacity; and more effective conventional weapons. Prina also points out that Russia has a comparatively larger defense budget than the US, since its personnel costs are much lower, it is not plagued by inflation, and it is self-sufficient in petroleum. Russia's manpower, with Warsaw Pact support, exceeds that of NATO, and now that Great Britain has announced a 10% decrease

in its NATO manpower support, the imbalance is even greater. In addition, he says, the communist bloc has a heavy margin of superiority in tanks and warplanes. If the Congressional advocates of MBFR should succeed, he warns, the NATO Alliance could lose its viability . . ."

FINANCIAL CHECKS ON SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, by Franklyn D. Holzman. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1975. 103 p.

Introduction; Explicit Soviet Defense Expenditures; Other Possible Budgetary Sources of Defense Expenditure; Possible Nonbudgetary Sources of Military Expenditures; Verification by Financial Means; Verification by Sampling; Soviet Military Outlays and the Problems of Residuals in the USSR State Budget; and Bibliography.

THE SOVIET MILITARY, SOVIET POLICY, AND SOVIET POLITICS, by John Erickson, in *Strategic Review* (Fall 1973) 23-36.

"Two recent developments in Soviet military affairs—the new MIRV capability and the unprecedented elevation of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo—spurred Prof. Erickson's analysis of the Soviet military, its perceptions, requirements and constraints. Instead of fearing that 'the Russians are coming,' he believes that they may already have arrived, in the sense that they have achieved certain strategic goals. The Soviet emphasis on military strength does not conflict with its policy of détente, says Erickson, for the Soviets see a rough strategic parity with the US as a prerequisite of détente. Erickson discusses the implications of the increased Soviet military 'presence,' noting that the Soviets view both military strength and détente as essential ingredients to guarantee their security. They define détente, he says, simply as a means of gaining time until they attain military superiority over the US; their military policy is motivated by a desire to retain their world-wide superpower status and to reap the benefits of such status. Another aspect of their military policy is to build the kind of force which will enable them to survive a nuclear war, should deterrence fail; thus, they have a spread of forces designed to cope with both war-waging and war-avoiding. To meet this dual 'job,' they have concentrated on building the largest possible standing force, both strategic and tactical, equipped with the most modern weapon systems. As a result, there has been a constant improvement in the quality of the various components of

the entire military system. Regarding the 'strategic balance,' Erickson observes that the Soviets lead in both delivery vehicles and megatons, while they are narrowing the US lead in MIRVs. He characterizes Soviet military strategy and capabilities as having an offensive bias but not truly designed for a first-strike. The buildup reflects the Soviet effort to reinforce its scientific-technological elements and to intensify its R&D programs. At the same time, says Erickson, the Soviets have increased their ground forces in both Europe and Asia, not sacrificing the European front because of the build-up on the Chinese border. The Soviet military command is also undergoing change; in Erickson's view, however, the promotion of Grechko to the politburo reflects Brezhnev's move to secure his own position on détente rather than an indication of vastly greater military influence. Throughout the military command, younger men are replacing the older WW II veterans, with the emphasis on technical training and expertise: the once top-heavy officer system may be shifting to a more balanced one . . ."

2. *USSR vs. US—The Strategic Balance of Power: Parity and Disparity (For Data See also Appendixes)*

AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY 1975, by James R. Schlesinger, in *Survival*, v. 17, no. 3 (May/June 1975).

"On 5 February 1975 the US Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, released his second annual Defense Department report. As in his 1974 report, Schlesinger emphasizes the need to maintain a spectrum of options for American strategic forces, and stresses that important political perceptions flowed from the state of the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. To a greater extent than in his statement last year he also underlines the importance of matching Soviet counterforce capabilities. In assessing the situation in central Europe, Schlesinger argues that NATO has the capability and resources to attain a more equal balance with the Warsaw Pact and, looking at the maritime balance, he appears to scale down the previous year's estimates of Soviet naval power. Excerpts from the first section of the Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1976 (and FY 1977) are reprinted . . ."

ARMING TO DISARM IN THE AGE OF DÉTENTE, in *Time*, v. 103, no. 6 (11 February 1974) 15-20 plus.

"Is the U.S. falling behind the Soviet Union militarily? Arsenal of experts are likely to be

rolled out to argue both sides of the highly complex question. But there is no dispute about the fact that while the U.S. was fighting the expensive and inconclusive Viet Nam War, the Russians were spending lavishly to improve their stores of nuclear and conventional weapons. Their armed forces are now larger than those of the U.S. and, particularly in the case of the Soviet navy, often equipped with newer hardware. More important, the continuing Russian effort, together with the ceilings imposed on U.S. arms levels in the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) with Moscow, leads analysts to fear that in the mid-1980s the Soviets might finally overtake the US . . . After two summits and SALT I, the nuclear balance is still, looking to the future, weighted to the Soviets' advantage. Schlesinger's task is to provide the muscle and tools to help Kissinger bring the balance back to center in further negotiations."

ARMS AND IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Jyotirmoy Banerjee, in *The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 5, no. 2 (October 1972) 277-300.

"The Soviet arms build-up in recent years has attracted considerable attention in the West and has been the subject of a spate of commentaries and analyses. The overtaking of the USA by the USSR in the number of strategic missiles on the one hand and the stepped-up Soviet activities on the other have led both academic and government circles in the West to devote a great deal of attention to such questions as: whether it has been the policy of the USSR to acquire a first-strike capability and thereby to threaten the precarious nuclear 'balance.' Have the increased Soviet nuclear power, coupled with a more assertive naval policy, caused perceptible shifts in the Soviet politico-strategic doctrine, and, if so, are such doctrinal shifts a prelude to a more vigorous, even aggressive, Soviet politico-strategic doctrine, and, if so, are such doctrinal shifts a prelude to a more vigorous, even aggressive, Soviet policy posture?"

INTEGRATED GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE ANALYSIS: GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING, by William M. Carpenter and others. rev. ed. Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, 1974. 155 p. (SRI Project 2230—Technical Note SSC-TN-2240-30; ASDIRS 4471.)

"Analyzes the factors which affect global U.S. force posture guidelines for the late 1970s and early 1980s. The following are examined:

changes taking place in the international political, military and economic environment; U.S. interests and U.S. foreign and defense policy in the new environment; the future role of military force; the relationships among U.S. forces and with allied forces; and the implications of all these factors for future global force posture planning."

INTEGRATED GLOBAL FORCE POSTURES: AN OVERVIEW, by W. M. Carpenter and S. P. Gilbert. Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center, 1973. 44 pp. (SRI Project 8974, Technical Note SSC-TN-8974-75.)

"This report describes the approach to the problem of deriving guidelines for global force posture planning for the 1980s. The report discusses the necessity to consider the implications for national security of changes in the international environment. Among such changes are the attainment by the Soviet Union of nuclear parity with the United States, the growing importance of economic interactions among nations, and increasing indications of political multipolarity in the world, as evidenced by the emergence of China as a nuclear power and the advent of significant economic strength in Japan and in the Common Market of Western Europe. The report also explains the importance of redefining the future role of military force, and the relationship of military force to other elements of national power. Synthesis of these analysis elements with the national security implications of the Nixon Doctrine will enable the derivation of guidelines for a global force posture appropriate to the preservation of U.S. interests and objectives in the coming decade."

(LI) — MAHAN — A STRATEGY FOR WORLD POWER UNDER NUCLEAR STALEMATE, by Lt. Col. William E. Newell. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 21 p. (Professor Study No. 4421.)

"This paper begins with the assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a nuclear stalemate indefinitely. It then poses the question of whether or not the presence of this stalemate returns the two world powers of today to the era when world powers were sea powers as defined by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. The paper then examines: (1) the Soviet Union's naval and maritime build-up, (2) the effect of Communist policentrism on Soviet foreign trade, and (3) the resources and

market areas presented to the Soviets through increased trade with the third world. Soviet foreign policy, trade, and naval/maritime expansion are then analyzed against each of Mahan's elements of sea/world power. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the Soviet maritime expansion and vastly increased naval forces fit the Mahan strategy pattern. If the Soviet efforts do fit the classic Mahan pattern, then further study of Mahan should hopefully produce some insight to the motives behind each of their actions. It should also enable us to plan a more meaningful response to those actions, which will better protect our real long-run national interests."

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1974/75, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 57, no. 12 (December 1974) 41-105.

This is an annual feature of *Air Force Magazine*, appearing in each December issue since 1971. "The Military Balance" is compiled by The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and "is an annual, quantitative assessment of the military forces and defense expenditures of countries throughout the world . . . Included in the section on the US and USSR is an assessment of the changing strategic nuclear balance between the two superpowers. The section on the European theater balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been expanded and a discussion of Mutual Force Reductions added. Also . . . an essay on 'Problems of Comparing Defense Expenditures and Gross National Product' . . . A table [is included] of technical data on the principal tactical and air defense missiles of the major powers." For the Soviet Union, as well as for other countries, informational figures are provided on the following: Strategic Nuclear Forces, Army, Navy, Air Force.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1974-1975. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974. 104 p.

Provides figures and information on the military strength of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, among many others in the world.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 1975-1976. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

"The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies continue to enjoy a decisive edge over NATO in numbers of soldiers, tanks and planes. But the higher quality of NATO weapons and the

sheer size of its defense would make any attack so costly that a rough parity exists. These are the chief findings of 'The Military Balance 1975-76.' . . . Like its predecessors, the new study provides a . . . rundown, country by country, of uniformed men and weapons around the globe."

OFFENSIVE MISSILES. Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, September 1974. 34 p. (Paper no. 5.)

"This SIPRI report, published against the current background of counter-force-countervalue strategy and the new round of SALT talks, concludes that the USSR has the potential for gaining a countervalue advantage in sizes and numbers of offensive missiles over the US by the early 1980s, when it will have completed MIRVing its present force. However, in terms of the counter-force characteristics of accuracy and yield, the report concludes that the US will continue to have a vast lead over the USSR when the USSR completes its MIRVing program, even if the US makes no further improvements. By totaling the accuracy and yields of all the missiles and warheads in the US and USSR arsenals, the report concludes that the US presently has a fivefold counterforce advantage over the USSR. However, it also concludes that the US presently does not have sufficient deliverable accuracy and yields to destroy more than a fraction of the Soviet Union's existing missile silos, that is, does not have a first-strike capability against the other's land-based missiles. Furthermore, existing weapons do not have sufficient accuracy and yield to destroy a single silo with one weapon; and a second weapon directed on a nuclear targeted area will lose accuracy because of 'fratricide' interference. As for proposed new weapons in each country, the report maintains that the Soviet MIRV program alone will not give the Soviets enough accuracy and yield to destroy all of the US silos."

REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FY 1976 AND TRANSITION BUDGETS, FY 1977 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST, AND FY 1976-1980 DEFENSE PROGRAMS. Washington, Department of Defense, 5 February 1975. Various paging.

In this annual report and posture statement the Secretary of Defense discusses, among many other things, the Russian military posture, and he provides an overview of Soviet-American relations.

RUNNING THE QUALITATIVE RACE (AND NOT LOSING), by Col. Richard M. Jennings, in *Military Review* (October 1975).

"Most sources agree that the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in an arms race of some type since the beginning of the Cold War, but there is little concurrence on the nature of the race or whether it will continue. Few analysts clarify to what extent the competition has been all-inclusive or strategic nuclear, quantitative or qualitative, whether it is phasing down or accelerating, or what the long-range outlook for the US role might be. In view of the resources involved, we should take a careful look at the anatomy of the phenomenon and the prospects for future American participation."

SOVIET STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS, by Walter Darnell Jacobs, in *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 26, no. 1 (1972) 60-71.

"Dr. Jacobs quotes recent statistics indicating that Russia now has the initiative in weapons technology over the US . . . The Soviets now have a mixed military establishment capable of supporting all foreign policy goals and of neutralizing or overcoming American counter-capabilities. While Soviet planners probably never set a specific date for attaining strategic superiority, neither did US planners actually intend to accept strategic inferiority. As Jacobs sees it, both sides reacted to objective conditions within their political frameworks with the almost inevitable results of American slippage in the Russian drive for superiority . . . Soviet planners, working under political leadership, have developed these forces, slowly at first but now rapidly, while American planners, working more within the parameters of public opinion, have observed a decline in US power to the point that one can foresee American security endangered. Jacobs concludes that, in any current comparison, it is clear that the Soviet military-industrial complex has been more efficient than its American counterpart. Both military-industrial complexes have their problems, and will continue to have them, but the prognosis for the Soviet military-industrial complex is good while that for the American complex is uncertain."

THE SOVIET UNION, 1974, in *Current History*, (October 1974) 146-192.

"The superpowers have sought détente, Alvin Z. Rubinstein suggests, because of the escalating cost of the arms race, a mutual wish to normalize relations in Europe, increasing promi-

nence of China in foreign policy calculations, mounting economic problems which led the Soviets to seek Western technology and credits, and growing US absorption with domestic affairs and weariness of foreign involvements. Although there have been several promising achievements to date, US experts are still uncertain as to whether the USSR views détente as an alternate means of continuing the cold war or as a realistic means of establishing new international relationships. Consequently, US policymakers are divided in their views between those who support immediate expansion of the agreements already achieved, and those who stipulate that the USSR guarantee free emigration of its citizens before the US offers additional economic benefits. At present the benefits of détente for the Soviet Union are more obvious than those for the US . . . According to Lawrence T. Caldwell, a military problem underlies the political and economic problems of US-Soviet relations and related dealings with the European community. The question is US acceptance of strategic parity with the USSR and the effect on the credibility of its deterrent force which now guarantees protection to its European allies. This question affects overlapping sets of negotiations: SALT II, in which the bipolar strategic balance is being negotiated; mutual force reduction (MFR) talks, which concern the balance of conventional forces; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which tends to emphasize basic judgments about the political bases of détente. Examining the various aspects of these negotiations, Caldwell concludes the mixture is potentially explosive: the SALT II stalemate threatens to boost the strategic arms race; the determination of strategic parity, combined with conventional disparity, may affect the credibility of overall US protection for its European allies; and the solution of both these issues is complicated by the political dimension of détente as observed in the CSCE . . . Although the current Soviet leadership has exhibited remarkable cohesiveness, continuity and political 'normalization' during the past 10 years, some chronic problems persist, R. Judson Mitchell says. He questions whether the apparent political stability conceals a real inability to deal effectively with modern social change, and whether the degree of political stability results from essential abandonment of revolutionary goals. Soviet society has lost most of its earlier revolutionary dynamism, Mitchell says, but this has proven advantageous in terms of stabilizing expectations, and promoting social cohesion and

Soviet power . . . The Soviet military establishment is undergoing a major transition in terms of technology, theory, expanded capabilities and global political commitments, Timothy J. Colton observes. However, the military establishment's place in the Soviet political system remains remarkably confined and stable. Basic political-military differences seem to center on the urgency of defense as a national concern and the extent to which defense considerations should impede domestic and foreign policy goals . . ."

STABLE DETERRENCE: A STRATEGIC POLICY FOR THE 1970's, by J. H. Kahan, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1972) 528-543.

"Now that the Soviet Union has reached a position of overall strategic equality with the United States, we no longer hear serious talk of the need for U.S. superiority, but find ourselves discussing criteria for 'sufficiency' and attempting to negotiate nuclear weapons limitations. Whatever the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), it seems virtually certain that the United States and the Soviet Union will remain roughly comparable in nuclear power over the next decade . . . The changed nuclear balance has thus introduced new political as well as military uncertainties into the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Whether or not a limited agreement emerges from the current arms negotiations, the task before us is to design an effective future strategic policy. This article describes a policy of 'stable deterrence' and argues that it is the best way of managing our strategic posture and maximizing our nuclear security in the 1970's."

(LI)—STRATEGIC OVERKILL: FACT OR FICTION, by Maj. George P. Yancey, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 73 p. (Research Study.)

"Certain government officials and influential citizens have advanced the idea that the US can destroy the Soviet Union many times over, and therefore does not need to further develop its nuclear capability. This study investigates the overkill issue by discussing probability theory, communist strategic capabilities and current US strategic capabilities. The study concludes that the concept of overkill is invalid and thus detrimental to our military posture."

STRATEGIC SURVEY 1974. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

"New military technologies are reaching a stage of development where they could 'deeply

affect' Atlantic alliance politics and superpower arms control arrangements. 'Smart bomb' technology has increased vulnerability of fixed targets and is blurring the distinction between conventional arms and nuclear weapons. These are among the major assessments."

THE SUPERPOWERS AND MULTIPOLARITY: FROM PAX AMERICANA TO PAX SOVIETICA?, by John R. Swanson, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1972) 1035-1050.

"The apparent loosening of the bipolar international system into a multipolar one at first suggests that both superpowers will lose international influence to newly emerging major actors. A closer examination of this transition, however, indicates that the diffusion of power represented in the process may come at the expense of one of today's superpowers and create potential advantages for the other. While the hypothetical beneficiary could be either the United States or the Soviet Union, there is a strong possibility that it will be the Soviet Union."

U.S. UNABLE TO MAINTAIN MILITARY POSTURE IF SPENDING TRENDS CONTINUE, in *Defense Space Business Daily*, (17 September 1975).

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, in showing how Soviets continue to grow in détente, states: " 'If we are to maintain a military equilibrium, we must also recognize that the forces of the Soviet Union today continue to grow; they grow in the atmosphere of détente as they did in the spirit of Camp David, in the spirit of Geneva, and in the spirit of Glassboro. And we should not be at all surprised by this because the fundamental statement of Soviet purposes reflects the fact that the Soviet state itself depends upon a growth in military power, and détente in the Soviet perspective is viewed as something that reflects the improved military posture of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the West'."

WHO'S OUT IN FRONT? SOVIET VS. U.S. STRATEGY: A DISPARITY IN DEFENSES, by Maj. Tyrus W. Cobb, in *Army*, v. 25, no. 1 (January 1975) 12-18.

"U.S. and Soviet strategic defensive systems won't ever face one another in combat and thus are difficult to compare, but the fact remains that this country's appears to dwindle in the face of the offensive threat presented, while the Soviet strategic defense waxes always more healthy."

WORLD POWER ASSESSMENT; A CALCULUS OF STRATEGIC DRIFT, by Ray S. Cline. Washington, Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975. 173 p.

"This book charts new ground in dealing with the old problem of international power politics. It explains why the balance of world power seems to be tipping toward the totalitarian states, the USSR and Communist China, and away from the United States. It describes the geographic distribution of economic, military, and political strength among nations as of 1975." Contents: Introduction ("Politectionics"; Measuring the Power of Nations); Power Macrometrics (Critical Mass—Population and Territory; Measuring Economic Capabilities; Military Capability—The Strategic Force Balance; Military Capability—Conventional Forces; Total Macrometric Power Pattern; National Strategy and National Will); Politectionic Assessment; Appendices; and Maps, Charts, and Graphs.

3. *The Role of Missiles in Soviet Strategy*

MISSILES OF THE WORLD, by Michael J.H. Taylor and John W.R. Taylor. New York, Scribners, 1972. 167 p.

"The authors present a volume containing details, drawings, and photographs (some never before published) of all guided missiles known to be in service or under development throughout the world, including China and Russia. Details contained on each missile are as current and complete as possible. The authors designate each missile by type and operational status and include, as far as possible, the following information on each missile: prime contractor, source of power, guidance and control systems, airframe construction and vital statistics, type of warhead, cruising speed, maximum range, launch weight, and a short history of each weapon's development and use . . ."

THE SOVIET ICBM THREAT IS MOUNTING, by Edgar Ulsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 56, no. 11 (November 1973) 34-37.

"Détente apparently does not mean the same thing to the USSR that it means to the US: The Soviet Union's military technology effort, especially the development of sophisticated strategic weapons, is at an all-time high, and continues to increase. New Soviet R&D programs range from ballistic missiles to strategic bombers and include such ominous elements as new launch techniques and MIRVing . . ."

SOVIET OBJECTIVE: TECHNOLOGICAL SUPREMACY, by Edgar Ulsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 57, no. 6 (June 1974) 22-27.

"In addition to four new ICBMs, a new SLBM, and new nuclear-powered submarines, the Soviet Union has under development a dozen new offensive missile systems and is pursuing an ominous, highly sophisticated new technology involving beamed energy weapons. The driving force behind these efforts to outdistance the US in weapons technology is Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko, who directs the massive campaign to attain the . . . Soviet Objective: Technological Supremacy."

SOVIET SLA-BASED FORCES AND SALT, by Richard Burt, in *Survival*, v. 17, no. 1 (January/February 1975) 9-13.

"While the outline of a new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) accord worked out at the summit in Vladivostok will supersede the limits on offensive missiles agreed to in the 1972 Interim Agreement (IA), the joint statement released at the talks says that 'relevant provisions' of the IA will be incorporated into the new agreement to be signed in 1975 . . . Because the full meaning of the IA for Soviet SLBM deployment remains to be understood by many in the West and because potential Soviet deployments could generate disagreement in working out the details of a new 10-year SALT package, it appears worthwhile to explore the implications of the IA for existing and future Soviet sea-based force design."

4. *Scientific-Technological Base*

(LI)—CYBERNETICS AND ITS MILITARY APPLICATIONS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, by Maj. William E. Cheney. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 58 p. (Research Study.)

"This research paper addresses Soviet progress in cybernetic research. It examines the background and growth of Soviet cybernetics from the 1950's to the present time. The main thrust of the paper is toward a general analysis of those Soviet cybernetic research projects oriented toward military technology and their potential threat to the United States and the Free World. A very brief discussion of similar efforts conducted in the United States is provided for purpose of comparison. The paper concludes that Soviet cybernetic technology poses a very serious threat to the Free World, and the gravity of this threat will continue to increase unless there are

significant changes in interest and attitudes towards cybernetics within the United States."

RUSSIA'S DRIVE FOR TECHNICAL PRODUCTIVITY, by Edgar Vlsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 58 No. 8 (August 1975) 68-69.

"A Department of Commerce Soviet expert shows how the USSR has raised productivity in defense-related areas to nearly double the national average."

(*)—SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY, by Mose L. Harvey and others. Miami, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972. 219 p.

"Three specialists in Soviet economics, military affairs, and science and technology provide a documentary account of the Soviet leaders' views of scientific-technological progress and the role it is expected to play, especially in the sphere of East-West competition. They examine strategic issues and the pursuit of military superiority; the continuous search for a more effective performance; levels of expenditures; the search for an optimum organizational and administrative approach; and the system for acquiring and disseminating foreign scientific and technological data. More than 100 pages of documents are included."

5. Nuclear Warfare Strategy

ACTION AND REACTION IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, by Colin S. Gray, in *Military Review*, (August 1971) 16-26.

"... Disagrees with the action-reaction theory which dominates much strategic thinking today. The theory fails to give due credit to domestic pressures which have often played a major role in US strategic decisions, such as the enormous missile expansion during the Kennedy Administration and the Sentinel decision during the Johnson Administration. Moreover, it is based on a dubious understanding of Soviet doctrine and reactive patterns. In the early 1960s the Soviets did react to the relatively inferior position in which they found themselves. However, they were not seeking to offset US strategic forces strictly in Western terms of deterrence. Instead, Soviet leaders seemed determined to neutralize any political leverage that an apparent strategic superiority might provide the US. Since 1964, Gray finds no persuasive evidence that major Soviet strategic decisions have been sensitive to US programs. The Soviets value defense of the homeland for itself, and they view the ability to disrupt an aggressor's

blow by preemptive strike as an important component of a stable deterrence. This strategy has apparently not been a reaction to offset the Sentinel and Safeguard. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs would be any smaller in the absence of a US ABM. They have also shown no greater urgency to counter MINUTEMAN III and Poseidon. Furthermore, their continued heavy emphasis on air defenses is not merely an antiquated fondness for defense; it reflects accurately the enormous megatonnage deliverable by SAC bombers and the tactical aircraft of the 6th Fleet and NATO forces . . ." threatened by hostile forces. Various steps have been taken to provide for the transition of power following Tito's death or retirement, but the success of these measures is still in doubt. Sullivan concludes that the collapse of Yugoslavia will pose new problems for the US in the near future and that the US and its allies may soon have to decide how far they are prepared to go in preserving the barrier between the Russians and the Mediterranean."

A COMPARISON OF U.S.-ALLIED AND SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, by S. T. Cohen and W. C. Lyons, in *Orbis*, v. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 72-92.

"After more than two decades of tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) development and deployment by the United States and, to a lesser extent, some of our allies, the actual utility of these weapons and their associated forces remains, to Western strategists, the most poorly understood component of our military defense. They were first developed and used as military devices for mass destruction—an image that has persisted up to the present time. As a consequence, their use in a limited theater was in support of a conventional field army has seemed almost contradictory . . . What seems by and large to be missing in the TNW debate throughout the years (not only in Congressional hearings, but in most of the U.S. professional literature as well) is an accounting of precisely what the Soviets have been doing in the field of tactical nuclear weapons development, deployment and doctrine. Moreover, insufficient attention has been given to comparing Soviet capabilities and doctrines with those of the West."

HOW RUSSIA IS TIPPING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, by Edgar Vlsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 58, no. 1 (January 1975) 48-53.

"Speakers at AFA's [Air Force Association's] Symposium [in Shreveport] on 'New Di-

mensions in Strategic Deterrence' assessed the . . . array of new Soviet nuclear weaponry. In this, the first of two special reports, Air Force Magazine reveals that the Soviets have embarked on history's greatest strategic buildup."

THE MYTH OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGY, by Col. Ransom E. Barber, in *Army*, v. 25, no. 6 (June 1975) 10-17.

"Major military powers tend to describe their strategy in two different ways, for internal and external consumption. The long-standing Soviet axiom that a big-power war could only be nuclear might be examined in that light, since their force structure suggests other options."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, ON U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AND U.S.-U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC DOCTRINES AND POLICY, MARCH 7, 14, AND APRIL 4, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 316 p.

THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGY, by Leon Gouré and others. Washington, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 148 p.

"The aim of this study is to provide insights that may be useful in current appraisals and debates relative to the new 'détente' relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, with particular emphasis on security implications for the U.S. The study is limited to the examination and analysis, in the light of open Soviet sources, of certain critical aspects of current Soviet thinking and planning for the nuclear forces of the USSR. The specific problem areas addressed relate to Moscow's views on the purposes its nuclear forces serve and the relative weight it attaches to these purposes; how much in the way of nuclear forces Moscow considers necessary under present and prospective international conditions; how Moscow envisages the possible military use of its nuclear forces; and Moscow's perception of the relationship between the use of strategic nuclear forces and theater forces."

(*)—THE SUPERPOWERS IN A MULTI-

NUCLEAR WORLD, ed by Geoffrey Kemp and others. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1974. 300 p.

"The volume begins with a primer on the US-Soviet nuclear relationship and its development over time, and includes an examination of technological possibilities and their strategic implications. It is, however, the analysis of the differing nuclear perspectives of different powers which gives the book its greatest interest. The book is a collection of papers given at the US-Soviet Strategic Balance and Nuclear Multipolarity Conference at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in May 1973."

6. *Civil Defense Preparedness in Soviet Strategy (Including Post-Strike Recovery)*

ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AND USSR POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR ATTACK, by F. W. Dresch and S. Baum. Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, 1973. various paging. (SRI Technical Note SSC-TN-8974-85; ASDIRS 4052.)

"Attempts to develop a practical methodology for translating estimates of possible damage from nuclear attack into statements about recovery potential. The approach followed has combined an attack model with an economic recovery model to simulate recovery schedules under a range of different assumptions about attack objectives and recovery policies. The results show consistent paths for economic recovery and provide plausible schedules for allocation of postattack investment among sectors. Variations in the size of the attack and postattack austerity (imposed by policy stipulated constraints on personal consumption and government expenditures) displace recovery schedules up or down without significant distortion. Recovery to preattack levels of GNP requires up to a decade after heavy attacks, but such preliminary results should be taken with caution until verified by more refined, less aggregated analyses."

(LI)—**CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION**, by Maj. Andrew C. Thompson. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 98 p. (Research Study No. 1945-71.)

"The purpose of Civil Defense is to protect the population and economy. Civil Defense can also help precipitate war. This could occur when an aggressive nation believes itself secure and asserts itself in pursuit of its national interests. This study analyzes Civil Defense in the Soviet Union

and concludes that the Soviet Union has a credible Civil Defense. The study also concludes that because of the security provided, and coupled with Soviet strategic arms, the possibility of conflict is increasing. Because of this, the United States must exercise great caution in formulating and conducting foreign policy."

(LI)—THE NEW SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM—A WARNING FOR AMERICA, by Stephen C. Bladey. Maxwell Air Force Base, Air War College, 1971. 10 p. (Professional Study No. 4288.)

A brief history of the Soviet Civil Defense effort is followed by a detailed description and analysis of significant changes noted in this program during the past ten years. Some of these new emphases are interpreted by the author as warnings to America and are listed in the concluding section."

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE—POST-STRIKE REPAIR AND RESTORATION. Coral Gables, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 49 p. (ASDIRS 4262.)

"Analyzes, on the basis of open Soviet source material, Soviet civil defense doctrine, organization, plans and activities pertaining to post-strike emergency repair and restoration operations. It is noted that Soviet doctrine places great emphasis on measures to assure the viability of essential industrial facilities, utilities, services and transportation in wartime as vital to the war effort and for the attainment of victory. Measures to limit damage from an attack include industrial dispersal, relatively simple hardening, stockpiling of raw materials and parts, as well as the preparation of large civil defense forces to conduct rescue, repair and restoration work in areas damaged by a nuclear strike."

7. *Soviet Overseas Bases*

BRIEFINGS ON DIEGO GARCIA AND PATROL FRIGATE. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION WITH ADM. ELMO R. ZUMWALT, APRIL 11, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 74 p.

Includes information on Soviet personnel in Somalia and Berbera, Soviet projects in Berbera area, Soviet facilities in Yemen, Iraq, and Umm Qasr, Soviet personnel in Aden, at Umm Qasr and at Mauritius, Soviet facility in India, etc.

8. *Strategic Implications of Soviet Espionage*

A HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN SECRET

SERVICE, by Richard Deacon. New York, Tappan Publishing Co., 1972. 568 p.

HOW TO SPY ON THE U.S., by Alexander Steele. New Rochelle, N.Y., Arlington House Publishers, 1974. 185 p.

The story of "a Red spy still operating on U.S. soil."

(*)—KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET SECRET AGENTS, by John Barron. New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1974. 462 p.

"Describes in detail KGB operations which have impacted on the security of the United States."

THE KGB'S UNITED NATIONS BASE, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 14 (3 July 1975) 1-3.

"There is growing concern in Washington and New York about the expanding activities of the KGB in the United States. Recent visitors have been struck by the extraordinary discrepancy between the almost unlimited space American publications of all kinds are devoting to the real or alleged misdeeds of the CIA and the sparse ration of KGB coverage. Yet the KGB's operations greatly exceed in scope those of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) combined. Moreover, using the privileged sanctuary of United Nations headquarters in Manhattan as a base, the Russians can operate with an impunity absolutely denied to American intelligence services in the USSR."

THE WORLD'S MOST PROFESSIONAL MACHINE; THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE NETWORK, by Lt. C. A. Jones, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 2 (February 1974) 74-81.

The Forging of the Machine; Precision Pieces of the Well-oiled Machine; KGB; GRU; MVD; Counterintelligence; The Intelligence Agent; Postselection Process; The Spy Schools; etc.

B. The Red Armed Forces (See Charts in Appendixes)

1. *A Selective Report*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

TECHNOLOGY, MANAGEMENT AND THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, by David Holloway. London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 44 p. (Adelphi Papers no. 76.)

Technology, Management and Soviet Military; The Automation of Troop Control; Military Management; Appendices; Select Bibliography.

b. *Doctrinal Concepts: Tactics, Logistics, and Strategy*

THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPE: PART IV—MILITARY DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY, by Steven Colby. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975. 42 p. (Adelphi Papers no. 109.)

Chapter II deals with Soviet Warfighting Concepts (Military Power from an Inferior Resource Base).

EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY THINKING, by Alfred L. Monks, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 3 (March 1971) 78-93.

Debate Intensified; Factionalism Apparent; Traditionalist View; Tank Role; Soviet Air Force; Defense Needs; A Modernist's View; Standard Thesis; Military Organization; Basic Deterrent Force; Allocating Resources; Centrist Position; Global or Local War; Escalation; Balanced Forces; Political Faction; Shift in Thinking, etc.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, by Col. P. Sidorov, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 12 (December 1972) 89-91.

Reprinted from September 1972 issue of the Soviet Military Review, Moscow.—“The Soviet military doctrine is regarded as the fundamental law of the state in the sphere of defense. This being so, it includes strictly scientific, strictly substantiated and verified theses which formulate the tasks of the Armed Forces in conformity with the potentialities of these forces and of the country as a whole. At the same time, while promoting the development of common views on the basic problems of military development, of troop training and education, the Soviet military doctrine does not fetter the thinking of military theorists, the initiative in action of the military leaders who are entrusted with the guidance of the Armed Forces.”

GEOGRAPHY AND SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING, by Raymond Barrett, in *Military Review*, (January 1970) 17-25.

“Defensive attitudes dominate Soviet military thinking and strategic planning because of the USSR's geographic vulnerability. Long, difficult borders allow the possibility of a land attack from Germany, China, and Japan. In order to protect itself, the USSR established subservient regimes in East Europe. Its domination of East Europe and the protection of its Asian frontiers are guaranteed by large conventional forces. The Warsaw Pact is used to mobilize East European troops while insuring that they serve Russian

interests. In addition, the USSR has deployed an ABM system to protect itself against China and other neighboring countries. As a result, the US may be unable to get Soviet agreement to limit ABM construction. It will also be difficult to achieve agreement on the reduction of conventional forces since the USSR, in view of its geographic situation, may find that such a reduction endangers its strategic posture. Mutual reduction of forces depends largely on the Soviet assessment of the viability of its East European bulwark. However, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet sensitivity to any change in East Europe indicate that the USSR does not find the situation conducive to a reduction in forces. Soviet control of East Europe and Germany is eroding at a time when the Chinese threat is increasing. As its position deteriorates, the USSR will become increasingly sensitive to potential threats. The USSR may find it necessary to give up opportunities for détente with the US in order to deal with the growing threat to its territorial integrity. The US must follow a careful policy that will encourage gradual changes without simultaneously arousing Soviet sensitivities that can lead to explosive reactions.”

THE IMPACT OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ON MILITARY STRATEGY. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 61 p. (ASDIRS 4445.)

“Evaluates the influence of weapon technology on military strategy. Three factors are discussed: Soviet threat and challenge to free world security; U.S. concept of deterrence; and the Soviet and US views of limited war. Concludes that America must not become apathetic, but maintain its technological superiority over the Soviet Union. Further, that in order to counter ‘National wars of Liberation,’ consideration should be given to developing more effective conventional weaponry, while at the same time sustaining the much needed sophisticated deterrent nuclear forces in-being.”

(LI)—THE SOKOLOVSKY STRATEGY: A PARADIGM FOR FUTURE CONFLICT OR SOVIET PROPAGANDA?, by Col. Frank J. Apel. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 83 p. (Professional Study.)

“Over the past decade, Soviet advances in military capability have placed the United States in a position of relative parity. Recent indications suggest that the USSR may, if they continue current trends in force acquisition and modernization achieve clear superiority in the not too distant

future. This study compares actual Russian military accomplishment over the last ten years with the strategy of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky to determine first, the strategy's authenticity, and secondly, its possible future application. The study concludes that the Sokolovsky strategy is valid and finds that the long range goal of Soviet planners is eventual world domination through nuclear blackmail."

SOVIET MANEUVERS, SUMMER 1971, by Maj. John F. Meehan III, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 4 (April 1972) 14-21.

"Recent testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee indicated that the United States had not conducted any division-size maneuvers of its US Strategic Army Forces units for at least four years although declining overseas deployment of US units should lead to a more frequent scheduling of such exercises. In the Soviet Union, however, division-size maneuvers are commonplace among those units based in European Russia as opposed to those deployed in Eastern Europe and on the Chinese border. An analysis of last summer's activities provides a good example of a typical summer training program in the Soviet Union. In 1971, there were no large-scale maneuvers such as Dnepr (fall 1967) or Dvina (Spring 1970), and the absence of such 'show-case' maneuvers provides an opportunity to view the Soviet summer schedule as it is normally conducted."

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY: REALITIES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS, by William F. Scott, in *Strategic Review*, (Summer 1975).

"Current Soviet military doctrine, adopted by the Party in the late 1950s, 'requires that the Armed Forces, the country and the whole Soviet people be prepared for the eventuality of a nuclear-rocket war.' This doctrinal decision required a new strategy, which was made known to the West in August 1962, through the publication of Marshal Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy*. Further explanations of Soviet military doctrine and strategy have been presented since that time in hundreds of Soviet books, pamphlets and articles. Subsequent events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and SALT negotiations have not altered their basic provisions. Development, production and deployments of Soviet weapons systems have been in accordance with stated military objectives and principles. Despite the clarity with which Soviet military doctrine

and strategy have been stated, most Western analysts throughout the 1960s misinterpreted or ignored their basic thrust. While seeking to find internal dissension among the Soviet political-military leadership, Western analysts have failed, as a group, to inform the public about the fundamental tenets of military doctrine and strategy upon which Soviet military-political policies are based."

(*)—SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY, by V. D. Sokolovskiy. 3rd ed. New York, Crane, Russak and Company, 1974. 550 p. (Translation, analysis, and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott.)

"The late Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy was a leading Soviet military thinker. His writings provide an insight into official Soviet views on war, nuclear weapons, and conventional armed forces. Harriet Fast Scott, a respected analyst on Soviet military affairs, examines the third edition of Sokolovskiy's work and compares it with previous editions."

(LI)—SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY, by Lt. Col. Isaac R. Jones. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1974. 51 p. (Professional Study.)

"A brief review of the Soviet military doctrinal changes that have occurred since World War II, together with a discussion of the attendant technological transformation of the armed forces, serve as a background for addressing the current Soviet military strategy that evolved from these revolutionary changes. The discussion of the four main elements of Soviet military strategy represents a collection of contemporary views expressed by prominent Soviet military leaders on the subject."

'SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT AND THE PRINCIPLES' (PART V), by Gp. Capt. E.S. Williams, in *The Royal Air Forces Quarterly*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 17-22.

"This article rounds off Parts I-IV of 'The Soviet Airman' series published in the Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter 1973 issues of the *Quarterly*. In this case 'The Officer's Handbook', on which some of the content of the present article is based, is intended for use by officers of all the Soviet Armed Forces. Therefore, the limiting 'The Soviet Airman', which was appropriate to the previous titles, has been omitted from this Part V of the series."

SOVIET SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY, by William F. Scott.

New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975. 72 p.
(National Strategy Information Center, Inc.)

"This book identifies and discusses Soviet military political spokesmen and their writings on military doctrine and strategy. It analyzes those Soviet publications which present basic tenets of Soviet military thought, as well as those intended for study by specific services within the Soviet Armed Forces. It also provides an annotated bibliography of over 160 Soviet books published between 1960 and 1974 used for the education, training, and indoctrination of the Soviet Armed Forces. Included is a brief list of Soviet writings that have been translated into English."

(*)—SOVIET STRATEGY—SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY-MAKING, by C. G. Jacobsen. Glasgow, The University Press, 1972. 232 p.

"The evolution of Soviet concepts relating to the use of military power in a nuclear age is traced . . . The book deals with doctrines, institutions, and practices, and raises as many significant questions as it answers."

THE SOVIET VIEW OF WAR, PEACE AND NEUTRALITY, by P.H. Vigor. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 256 p.

"War, peace and neutrality are three tools which the Russians use for attaining their political objectives. In this study P.H. Vigor shows how they have evolved a clear-cut view, based on Marxism-Leninism, of the origins of war, the categories of war, the ways in which it can be made to serve the Marxist revolutionary interest, and the circumstances in which it is profitable to use it. What are the factors making for victory in war? Even if you win a military victory, under what circumstances can you hope that it will secure for you the goals for which you fought? To what extent is strategy the tool of policy? These are some of the questions the book sets out to answer. As for peace, both Lenin and Khrushchev described it as a 'temporary, unstable armistice between two wars'. In the Leninist view, peace is a tool for attaining political objectives just like war, while neutrality is essentially ridiculous: 'he who is not with me is against me'. Nevertheless, there are occasions when neutrality is a concept acceptable to the Soviet leaders, and this study examines some instances of this." With bibliography.

c. Military Policy and Preparedness

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON SOVIET STRATEGY; IS IT CONVENTIONAL?, by Col. Ransom E. Barber, in *The National War College Forum*, 17th issue (Summer 1973) 21-30.

"Among many of the Kremlinologists who practice their art in the United States, there seems to be a widely accepted conventional wisdom on the military strategy and associated force design of the Soviet Union. In its shorthand form, this wisdom suggests that the Russians have rejected the proposition that a war between major powers could long remain conventional or that once either side has resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear battle could be limited. According to this view, the Soviets have created a large, balanced force that is primarily structured for a wide variety of missions on the nuclear battlefield. Along with this sort of thinking goes the conclusion that Soviet forces are not capable of conducting a sustained conventional campaign because Soviet force planners do not foresee the prospect of protracted operations. Further, it is concluded that the Soviets will do just what they say they will do in response to the first use by NATO of nuclear weapons—respond with a massive and theatre-wide strike of their own . . . Thus the picture of a massive Soviet armed force poised to execute a strategy of instant nuclear response is sharply engraved by what the Russians advertise as their war-fighting approach. Yet I suggest that accepting these notions at face value can be dangerously misleading . . . I will attempt to support my views with a combined analysis of Soviet pronouncements and military capabilities. This paper will not give a detailed catalogue of the total record of published Soviet doctrine. That has been done before. However, some of the lesser known elements of their thinking are considered in order to show that there are many facets to their military policy which we must be prepared to counter with our own strategy. A detailed analysis of Soviet military capabilities will also be avoided because that too has been done before. Rather, the paper will advance enough evidence to make the point that the Soviets have built a military machine that can conduct a wide variety of operations other than the advertised lightning-quick, all-destructive nuclear battle."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POLICY, by Lt. Col. John G. Pappageorge, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 7 (July 1972) 36-43.

"The Soviet aim has been to pursue policies which would provide a material strategic advantage and which guarantee Soviet security by concluding treaties which would maintain any advantages gained. Corollaries to that basic policy have been the desire to limit the power and influence of Red China and to increase the influence of the Soviet brand of communism in the Third World. With this in mind, let us examine the capability of the Soviet military power to support Soviet foreign policy at any given level of conflict."

A NOTE ON WHEAT AND THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, by Harriet Fast Scott, in *Strategic Review*, (Fall 1975).

"There is a great deal of speculative thought in the United States about selling wheat and other grain to the Soviet Union. Few, however, consider the Soviet point of view. General of the Army Yevdokim Yegorovich Mal'tsev, Commandant to the Lenin Military-Political Academy in Moscow, explains the Soviet need for wheat in a recent book, 'The CPSU—the Organizer of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland,' which appeared in Moscow bookstores in 1974. General Mal'tsev explains: Modern war makes great demands for supplying industry with raw materials, for supplying the army and the population with foodstuffs and other material means. 'The Red Army,' wrote V.I. Lenin, "cannot be strong without great state reserves of wheat because without this the army cannot be moved about freely, nor trained as it should be. Without this one cannot maintain the workers who work for the army.' Agriculture in many ways determines the development of branches of industry, including defense . . . The Soviet Armed Forces today number between 5 and 6 million men—more than double the size of the Armed Forces of the United States. As General Mal'tsev reminds us, as the momentum of Soviet military power steadily increases, 'the Red Army cannot be strong without great reserves of wheat . . .' It might be well for Americans to reflect seriously on this military reality so simply stated by this official pronouncement."

d. Manpower

ARE WE UNDERRATING SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER?, by Col. William F. Scott, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 51, no. 4 (April 1974) 26–31.

"An authority on Soviet military affairs presents an analysis of Soviet military man-

power that is at considerable variance with generally accepted estimates. At a time when the USSR has numerical—and in some cases, qualitative—superiority in several major weapons categories, 'we can ill afford to delude ourselves about the true size and quality of the USSR's pool of trained military people.' Here are some disturbing answers to a question of vital importance . . ."

5 FOREIGN ARMY RESERVE SYSTEMS, by Col. Irving Heymont and Col. Melvin H. Rosen, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 3 (March 1973) 83–93.

"The purpose of this article is to examine the army reserve systems of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Israel, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Soviet Union to determine similarities and differences and their probable causes."

NEW WARRANT OFFICERS FOR THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, by John Erickson, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 12 (December 1975) 70–77.

"At the end of January 1973, a meeting of some significance convened in Moscow. This was nothing less than a full-dress review of the workings of the new institution and rank structure for warrant officers in the Soviet armed forces—namely, the praporshchik (a revival of the old Imperial Army title of 'ensign') and michman (a corresponding rank for the Soviet Navy). For reasons of general convenience, I have used the term 'warrant officer' to cover this category, which is clearly intended to be distinguished from the sergeant or the chief petty officer and the commissioned officer as such—indeed, this is the whole object of the recent Soviet enactment which brought the new structure into being. The innovation is important and Soviet comment leaves no doubt over that matter, hence all the publicity and the staging in January of the 'All-Army Assembly of Warrant Officers' which met in the presence of the Defense Minister and where each section was presided over by the particular commander in chief of the arm involved (Pavlovskii for the ground forces and so on)."

SELECTIONS FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESS, 1968–71, comp. by Albert Ferri, Jr. Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, 1973. 142 p. (SRI Project 8474, Technical Note SSC-TN-8974-70; ASDIRS 4097.)

"Presents major ideas in Soviet force planning, without the usual Marxist-Leninist propa-

ganda. In certain cases, however, where there is a need to understand the political side of force planning and use, this material is presented in the article."

SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER POLICIES, by John Erickson, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1974) 29-47.

Military Service and Military Manpower—The 1967 Revisions; The Professionals Manning and Managing the Soviet Officer Corps; and Readings and References.

e. *Party-Military Relations*

THE MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION IN TODAY'S SOVIET FORCES, by Lt. Col. Joseph J. Heinlein, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 11 (November 1973) 55-64.

"From the time of its introduction into the Soviet Army by Trotsky in 1918, the political commissar system has had the overriding mission of ensuring the subordination of the military to the political leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The need for such an organization was clearly apparent in 1918. The Soviet leadership has evidently been satisfied with its effectiveness since that time even though the particular circumstances giving cause for concern over military deference to political authority have varied considerably over the years. The argument advanced here is that the CPSU believes that the political control system in the Soviet Armed Forces has considerable utility beyond its traditional role and remains viable today under conditions which are vastly different from those of the Stalin era . . . What follows herein is an elaboration of the 'revolution in the military affairs' as viewed from what Erickson calls 'the political side of the Soviet military house'."

(*) — **MARXISM - LENINISM ON WAR AND ARMY (A SOVIET VIEW)**, by A. A. Sidorenko. Washington, U.S. Air Force, 1974?

"This, the second volume in the US Air Force current series of significant Soviet military and strategic writings . . . An authoritative . . . textbook which is cited in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia as a basic reference for the subject of military doctrine . . . It is a rationalization in the language of Marxism-Leninism/dialectical materialism of the Soviet military policies which took shape in the 1960s. Having arrived at the decision to equip and train the Soviet Armed Forces for nuclear warfare, the philosophical

umbrella had to be shaken out and rebuilt. That's what the book is, a retooling of Communist theory so the universality of application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to military theory and practice can be 'demonstrated'."

THE MILITARY INDOCTRINATION OF SOVIET YOUTH, by Leon Gouré. New York National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1973. 75 p. (Strategy Papers No. 16.)

Soviet Views on the Need for Military-Patriotic Education; The Organization of Military-Patriotic Education; The Content of Military-Patriotic Education; Training and Indoc-trination of Schoolchildren; Preliminary Training of Future Conscripts; The Media in Military-Patriotic Education; Problems of the Military-Patriotic Education Campaign; Significance of Military-Patriotic Education; and Bibliography.

MILITARY TRAINING OF SOVIET YOUTH, by Lt. Comdr. James A. Barry, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 2 (February 1973) 92-103.

"On 1 January 1968, a new Soviet law on universal military service became effective. Among its provisions were a lowering of the draft age from 19 to 18 years, a change in the criteria for draft deferments and, most important, a decrease in the term of service for conscripts. Official explanations stressed 'the substantial increase in the general-education and technical level of young people' as the major factor in this decision . . . It seems more likely that the military was under pressure from the bureaucracy to release more trained manpower for the civilian economy although the desire to build up a large reserve for possible protracted conflict with China may have had some bearing on the decision. Another possibility is that the Soviet leadership was seeking to allay its growing doubts about the ideological purity of Soviet youth by subjecting greater numbers of young people to army-sponsored indoctrination."

(LI)—**PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES**, by Maj. Joseph E. Hickox. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 101 p. (Research Study.)

"The Communist Party has developed a vast and well-organized network of political organs and organizations throughout the Soviet Armed Forces. This study examines the role of the Party in the military, including its structure,

functions, and objectives as defined by the Central Committee. Evidence is presented that focuses attention upon the political organs as possessing the real power and authority to direct and control Party-political work. Although many military professionals voice their resentment over constant Party control, the conclusion was reached that the Soviet military establishment is unquestionably loyal to its country and the Communist Party."

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONING OF THE SOVIET SOLDIER, by Lt. Col. William C. Dukes, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 12 (December 1974) 69-78.

"Preparing the soldiers psychologically for battle is neither new nor unique to the Soviet Army. The tremendous emphasis which is currently being placed on psychological training by the Soviet military leadership, however, is unique. This emphasis stems from the Soviet view of modern nuclear warfare."

SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION AMONG COMRADES, by Lt. Comdr. Gerald C. Caron, Jr., in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 4 (December 1971) 65-93.

"The concept of continuing institutional conflict between the Communist Party and the armed forces can lead to entirely inaccurate conclusions about the relations between the civilian leaders and career military officers in the U.S.S.R. The top figures in both groups are all political professionals, and most of the so-called conflicts—both of historic and contemporary genre—transcend normal institutional lines. Although the peculiar Soviet version of the classic Great Russian politico-military model is characterized by an inherent potential for discord, it also includes unique provisions for perpetuating the present political system and for sustaining the thrust of the country's national strategic objectives."

(LI)—THE SOVIET CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: A STUDY OF SUPPRESSION, by Maj. Walter J. Brug, Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 78 p. (Research Study No. 0265-71.)

"This study was conducted to determine what civil-military relationship exists in Russia and if this relationship affects the use of the military in attaining international goals. A historical approach was used, beginning with the inception of the Red Army and tracing its devel-

opment to the present. Throughout this study attention was directed primarily to ascertaining how the Party controls the military. Three major political events were examined to provide an analysis of the relationship. The study concludes that the military is just now recovering from years of suppression which nearly destroyed its self-confidence."

f. *Soviet Military-Industrial Complex*

THE SOVIET MILITARY - ECONOMIC COMPLEX, by Konstantin K. Krylov, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 11 (November 1971) 89-97.

"It has become fashionable to discuss the military industrial complex of the United States and other Western Powers. With respect to the Soviet Union, however, a discussion of the military industrial complex does not even touch a whole series of related matters that define the nation's capability to prepare for military conflict. One must address a broader perspective—the Soviet military-economic complex. In its 53 years of existence, the Soviet leadership has placed heavy emphasis on the maximization of the state's power and on insuring the continued existence of the Communist system. In the Soviet system, where the attention and will of the leadership are the primary criteria for action, the military industrial complex has enjoyed a special position. From the very beginning, the leaders have placed particular emphasis on increasing the nation's 'defense capability'."

g. *Organization and Command and Control*

DIRECTORY OF USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES OFFICIALS; REFERENCE AID. Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, April 1975. 57 p. (A(CR) 75-14.)

"This publication is a functional reference guide to leading officials of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces." Following each name is a date of appointment to listed position, and date of birth. An organizational chart of the Ministry of Defense is included. Ranks reflect Soviet nomenclature rather than US military equivalents.

SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL, by John Erickson, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 1 (January 1972) 41-50.

"In the Soviet view, there are three stages to the revolution in military affairs—the advent of nuclear weapons, the appearance of the missile,

and the application of automation to the problems of command and control. The first two stages have had an enormous impact on the Soviet military establishment; the third promises to be equally significant. In fact, it is the logical outcome of applying stages one and two in order to exploit fully the potentialities of the new weapons. The implications of the new weapons have forced the Soviet Command to reappraise the nature of its establishment and to consider how it might best work under these specially arduous conditions—hence, the first investigations into the psychology of the military collective and the study of the importance of the subunit. Similarly, the advent of automation in the area of troop control has caused both military professionals and party authorities to think about the nature of command.”

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND: RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, by Alexander O. Ghebhardt and William Schneider, Jr. in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 5 (May 1973) 3–14.

“Since World War II, there have been three major shakeups of the Soviet High Command. The first, in 1946, occurred when Stalin discarded most of the wartime military leadership to ensure the postwar political reliability and loyalty of the armed forces. The second, in 1957, was the direct result of Marshal Zhukov’s ouster as Defense Minister. Limited changes were made in the Soviet High Command in 1967 following the death of Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky. These changes were a precursor of major changes which have taken place in 1972.”

(LI)—THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE: SOME ASPECT OF ITS PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS POSSIBLE REACTION TO UNITED STATES POLICY INITIATIVES, by Major Freeman B. Olmstead. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 65 p. (Research Study No. 1460–71.)

“Recent studies of the Soviet military establishment have highlighted periodic differences of opinion between Soviet military and political leaders. These differences have been described in historical, situational, and ideological terms. This study suggests the existence of functional military imperatives within the Ministry of Defense, which would explain Soviet military behavior in the cited debates. The study concludes that these purely military motives could continue to be at variance with the international objectives of the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union. It recommends the consideration of Soviet military motivational and behavioral patterns in the US policy process.”

h. Research and Development

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN MILITARY TRADITION, by David R. Jones, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 120, no. 2 (June 1975) 31–34.

“The history, traditions, techniques and personnel of the Imperial army deserve careful study. They themselves can tell us much about the Russian past and only when this is properly understood can the intertwined strands of Russian nationalism and revolutionary Marxism be unraveled. Then the true nature of the present Soviet army, its capabilities, and its expectations, can be viewed in the proper historical perspective—a perspective ignored by all too many Sovietologists and other presumed analysts’.”

(LI)—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, 1917–1972. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air University, Institute for Professional Development, 1973. 102 p.

“This study is largely a narrative of the growth of the Soviet Armed Forces from a tiny nucleus in the Red Guards of 1917 to the present mighty military machine. The main emphasis is on the development of the organization, the size, and the quality of the Red Army over the last half a century, with some mention of the weapons available to it. The narrative is partly based on standard works in English and German, but with the main emphasis on Soviet materials (books, periodicals, and newspapers), always, of course, used with caution because of the nature of Soviet historical writings. The final chapter is a description of the Soviet Armed Forces today.”

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ON THE SOVIET MODEL: THE CASE FOR THE PROTOTYPE, by Lt. Comdr. Gregory V. Gushaw, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 27, no. 1 (July–August 1974) 69–80.

“The recent pattern of military competition has emphasized qualitative rather than quantitative factors. This is placing an increasing importance on the research and development phases of military hardware development. American defense planners should give consideration to the basic Soviet research and development technique: building competitive prototypes before a commitment to production is made. Such a program would realize not only a lower dollar cost, but would

have the added advantage of increased design flexibility, less leadtime to production, and the creation of a considerable subsystem menu from which to choose proven components for future needs."

SOVIET ARMAMENT PROJECT ORGANIZATION, by Konstantin A. Krylor, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 1 (January 1973) 45-50.

"The striking achievements of Soviet research and development (R&D) in the fields of space and military armaments stand in sharp contrast to the results that have been attained in other sectors of the Soviet economy. The rapid pace and obvious successes of Soviet R&D—the Soviet term is NIOKR which is the abbreviation for 'scientific, research and experimental design work'—in the creation of Soviet armaments have been achieved primarily by the use of special methods of project planning and organization. The nature of these special methods and the extent of their application within the Soviet context become clear if we compare R&D in the military and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy."

i. History

SOVIET MILITARY HISTORY; EFFORTS AND RESULTS, by Col. John E. Jessup, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 53, No. 6 (June 1973) 13-26.

"Many students of history seem to perceive a sharp demarcation between what was published in Russia in Imperial times and what followed in the Soviet period. It can be argued, however, that a thread of continuity exists between the historical efforts of the two periods. This is most apparent in military history because the emphasis of the research effort has been on how the military forces of a nation waged war. Only since the close of World War II has there been any systematic effort to include the broader spectrum of the military as an adjunct to political and social history. Moreover, there are additional factors that come into play since the Russians have always appeared to be more historically minded as a nation than most peoples. This sense of history is an integral part of the traditional Russian mind."

THE WHITE DEATH: THE EPIC OF THE SOVIET-FINNISH WINTER WAR, by Allen F. Chew. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1972. 313 p.

"This account of the 105-day war between Finland and the Soviet Union in the winter of 1939-1940 . . . [describes the] Finnish victories at Tolvajarvi, Suomussalmi, and other battlefields

. . . [and discusses also] the political and social aspects of the conflict." With bibliography.

2. *The Army: Doctrine, Tactics and Weapons*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

SIZING UP THE SOVIET ARMY, by Jeffrey Record. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975. 51 p.

An analysis of "the character, capabilities, and strategy of the Soviet Army." The author "argues that a doctrinal fixation on a short, intense war dominated by high-speed armored thrusts has resulted in a massive Soviet army with an immense initial punch; but that its lack of offensive staging power strategic mobility, and technological prowess could eventually prove to be its undoing. He concludes, however, that such a military posture is well suited for Central Europe, where the Soviet army confronts smaller, differently structured, and geographically restricted NATO forces." With tables.

THE SOVIET ARMY, by Albert Seaton. New York, Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1973. 40 p.

"Albert Seaton . . . describes the Soviet Army. Delving into its Tsarist background, he outlines conditions which existed in the earlier army and the fluctuating political atmosphere in the country which contributed greatly to the changes and moods of the army over the years. He covers the Revolution and the beginning of the Red Army, the Civil War, the wars with Poland and Finland, and, of course, WW II. The uniforms illustrated progress from the very simplest design in the days of Tsars to the more colorful and ornamental ones dating from 1935 to the sixties."

b. *Organization*

THE RED ARMY, in *Armies and Weapons*, no. 15 (15 January-15 March 1975) 27-34.

A special report providing a brief history of the Red Army following World War II, and providing current information on the: structure, the armoured division, the motorized infantry division, the airborne division, and equipment.

c. *Weapons and Weapon Systems*

BRASSEY'S INFANTRY WEAPONS OF THE WORLD, 1975, ed. by Maj. Gen. J. I. H. Owen. London, Brassey's, 1975. 323 p.

Infantry weapons and combat aids in current use by the regular and reserve forces of all nations, including the USSR.

JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS 1975, ed. by Maj. F.W.A. Hobart. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1974. 860 p.

"This book is the first to cover all infantry weapons likely to be met in use today. It deals with hand-held weapons such as pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns and machine guns; with grenades and mortars; and with those anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons used in infantry formations. This book gives detailed specifications and development history of all types of weapon. It does not confine itself to weapons in current production, although naturally more emphasis is given to the latest developments. There is comprehensive coverage of the firearms, grenades and specialised weapons employed by the Soviet Bloc and China as well as the NATO and uncommitted nations. The section on machine guns includes an appreciation of the new Russian GPMG family—the PK, and a description of the first home-produced machine gun from Red China. The information on rifles is presented so as to allow a comparison of American and Russian guns, and there is some discussion of the future programme in the USA. Information is provided on the functioning and characteristics of the Russian infantry anti-tank missiles, with an appreciation of how the Sagger affected the Yom Kippur War."

NEW SOVIET WEAPONS UNVEILED IN MIDEAST, by Robert Hotz, in *Aviation Week*, (24 March 1975) 25.

"Soviet Union has developed a new generation of armored weapons designed for swift offensive blitzkrieg-type thrust through battlefields contaminated by nuclear or chemical warfare. This is evident from a detailed examination of a large array of new Soviet-manufactured weapons captured by the Israeli Defense Forces from the Egyptian and Syrian armies during the October 1973, war. The new generation of weapons includes not only a family of armored fighting vehicles but also a wide variety of motorized support vehicles including trench diggers, automatic mine-laying machines, motorized bridging equipment, specially designed missile transporters, mobile missile simulator trainers and a gyro-equipped command vehicle with a moving map display."

SURFACE TO SURFACE ARTILLERY, by John Marriott, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 19, no. 6 (December 1974–January 1975) 68–73 plus.

"The object of this article is to discuss the

various guns and rockets used in the surface-to-surface role in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, together with the methods of using them. The article is divided into two parts: weapons used on land and weapons used at sea. Guided missiles are not covered, since they form a subject all of their own."

d. Doctrine and Tactics

(1) Miscellaneous Aspects

SOVIET TACTICAL PIPELINES, by C. N. Donnelly, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 119, no. 2 (June 1974) 56–59.

"During the last 15 years, the Soviet Army has put a great deal of effort into the developing of a separate corps of troops whose job in war is to lay tactical fuel pipelines in the rear of the fighting forces. The fact that the Soviets continue to try to improve their tactical pipeline supply systems is evidence of their constant concern about fuel supplies in modern war, particularly during a large-scale advance. Authoritative Soviet sources maintain that 60 per cent of the total volume of material delivered to troops in battle is POL. Fuel supply will, therefore, constitute one of the major demands on logistic transport. However, the Russians themselves recognise that their logistic support, especially road transport, could do with a great deal of improvement if it is not to be found wanting under the pressure of modern total war. Concern is constantly being expressed in the Soviet military press about the dangers of reliance on rail transport for resupply, and the inadequacies of available wheeled transport. A continued policy of giving priority to the equipping of teeth arms at the expense of rear services, and the current Soviet military doctrine which lays great emphasis on the waging of fast mobile war of great intensity means that successful resupply is ever more important to the Soviet's ability to wage offensive war in the way they want to wage it with extended lines of supply."

(2) Airborne Operations

SOVIET AIRBORNE TROOPS, by Graham H. Turbiville, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 4 (April 1973) 60–70.

"Firepower, maneuver and rapid rates of advance are the primary tenets of Soviet offensive doctrine. Tank-heavy armored and motorized rifle divisions are expected to penetrate quickly enemy defenses and seize deep objectives throughout the theater of operations. Rates of advance in a nuclear conflict are expected to exceed 50 miles

a day. In order to attain these rapid advance rates and to assure that key areas are captured or destroyed, the Soviets have placed increasing reliance on their airborne forces, particularly in the context of a nuclear environment. Additionally, and discussed in more detail below, is a new and larger role assigned to the airborne troops who, according to the Soviets, are capable of performing strategic missions independently."

(3) *Armor Operations*

IS THE SOVIET ARMY OBSOLETE?, by Col. Edward B. Atkeson, in *Army*, v. 24, no. 5 (May 1974) 10-16.

"By relying too heavily on tanks and too lightly on other arms in an era of sophisticated and proven antitank weapons, the Russian high command may be letting itself be unduly influenced by a war fought 30 years ago."

SOVIET ARMORED WARFARE, by Daniel K. Malone, in *Ordnance*, (January-February 1972) 295-299.

"Malone believes the Russians have not forgotten the lesson of updating tank weaponry and tactics during WW II. The 19,000 tanks in the Warsaw Pact forces have all been updated, as well as the tactics, for their role in a mobile nuclear war. Although Soviet military doctrine regards the strategic rocket troops as the primary arm in a future nuclear war, it still considers tank forces the primary mobile ground force. The Soviets intend to overcome Western antitank weapons superiority by the mass and mobility of their armored forces. Malone recommends reshaping Western helicopter forces to meet the massive armored nuclear war our major potential aggressor can wage."

(4) *Desert Operations*

SOVIET DESERT OPERATIONS, by Graham H. Turbiville, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 6 (June 1974) 40-50.

"Soviet military operations against the People's Republic of China remain at least a possibility while Soviet involvement in the Middle East, both indirectly and directly, is a reality. Combat operations in both areas would, of course, involve operations in desert environments. For this reason, Soviet desert warfare capabilities are of particular interest to Western military analysts at this time . . . Drawing on their World War II experiences, training exercises in desert regions, and the experience of other nations, the

Soviets have developed tactical doctrine and equipment well-suited to the conduct of desert warfare."

(5) *Night Operations*

SOVIET NIGHT OPERATIONS, by Lt. Col. Erich Sobik, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 8 (August 1972) 71-76.

"Soviet military leaders attribute great importance to operations conducted at night. The capability to attack at night, as well as by day, is not only demanded in regulations, but is also underlined in a great number of articles by writers on military affairs . . . Soviet ground forces attach much importance to night combat training. It is essential to overall combat training, both individual and unit."

SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR NIGHT COMBAT, by Capt. Eugene D. Bétit, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 8 (August 1975) 21-33.

"Soviet tactical doctrine places primary emphasis on combined arms action during night combat, emphasizing that the special demands of limited visibility require that the various branches of arms support each other to the maximum extent possible. After examining some general considerations, this study of Soviet tactics will begin with the basic Soviet combat branch, motorized rifle (in Western parlance, mechanized infantry), but, of necessity, the interacting nature of the various arms' duties will be reflected."

SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR NIGHT COMBAT, by Capt. Eugene D. Bétit, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 3 (March 1975) 89-93.

"Today's Soviet military leaders stress the ability to continue operations throughout hours of darkness. Not only is this ability demanded in regulations, but it is also amply underlined in the Soviet military press with emphasis on the value of night operations under conditions of nuclear warfare and the widespread use of mass destruction weapons."

SOVIET TRAINING FOR NIGHT WARFARE, by Capt. Eugene D. Bétit, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 9 (September 1975) 80-86.

"The study of Soviet training as it is described in the military press is an important and revealing aspect of their night combat capability."

While Soviet doctrine delineates what might happen under ideal or most desirable conditions, a study of the many articles detailing training methods provides a more realistic appraisal of their probable actual level of accomplishment. Of 31 articles appearing in *Voennyi Vestnik* (Military Herald) or elsewhere in the Soviet military press during the past four years, all but one described either individual training or unit drill, and the lone exception mentioned a battalion night operation during Exercise Dniepper (1967) quite vaguely and only in passing. While obviously this is not to say that Soviet units have not attained a higher state of training, it does at least suggest a more realistic appraisal of actual Soviet capabilities to wage this complicated demanding warfare. Indeed, one sometimes has the impression that, whatever the special claims made for the importance of night combat on the modern battlefield by Soviet tactical doctrine, night training's major function as far as some commanders are concerned is mostly to force troops to master basic skills more fully. Numerous night training articles start out with a warning to the effect that night training is not even to be contemplated until troops qualify in daylight norms. At this point, a closer examination of Soviet training methods for the various branches of arms is in order."

(6) Offensive Operations

THE "MARCH" IN SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE, by C. N. Donnelly, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 119, no. 3 (September 1974) 77-80.

"Soviet tactical doctrine is basically offensive and Soviet commanders believe that only offensive action, pushed to the limit, waged at great speed with deep penetration will give them an assured victory in the event of a war in Europe. It necessarily involves exposed flanks and no continuous front line as such. The move of ground troops to contact and into battle therefore requires the most careful organisation so that the troops can be fed into action without a check and able to react to the emergencies of battle. The Soviet army terms this drill 'the march.' The aim is to deploy into action without a check, and to feed successive echelons into the combat as the leading ones are used up or come to a standstill. There are two cases. A long approach march from the rear areas will take into account the varying speeds of tanks and wheeled vehicles and road safety and so on; in a tactical

march the order of march will be in mixed battle groups of all arms ready to go into action without any regrouping. To assist the senior commander in organising the march, Soviet tactics manuals rationalise the operation into two distinct spheres — 'movement organisation' (*organizatsiya dvizheniya*) and 'march security' (*obespecheniye marsha*)."

(*) — THE OFFENSIVE (A SOVIET VIEW), by A. A. Sidorenko. Washington, U.S. Air Force, 1974?

"The Offensive (A Soviet View) is the 'first in a series of significant and representative recent Soviet military writings to be translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force.' The overall series is designated Soviet Military Thought. This initial volume is a . . . translation comprising a timely analysis of contemporary offensive doctrine. Since the author, Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science, is a faculty member of the Frunze Military Academy, and the book is listed as recommended reading in the Soviet 'Soldier's Bookshelf,' it naturally contains an authoritative Soviet view of the offensive. As important as having access to the Soviet view on the offensive is the quality of research, the associated analysis, the summary of Western/NATO-related doctrine, and the statements of what is most likely to work well in future operations."

RIVER CROSSING; KEY TO SOVIET OFFENSE, by Capt. Eugene D. Bétit, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 10 (October 1971) 88-96.

"Soviet strategists place considerable emphasis on the maintenance of rates of advance as high as 60 miles per day to insure success on the modern, particularly nuclear, battlefield. The chief of Soviet tank forces reportedly told a Western observer in 1966 that the USSR possessed the capability to overrun Western Europe, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, in 10 days. This would be impossible without the skillful and frequent crossing of numerous water barriers. The Soviets are well aware that, in Europe, rivers up to 100 yards wide are encountered every 20 to 35 miles, water obstacles between 100 and 300 yards wide are found every 60 to 90 miles, and every 150 to 190 miles, water barriers greater than 300 yards in width will be encountered. Available information clearly indicates that Soviet ground forces have been outfitted on a grand scale with modern and effective equipment designed to facilitate the maintenance of a vigorous

advance despite any water obstacle. In addition, USSR military literature indicates that river-crossing methods and techniques are emphasized in training programs at all echelons, and river-crossing operations have been prominent features of Warsaw Pact exercises in recent years."

SOVIET NUCLEAR TACTICS, by Martin J. Miller, Jr., in *Ordnance*, (May-June 1970) 624-627.

"The Soviets are well prepared to fight a land nuclear war. Their army is completely equipped with nuclear weapons and delivery systems down to divisional level, and the once dominant role of conventional artillery has largely been replaced with rocket artillery armed with nuclear weapons. They contemplate employing nuclear weapons to support all types of ground operations, and constantly stress the importance of large operations carried out in the early days of a modern war. They believe that tactical nuclear weapons will be most effective when employed en masse and in support of the main attack forces. To them tactical nuclear weapons are not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively, superior to conventional weapons because of their psychological effects. The Soviets advocate the use of nuclear strikes to contaminate areas with radioactivity so as to deny them to enemy troops. Unlike US doctrine, the Soviet Army does not stress pinpoint accuracy and strict target selection but rather mass barrages intended to smash paths through enemy formations and rear areas for the ground units to exploit. There is little indication that they have seriously considered concepts such as controlled nuclear response. Unlike official NATO strategy, the Soviets make no distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear war, contending any use of nuclear weapons will lead to all-out nuclear war. According to Western analysts, the Soviet theory of a spontaneous global war is intended to reinforce the credibility of Soviet massive retaliation and to discourage the US and its allies from setting up guidelines for limiting nuclear war."

THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE, by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. Arlington, Va., System Planning Corp., 6 February 1975. 88 p. (Research Note 201.)

"This document presents the initial results of an unclassified examination of translated Soviet documents dealing with tactical nuclear war in Europe. The Soviet image of theater nuclear war is described and analysed." With references.

(7) Winter Operations

SOVIET ARMY WINTER OPERATIONS, by Col. Erich Sobik, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 6 (June 1973) 54-58.

"The Soviet military doctrine for winter battle and winter training is derived from two sources—the historical experiences of World War II and the geography of Russia . . . The Red Army has taken full advantage of past experience in applying lessons learned to doctrine formulation, weapons development, and training."

SOVIET TECHNIQUES IN WINTER WARFARE, by Lt. R. J. H. Haynes, in *RUSI Journal for Defense Studies*, v. 119, no. 2 (June 1974) 59-62.

"The Red Army possesses all the advantages over the armies of other states in relation to practice and ability to operate in the harsh conditions of the winter period. The advantages flow from the geographic conditions of the USSR with its cold latitude climatic belt, from the rich military—historical experience and better equipment of the Red Army for winter operations'—1939 Manual for the operation of troops in winter. The Soviet Army has developed special techniques by which the proverbial severity of the Russian winter can be turned to advantage when fighting in defence of the homeland."

3. Soviet Air Forces and Aircraft

JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 1975-76, ed. by John W. Taylor. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1975. 796 p.

Provides information on aircraft of most nations in the world, including, among others the NATO nations as well as the Warsaw Pact nations.

THE OBSERVER'S SOVIET AIRCRAFT DIRECTORY, comp. by William Green and Gordon Swanborough. London, Frederick Warne & Co. Ltd., 1975. 255 p.

"Provides for the first time a concise yet comprehensive reference to Soviet aircraft development over the past quarter-century. It details the various Soviet systems of designating aircraft and lists the 120-plus reporting names assigned over the past 20 years by the Air Standards Co-ordinating Committee to Soviet aircraft for use by NATO countries; it illustrates and describes many of the aircraft which competed unsuccessfully with those ordered into production

and accordingly assigned western reporting names; it provides detailed information on all aircraft types, both military and civil, known to be currently in service in the Soviet Union, and it includes appendices on the organization and current status of the Soviet Air Forces and the Soviet national airline."

THE ORIGINS OF SOVIET AIR THEORY AND DOCTRINE, by Lt. Col. David R. Mets, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 8 (August 1975) 36-48.

"Though there are competent works on the history of the air force of the USSR, more attention has been given to the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force (RAF) than to Russian air power, particularly in periodical literature. Further, the literature which does exist gives little attention to the theoretical side of the subject. Thus, a look at the pre-World War II foundations of Soviet air power theory is in order."

RUSSIA'S SUPER CHOPPER, by Lt. William B. Bigler, II, in *Army*, v. 23, no. 4 (April 1973) 29-35.

"Long the leader in the design of heavy-weight helicopters, the Soviet Union has a new giant in the air whose 25-ton lift will be at work some years before the United States fields its HLH craft."

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE HIGH COMMAND, by Alexander O. Ghebhardt and William Schneider, Jr., in *Air University Review*, v. 24, no. 4 (May-June 1973) 75-83.

"The organizational structure of the Soviet Air Force is a useful vehicle for an understanding of the fundamental military concepts and doctrine that support the *raison d'être* of the military organization. This is especially true of Soviet armed forces because of their acute general awareness of the necessity that organizational form follow doctrinal underpinnings. The Soviet armed forces in general and Air Force in particular have departed radically from the Western form of military organization to meet their specific and unique requirements. All branches of the Soviet armed forces are subordinate to a single Minister of Defense, a key element of the post-Stalin reorganization of the Soviet armed forces in 1953."

WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORY, INCLUDING WORLD SPACE DIRECTORY. Washington, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1973. 1358 p.

"Lists aerospace companies and officials."

WORLD MILITARY AVIATION; AIRCRAFT, AIRFORCES AND WEAPONRY, ed. by Nikolaus Krivinyi and others. New York, Arco Publishing Co., 1973, 224 p.

WORLD'S AIR FORCES, by David W. Wragg. Reading, England, Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1971. 232 p.

4. *The Soviet Marines*

THE SOVIET "MARINE CORPS," by Maj. John F. Meehan, III, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 10 (October 1972) 84-94.

"The 50th anniversary parade held in Red Square in Moscow on 7 November 1967 was a remarkable display of Socialist military might, and it was during this parade that the new version of the Soviet marines made its public debut. Beginning with the parade, both Western and Soviet press sources have devoted increasing attention to the Soviet marines, but their actual beginnings were visible at least 10 years before. By 1964, Soviet marine units were an accomplished fact—a fact which had been largely ignored in the Western press."

THEY ARE PROUD TO CLAIM THE TITLE OF THE SOVIET MARINES, by Charles G. Pritchard, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 3 (March 1972) 18-30.

"Will Russia's small, but revitalized, Marine Corps be given only limited missions in the Soviet Union's contiguous seas, or is it being groomed for more important duties?"

5. *Seapower: The Strategy and the Forces*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE BLUE WATER SOVIET NAVAL OFFICER, by Capt. Sumner Shapiro, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 97, no. 2 (February 1971) 18-26.

"There is an aura of confident professionalism about the Soviet naval officer—a 'blue water look'—that was totally unknown in the Soviet Navy a few years ago."

THE FISHING FLEET AND SOVIET STRATEGY, by Comdr. Richard T. Ackley, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 101, no. 7 (July 1975) 30-38.

"The rise in the Soviet Navy is well known, but its partner the fishing fleet has also made large

contributions to achieving political and economic goals."

RED STAR RISING AT SEA, by Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute, 1974. 150 p.

"The articles that form the core of this book originally appeared in 1972 and 1973 in *Morskoï Sbornik*, the official journal of the Soviet Navy. The articles were published in translation throughout 1974 in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, with commentaries by American Admirals. The articles are brought together here with those commentaries, a brief biographical account of Admiral Gorshkov, and an introduction and conclusion by the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)."

(*)—RUSSIAN SEA POWER, by David Fairhall. Boston, Gambit, 1971. 286 p.

"A study of Soviet maritime power and prospects—mercantile as well as naval—by the defense correspondent of *The Guardian*."

RUSSIA'S ANCIENT ALLY: THE SEA, by Robert W. Daly, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 8 (August 1972) 60-67.

"It is fashionable—and demonstrably wrong—to dismiss the currently seaconscious Russians as comparative amateurs who cannot match the centuries of professional Western experience at sea."

SOVIET NAVAL POWER; CHALLENGE FOR THE 1970s, by Norman Polmar, revised ed. New York, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1974. 129 p.

Perspective; Postwar Opportunities; Khrushchev and Gorshkov; New Missions and Ships—Phase Two; Naval Personnel; Naval Operations Ancillary Operations; etc. With bibliographical note and appendixes (Commanders of the Soviet Navy, Comparative Naval Strengths, Soviet Ship Descriptions, etc.).

THE SOVIET SEA CHALLENGE; THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS, by Rear Adm. Ernest McNeill Eller. Chicago, Cowles Book Co., 1971. 315 p.

"Russian submarine surface fleets cruise the Atlantic, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. In the Mediterranean, where the U.S. 6th Fleet once reigned supreme, a powerful

Russian fleet sails, ready to counter any U.S. move. While the Soviet Union has long had the world's largest submarine fleet, the United States has felt secure in its lead in nuclear powered and armed submarines. Now, even in this latter category Russia is on the verge of surpassing U.S. capabilities. Twenty-five years ago the United States boasted the largest navy and merchant marine fleet. Today, the Russians have taken the lead in both areas. In addition, Moscow holds a vital edge in oceanographic and deepsea fishing fleets, which serve everywhere as adjuncts of her navy for operations and for intelligence. Such is the background for 'The Soviet Sea Challenge.' In early chapters Admiral Eller traces the historic influence of the sea on the destinies of America and Russia through World War II and focuses sharply on the role of the Navy in the desperate Battle of the Atlantic and the bitter Pacific struggle, from Pearl Harbor to the Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Leyte, and Okinawa. He then covers the key events of the past quarter century, including the impact of sea power in Korea, where the U.S. Navy helped to save the foothold at Pusan and to execute General MacArthur's daring amphibious coup at Inchon, and Vietnam, where the U.S. Navy has demonstrated its versatility in assault, gunfire support, air interdiction, and riverine warfare. Additional chapters cover technological innovations in naval aircraft, missiles, submarines, and high-speed amphibious attack ships—assault helicopter carriers, for example. What emerges is a serious message. Technological advances can have no real value, Admiral Eller contends, if the United States continues its current policy of naval cutbacks in face of the phenomenal growth of Soviet sea power, which has already brought Russia large gains, from Cuba to Africa and the Middle East. The threat to the United States, if she does not regain her naval supremacy, as well as to all non-Communist nations, is far more serious than any that has previously confronted the nation."

b. *Soviet Naval Expansion and Capabilities* (See also Appendix)

(LI)—AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET SEA-POWER, by Lt. Comdr. Jimmy W. Davis. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1970. 45 p. (Research Study No. 0385-70.)

"The Soviet Union, historically thought of as a land of power, apparently has recognized the utility of seapower in international politics. The modern, innovative Soviet Navy and its dra-

matically expanded and versatile merchant fleet are challenging the partly obsolescent United States Navy and its decrepit merchant fleet for supremacy of the seas. The study analyzes the staggering growth of both the Soviet Navy and the Soviet merchant fleet along with their capabilities. The study concludes that for the United States to maintain its primacy in seapower, it must reassess its national maritime commitment."

CONSTRAINTS OF NAVAL GEOGRAPHY ON SOVIET NAVAL POWER, by Cmdr. Clyde A. Smith, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 27, no. 2 (September-October 1974) 46-57.

"The element of geography poses clear limitations on both the development and employment of naval powers by the Soviet Union. Failure on the part of naval planners to recognize and exploit this strategic advantage would be a disservice to the defense budget, the national economy, and the United States citizenry."

(LI)—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXPANDING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE, by Lt. Comdr. John M. Rodgers, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 81 p. (Research Study.)

"The Soviet Navy has rapidly expanded during the past ten years. This growth has been reflected in massive qualitative and quantitative progress. The Russian Navy, which had been essentially a modest coastal defense force ever since its origins in the seventeenth century, has for the first time, carried Soviet influence into the world's oceans where it now contends with the U.S. Navy in every area of mutual interest to the United States and the USSR. This study develops six strands of Russian naval tradition, through an analysis of Russian naval history, which determine the composition, capabilities and operating doctrine of the present Soviet Fleet. The study then goes on to conclude that the Soviet Fleet is a very real threat to the United States, both politically and militarily, and how the Soviets will utilize their new found maritime capabilities in the future."

(*)—SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS: CAPABILITY AND CONTEXT, ed. by Michael McGwire. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. 555 p.

"In the recent war in the Middle East, the Soviet navy played a key role. For the first time, it posed a serious and direct challenge to American postwar supremacy in the Mediterranean. This

volume tells . . . about the rise and expansion of the modern Soviet navy. The . . . essays cover an enormous range and are invaluable for an understanding of Soviet strategy and capability."

SOVIET NAVAL PROGRAMMES, by Michael McGwire, in *Survival*, v. 15, no. 5 (September/October 1973) 218-227.

"The output of a country's warship building programme represents a substantial investment of the national resources, and therefore provides a reasonably good indicator of that country's perceived naval requirements and intended operational concepts at the time when the initial decisions were taken. This is a particularly fruitful basis for analysis if the country is faced by a serious and clear-cut maritime threat, and when both its pattern of naval operations and the characteristics of its ships are unmistakably related to such a threat; this was to be true of the Soviet Union until the middle 1960s. An essential prerequisite for drawing inferences from Soviet warship building programmes is to identify with reasonable accuracy the period when the 'design decision' (i.e., the decision to apply funds and development effort to meet a perceived operational requirement) was taken. It may be possible to identify this date from various forms of collateral evidence, but in all cases the factors of 'lead time' and 'pipeline inertia' must be taken into account so that a clear picture can be obtained . . . Current Soviet warship construction derives mainly from decisions taken between 1957 and 1965, and reflects the requirements of replacing the ships built during the first post-war decade for the traditional tasks of defending the fleet areas and supporting ground operations; of providing ships for the new tasks which have emerged since then; and of remedying the distortions introduced into the fleet by technological inadequacies and by decisions taken in 1954."

THE SOVIET ARMY: ACQUIRING GLOBAL CAPABILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES, by C. G. Jacobsen, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 7 (March 1972) 41-52.

"Military forces in general, and naval units in particular, often have a political impact of far greater proportions than their mere combat potential might at first suggest. Thus, in times of peace the utility of Soviet forces cannot be measured simply in terms of their firepower *per se*. Rather, their role must be viewed in light of the situations in which they could be employed short of general war, as well as their continued efforts to grow both qualitatively and in numbers."

SOVIET UNION—ALL THE SHIPS AT SEA, in *Time*, v. 105, no. 18 (5 May 1975) 45 plus.

"Around the world last week, ships of the Soviet navy were under full steam . . . At least 200 surface ships and 100 submarines, along with land-based aircraft, were involved in a massive naval exercise . . . The Soviets dubbed the maneuvers 'Spring'; the West called them 'Okean 1975'."

c. *Soviet vs. US Naval Power: Parity and Disparity*

THE CHANGING SOVIET NAVY, by Barry M. Blechman. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1973. 51 p.

"Mr. Blechman considers the number, type, and characteristics of Soviet naval units acquired and retired during the period between 1958-73. He concludes that the improvement of Soviet naval capabilities is a matter of intensive modernization rather than increased force levels. In fact, the Soviet Navy has reduced by about one-third the level of its forces since 1958. The change from quantity to quality was required by increased costs, the lengthy time periods necessary to build weapons, and the need for highly trained personnel. For example, Blechman contends that submarines have suffered a major decline in force levels with the retirement of diesel-powered submarines. As the number of these submarines has been and will in the future be reduced, nuclear-powered submarines have been produced (16 a year since 1968, over half of which carry ballistic missiles); if this rate continues, by 1980 the submarine force will be half the size of the force in 1958, but three-fourths of it will be nuclear-powered and its total tonnage and number of torpedo tubes will be greater . . . Blechman concludes that the rivalry between the two superpowers is heightened by fear of the political consequences of any apparently sharp change in the relative naval balance. If this balance should change in favor of the Soviet Union, some nations would be hesitant to associate themselves with the US and would eventually be drawn closer into the Soviet nucleus. Blechman prescribes that the US fleet maintain a high degree of political usefulness in peacetime and in crises."

(LI)—THE EVOLUTION OF TODAY'S SOVIET NAVY: A RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR COMMAND OF THE SEA, by Comdr. James H. Flatley III. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air

Command and Staff College, 1970. 49 p. (Research Study No. 0480-70.)

"Nowhere in the present spectrum of the Cold War conflict can one find more discernable evidence of Soviet resolve to become the world's dominant military power than in an analysis of the changing strategic naval balance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. This study traces the Soviet Navy's evolution from a force designed for coastal defense to a force capable of projecting a balanced offensive on, under, and over all the world's oceans. In this context the feasibility and probability of the Soviet Union balancing its modern fleet with an attack carrier-force employing V/STOL aircraft is examined. The study concludes that the Soviet Navy's new and challenging strategy may well be completed by an attack carrier force employing V/STOL aircraft."

JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1975-76, ed. by Capt. John E. Moore. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1975.

"The Soviet Union has spent 50 per cent more than the United States on naval shipbuilding in the past 10 years and the still-growing Soviet fleet can only be intended for aggressive action . . . There is no answer to the question which of the superpowers' navies is No. 1. But, . . . the Soviet Union has spent 50 per cent more than the United States on naval shipbuilding in the last 10 years and is currently expending one-third more than the United States for this purpose. The ever-growing Soviet navy has outrun the legitimate requirements of national defense and has no logical merchant-defense role in time of war . . . The NATO nations must abide by the lesson of history—unnecessarily large forces are intended for aggressive action."

SOVIET NAVAL INTERACTION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENT, by Thomas W. Wolfe. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., October 1972. 39 p. (Rand Paper 4913.)

Mr. Wolfe examines Soviet-US naval interaction and its influence on Soviet naval development during 1945 to mid-1950, the decade of the fifties to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the decade preceding the 1972 signing of the SALT I accords. Wolfe maintains that during the immediate post-war period the focus of the US and Soviet military alignments was on Europe . . . During the 1950-1962 period, the West continued to perceive the USSR as a second-rate power. However, the USSR now became more responsive

to the threat posed by American naval power, particularly the US carrier strike forces. In the mid fifties, the Soviets decided to: 1) create an ocean-going Navy capable of conducting combat operations in both nuclear and nonnuclear wars, as well as supporting state interests in peacetime; 2) develop a variety of missile systems which could be placed on small surface ships, submarines, and long-range aircraft; 3) forgo the building of large attack carriers . . . After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviets made a major effort to develop a ballistic missile submarine comparable to the Polaris. By 1967 they began closing the margin in SLBM forces between the USSR and the US. Their conventional naval competitor became acute in the summer of 1967, when the Arab-Israeli conflict provided the opportunity for establishment of a substantial Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. There was an estimated tenfold increase in the operational days spent by the Soviet Navy outside its home waters from mid-1965 to mid-1971. According to Wolfe, the SALT I accords of May 1972 validated, in the eyes of the Soviets, their 'equality' with the US in SLBMs, at least numerically, leaving the next phase of US-Soviet naval interaction to qualitative competition."

WHAT ARE YOU UP TO, SERGEI? by K. Jack Bauer, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 100, no. 12 (December 1974) 32-37.

"How much manpower and material will the U.S. Navy need to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet Union's increased and ever increasing maritime capability? To answer, our planners ought to have at least a clue as to Soviet intentions. But, as is clear from the Gorshkov papers, Russians don't think like we do—and we don't seem to be able to think like they do."

d. *Soviet vs. NATO Naval Power*

PROBLEMS OF NATO 1974: I—SOVIET MARITIME POWER, by Vice Adm. B. B. Schofield, in *World Survey*, no. 62 (February 1974) 17 p.

"This is the first of two Surveys on the situation of the Atlantic Alliance today. It deals with the challenge presented by Soviet Naval expansion."

THE ROLE OF NATO MILITARY FORCES AS PART OF THE ALLIANCE'S OVERALL OBJECTIVES, by Louis G. M. Jaquet, in *NATO Review*, v. 22, no. 6 (December 1974) 6-13.

"This article concludes the series on aspects of the defence problems which are facing the

NATO allies . . . The first article in this series appeared in Issue No. 1, 1974 of the *NATO Review* and was by Kenneth Hunt, Deputy Director of the ISSS, who discussed the theory of deterrence. W.F.K. Thompson, Defence Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, wrote the second article, which appeared in issue No. 2 and dealt with NATO's force posture in Allied Command Europe. A third article, by Dr. Wolfgang Hopker, German author of several books on Soviet naval power, was published in issue No. 3 and was entitled *Soviet Global Strategy—A Challenge at Sea*. Stefano Silvestri, Deputy Director of the Institute for International Affairs, Rome, contributed the fourth article on Defence Expenditures and National Economies which appeared in issue No. 4. A further two articles, on the American/West European Defence Relationship, were published in issue No. 5—*Core, Troubles, Prospects*, by Horst Mendershausen of The Rand Corporation, California, and *Old Worries and New Issues*, by Curt Gasteyger of the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva."

THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER AT SEA, by Adm. R. C. Colbert, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 10, no. 4 (Winter 1972-1973) 470-479.

"Admiral Colbert stresses the asymmetries between the NATO and the Soviet naval forces. These include that: NATO operates a multinational cooperative, while the Soviet navy need worry little, about inter-allied coordination, being practically alone on its own side; NATO's naval forces must cover multiple contingencies because of long sea routes, while the Soviets, having internal lines of communication, can specialize in offensive tactics; last but perhaps most important, the Soviet navy is growing rapidly with no sign of a slow-down, while NATO finds it difficult to obtain the funds even to modernize a force which is not growing in size."

THE SILENT THREAT, by Vice Adm. Fred G. Bennett, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 17, no. 1 (February-March 1972) 102-108.

"Despite recent significant surface ship improvements, the Soviets continue to develop their submarine fleet as their main naval striking force. There are more than 350 submarines in the Soviet Navy, the vast majority of which operate in waters adjacent to the NATO countries. The Soviet Northern Fleet alone has more submarines than any single NATO navy. In addition, the Soviet submarine force is unrivaled in its diversity,

possessing modern nuclear and diesel-powered submarines capable of attacking strategic targets and Western surface ships with missiles as well as torpedoes . . . Because the strategic key to the NATO alliance is maintenance of control over the Atlantic countering the Soviet submarine threat is a major responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and his subordinates. There is no single subordinate commander within the NATO organization charged specifically with the conduct of antisubmarine warfare, but rather each area commander is responsible for ASW within his area. However, the Commander Ocean Area Atlantic is also Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, in the United States chain of command, and as such has the majority of United States ASW resources in the Atlantic at his disposal. How do NATO naval forces counter the Soviet submarine threat?"

SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY, by E. P. Takle, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 120, no. 2 (June 1975) 29-31.

"An important element of the threat to NATO's northern flank is the Soviet ability to launch amphibious attacks using its Naval infantry. This article will describe, in some detail, the development, training and equipment of the Soviet Naval Infantry with particular reference to the role of the units attached to the Red Flag Northern Fleet of Murmansk."

e. Naval Policy and Strategy

(1) Miscellaneous Aspects

SOVIET NAVAL POLICY; OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS, ed. by Michael McGwire. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 663 p.

The Context of Soviet Naval Policy; Soviet Policy and the Third World—Case Studies; Some Analytical Material; The Soviet Understanding of Deterrence and Defense; Aspects of Soviet Naval Policy—1960-74. With tables, figures, and maps.

STRATEGY AND POLICY IN SOVIET NAVAL WARFARE, by Peter Vigor, in *Strategic Review*, v. 2, no. 2 (Spring 1974) 68-75.

"Soviet policy makes military strategy the handmaiden of politics. It regards 'the most fundamental objectives' as the unconditional surrender of the enemy and conversion of his economy and society to a Marxist system. This would be the aim of nuclear war in which Soviet ballistic missile submarines would pulverize the enemy industry and cities to destroy his will to resist, and attack submarines would sever his sea lines

of communication. A conventional war might be a limited war in which a territorial advantage would be seized, with success or failure not bearing on Soviet vital interests. In this instance, the Navy would support the operation with local seaborne security operations but without extending operations to more distant elements of enemy strength."

(2) Mission

THE SOVIET NAVAL HIGH COMMAND, by John Erickson, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 5 (May 1973) 66-87.

"While the prime naval mission has been to counter the direct threat posed to the Soviet homeland by Western maritime strike capability (and the Soviet Navy has developed roughly in proportion to the increase in Western reliance on seaborne weapon systems), the Soviet naval command with admirable professional persistence has pressed diligently for that elixir of Soviet naval being, the independent naval mission. It requires little demonstration to show that this has been far from easy, complicated as it was by the inescapable fact of overall naval inferiority and made increasingly intricate by the impact of an all-consuming technological revolution. Yet, despite all its vicissitudes, the Navy's role has changed from its old one of being that branch of the Soviet armed forces most frequently and disastrously purged, to a position in which it has come to enjoy an unprecedented stability of command. All this spells transition and promises further transformation. Much has been achieved by the present naval command, which is itself in a transitional phase in terms of its experience, organization, outlook, professional skills, and personal cohesion; and in terms of the continuity of policy and of the navy's emplacement within the Soviet military system as a whole."

(3) Gorshkov on Naval Doctrine

ADMIRAL S. G. GORSHKOV'S VIEWS ON SEAPOWER, by P. H. Vigor, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 119, no. 1 (March 1974) 53-60.

"In February 1972 the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, published in *Morskoi Sbornik* the first article of what was to be a fairly extensive series under the general title of 'Navies in War and Peace.' As it subsequently transpired, there were 11 articles in the series, the last of which appeared in *Morskoi Sbornik* in February 1973. Since *Morskoi Sbornik* is the best-known Soviet naval journal

and is published under the auspices of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, the fact that it was featuring a whole series of well-argued articles by no less a person than the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy himself naturally lent them an unusual degree of interest and importance. The overwhelming impression on the reader as he reaches the end of the final article, is that of the supreme value for any country of having a strong fleet."

THE GORSHKOV PAPERS: SOVIET NAVAL DOCTRINE FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE, by E. T. Woolridge, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1975) 1153-1175.

"In February 1972, Admiral Sergy Georgiyevich Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, initiated a series of eleven articles entitled 'Navies in War and Peace' in 'Morskoi Sbornik,' the Soviet naval digest. Publication of articles dealing with doctrine, strategy, naval science or military art by flag officers of the Soviet navy is commonplace in the USSR, especially since the time of the Khrushchev regime, when Soviet defense intellectuals were given the task of transforming the thinking of the military forces from World War II concepts to nuclear warfare. Admiral Gorshkov's series, however, has evoked considerable interest and speculation in Western Europe and the United States because it extended over a period of thirteen months and amounted to over 50,000 words. Of equal significance is the manner in which Gorshkov expounds on Soviet naval operational and strategic concepts, force composition, missions, the influence of Marxist-Leninist precepts on the conduct of modern war at sea, and the utility of naval presence in peacetime as a political instrument. The depth of the study and the fact that the treatise was published under the name of the Commander-in-Chief have caused it to be compared in import to A. Svechin's 'Strategy,' published in 1926, and the three editions of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy's 'Military Strategy,' published from 1962 to 1968."

THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GORSHKOV ARTICLES, by Comdr. Clyde A. Smith, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 26, no. 5 (March-April 1974) 18-37.

"The Gorshkov articles represent a 'window' into the planning offices of the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov speaks from a background of vast experience and from a position of authority. He presents a clear message that the Soviet Navy is no mere transitory phenomenon on the world's maritime stage."

NAVIES IN WAR AND IN PEACE, by Adm. S. G. Gorshkov, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 100, nos. 1-11 (January-November 1974) 11 pts.

"Admiral Gorshkov has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy for 18 years. He is a Deputy Minister of Defense. He and his First Deputy are full members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party." This is a translation of an article which appeared in 'Morskoi Sbornik,' no. 2, 1972. "Since the early 1950s, the world has watched the Soviet Union build up its merchant and combat navies and break out into the Great Oceans in a comprehensive program of political, commercial and coercive penetration of less developed areas. Their overall approach is an updated version of that taken by the more successful, durable great powers of history. Particular effort has been funneled into three important geographic crossroads: Mediterranean-Suez Arabian Sea; Southeast Asia-Straits of Malacca; and the Caribbean. Soviet actions appear to reflect systematic exploitation of strategic geography and the lessons of history to further their overseas interests. Now we have the words of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov to confirm these carefully planned and executed actions."

(4) *Carrier and Submarine Threat*

DOD APPROPRIATIONS, 1976. HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART 10—TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HYMAN G. RICKOVER. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 158 p.

Includes, among others, comments on the Soviet submarine threat.

THE END OF AN ERA, by Comdr. Roy Beavers, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 7 (July 1972) 18-25.

"The Soviets are building a Navy which is in close conformity with the prevailing dominant reality of naval warfare—the combat superiority of the submarine."

NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM—1975. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SES-

SION ON ERDA FISCAL YEAR 1976 AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 120 p.

Includes among others information on the following: Soviet Threat (Russian Advantage in Strategic Submarines; and Soviet Nuclear Submarine Force).

THE SOVIET "AIRCRAFT CARRIER," by Norman Polmar, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 100, no. 855 (May 1974) 144-161.

"More than a half century after the first U.S. aircraft carrier—the USS Langley (CV-1)—was commissioned, the first Soviet 'aircraft carrier' is being completed. The delay is significant, for even without this type of warship by the early 1970s the Soviet Navy stood ready to challenge the U.S. Navy in both size and general-war-fighting capabilities. Why then, when such ships are not required to challenge the United States at sea, has the Soviet Union now apportioned the considerable resources for the construction and operation of such a warship? And, if aircraft carriers are as capable as their proponents would have us believe, what will be the impact of Soviet 'flattops'?"

SOVIET CARRIER STRATEGY, by John T. Funkhouser, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 12 (December 1973) 27-37.

"Are the trends of the past few years an indication only of growing Soviet interest in the use of shipborne aircraft or do they indicate an intent to build strike carriers of their own?"

(LI)—SOVIET SEA POWER: WHY SO MANY SUBMARINES?, by Maj. Peter A. Traversa, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 49 p. (Research Study.)

"The Soviets have learned to think in terms of naval strategy and now possess the second strongest navy in the world. This study analyzes the structure and capabilities of the Soviet submarine force and relates this force to the overall Soviet objective of world domination. Examination of certain areas of the world where the Soviet Union is trying to establish her naval forces is followed by a brief analysis of the threats posed to the United States by this submarine force. The study concludes that the Soviet submarine force presents a growing threat—a threat that the United States cannot let go unchallenged."

THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, by Lt. Thomas T. Holme, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 97, no. 8 (August 1971) 60-62.

"As is evident in this assessment and in the companion Pictorial [The Soviet Submarine Force, by Lt. Cmdr. Robert D. Wells], the record is . . . clear—the Soviet submarine threat is both grave and growing."

f. *Soviet Naval Presence in the Caribbean*

RUSSIA IN THE CARIBBEAN. Washington, Georgetown University, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973. 2 pts. (Special Report Series Number Thirteen.)

Part One—Panelists' Findings, Recommendations, and Comments. Part Two—A Special Report. These two pamphlets were published in conjunction with the conference sponsored by the Center on October 7, 1971, in Washington, D.C.—Subjects dealt with: Strategic Significance of the Caribbean Area; Geography; Patterns of Power; The Soviet Union's Caribbean Strategy; Moscow and Caribbean Communism; Soviet Diplomatic Relations; Soviet Espionage and Political Subversion; Soviet and Cuban Support for Revolutionary Violence; Soviet Aid, Trade, and Shipping. Moscow and Havana's Caribbean Oceanography; Soviet and Cuban Caribbean Fisheries; Soviet Naval Policy; Cuba's Dependency on the Soviet Union. With select bibliography.

(LI)—SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN: A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE, by Lt. Comdr. John K. Ready. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 57 p.

"Recent Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean area has been discernable evidence of Soviet resolve to gain a foothold in Latin America. This subtle form of Communist protraction is occurring at a time when the inter-American system is in a politically volatile state as a result of frustrated ambitions for modernization. This study examines probable Soviet political and military objectives in expanding seapower to the Caribbean. The study concludes that Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean presents a formidable challenge to the security of the United States and to future inter-American relations."

SOVIET SEAPOWER IN THE CARIBBEAN: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLI-

CATIONS, ed. by James D. Theberge. New York, Praeger, 1972. 175 p.

"... Western policy-makers are not fully aware of the increasingly important role of Soviet seapower in Soviet political and economic penetration of the Third World. The various elements of that seapower—navy, merchant marine, fishing fleet, oceanographic research vessels, and intelligence collectors—are being used as instruments of cold war diplomacy. In recent years Soviet maritime activity has expanded into the Caribbean Sea, one of the world's strategic bodies of water and the 'strategic rear' of the US.' In general, Theberge believes, Caribbean America, with the exception of Cuba, is of low priority to Russia, but of significant strategic and political importance to the US. Although Russia's ultimate objective is to establish reliable pro-Soviet communist regimes in Latin America, its immediate interest is more in reducing US influence and enhancing its own in the hemisphere; at present, Soviet leaders still regard Latin America as an area where more damage can be done to the US than positive benefit gained by the USSR. It is also establishing itself as a party to discussion of maritime affairs in the hemisphere, and is gaining entry into other areas from which it might normally be excluded. Theberge concludes that the greatest danger to security in the hemisphere is that an anti-American regime would seek Soviet protection and tempt Russia to extend its military power in the area. Soviet miscalculation of US willingness to block such further encroachment could lead to a dangerous confrontation between the superpowers..."

g. *Soviet Naval Presence in Cuba*

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS, FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS, 1971, 1972. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971, 1972. 3 pts.

SOVIET SUBMARINE VISITS TO CUBA, by Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 101, no. 9 (September 1975) 30-39.

"The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 attracted worldwide attention, but the Soviets seem to have adopted subtler methods since then with their submarine deployments."

h. *Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean*

(LI)—AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Comdr. Joseph F. Ruchala. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 38 p. (Research Study No. 1640-71.)

"The major objective of this study is to determine if Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean Sea poses an increasing threat to the Free World in this area. The Soviets have deployed naval forces from her rapidly growing fleet to this area, and have further shown great interest in obtaining bases in the Mediterranean area. A brief coverage of Soviet objectives is followed by fleet composition, threats, and Free World naval forces in the Mediterranean area. The author concludes that the Soviet expansion of naval power in the Mediterranean does constitute a growing threat to the Free World and a distinct strategic threat to NATO's southern flank."

NATO'S SOUTHERN FRONT—WHERE SOVIETS SHOW BIG GAINS; INTERVIEW WITH Adm. Means Johnston, Jr., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 73, no. 22 (2 June 1975) 22-23.

"Russia's growing naval might in the Mediterranean is worry enough. On top of that—political conflicts harm Allied unity."

NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 18, no. 4 (August-September 1973) 58-62 plus.

"The emergence of the Soviet Union as a seapower has brought the Warsaw Pact and NATO into competition in the Mediterranean in terms of this historic statement of mission... The combatant strength of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force is numerically inferior to the Italian Fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet combined. That disparity is even more evident since NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean include not only the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the entire Italian Fleet, but the Greek Navy and elements of the Turkish and British navies as well. Thus on a numerical basis, there is no question that NATO enjoys superiority in the Mediterranean... The major difference, and perhaps the most significant one, between NATO naval power and Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean rests in the assignment to NATO of STRIKFORSOUTH's carrier

task groups. These powerful forces provide tactical naval air power, capable of maintaining air supremacy in any area of the Mediterranean. Their operations, lacking the presence of substantial air opposition, could be decisive in neutralizing the Soviet naval surface ships in a relatively short period. STRIKFORSOUTH is the major naval combatant force in the Mediterranean and is the core of NATO naval power."

RED STAR OVER THE SOUTHERN SEA, by Capt. Paul R. Schratz, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 96, no. 6 (June 1970) 23-31.

"Translating NATO strategy into dynamic policies which will support the interests of both the United States and NATO becomes doubly difficult—and the more imperative—as ever increasing numbers of Soviet warships appear in the Mediterranean . . . The significantly increased presence of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean dramatizes the need for wholesale reappraisal of U.S. political, military, and economic policies in the region."

(LI)—RUSSIAN POWER PLAY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Lloyd N. Hoover. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 19 p. (Professional Study No. 4152.)

"The historical Russian interest in sea power is discussed. The role of Russian naval power is discussed in recent wars. Post World War II trends are discussed under Stalin and Khrushchev. The body of the article compares the present strengths and weaknesses of both Russian and Western sea power and certain asymmetries between them. Development of Soviet amphibious capabilities, bases, and commercial maritime activity are discussed in the context of Russia's ambitions for extending her influence into the Near East and North Africa and weakening the southern flank of NATO."

SEA POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—THE NEW BALANCE, by Adm. Richard G. Colbert, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 17, no. 5 (October-November 1972) 42-48.

"Not so long ago, it used to be that the Mediterranean was an Allied mare nostrum. Its three narrow egresses—Suez, Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles/Bosporus—could be controlled in time of war to ensure the integrity of the entire basin. Not only was the presence of naval opposition non-existent, no such opposition could be deployed to the Mediterranean from elsewhere. Now the situation has completely changed. Admittedly,

Gibraltar and the Sea of Marmara would be under NATO control in the event of hostilities, and the Suez is, for the time being, closed. But these choke points have diminished in importance from the defensive point of view in that there are now powerful Russian forces in being continuously on either side of them."

SOVIET SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Ciro Zoppo, in *Orbis*, v. 14, no. 1 (Spring 1970) 109-128.

"As we enter the 1970's the political instability of the Middle East is foreboding because it raises the danger of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is aligned, almost reluctantly, with Israel, and the Soviet Union with Israel's Arab neighbors, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, protagonists of an undeclared war . . . The United States and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are clearly concerned about their political influence in the Arab East. For the Soviet Union, control of this region would represent an important achievement in her bid on world leadership. For the United States, the denial of such control would be an important way to contain her superpower rival . . . Soviet ships roaming this landlocked sea have heightened tensions in the already combustible Middle East. The deployment of such forces in a region where Soviet political objectives are ambitious and where the United States has long deployed a naval force of her own underscores Moscow's willingness to pursue a higher-risk policy in the area. The Soviet naval buildup has evoked considerable U.S. and European concern. It should be emphasized, however, that Soviet interest in the Mediterranean is not novel and that the increase in Soviet naval forces has been taking place for several years."

SOVIET STRATEGY, THE MEDITERRANEAN THREAT, by Lawrence L. Whetton, in *Survival* (September 1970) 252-259.

"The most dramatic change in the Middle East over the past 20 years has been the establishment of a viable Soviet military presence. Following WW II Russia was primarily concerned with internal problems and the Western containment barriers but since 1964 it has concentrated more on developing its capacity as a global power. In the Mediterranean this was made evident with a steady quantitative and qualitative increase in the number of ships located there. Achieving in-

tercontinental nuclear parity allowed Russia to concentrate more in this area . . . As its strength grew, it was able to release medium range delivery vehicles, including a number of cruise missile submarines, to other theaters such as the Mediterranean Basin. They can now saturate this area, which has the poorest sonar conditions in the world, with submarines, and thus upset the regional stability. This is not as important to the Soviet economic interests as it is to that of the NATO nations. Thus, the combination of intercontinental parity and the powerful position of its forces in the Mediterranean places the Soviet Union in the strongest military position outside its immediate continental confines it has ever enjoyed. At minimum cost, NATO naval defenses are challenged and US strategic deterrence has been bypassed. New concepts of naval warfare have been imposed on the West, reducing their overall capability by requiring an increasing number of fleet protection aircraft. This has increased the burden for land based aircraft which would be seriously inadequate if operating rights were denied in Turkey and Spain. On the other hand the Soviet fleet is confronted by access routes under NATO control, an overwhelming NATO naval and tactical air power supremacy, and a larger combined NATO fleet . . . Improvements on both sides in weapons, training and techniques should be assessed not only for the immediate tactical impact, but for their effect upon escalation, regional stability and the degree of control by the great powers."

i. *The Soviets in the Adriatic*

THE ADRIATIC: SOVIET SEAWAY SOMEDAY?, by Eugene P. Sullivan, in *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, (August 1972) 27-31.

"Maintains that the increase of Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean has seriously challenged the traditional role of the US Sixth Fleet as protector of NATO's southern flank. Although this situation has prompted some response from NATO, there is a possibility that the situation will deteriorate within the near future because of developments on the Balkan peninsula. According to Sullivan, the greatest weakness of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean has been the lack of permanent bases from which to operate. The Soviets have been forced to use permanent bases in the Black Sea or the distant Baltic and Arctic Seas. In time of peace this situation weakens the deterrent effect of the presence of Soviet fleet units, and during a time of war the

Soviet Navy would be at a serious disadvantage. As a result, attainment of a direct and unimpeded access to the Mediterranean has been one of the most constant themes of Russian foreign policy. At one time the possibility existed that direct access to the Adriatic could be obtained through the incorporation of Yugoslavia and Albania into the Soviet satellite empire. However, this possibility collapsed when Tito broke with the Soviet Union and led Yugoslavia to national communism. In 1961, Albania also broke with the USSR and has since been allied with China. So far, the Soviet Union has refrained from taking such a serious step as the invasion of these states. Yet, the doctrinal basis for such re-establishment of Soviet power has already been expressed in the Brezhnev Doctrine. This states that one socialist state has a right and an obligation to come to the aid of another when the existence of socialist rule is threatened by hostile forces. Various steps have been taken to provide for the transition of power following Tito's death or retirement, but the success of these measures is still in doubt. Sullivan concludes that the collapse of Yugoslavia will pose new problems for the US in the near future and that the US and its allies may soon have to decide how far they are prepared to go in preserving the barrier between the Russians and the Mediterranean."

j. *The Soviets and the Baltic Sea*

A BALTIC SQUADRON FOR NATO? by Edward Wegener, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1974) 63-70.

"The question of NATO's need for a Baltic Squadron, says Adm. Wegener, is complex. The Baltic is an internal sea, connected with the ocean only by way of the Danish Straits and Kiel Canal. The canal has little strategic importance, since it is closed by ice for about six months each year. While under NATO control, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, the territories dominating the Straits, constitute a key naval strategic position by preventing the Soviet Union's Baltic Fleet from passing the Baltic Approaches. If Russia should control the Straits, says Wegener, either by occupying Denmark or by integrating it into the Soviet power sphere, its Baltic fleet could then unite with its Northern Fleet to take action in the North or Arctic Seas or in the Atlantic, putting NATO naval forces at a 'disastrous' disadvantage. Furthermore, Soviet control of the Straits could adversely affect overall strategy, particularly with regard to defense of southern Norway, the NATO

front in Central Europe along the Iron Curtain which would be outflanked from the North, and Sweden, which would be cut off from the open seas. Wegener is confident that amphibious operations will play a decisive wartime role in the Baltic. The amphibious potential of the Warsaw Pact countries in the area is threatening, he notes, but NATO general forces capable of repelling such amphibious landings are sadly lacking. Thus, any defense against amphibious attack will depend almost entirely upon NATO naval forces; and only the meager navies of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany—both of which are inferior to Communist bloc sea and air forces—are available to fill the role, with no provision for NATO reinforcements. An indication of the quantitative balance of forces, obtained from the ratio of naval personnel, says Wegener, stands at approximately 1:6, with the Eastern side possessing additional advantages in their higher quality of materiel and training levels. In light of these unfavorable circumstances, formation of a Baltic Squadron to strengthen NATO naval forces in case of war appears highly desirable . . ."

THE CORK IN THE BALTIC BOTTLE, by Lawrence Griswold, in *Sea Power*, v. 15, no. 1 (January 1972) 9-13.

"As primary and secondary reservoirs of Russian sea power, the Baltic and Black Seas open to the world's oceans only through bottlenecks controlled by NATO allies. Open in peacetime to all shipping, in a time of acute stress between Warsaw Pact and NATO nations they could, nominally, be closed. Turkey's Bosphorus is one and the international strait of Ore Sund (Sound), flanked by Sweden at the east and Denmark's Jutland at the west, is the other. Denmark is a NATO ally; Sweden is not. The strength of NATO's control depends on NATO's prestige. At its present low ebb, Moscow's efforts to dominate those bottlenecks by all means short of force are unrelenting. Early last November, an editorial in the official Moscow publication, 'Soviet Diplomatic Lexicon,' by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko demanded that all NATO warships be excluded from the Baltic Sea which, it declared, 'must be reserved for the use of nations bordering it.' Excepting Finland, Sweden, eastern Denmark and West Germany, the rest of the Baltic is a Communist lake, although U.S. warships now make occasional 'show the flag' cruises there. Such an editorial demarche, if new, would have stirred considerably more apprehension in western Europe than it did. But it was not a novelty; the

same periodical has been issuing the same demand since 1962. What alerted NATO nations this time, however, was the published reply by the new Danish Defense Minister in answer to a question put by a German correspondent. According to this, he stated 'unilaterally' that Denmark would henceforth restrict NATO maneuvers to areas west of the Danish island of Bornholm. Since that would comply with the Russian demand, Denmark's fellow NATO allies were understandably startled. The following day, however, Copenhagen declared that Defense Minister Kjeld Olsen had been 'misquoted' and that Denmark's loyalty to NATO remained unchanged. But a renewed Danish trend to the left might create a different situation. If the misinterpretation did nothing else, it sharpened Western attention to the fact that the international strait of Ore Sund between southern Sweden and northern Denmark was a very narrow bottleneck through which all maritime traffic, merchant or warship, must pass and, moreover, it is under a form of attack."

k. *The Reopening of the Suez Canal: Advantages to the Soviets*

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REOPENING OF THE CANAL FOR THE AREA EAST AND SOUTH OF THE SUEZ, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *New Middle East*, no. 34 (July 1971) 29-32.

"Secretary of State Rogers' recent visit to the Middle East has brought to the fore again the question of the significance of the Suez Canal and the implications of its reopening . . . The reopening of the Suez Canal has become a vital necessity, given the growing power of the Soviet Navy—a naval power non-existent when the State of Israel was established. Soviet naval power is rapidly becoming the prime instrument for extension of Soviet political influence. It is against this background that the consequences of the proposals for the reopening of the Suez Canal at this juncture should be carefully weighed."

SUEZ AND THE SOVIETS, by Shlomo Slonim, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 101, no. 4 (April 1975) 36-41.

"Clearly of immediate, vital military interest to Arab and Jew, the Canal directly affects the long-range vital interests of the superpowers—and especially those of the Soviet Union."

1. *Soviet Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean*

(1) *Soviet Penetration into the Indian Ocean*

THE INDIAN OCEAN IN SOVIET POLICY, by Geoffrey Jukes. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972. 30 p. (Adelphi Papers no. 87.)

Historical; The Naval Background; The Soviet Presence; Implications of Soviet Interference; Appendices.

(LI)—THE INDIAN OCEAN: THE RUSSIANS HAVE COME, by Lt. Col. Stanley K. Moe. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College. 1972. 37 p. (Professional Study.)

"The Soviet Union is rapidly becoming a dominant political and military power in the Indian Ocean area—the position held by Great Britain for several centuries. Soviet activities are identified at a minimum of 39 points on the littoral, many of which are in areas of vital concern to the United States and the Western powers. Several possible reasons for the unprecedented expansion are analyzed. While evidence supporting a specific Soviet intent or policy is largely circumstantial at this point, ultimate Communization of the entire region through the world revolutionary process is suggested."

THE SOVIET NAVY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, in *Strategic Review*, v. 2, no. 4 (Fall 1974) 25–35.

"Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean is the extension of an old Czarist thrust for an outlet to the south, dating from the time of Peter the Great. That interest is overlaid with the ideological drive for a worldwide Soviet hegemony. Increasing Soviet military power and decline of the European powers impel the present Soviet drive to replace Britain as the dominant power in the littoral states. Soviet naval power has been aggressive in grasping the opportunity. In Iraq, in Bangladesh, in South Yemen and in the Somali Republic, Soviet base-building has been active. Reopening of the Suez Canal will greatly benefit the Soviet naval presence, both military and commercial. Soviet dominance serves both to protect its own interests in the area and to threaten the vital oil supplies of Europe and the United States. In extension to Africa, the Soviet build-up threatens to outflank Europe. Because the littoral states are accustomed to a Great Power presence, the United States is called to provide a balancing naval presence to reassure friendly powers and discourage Soviet-inspired expansion."

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE INDIAN

OCEAN, by Edward Hughes, in *Reader's Digest*, v. 100, no. 600 (April 1972) 137–140.

Condensed from Navy International—"From Suez to Singapore, Moscow's seamen, salesmen and diplomats are making deals and influencing people . . . Two winners emerged from the recent war between India and Pakistan. One was the tough, well-equipped Indian army, which had little difficulty sweeping aside the troops of divided Pakistan. A second winner was the Soviet Union, which watched from the background as its close friend and ally raced to victory in Russian jeeps and MIG–21 jets. The war was, in fact, a climax of sorts in Moscow's long and dedicated drive for influence in the Indian Ocean region. Two years ago, the U.S.S.R. had no secure naval facilities anywhere in the area. Now it is making use of dock facilities at Singapore, in Upper Egypt, Somalia, North and South Yemen, and at India's main naval headquarters on the Bay of Bengal at Vishakhapatnam. At Aden, once a symbol of British imperial power, former British facilities are being used as a major Soviet naval base. Nowhere, however, is Moscow's presence more dramatically apparent than in India, strongest of all the Indian Ocean powers. India is, in fact, one of the largest recipients of Soviet assistance; in a decade and a half, it has received a total of \$1.5 billion in credits and grants. That includes tens of millions of dollars worth of new Russian army and air-force equipment, an entire \$100-million steel plant, and more than a dozen other factories to help satisfy India's craving for industrialization."

THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Rocco M. Paone, in *Military Review*, v. 50, no 12 (December 1970) 48–55.

"One of the most important and strategic areas of the world in contemporary international relations is that of the Afro-Asian Ocean area, extending as it does from southern Africa along the border of the eastern quarter of that continent, across southern and Southeast Asia, including Vietnam and Malaysia, all the way to Australia. This region has recently experienced the greatest and most profound political segmentation that the world has ever witnessed . . . The Afro-Asian Ocean region is of such diplomatic significance today that the student of international relations can apply a paraphrase of Sir John H. Mackinder's heartland concept to this area: that, among the major powers, the nation that can influence the countries here would have

predominant political power in the world . . . The nature of the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean heartland is multidirectional. It is political, economic, and military. It is aimed at gaining supreme influences for the USSR in the region, as it is directed against the curtailment of the power of both the United States and Red China in that area. The USSR is quite satisfied to keep the attention of both the United States and Red China occupied in the Vietnam conflict."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Geoffrey Jukes, in *Survival*, v. 13, no. 11 (November 1971) 370-375.

Reprinted from World Review, Australia, July 1971.—"In the West, discussion of the Indian Ocean usually focuses around the growing presence there of the Soviet Navy. The author . . . takes this presence as his starting point and then looks at some of the maritime and political facts and factors, and at some Soviet interests and possible objectives."

(LI)—THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Wing Comdr. Alaister G. L. Hutchison. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 74 p. (Professional Study.)

"General remarks drawing the background to the current situation in the Indian Ocean area. An assessment of the degree and importance of Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea leading to the significance of this penetration vis-a-vis political influence in those areas and further Soviet expansion. An analysis of the increasing Soviet and Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean area and the problems to the defence of the Free World created. The increasing strategic significance of South Africa and Australia and the steps taken by these countries in the light of Communist infiltration. The study concludes with an examination of the initiatives which could be taken by the West to counter Soviet influence in the region and leads to the suggestion of the setting-up of a maritime alliance involving interested nations."

(2) *Soviet-US Naval Competition in the Indian Ocean*

MEANS OF MEASURING NAVAL POWER WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO U.S. AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. Washington, Government Printing Office, 12 May 1974. 16 p.

Prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

RUSSIA-U.S. SHOWDOWN COMING? BEHIND THE BIG-POWER MOVES IN INDIAN OCEAN, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 72 no. 4 (24 January 1972) 32-34.

"Stakes are high in the latest match-up of the superpowers: control over a vast expanse of sea stretching below the entire Asian continent from Africa to Australia. Russia's aim—to out-flank its rivals, set up a new area of Soviet domination. Now, U.S. decision is to move in, not let that part of the world go by default. A dangerous course? This in-depth survey weighs a problem getting urgent attention."

SOVIET-U.S. NAVAL COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1975) 1109-1128.

"The danger in the Indian Ocean is that the USSR could achieve a position of dominance in an area where the lessons of naval power are still deeply imprinted on the diplomacy of the littoral states . . . The essential question is whether or not the West can allow the USSR—whose interests in so many instances lie in altering the status quo—to achieve a position of potential naval hegemony in an area where conflicts abound and where air and maritime power can be decisive. If the USSR does achieve such a position, Admiral Zumwalt's view that the Indian Ocean is the area with the greatest potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade may prove to be disastrously accurate. It is highly desirable that the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean be adequate to support, politically and psychologically, our diplomacy in the region."

(LI)—THE SOVIET VERSUS U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Lt. Comdr. James T. Eilertsen. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 56 p. (Research Study.)

"This paper explores and analyzes the power struggle between the Soviet and U.S. navies in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet objectives which relate to her activities and influences in the Indian Ocean are discussed. U.S. and Afro-Asian efforts and national interests in this vital region are specified. With the British withdrawal 'East of

Suez,' Soviet naval power has been predominant. Soviets use their naval influence to obtain the maximum political and psychological advantages. U.S. efforts at Diego Garcia and Bahrain, and employment of Seventh Fleet ships are noted. Present U.S. policy should be continued with emphasis on negotiations."

UNITED STATES COUNTER TO SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: A PRACTICAL SOLUTION, by Capt. Richard A. Hoffman, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 20 p. (Professional Study no. 4148.)

"Almost simultaneously with the British announcement of their withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, Soviet naval vessels began operations in the area. The developing power vacuum and concomitant Soviet moves to fill it have been the subject of intense debate in the United States. However, at this writing, no viable US force is in the Indian Ocean. This article reviews the importance of the Indian Ocean area to the United States and the Free World, describes some details of Soviet and Red Chinese naval, commercial, and political maneuvers in the basin, and discusses the problems facing the United States in establishing a military presence. The article proposes a new basing approach which draws on previous US experience with the seaplane/tender combination and which takes advantage of new aircraft and ship design concepts. The offered approach contains within it the seed of the beginning of a new multinational Free World force for the Indian Ocean."

(3) *The Big Three and the Indian Ocean*

THE BIG THREE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by R. M. Paone, in *Sea Power*, v. 18, no. 8 (August 1975) 28-34.

"PRC, USSR Fight for Supremacy While U.S. Seeks 'Reasonable Balance' . . . The objectives and the nature of the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC in the Indian Ocean Heartland, as well as the interaction of their policies, are of particular interest in today's shrinking world, and are likely to thoroughly test the probability of the old adage that neither the 'West' wind nor the 'East' wind (China) shall prevail over the East African peripheral."

m. *The Arctic Ocean in Soviet Naval Strategy*

SOVIET STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THE MARITIME ARCTIC, by Capt. Gerald E. Syn-

horst, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 5 (May 1975) 88-111.

"Some American writers look upon the Arctic Ocean, those waters north of the Arctic Circle, as a buffer between America and the Soviet Union, with both nations having similar minor strategic interests in the area. In fact, however, control of the Arctic Ocean is central to the Soviet Union's defense network. Soviet strategic and commercial interests in the region are so great as to make U.S. interests there seem minuscule by comparison. Geographically—but, more important, demographically—the Soviet Union is a far more northerly land than the United States; populated Soviet Russia is infinitely closer to the Arctic Ocean than is populated America."

n. *Soviet Naval Presence in the North Atlantic*

ICELAND AND THE MARITIME THREAT TO NATO, by F.P.U. Croker, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 117, no. 666 (June 1972) 51-54.

"Although the theory has been advanced that the Red Fleet is intended firstly for the seaward defence of the Soviet Union, there is nothing, in a primarily maritime war, to prevent it being used offensively, almost in its entirety, since Russia and her satellites are economically self-sufficient and hence independent of the seaborne supplies whose protection, in the case of NATO, must absorb so much naval effort. That this is in fact the Soviet intention is proved beyond all doubt by the following extract from the textbook 'Military Strategy' issued under the authority of the veteran Marshal Sokolovsky: 'One of the Navy's main tasks in a future war will be to sever the enemy's ocean and sea transport routes . . . Operations against enemy lines of communication should be developed on a large scale from the very beginning of the war . . . by destroying convoys and transports at sea.' To implement this policy, one thing only is lacking—an advanced operating base—for the home ports of the Red Fleet are so remote from the vital North Atlantic shipping routes that dependence upon them would entail a very large replenishment at sea effort, itself vulnerable to NATO counter-attack. Nor could land-based maritime air support be effectively provided from the equally distant Warsaw Pact air bases. A glance at the map of Northern Europe suggests that Iceland is the ideal and, indeed, the only feasible site for the advanced base. From this island, all the North Atlantic shipping routes and

local areas are within easy reach of the medium-range submarines, surface warships and strike aircraft which the USSR possesses in such abundance; moreover, effective air and sea cover can then be provided for seaborne follow-on supplies from Murmansk—a continuing commitment which could be further eased by the seizure of Northern Norway and its airfields, though this is not mandatory, especially if the Iceland bases can be obtained by peaceful means. The expressed desire of the new left-wing Iceland government to review or terminate its existing military protection agreement with the United States may represent the measure of the success of Soviet diplomatic efforts in this direction, and could result in the loss to NATO of the Keflavik air base. Iceland would then be left internally undefended—a fruit ripe for plucking, since it could be seized by a quite small airborne operation if base rights could not be secured by negotiation.”

THE NORTH ATLANTIC: THE NORWEGIAN SEA, A SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY PROBLEM, by Capt. Christor Fredholm, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 10 (June 1972) 56–64.

“Growing Soviet naval activity in the vital Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic received little notice despite the region’s strategic importance and relative vulnerability. Caught in the dilemma occasioned by an expanding Soviet Fleet and a U.S. overseas force reduction, NATO and more particularly small nations like Norway and Denmark which lie within Moscow’s sphere of interest may soon face a choice between accommodation to Soviet political goals or precipitating a direct confrontation between the superpowers. A firm commitment in this strategic part of the world by NATO and the United States is the best insurance against such a situation ever becoming reality . . . Iceland would play a vital role in the protection of any allied shipping across the Atlantic. Should NATO find itself in the position of not having access to bases on Iceland, the Soviets would find it far less difficult for their northern fleet units to reach their patrol areas in the Atlantic undetected. Any Soviet occupation of Iceland would breach a vital link in NATO’s defense line and greatly facilitate the undetected passage of Soviet submarines into the Atlantic. In terms of air operations, the establishing of a Soviet base on Iceland would be a major strategic disaster for NATO as the Soviet Fleet would then be assured of extended air support in the Atlantic. In essence, an Iceland defended by powerful Soviet

fighter and missile units would constitute a gigantic, unsinkable aircraft carrier in an ideal strategic position. The strategic significance of Iceland today cannot be overemphasized. The confined waters in the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-Scotland region might be likened to a lock, and whoever holds the key controls the North Atlantic. That key is Iceland. A change in the existing situation would result in an entirely new politico-military picture both in Europe and the north.”

SOVIET UNION—ALL THE SHIPS AT SEA, in *Time*, v. 105, no. 18 (5 May 1975) 45 plus.

“Around the world last week, ships of the Soviet navy were under full steam . . . At least 200 surface ships and 100 submarines, a massive naval exercise . . . The Soviets dubbed the maneuvers ‘Spring’; The West called them ‘Okean 1975’.”

o. *The Soviet Navy and Ocean Law*

THE SOVIET NAVY AND OCEAN LAW, by Lt. Mark W. Janis, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 26, no. 5 (March-April 1974) 52–58.

“The Soviet Union, by virtue of her strong navy and large merchant fleet, is one of the world’s leading maritime powers, a power whose better interests lie with the maintenance of traditional freedoms of the sea. In his comprehensive series of articles on Soviet naval policy entitled ‘Navies in War and in Peace,’ Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov touches upon the problem of how to reconcile this ‘conservative’ interpretation of sea law with the ‘progressive’ extensions of territorial sea favored by many developing nations. Ideological rhetoric, notwithstanding, it remains apparent that the Russian policy stems from her position as a leading maritime power little served by a radical change in the legal-status quo.”

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, by William E. Butler. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. 245 p.

“An analysis of Soviet doctrines and practices relating to territorial waters, inland seas, the continental shelf and the high seas.”

p. *History*

(*)—A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET SEA POWER, by Donald W. Mitchell. New York, Macmillan, 1974. 657 p.

“Dr. Mitchell presents an . . . account of a navy whose heritage and traditions are vastly different from our own . . . He depicts a navy that

is the world's largest and most modern, the USSR having built more warships since World War II than the rest of the world combined. He also portrays a navy whose last successful fleet action was at Sinope, 121 years ago, and whose last major surface engagement of any kind, at Tsushima in 1905, the Russians would probably just as soon forget. The author makes clear the difficulties of a navy in a country that has had virtually no maritime tradition and has been backward technologically, industrially and educationally. He portrays a service that has been regarded as primarily an adjunct to land forces and that has with rare exceptions suffered from weak leadership. He shows that this same navy had a capable force of marines (naval infantry) since 1705, developed the first modern landing craft during World War I, successfully mounted several small amphibious operations during World War II, and excelled in the conduct of mine warfare and the employment of small boat flotillas. The last few chapters assess the current strengths and weaknesses of a country that has finally achieved the potential for true sea power, and analyze US and Soviet naval capabilities."

RUSSIA'S FICTITIOUS NAVAL TRADITION, by Patrick J. Rollins, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 1 (January 1973) 65-71.

"Modern Western writers, usually quoting one another, have created a long and illustrious naval tradition for the Russians where, relatively speaking, none existed."

C. The Role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

(*)—**ALLIANCES: LATENT WAR COMMUNITIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD**, ed. by Francis A. Beer. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 384 p.

"A collection of essays on alliances and international conflict, the nature of cooperation in such alliances as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, the Arab League, and the Organization of African States, and the characteristics of alliance disintegration."

THE EASTERN ALLIANCE, by Ugo Mazza, in *Armies and Weapons*, v. 3, no. 12 (15 July-15 September 1974) 48-52.

"The Political Consultative Committee of

the Warsaw Pact nations held a meeting in Warsaw last April which was attended by the Party Secretaries and the Prime Ministers of the various nations. Little is known of what happened at the meeting, but the long communique which was issued at the end, apart from mentioning the usual themes of brotherhood and co-operation, confirmed the need to proceed with both the Geneva conference on European security and co-operation and with the Vienna talks on a balanced reduction of forces. According to observers, the Warsaw Pact nations, like their NATO counterparts, are going through a period of 'fatigue,' which has perhaps been brought about by the improved relations between the two blocs and by the diminishing chances of an all-out nuclear war. After all, the situation which led to the creation of the two alliances has considerably altered over 20 years. The Warsaw Pact dates from 14 May 1955, and it was the Eastern Bloc's reply to NATO—as well as being an answer to the entry, and thus the re-armament, of Federal Germany in the Atlantic Alliance."

EASTERN EUROPE: A GEOGRAPHY OF THE COMECON COUNTRIES, by Roy E. H. Mellor. New York, Columbia University Press, 1975. 358 p.

Physical Environment and Political Geography; The Demographic and Economic Framework; and Comecon and the National Economies. With illustrations and tables.

EFFECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR AND THE ENERGY CRISIS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE, JULY 1974 PANEL VII. Washington, National War College, February 1975.

The Warsaw Pact—NATO Security Balance; The Role of the U.S. in NATO; Political and Economic Effects of the Middle East War; A New Level of Cooperation in NATO.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT, by Aurel Braun, in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, v. 3, no. 3 (Winter 1973/74) 27-36.

Why the Treaty?; Overall Structure of the Warsaw Pact; Right of Intervention; Organization; Political Evolution; and Bibliography.

THE FUTURE OF INTER-BLOC RELATIONS IN EUROPE, ed. by Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman. New York, Praeger, 1974. 217 p.

"Essays which cover a range of topics: an empirical analysis of system change, an aggregate statistical comparison of each bloc, various military, economic and political issues, including analysis of the Warsaw Pact's approach to European security and regional integration in Eastern Europe. The methodology, which includes factor and content analysis, is . . . likely to raise the usual controversy."

(LI)—LOOKING AHEAD AT THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION, by Maj. Franklin D. Johnson. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 62 p. (Research Study.)

"This thesis examines nationalism in Eastern Europe along with the creation and organization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It also looks into various changes that have occurred over the years. The study then continues on subsequent to the Czechoslovakian invasion. Results of the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty are also shown. The remainder of the study looks into what might be expected in the coming years as well as some conclusions drawn by the author."

ROLE OF THE WARSAW PACT IN SOVIET POLICY, by Thomas W. Wolfe. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1973. 19 p. (Rand Paper, PO4973; ASDIRS 4107).

"Explores prospects for major changes in Soviet policy on the Warsaw Pact. The Pact enables the Soviets to impose their will on Eastern Europe in the name of 'proletarian internationalism' and 'fraternal solidarity.' It also provides bases for 25 to 30 Soviet divisions, tactical air, and missiles, plus joint force exercises and equipment standardization."

TWENTY YEARS THE WARSAW PACT, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 11 (22 May 1975) 1-3.

"The twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on 14 May was marked by low-key celebrations and protestations of peaceful aims, but there were no indications that the pace of arms build-up is to be reduced. Speeches, and comment by the press and radio, made it clear that the political rather than the military significance of the Pact remains uppermost in Soviet strategic thinking, and gave some interesting insights into Soviet foreign policy."

(LI)—THE WARSAW PACT—A TWO-EDGED SWORD, by Maj. James B. Fackenthall. Maxwell Air Force Base, Air Command and Staff

College, 1970. 162 p. (Research Study No. 0458-70.)

"This thesis analyzes the evolution of the Warsaw Pact from its beginning on 14 May 1955 to the present. The background of the area is examined and the reasons for the pact, both expressed and implied, are analyzed. The early crises, Poland and Hungary, are discussed, followed by the early development of the organization, and then a detailed description of the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. The results of this action and the changes that have appeared in the pact are then explored. The study then looks at the United States' future policy alternatives in its foreign policy relationships with the pact countries and with its West European neighbors. The author concludes that the United States must be closely attuned to the times in our policy with Europe. The current national desire for less foreign involvement and the intense nationalism in Europe are factors that must be considered. Our policy should be to withdraw only that portion of our troops that still permits us to function as a full NATO partner. In the near future we should encourage, inspire, and teach our European friends how to live and work together. With this policy we may someday have a strong, viable partner and ally in the United States of Europe."

THE WARSAW PACT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION, by Radovan Vukadinović, in *Review of International Affairs*, v. 25, no. 579 (20 May 1974) 23-25.

"The recent session of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact, which was attended by top party and government officials of seven East European countries, aroused lively interest, because of its timing as well as because of its new decisions . . . As they have already done in many previous declarations, the members of the Warsaw Treaty laid stress on the principles which they consider essential for achieving new international relationships free of tensions, in which states with different socio-political and economic systems can not only exist side by side but also work together successfully . . . After assessing European trends, which were analyzed primarily in the light of the results of Helsinki, Vienna and Geneva, the participants strongly advised that the processes of political détente should be linked with the military easing of tensions."

THE WARSAW PACT TODAY, by Malcolm Mackintosh, in *Survival*, v. 16, no. 3 (May/June 1974) 122-126.

In this review of the Warsaw Pact today the author discusses: The Budapest Reforms of 1969; The Warsaw Pact Today; The Future of the Warsaw Pact.

(LI)—THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: AN APPRAISAL, by Lt. Col. Donald L. Burt. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 30 p. (Professional Study No. 4087.)

"On May 14, 1955 the Warsaw Treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European nations as a multilateral military alliance. In early years it was viewed as a continuation of prior arrangements within the Soviet sphere of influence and as a vehicle providing sanction for continued Soviet troop presence in the member states. Initially a political and propaganda answer to the admission of West Germany into NATO, the organization has now changed in character and potential. Military forces have been modernized both qualitatively and quantitatively and the satellite states have been given a greater role in military and political affairs. This has caused NATO to re-appraise the threat posed and to realign NATO strategy accordingly. Several periods of Soviet promotion of relaxation of tension notwithstanding, the Warsaw Treaty Organization remains a Soviet controlled military giant with extensive capability to conduct immediate, unwarned, major operations."

2. Military Developments, Strength, and Capabilities

THE ANTI-TANK PROBLEM, by John Marriott, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 17, no. 2 (April-May 1972) 72-82 plus.

"The Warsaw Pact's tank forces outnumber those of NATO by a factor of 3 to 1. The latest count gives the former 21,700 tanks and the latter 7,750. It follows therefore that NATO must expect that the spearhead of any Russian advance, particularly in the central area, will undoubtedly be a massive concentration of armour. NATO's 7,000 odd tanks, even if they could all be concentrated in the right area to oppose the attack, would have about as much effect as trying to stop an elephant with a pea shooter. NATO is firmly committed to a policy of flexible response. This means that conventional attack must be met with conventional forces and contained long enough for the politicians to make up their minds as to whether they intend to use nuclear weapons or not. With such a preponderance of armour, it would seem easy for the Soviets to draw off

NATO forces by well planned feint attacks. One can well imagine NATO tanks rushing to oppose an apparent attack in one sector, and, when they are all firmly committed, for the Soviets to launch the main attack hundreds of miles away. Whether such a ruse is adopted or not, there seems little doubt that NATO must face the fact that, in the opening stages of a war, Russian armour will penetrate deep into NATO territory unless some new method can be found to mount a far more efficient and mobile antitank defence than is possible at present. When two contestants meet and one is infinitely stronger than the other, the weaker can only hope to win by the use of guile, ruses and surprise. It is the old story of David and Goliath. It is obvious that for NATO to rely on her tanks and her present, pitifully few vehicle and ground mounted anti-tank weapons to stop a Soviet onslaught is just not on. Other means must be found, means which step outside the old concept of anti-tank warfare and which break new bounds. What then are these means?"

DETAILS OF TANKS IN SERVICE IN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 20, no. 1 (February-March 1975) 47-56.

THE NEW SOVIET THREAT TO NATO, by John L. Frisbee, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 58, no. 8 (August 1975) 6-7.

"Dr. Joseph Luns, NATO's Secretary-General, in an article beginning on p. 58 of this issue of *Air Force Magazine*, finds small comfort in détente as a reason for NATO relaxing its guard and points to the continuing expansion of the Warsaw Pact's combat capability as a principal reason. (Warsaw Pact members are the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.) The specifics of Soviet military activities in Eastern Europe serve to reinforce Dr. Luns' judgment and, we hope, point up the rash imprudence of perennial attempts to cut deeply into the US contribution to NATO."

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE, by John Erickson, in *RUSI*, v. 120, no. 1 (March 1975).

"Recent improvements within Soviet (and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact) forces in the European theatre amount to more than mere tinkering with organisation and weapons. Soviet doctrine, as ever, continues to emphasise the rapid seizure of the initiative from the 'defensive' and high speed

penetration into the whole depth of the theatre: while this does imply a 'short war in a nuclear environment', one of the noticeable features over the past year or so has been increased Soviet interest in the possibility of substantial non-nuclear operations even in the initial stage of a major engagement, for which reason the 'attack norms' of a nuclear blitzkrieg have been scaled down to meet the conditions of a conventional phase . . . Current instruction in the Frunze Academy, in which the first part of the course analyses NATO's capabilities in great detail, followed by the means getting 'in and under' and to great depth with the maximum speed—thus enjoining a Soviet interest in keeping the nuclear threshold quite high. In addition, 'received doctrine' (if I may put it that way) tends to emphasise the need to insure—and that at a high level—against purely local collisions escalating rapidly (a contingency which applies to both halves of Europe and which is perhaps especially relevant within the confines of eastern Europe itself)."

TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, in *NATO Review*, v. 21, no. 4 (1973) 8–11.

"Current military trends can best be determined by reviewing developments in recent years. This summer marks the fifth anniversary of the Soviet military invasion of her Czechoslovak ally. That event was a turning point in the development of the Warsaw Pact, both politically and militarily . . . Having reviewed the significant and important growth of the Warsaw Pact armed forces during the last five years, both in a quantitative and qualitative sense, an effort should now be made to explain this growth. What reasons can be offered for expanding still further the already formidable military machine of the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact partners?"

WARSAW PACT EXERCISE, SHIELD-72, by Graham H. Turbiville, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 7 (July 1973) 17–24.

"Under the motto 'Warsaw Pact—The Shield of Socialism,' combined air and ground elements of the Soviet, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and East German Armies conducted major maneuvers on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The exercise, code-named Shield-72, took place from 4 to 16 September 1972, and was the first major Pact exercise to be conducted in Czechoslovakia since the Soviet intervention there in 1968. Pact press reports indicated that 'several tens of thousands of troops and several thousands of combat vehi-

cles' participated, while Western estimates of participating personnel ranged as high as 100,000."

WARSAW PACT MILITARY POWER, in *NATO Review*, v. 20, nos. 7–8 (July/August 1972) 13–16.

"Throughout this review of the current state of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military strength and capabilities, the obvious question is raised repeatedly: where are they going, and how far? Soviet long-range goals are not known to have changed. How does their military posture support these goals? Is there consistency between the continuing build-up of military power and the concept of 'peaceful coexistence'?"

WARSAW PACT MILITARY STATUS, in *NATO Review*, v. 22, no. 4 (August 1974) 21–22.

"At their meeting in Brussels on 14 June 1974, the NATO Ministers of Defence were given a report on the status of the Warsaw Pact Military strength and capabilities. The main points of the report are given below."

3. *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe*

(LI) —AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1968 INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, by Maj. Wendell L. Schuler. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 61 p. (Research Study No. 1725–71.)

"In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek assumed the leadership of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party. Dubcek's regime allowed long-awaited reforms to be introduced in the areas of the Communist Party and government, the economy, communications, and foreign relations. In August 1968, the Soviets led five Warsaw Pact states in an invasion of Czechoslovakia, suppressing the many reforms. Each one of the major areas of reform during Dubcek's reign has been researched in an effort to determine the cause of the Soviet-led invasion. It has been determined that the Soviets feared that the Communist Party was losing the leading role in Czechoslovakia, which would in turn lead to the loss of Czechoslovakia as an ally and have an adverse effect on other Eastern bloc countries."

THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ITS EFFECTS ON EASTERN EUROPE, ed. by E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz. New York, Praeger, 1972. 210 p.

"A melange of 11 essays dealing with various aspects of the impact of the 1968 invasion on the other states of Eastern Europe."

(LI) —TWO YEARS LATER—AN EXAMINATION OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA, by Maj. Thomas N. Jones. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971, 60 p. (Research Study no. 1050-71.)

"This thesis examines the effect of the Czechoslovakian invasion of August 1968, on the six East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Reasons for the creation of the Treaty and the Russian advantages, both military and political, are presented. The events leading up to the invasion and the invasion itself are described, followed by an examination of the aftermath and effect on Czechoslovakia as well as a country-by-country analysis of each remaining satellite. The study concludes that, while liberalization has had quite an effect in a few countries, their necessary dependence on the Russians for economic support will force them to stand behind their commitments."

4. *Warsaw Treaty Organization vs. NATO (See also Appendix)*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

HOW MANY DIVISIONS? A NATO-WARSAW PACT ASSESSMENT, by Col. Delbert M. Fowler, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 11 (November 1972) 76-88.

"How many divisions should the US Army have? Such a relatively simple question appears at first glance to have some relatively simple answer. But, by now, we should all be prepared to accept the fact that war is but the extension of other forces—political, economic and psychological—and the evidence of their unsuccessful use in pursuit of US foreign policy objectives. We would all likely admit to failure in quantifying the amount of political, economic or psychological force necessary to accomplish a given objective with an opponent; why should it be so easy to calculate the amount of military force required? The difficulty involved in arriving at sound and logical judgments—much less anything approaching a finite unique solution—cannot be exaggerated. For such a critical question, it seems mandatory that solutions be attempted as a means of sharpening our intuitive judgments. In these solutions, however, one should bear in mind that any military force must be perceived by the enemy

as being capable of successfully terminating a conflict if it is to deter that enemy from initiating conflict. In other words, its capabilities must be credible or believable. At the same time, if we are to exact the maximum cooperation from our allies, those same capabilities must be believable to them . . . The possible scenario of conflict in NATO Europe should be examined for its bearing on how many divisions the Army should have."

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE, by Trevor Cliffe. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972. 58 p. (Adelphi Papers 89.)

Tactical Nuclear Weapons; A New Approach To Tactical Nuclear Weapons; Chemical Weapons; Armoured Warfare; Artillery Weapons; The Automated Battlefield; Air Mobility in the Battlefield; Air Warfare; The Effects of New Technology on Military Capabilities; Technology and Manpower. The Cost Implications of New Technology; A shopping List; Appendices (Comparative Strengths of NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Theatre Forces—Ground and Air, Soviet Military Strategy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Main Battle Tanks, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, Heavy and Medium Lift Helicopters, Tactical Aircraft, Tactical Air Defence Weapons Systems, Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles, and Unit Costs of Weapons Systems and Other Military Equipment).

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in *Parameters*, v. 4, no. 2 (1974) 13-22.

"A comparison of the Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty Organizations which presents and analyzes Soviet Perceptions of the differences between the two alliance systems."

(LI) —NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT—THE CHALLENGE OF MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, by Maj. Allan C. Blaisdell. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 63 p. (Research Study.)

"NATO's mutual and balanced force reduction proposal (MBFR) presents the United States with a critical problem: what types of balanced reductions should be effected between NATO and the Warsaw Pact while insuring the Soviet Union does not become the dominant power in Europe through default. This study identifies and analyzes variations of two MBFR alternatives: withdrawal of 'stationed,' troops, and per-

centage/proportional reductions. The study concludes that no significant reduction in American presence or power in Europe should be affected as such action would be detrimental to the security of both the United States and the free world."

(*) —SECURITY IN EUROPE, by Robert Hunter. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972. 281 p.

"The author analyzes the growth of the formal European security institutions, first NATO and then the Warsaw Pact, in relation to the onset and progress of the Cold War. He discusses the political role played by each alliance; how the evolution of a strategic doctrine in the West built up tensions within NATO; and how both alliances have fulfilled important non-military needs of the countries involved. The final section of the book assesses the process of détente in Europe and speculates on the outcome of the proposed Security and Cooperation Conference."

U.S. ARMS: ARE OUR DEFENSES DOWN?, in *Newsweek*, v. 85, no. 11 (17 March 1975) 45-48 plus.

An overview of the U.S. military posture and the role of U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in strengthening our defenses. Included is an interview with the Secretary in which he was asked whether or not the U.S. is "entering an era of neo-isolationism that will erode its power, among other questions concerning U.S. defense. Also included is a chart on the world strategic balance, including, among others, a comparison between NATO and Warsaw Pact strengths.

THE WARSAW PACT: A SOVIET RESPONSE, by Capt. Elaine M. Henning, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 9 (September 1975) 46-49.

"Creation of the Warsaw Pact organization is traditionally viewed as the Soviet Union's immediate political-propaganda countermeasure to the acceptance of West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Historically hidden, and perhaps the more compelling reason, is Eastern Europe's ancient fear of the Germans. The rearmament of Germany as a NATO member served to rekindle the centuries-old fear of East Europeans, as well as emphasize the still very vivid memories of German atrocities against both Russians and East Europeans. The Soviet leaders, therefore, saw the need for a legally established organization to bind together the military forces of the Eastern nations in order

to counter Germany's potentially large military contribution to NATO, as well as ensuring their political control over the East European states."

THE WARSAW PACT THREAT IN THE 1970's, by Lawrence L. Whetten, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 5 (October-November 1970) 20-28.

"As public clamour mounts in the West for the withdrawal of troops stationed abroad, and NATO members continue to reduce the proportion of their GNP allocated to defense, and the costs of weapons procurement multiples rapidly, an assessment is warranted of the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact as the first step in an assessment of an improvement in East-West relations. The actual strength of the Warsaw Pact is contestable. Few authorities agree on its relative or absolute combat effectiveness or comparative posture to NATO. Most Western observers, however, do agree that marked improvements have been made and that compared to even three years ago its strength has been significantly enhanced. This comparatively stronger posture is due in part to rapid weapons modernization programs and the introduction of energetic training programs, the sharp expansion of the Soviet Navy and its assumption of an offensive role, the enlargement of theater resources resulting from Moscow's attainment of strategic nuclear parity, and the deployment of the Soviet Central Group of Forces into Czechoslovakia. Despite the asymmetries between NATO and the Pact in mobilization rates, industrial resources, reserves, military geography, weapons effectiveness and rate of fire indices, it is sufficient merely to record the Pact relative numerical strength over NATO before analyzing improvements in the Pact's posture over the past ten years."

b. *The Soviet View*

NATO: BACK TO OLD POSITIONS, by V. Matveyev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 9 (September 1974) 102-105.

"The Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted in Ottawa by the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries on June 19, 1974 and signed a week later in Brussels during a meeting of NATO heads of state and government is intended to serve, as its text shows, as a political guideline for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the today's conditions. According to Britain's *The Guardian*, the new Atlantic Declaration has been drawn up with the aim of convincing the world

that NATO still has significance and meaning in the era of détente. This is not an easy assignment. More than a year has passed since the United States first came up with the idea of drawing up and signing a declaration—an idea which immediately triggered off mixed reaction in West European capitals. It proved difficult to word even this document, which does not touch on the thorniest and most vital aspects of relations between the NATO countries. Many Western observers consider that the Declaration skirts round the intractable economic and political problems. Commenting on the Declaration in this vein, *The Washington Post* even claims that it is essentially devoid of any content. Even though the Declaration may, in fact, avoid the acute problems of the mutual relations between the Atlantic allies, one can hardly agree with the above-mentioned claim. An exemption of the document permits certain conclusions to be drawn about the main directions of NATO activity in today's conditions and concerning the main political line pursued by the bloc's leaders."

NATO IN CONDITIONS OF DÉTENTE, by A. Antonov, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 2 (1974) 34-41.

"The USA's policy during the military action in the Middle East in October 1973 extremely sharpened US contradictions with its allies within the military NATO bloc. The press on both sides of the Atlantic was full of exclamations like 'NATO crisis,' 'blow at the alliance,' and 'worst shock ever.' Here are the facts. The USA's West European allies, with the exception of Portugal, publicly dissociated themselves from Washington's pro-Israeli policy—The crisis in the relations between the Atlantic partners took such a sharp turn during the Middle East events because this abrupt shift had already been prepared by earlier developments within the bloc. That is why the fresh outburst of differences between the NATO members reflects deep-going processes connected both with an aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions and the crisis of the imperialist bloc policy in general in the conditions of détente. Divisions within the bloc have become particularly pronounced over the past few years, as international tensions have relaxed. NATO's line of confrontation with the socialist world has become a glaring anachronism, and the West European countries have gained some scope for a more independent policy outside the NATO framework."

NATO NUCLEAR PLANS: PAST AND PRESENT, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 11 (1973) 105-106.

A review of the following book: *The Nuclear Policy of the USA in NATO*, by V. G. Mitayev. Moscow, International Relations Publishers, 1973. 207 p. "The Soviet-American agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic arms visibly symbolise the rapid change which has occurred in present-day international relations. This change did not come of itself; it was prepared and determined by the long and steadfast struggle of the Soviet Union against the forces of reaction and aggression, against the arms race and the policy of militarism and revanchism in Europe. One of the important aspects of this struggle was the foiling during the 1960s of the plans for providing nuclear weapons to North Atlantic bloc. A detailed study of American nuclear policy in NATO and the stand of the USSR on these questions is the subject of the monograph *The Nuclear Policy of the USA in NATO* by V. G. Mitayev. This work is of importance not only as a historical study, although an insight into the way of thinking and methods of action used by the enemies of an International détente in the recent past is useful in itself. The author stresses that the reactionary militarist circles in Western Europe still cherish the hope of getting hold of nuclear weapons in one way or another and are seeking loopholes for achieving this end."

c. WTO and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

(*)—ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS: EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FORCE REDUCTIONS, by Wolfgang Klaiber and others. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1973. 192 p. (Published by the Atlantic Council of the United States.)

"Members of the Atlantic Council of the United States discuss the relationship between the two major multilateral conferences—the CSCE and the conference on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and the issue of European security during a period of negotiation and détente. In analysing the complex issues involved, the authors consider such questions as whether the conferences will lead to a freezing of the present division of Europe or contribute to better relations between East and West; whether they will lead to better security or only a dangerous illusion of security; and whether they will contribute to more or to less cohesion within the two blocs themselves."

MBFR: FORCE LEVELS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, by John Erickson, in *Strategic Review*, v. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 28-43.

"The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, convened in July 1973, culminated a decade of Soviet work to ratify the political status quo in Europe and to soften the NATO anti-Soviet stance. This Soviet interest had not embraced mutual or balanced arms reduction, that aspect of security having been introduced by the U.S. and NATO. The Soviet Union regards its superior military strength and the supporting Brezhnev doctrine as essential to its security, and looks upon the political hostility of the West as the chief threat to peace and security of Europe. The heavy concentration of Soviet forces in Central Europe belies reports of imminent conflict with Red China. Soviet leaders dominate the command structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Forces. Soviet armament and doctrine are for aggressive offensive combat. While emphasizing 'peaceful coexistence' and a general military balance, the Soviet Union has built up a formidable superiority in conventional weapons in Europe, which it is unlikely to relinquish in negotiations for balanced force reductions. The Soviet nuclear build-up has neutralized the NATO advantage in U.S. nuclear weapons, leaving NATO in a relatively weak posture. In these circumstances, the Pentagon estimate that NATO forces could withdraw in an effective delaying action, pending reinforcement, may be optimistic. Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops would sorely weaken NATO forces, yet that prospect will enter Soviet calculations against making concessions in the negotiations. Soviet negotiators have eliminated the prospect of 'balanced' force reductions which might consider the Soviet geographic advantage, and have won agreement that cuts will be proportional. NATO negotiators have accepted the exclusion of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary from counting in arms-reduction planning. Soviet negotiators have agreed to the date of October 30 for the opening of troop-reduction talks. The prospect is that troop-reduction talks will be extended. Any prospect of reducing the Soviet superiority in conventional arms through these talks is remote. The talks will introduce strains in NATO, at no cost to the Soviet side. It is not the Russians who will be pushed out of Europe."

(*)—MBFR: ITS ORIGINS AND PERSPECTIVES, by James F. Sattler. Paris, Atlantic Treaty Association, 1974. 27 p.

"Dr. Sattler, Research Associate of the US Atlantic Council, has undertaken, on behalf of the ATA, a short study—the main body of the text is

only some twelve pages long—on the origins and objectives of MBFR considered from both Soviet and Western viewpoints. Anyone wishing to follow the current negotiations in Vienna will find this a useful guide to what, inevitably, is a complex and slow process. Three appendices give the texts of the communique issued at the completion of the exploratory MBFR talks in June, 1973, opening statements by the American and Soviet representatives in October, 1973, and press briefings by Mr. Quarles van Ufford on behalf of the Western participants in January and April, 1974. The subject can be further brought up to date by a reading of Mr. van Ufford's press briefing of last July, the text of which is to be found in issue No. 5 of the NATO Review."

MBFR: POLITICAL OR TECHNICAL ARMS CONTROL?, by Robin Ranger, in *The World Today*, v. 30, no. 10 (October 1974) 411-418.

"A limited agreement on mutual force reductions, avoiding deadlock over the technical requirements of MBFR, may well prove acceptable to both super-powers as a measure symbolizing their political détente; it would, however, do little to curb their use of military technology. The negotiations between Nato and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) began in Vienna in October 1973, but there has been relatively little progress towards agreement since the USSR and the US tabled their opening offers. An analysis of these offers shows that in these, as in other arms control negotiations, the Russians were seeking political arms control while the US was seeking technical arms control. Despite the gap between the two super-power positions, their common interest in securing a political agreement preserving the status quo in Europe meant that a limited agreement was possible within the next year, especially given the recent changes in West European governments which made them more favourable to such an agreement."

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS—TOWARD A MODEL. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 54 p. (ASDIRS 4341.)

"Mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have emerged as one of the more important security issues of the 1970's. Exploratory discussions commenced 31 January 1973, and actual negotiations could start in the Fall in 1973. President

Nixon has affirmed that the US would not reduce its forces in Europe without reciprocity by the Warsaw Pact. Pact forces outnumber NATO's, better than 2:1 in tanks and aircraft in Central Europe. This imbalance, coupled with a superior Pact mobilization and reinforcement capability and the immutable factors of geography leads to the conclusion that MBFR could be to NATO's disadvantage, unless offset by other comprehensive measures such as constraints and verification. The outline of an illustrative model on 'How to Reduce' is provided—a comprehensive model involving constraints, verification, 50% reductions in US and USSR ground forces, and 10% reductions in the other NATO and PACT nations involved in Central Europe. As a follow-up to a post-MBFR period is the requirement that US and NATO planners need to evaluate the future posture and disposition of residual US ground forces in Europe—toward a reserve role for a highly mobile US Corps."

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 10 (October 1971) 3-11.

"Soviet policy toward arms control measures for Europe has shifted dramatically in 1970-71, in tandem with Moscow's attitude toward other possible domains for arms limitation. What is the meaning of these changes? Is the Kremlin groping toward a strategy of interdependence with the West? Or are these changes merely part of a forward strategy carried on with indirect or 'rightist' tactics? Is Moscow interested in a settlement that will accommodate the conflicts and heal the wounds left in the aftermath of World War II? Alternatively, are we witnessing another round in the Soviet Union's historic tendency to fill the vacuums susceptible to its power? If we could identify the essential criteria for measuring the willingness of the USSR to move toward a reasonable settlement of European problems—one that took account of Western, as well as Soviet, security concerns—three standards might be noted: A willingness to include the United States and Canada in any European settlement and its planning. A willingness to discuss mutual troop reductions and not just the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. A willingness to regularize the status of West Berlin. Soviet policy on other matters would also be an indicator such as the Kremlin's attitude toward strategic arms aimed at or located in Europe, but these three points are probably the touchstones by which to assess the main thrust of Soviet strategy in the early 1970's."

MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE, by John Yochelson, in *Survival*, v. 15, no. 6 (November/December 1973) 275-283.

"New talks between Warsaw Pact and NATO member states on mutual force reductions in Central Europe have opened in Vienna on 30 October 1973. The following two articles, both excerpts from longer original papers, discuss possible Western aims in the negotiations. John Yochelson, currently with the Center of International Affairs, Harvard University, looks at American options and interests in early 1973; in the meantime the implications of the Watergate affair on the relationship between the US Congress and the Administration, which became clear only after the article was written, may have generated new pressures in favour of Yochelson's 'Quick Fix' option. Johan Holst, the Acting Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, considers force reductions in the overall setting of European security relations and argues that agreements on the level of forces are less important than agreed restrictions in the use of military force in Europe. The text of his article is an amended version of the original paper 'Force Limitations and European Political Development'."

THE WARSAW PACT IN THE ERA OF NEGOTIATION, by David Holloway, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 7 (July 1973) 49-95.

"It is widely believed that a new stage in the politics of East-West relations has been ushered in by the Four-Power agreement on Berlin, the West German treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union, and the strategic arms limitation agreements. The Conference on European Security and Cooperation for which the Warsaw Pact powers have been pressing since the mid-1960s now seems certain to take place; and it is likely that talks will be held about the reduction of forces in Europe. Whatever procedural arrangements are devised for the Conference and the talks on force reductions, it is clear that a period of protracted and intricate negotiations is beginning in Europe which will place new demands on the Warsaw Pact."

5. *Nationalism: An Influencing Factor in Eastern Europe*

(LI)—**THE FUTURE EFFECT OF NATIONALISM ON THE WARSAW PACT: A RUMANIAN CASE STUDY**, by Maj. Robert P. Caputo. Maxwell AFB, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 113 p. (Research Study.)

"The Rumanian struggle for independent, national Communism since 1945 has irrevocably affected the relationships which have existed between the Soviet Union and the East European Bloc. This study traces the development of both Rumanian-style Communism and the Warsaw Pact to their respective current stages, superimposes the one upon the other, and, finally, injects general East European nationalism. An evaluation of this complex interaction leads to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact has outlived its usefulness; that the Soviets are becoming increasingly more cognizant of this fact; and that closer East-West European ties will be the inevitable result."

NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE.
McLean, Va., Research Analysis Corp., January 1970. (RAC-R-89.)

"This study analyzes the scope and extent of nationalism in Eastern Europe and attempts to determine its impact both on the politics of continental Europe in general and the USSR in particular. US foreign policy implications are also appraised. One principal conclusion is that Eastern European nationalism represents a basic and dynamic political force. Its intensity is in inverse relation to the influence of an outside power (USSR). If colonial control is strong, nationalism weakens, but whenever imperial influences relax, nationalism reasserts itself. A distinction must be drawn between mere anti-Soviet prejudices by the subjugated nations of East Europe and their *true* nationalism, defined here as a long-term historical and ideological force shaping their destinies. Nationalism itself will continue to be relevant in the pro-Soviet countries of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, whereas the currently relatively independent countries (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania) will become even more independent. US policy for the 1970's will need new principles and guidelines. The slogans of the 1950's or the 1960's will not be sufficient. New cultural and commercial policies must be formulated for a region in which the US has no *direct* military or political interests."

WARSAW PACT: THE BROOD OF THE BEAR, by Lawrence Griswold, in *Sea Power*, (April 1975) 27-32.

"Throughout the Spring of 1975 the Warsaw Pact countries, led by the Russian Army, have conducted a series of military maneuvers designed to 'awe' the NATO Alliance and the Third World nations of Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. However, Mr. Griswold maintains, many sceptics

believe the maneuvers were equally intended to impress upon the USSR's own satellite states that the Soviet Union, with the Warsaw Pact, is the greatest military power on earth. Despite Moscow's power, the necessity for such reassurance, he says, indicates the need for a show of force to keep Russia's occasionally rebellious 'slave states' in line. Reviewing the history of the often unstable and quarrelsome Balkan states, Griswold says it was relatively easy for the Soviet military to conquer them and install communist governments after the German surrender at Stalingrad. Similarly, although Western nations objected, the imposition of Soviet influence in the Baltic territories was not difficult. With the exception of occasional 'flare-ups,' no rebellion against communist authority was visible in the Baltic countries until 1969, when Russia initiated its 'rehabilitation of Stalin.' Widespread riots occurred in 1971 and 1972, the result of religious repression, lingering patriotism and inflation due to crop failures. While military action put down these disturbances, the Eastern Baltic remains a potential trouble spot in Soviet eyes. Similar disturbances in the Balkans since 1972 also make the Soviet Union uneasy . . ."

III. USSR's Foreign Policy: Politico-Economic Ventures and Options

A. Some Elements of Soviet Foreign Policy (For Regions and Countries See Below)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

FORMATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Vladimir Petrov, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 819-850.

"The process of foreign policy formation in the Soviet Union has been one of the most difficult subjects to study. No books or articles have been written about it in Russia; for the lack of reliable basic information, Western studies have also been wanting. Intelligence analysts have probably pieced together enough to reconstruct a plausible picture. The . . . essay contains no actual revelations. Its claimed originality is that it attempts to sketch the picture of Soviet foreign policymaking as it appears to a composite 'insider': a bureaucrat, a diplomat, a researcher in a policy-oriented academic institution, a journalist."

(*)—**INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE: A CASE STUDY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW**, by Richard J. Erickson. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana, 1972. 254 p.

"Research into Soviet writings and practice underlies this . . . study, the main theme of which is the Soviet Union's general acceptance, with due concern for its ideology and political aims, of much of customary international law."

(*)—RUSSIA AND THE WORLD: A STUDY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by William Hayter, New York, Taplinger, 1970. 133 p.

"Reflection by the former British Ambassador in Moscow on the 'conservative' as against the 'revolutionary' components in contemporary Soviet foreign policy."

(*)—ST. PETERSBURG AND MOSCOW: TSARIST AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1814–1974, by Barbara Jelavich. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1974. 480 p.

"This study 'presents a survey of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy from the Congress of Vienna, 1814, to 1974.' Of the ten chapters, six deal with the Tsarist period, and one each on the Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev periods. Containing a wealth of information, well organized, and developed in balanced, insightful manner."

SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by N. Kapchenko, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 4 (April 1975) 3–13.

"Four years have passed since the 24th Congress of the CPSU. This period has proved convincingly that congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constitute historic events, inasmuch as they exert immense influence not only on life in the Soviet Union but also on the development of international affairs in their entirety. The achievement of the goals in both domestic and foreign policies, set forth by the Congress, opens a new stage in the historical development of the USSR, in the struggle waged by peoples to consolidate peace, and in providing reliable basis for universal security . . . The CPSU regards foreign policy as a major aspect of its allround activity. The destinies of the Soviet Union and of the whole world largely depend on how international problems will be solved. Soviet people remember what Lenin said on this score: 'From the very beginning of the October Revolution, foreign policy and international relations have been the main questions facing us.' Today the significance of this issue, far from diminishing, has, on the contrary, increased."

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND NON-ALIGNMENT, by Radovan Vukadinović, in *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, v. 25, no. 570 (5 January 1974) 13–16.

"There have been important changes in the relations among the nonaligned countries themselves, their numbers have increased, and their activities have become more dynamic, but there have also been significant changes in the attitudes of other countries, particularly the great powers, toward the policy of nonalignment. The Soviet Union holds an important place among these outside observers of the policy of nonalignment and its tasks, and it has paid careful attention to the meetings and joint actions of this large body of states. Viewed in historical retrospect, Soviet foreign policy has since Lenin and his theoretical and practical activities in the field of foreign policy stressed the value and importance of oppressed nations. In his theoretical analyses of Eastern peoples, who at that time were almost all under colonial rule, Lenin stressed their important role as true allies in the struggle against imperialism."

(*)—SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN, by H. Hanak. Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972. 340 p.

"A . . . selection of documents, with introductions, to illustrate the movement of Soviet foreign policy since 1953."

SOVIET SPORT AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by James Riordan, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 26, no. 3 (July 1974) 322–343.

"The influence of politics on sport is particularly evident today in relation to foreign policy, where sporting success is seen by some as a measure of national vitality and prestige; it can therefore serve as an unobtrusive form of propaganda . . . It is apparent that, today, the nations of the world rank differently according to the amount of interest their governments take in the organization and conduct of sport. On the one hand are those states whose sports movements are fully integrated into the social and political system and thus have become an important instrument of government policies. On the other hand are countries in which sport is largely organized by non-government bodies and tends to be free of state control—except, possibly, when it involves international competition. It is efficiency and command over resources and state commitment that today count most towards success in international sport, and this is a factor that favours state-socialist systems, the Soviet Union's above all."

YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1970. New York, United Nations, Office of Public Information, 1972. 1177 p. (v. 24.)

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1971. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971. 343 p. (Published under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs.)

Includes, among others, review and analysis of events of importance having occurred for the period.

2. *The Role of the Military*

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1970-73, by Ilana Dimant-Kass, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 26, no. 4 (October 1974) 502-521.

"This article attempts a case-study in the relations between the party and the military in the USSR. The Soviet press material for the study turned out to be fairly rich, to the extent of indicating that basic policy differences in the USSR may be strongly expressed in the publications of particular institutions or interest-groups. A brief recapitulation of relevant aspects of the field of policy concerned, namely the Middle East, may be needed as an introduction."

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY: THE ARMY VIEW, by Charles Stockell, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 10 (October 1973) 72-83.

"The last 10 years have seen a revolution in Soviet affairs which many Westerners do not recognize or seem to care about, yet it carries a potential that is even more dangerous to the West than the more famous October Revolution in 1917. The modern Soviet revolution is the dramatic change in military capabilities. Soviet strategy and national goals have basically changed very little since 1917 except to adjust to new demands, new weaponry and new threats to Soviet aspirations. On the other hand, tactics and organization have undergone major modifications. Primarily, the threat, rather than the use, of Soviet military power gives meaning to political moves and international economic initiatives. The West can in the coming years expect to see the Soviet Union, with its increased confidence and sense of security due to its improved military situation, move more boldly into world politics and seek a more dominant role in international affairs. The major means in this projection of political power will continue to be the Soviet armed forces."

THE SOVIET NAVY'S ROLE IN FOREIGN

POLICY, by Comdr. Richard T. Ackley, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 9 (May 1972) 48-65.

"While the Soviet Navy has been often pictured recently as presenting a new challenge to America's ability to control the oceans of the world in the event of hostilities, Soviet naval forces today are in a much better position to play a more subtle but equally important role in support of Russian foreign policy. By means of eight case studies the author demonstrates the part played by Soviet Navy ships in a variety of situations, revealing how their actions directly parallel and support the Kremlin's political stance abroad."

(*)—SOVIET STRATEGY—SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by C. G. Jacobsen. Glasgow, Robert Maclehose and Company, Ltd., 1972. 236 p.

"In considering the role of the military as a pressure group affecting Soviet foreign policy-making, Dr. Jacobsen contends that 'although the armed forces constitute one of the policy-effecting instruments at the disposition of the political leadership, the armed forces establishment is integrated into this political leadership to an extent which entails considerable influence on the choice of instruments.' In support of his thesis, he points to recent Soviet naval developments, increases in the Soviet defense budget, and the noticeable presence within the party system of military professionals. His conclusion is that while the Soviet party will not permit a challenge from the military to its societal role, the pressures in the international arena of the 1970's will require it tolerate a greater degree of flexibility in regard to the military's position and influence."

3. *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour*

SOVIET RISK-TAKING AND CRISIS BEHAVIOUR: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COEXISTENCE?, by Hannes Adomeit. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973. 40 p. (Adelphi Papers no. 101.)

"How has the achievement of nuclear parity affected the behavior of Soviet leaders in crisis? Are they prone to take a harder line for the sake of prestige? What evidence is there to justify optimism in some Western quarters that present East-West relations are fundamentally different from the short-lived Spirits of Geneva and Camp David? The author analyzes that there is some basis for optimism. Soviet foreign policy over the past decade has not fulfilled Western predictions

that its newly won status as a superpower somehow required risky expansionist adventures. The author warns against euphoria, however."

SOVIET STRATEGIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT, by Andrew Gordon, in *Strategic Review*, v. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1975) 30-40.

"Soviet language gives common terms a special Marxist-Leninist significance different from their ordinary meaning in western communications. Thus, western negotiators must understand that Soviet policy follows the 'science' of Marxist sociology which contemplates a process of changing socioeconomic formations presently evidenced in the conflict of capitalism and socialism and in which socialism will prevail. Class warfare is a characteristic of all except socialist societies. The aim of crisis management is the preservation of socialism in the Soviet Union and its extension to other states as possible. Soviet foreign policy embraces these tenets as it strives to build a communist society on a global scale. The state carries out foreign policy programs under direction of the Communist Party of the USSR. The fundamental principle of proletarian internationalism prescribes a worldwide concord of interest through communist parties. A companion principle of 'peaceful coexistence' prescribes assistance to wars of liberation while avoiding nuclear war. Thus, policy seeks confrontation to create crisis which is then managed in the Soviet interest, using peaceful coexistence to limit commitment. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the meetings on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are long-planned Soviet gambits to produce situations manageable in the Soviet interest."

4. Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THE NEW SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Wolfgang Leonhard, in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1973) 59-74.

"The paradox between the USSR's increasingly flexible foreign policy since 1969 and the harsh repression that characterizes its domestic scene results, Prof. Leonhard maintains, from the Brezhnev-Kosygin attempts to find a compromise between the 'liberals and conservatives' of the Soviet leadership. During Khrushchev's era of de-Stalinization, limited reforms were initiated within the USSR; however, after his fall in 1964, the new Brezhnev-Kosygin coalition returned to harsher politics. The secret police has been unleashed; intellectuals have been harassed under

more stringent cultural policies; the Communist Party itself has become more 'closed,' with fewer members; early Khrushchev economic reforms have been muted; the army's influence has grown in conjunction with emphasis on the superiority of Russian nationals; and the Party ideology is adapting to conform with these changes. At the same time, a more flexible USSR foreign policy has become evident in the treaty with West Germany, the Berlin Agreement, Nixon's trip to Moscow and Brezhnev's trips to Washington and Bonn. Leonhard identifies the stagnation of the Soviet economy, which is still behind the US in many important areas of industry, agriculture and science-technology, the Sino-Soviet conflict coupled with the US-Chinese rapprochement, and the Soviet desire to gain influence in Western Europe, as the three main reasons for the thaw in Soviet foreign relations. The USSR, unable to cope on its own, is seeking economic help from the West to develop its untapped resources; simultaneously, the USSR is seeking to avoid confrontations on both foreign policy since, Leonhard says, it has determined that reconciliation with the Chinese is not feasible."

(*)—**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR: DOMESTIC FACTORS**, by Morton Schwartz. Encino, Calif., Dickenson Publishing Company, 1975. 214 p.

"The author . . . feels that 'neither domestic nor external factors alone best explain Soviet policy but, rather, the interplay of both,' but, as the title indicates, he stresses domestic or 'microanalytic' variables. He assumes 'that Soviet decision-makers do not deal with the external world in vacuo but that they see threats and opportunities, choose their goals and their methods in the context of an ideological-cultural-political milieu which, along with their country's economic and military resources, conditions their attitudes and goals and shapes their policy choices.' The seven chapters cover environmental, demographic and economic factors; military capability; historical influences and traditions; ideological influences; domestic system needs; foreign policy formulation; and the weight and direction of domestic policy determinants."

5. Soviet Support of Guerrilla Movements in Other Countries

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, by Leon Romaniecki, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 26, no. 3 (July 1974) 417-440.

"The systematic training and provision of arms for left-wing terrorist guerrilla groups by communist countries is a well-known fact of long standing. Since the early 1960s, the Russians and the Chinese have been training terrorists and guerrillas, mainly from African and Middle Eastern countries. At present, when terrorism has ceased to be of parochial interest and has become a matter of international concern, irrespective of the aims and motivation of the terrorist, the approach of the Soviet Union towards terrorism, from the point of view of its state policy, is of prime interest."

6. *Peace As a Tactic of Soviet Foreign Policy*

(*)—DECEITFUL PEACE: A NEW LOOK AT THE SOVIET THREAT, by Gerhart Niemeyer. New Rochelle, Arlington House, 1971. 201 p.

"In this extended essay Professor Niemeyer argues the continuing danger of communism, and the basic irrationality of its central premises."

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET PEACE PROGRAMME, by S. Beglov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 3 (March 1975) 3-12.

"The fourth year of the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress is now coming to an end. This time has been marked by many substantial and positive changes in world politics. It is sufficient to compare the political picture of the world as it was at the end of the sixties with the current course of events in order to form a clear idea of the favourable changes that have occurred in the world political climate. The cold war produced various complications of the international arena. The relations between the major capitalist states, particularly the USA and the FRG, on the one hand, and the socialist world, on the other, were characterized by tension. General Secretary of the CC CPSU Leonid Brezhnev stressed in an electoral speech made on June 14, 1974: 'Our Party never regarded this situation as inevitable and least of all normal. Having assessed the general balance of forces in the world, we came to the conclusion even a few years ago that there was a real possibility to achieve a cardinal change in the international situation. It was a matter of starting a large-scale constructive discussion and solution of the outstanding issues. These intentions and this policy of ours have been summarized in the Peace Programme, adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress'."

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: A FACTOR FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS, by S. Morkovnikov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 11 (November 1974) 101-110.

"The first half of the current decade will be remembered by the people throughout the world as marking the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the international political and economic relations. The fraternal community of socialist countries continues to consolidate itself and is acquiring an ever more powerful basis in the form of economic integration. The foreign policies of the socialist countries are becoming increasingly coordinated. A turn, favourable to the cause of peace and progress, has been clearly registered in relations between the countries belonging to the two systems. This is fully linked with the intensifications of the peace offensive launched by the Soviet Union in close cooperation with other socialist states. It is connected with the implementation of the Peace Programme, adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, and the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of the socialist economic integration of CMEA countries. There is deep-going link between the two documents: the Peace Programme, which has practically become the common foreign policy platform of the fraternal parties and countries, and the Comprehensive Programme. Basing themselves on the existing concrete historical conditions and world trends, they have determined the cardinal directions, ways and methods for raising the economic and political potentials of the socialist community and intensifying its positive influence on the world situation. The role played by Soviet foreign policy is being steadily enhanced. Among the factors, making Soviet foreign policy a powerful instrument for peace, democracy and socialism are: a class approach to world processes, a reliance on Marxist-Leninist theory and traditions, more than half-century experience in implementing a Leninist foreign policy, and solidarity with contemporary revolutionary forces."

B. Soviet Conflict and Cooperation with the US and the Western World

1. *Détente in Super Power Strategy*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE ADMINISTRATION: FURTHER FALLOUT FROM THE SHAKE-UP, in *Time*, v 106, no. 21 (24 November 1975) 29-30.

Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on détente following his removal from office: "Whether we are successful in pursuing détente, or we hedge against the possible failure of détente, a military balance remains necessary. Though we should pursue détente—vigorously—we should pursue it without illusion. Détente rests upon an underlying equilibrium of force, the maintenance of a military balance."

DÉTENTE AND REALITY, by Isaac Don Levine, in *Strategic Review*, v. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1974) 44–50.

"From President Franklin D. Roosevelt to President Richard Nixon, the United States has vigorously pursued a grand design for an era of peace premised on the cooperation of the Soviet government. U.S. hopes have repeatedly been dashed by the hostility of Soviet responses, but the basic design has not been abandoned. SALT I and the October War reveal how far the United States has gone and how costly its pursuit of peace can be. Presidents should forswear summit negotiation and meet there only to sign previously agreed documents. Disarmament should take place where belligerency reigns—in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Oil wealth should be committed to the development of blighted lands. And cooperation in trade should be extended only to countries in which labor is not enslaved. The principles of freedom should be voiced vigorously in all forums. There can be no true détente except on the basis of common decency."

(*)—**DÉTENTE DIPLOMACY: UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE 1970's**, by Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt. New York, Dunellen (for the Atlantic Council of the United States.), 1970. 170 p.

"An historical analysis of the main problems confronting the architects of East-West détente in Europe."

DÉTENTE. HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, ON UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES [including USSR], AUGUST 15, 20, AND 21, SEPTEMBER 10, 12, 18, 19, 24, AND 25, AND OCTOBER 1 AND 8, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975, 524 p.

DÉTENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE REALITY OF COMPETITION AND THE IMPERATIVE OF COOPERATION, by Henry

Kissinger, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 71 no. 1842 (14 October 1974) 505–519.

The Challenge; The Course of Soviet-American Relations (American Goals: The Global Necessities); The Evolution of Détente—The Balance of Risks and Incentives (The Elaboration of Principles; Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements; The Economic Component; The Strategic Relationship); An Assessment of Détente; and Agenda for the Future.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE DURING THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA, by Capt. Richard J. Erickson, in *Air University Review*, v. 24, no. 2 (January-February 1973) 13–21.

"Several years ago a book appeared entitled, 'The War Called Peace: Khrushchev's Communism.' The title of this work by Harry A. and Bonaro Overstreet aptly describes peaceful coexistence, a term fraught with implications of Orwellian newspeak that 'war is peace' or, more to the point, 'peace is war.' It is the belief of George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, that no term has been more loosely and at times more unscrupulously used than 'peaceful coexistence.' It is the purpose of this article to examine this concept as it evolved during the premiership of Nikita S. Khrushchev."

THE DURABILITY OF DÉTENTE, by Maj. Tyrus W. Cobb, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 4 (April 1974) 3–15.

"In a rather significant departure from postwar Soviet foreign policy, the USSR has, in recent years, actively sought to normalize relations with the West in order to lay the foundation for a stable and peaceful international order. This policy of 'détente' has become increasingly associated with Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev whose efforts toward reaching accommodations with the capitalist countries have been endorsed by the party's Central Committee. Outside the Soviet Union, however, enthusiasm for détente has recently waned, and the viability of Brezhnev's avowed policy of relaxation of tensions has been challenged. As the USSR intensifies its repression of internal dissidents, accelerates the production of advanced military weaponry and technology and continues its campaign to isolate and denigrate the Chinese Communists, some Western observers have been moved to speculate that the shift toward improving relations with the West may be merely a tactical

phase rather than a permanent aspect of Soviet foreign policy."

HOW THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED; CAN THE DÉTENTE POLICY SUCCEED?, by H. George Franks, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 20, no. 1 (February-March 1975) 30-38 plus.

"In view of the criticism (and praise) which have followed the tentative agreement reached in Moscow during the visits of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, we feel that a general review of the development of U.S. policy in this sphere and the principles on which it is based, should be carefully studied by all who are interested in the possibility of a more or less lasting peace in general in Europe, and in the prospects for NATO in particular. Accordingly, we summarize here the voluminous speeches and press statements made by the American leaders in connection with their latest talks with the Soviet Union, including reasonably clear explanations of the present situation and the hopes for the future."

"LETTER FROM MOSCOW" CAN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN DÉTENTE BE SALVAGED?, by Fred Warner Neal, in *Center Report*, v. 8, no. 2 (April 1975) 9-12.

"Shortly after Congressional passage of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Act which tied emigration of Soviet Jewry to American granting of Most Favored Nation trading status to the Russians and the subsequent soviet reaction, Center Associate Fred Warner Neal, Professor of Government and International Relations at the Claremont Graduate School led an unofficial delegation to Moscow. There they met with ministers and deputy ministers of foreign affairs and foreign trade, with the chief of the American Department of the Foreign Office, editors of Pravda and Izvestia, officials of the Supreme Soviet and others . . . The movement away from the Cold War and toward détente is the most significant foreign policy development since the end of World War II. The recent congressional action to eliminate trade discrimination against the U.S.S.R. and offer credits only if Moscow would alter its emigration policies was contrary to all norms of international conduct. It violated an American-Soviet agreement and was self-defeating in terms of its own objectives. The implications of this knee-jerk obeisance to minority pressure, ersatz liberalism and Cold War thinking go beyond its effect on the détente. They raise the question of

whether the United States is capable of carrying on a rational foreign policy. Can it be that an isolationist foreign policy—a la Suisse—is all we are fitted for? Are our ethnic divisions so extensive, our political conflicts so deep, our prejudices so rigid, our ignorance of the rest of the world so acute, our missionary instincts so unsophisticated that we are destined to go on behaving irrationally until the time when the inexorable forces of history bring an explosive end to us all? A brief recapitulation of the facts concerning détente, the trade agreement and Soviet emigration may help to explain why these harsh questions arise."

(*)—SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES: FROM COLD WAR TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, by Foy D. Kohler and others. Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 241 p.

"This text combines an analysis of a selected element of Soviet national power with the supporting Soviet documentation. As the authors stated, their purpose was to present what Soviet leaders—past and present—have said on the strategy of peaceful coexistence and to 'interpret . . . the implications of these pronouncements . . . on Moscow's strategy for the 1970's.'"

THE STATE OF DÉTENTE, in *International Perspectives*, (July/August 1974) 3-18.

Comprised of the following articles: The Soviet Internal Dimension, by Paul Marantz; Two Unpalatable Choices for the West, by Mark Gayn; Illusions in the Search for Accommodation, by Lewis S. Feuer; and Interpreting Moscow's Aims, by Luc Dohamed.

TOWARD A WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF COEXISTENCE, by Marshal D. Shulman, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 1 (October 1973) 35-58.

"The barometer of tension has risen and fallen many times during the last 26 years or so of our relationship with the Soviet Union. While some fear the present abatement is no more than a lull or a truce, it seems probable that we are on our way to some new stage. What the nature of this stage may be, however, has not yet become clear in our public discourse, nor have we begun to clarify for ourselves the direction in which we would like to shape events, to the extent that it lies within our power to do so. Despite the distractions of our time, there is an urgency to the

task, for decisions have to be made and they should be governed by a perspective that is larger than our immediate national preoccupations. Let us begin with three questions: How should the present stage of our relations with the Soviet Union be characterized? Are we witnessing a historic shift in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union? What should be our philosophy toward our relations with the Communist world, our objectives, our criteria for weighing alternative policies?"

THE U.S. AND THE USSR: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, by William R. Kintner, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 12, no. 1 (Spring 1974) 81-102.

"Despite superficial similarity, the Soviet and U.S. approaches toward establishing a new relationship are difficult and for the most part mutually exclusive, says William R. Kintner. The United States is willing to aid the Soviets in return for a less tense, apparently less ideological, less conflictual relationship. The Soviets refuse to abandon their crusading 'mission,' although their tactics have been toned down somewhat. Furthermore, they are striving to tighten their own grip on their own citizens and on their East European empire. Despite this difference, the improved superpower relationship appears to be far more permanent than some of the transitory *détentes* of years past, in his opinion." See also under same title in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 691-719.

USA: DÉTENTE, CRISES AND PROBLEMS, by Mike Davidow, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 4 (1974) 64-71.

"Soviet-US meetings on the summit level, the official acceptance of peaceful coexistence as the principle governing relations between the leading countries of the two world social systems, agreements, extending from limitation on anti-ballistic defence systems and on strategic arms to working jointly against the two great scourges of mankind, cancer and heart diseases, a several-times increase in trade—these are some of the fruits of the *détente* for which the Soviet Union long struggled. The significantly improved and normalised US-USSR relations have had a profound impact on world affairs . . . The developing *détente* in US-USSR relations is equally vital for the American people for normalising conditions on the home front and for the normalisation of international relations as a whole. To strengthen the process of genuine *détente* on the international scene now is no less urgent task for the USA

than the elimination and staving off of the domestic political crisis that is developing at such an uncontrollable tempo. That is why in our days peaceful coexistence between the states of two world social systems and the complete normalisation of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have become an urgent necessity for the American people."

WHY DO THE SOVIETS WANT DÉTENTE?, by Michael M. Boll, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 11 (November 1974) 54-60.

Soviet Society in Search of a Model; Brezhnev Charts the Communist Future; Communism and Consumerism—The Theoretical Perspective; Consumerism and *Détente*—The Linkage of Domestic and Foreign Priorities; The Soviet Military; etc.

WITNESS TO HISTORY, 1929-1969, by Charles E. Bohlen. New York, Norton, 1973. 562 p.

" . . . During his tenure in Paris, [Ambassador] Bohlen was confronted with the imposing figure of de Gaulle at the height of his power. As might be expected, Bohlen has his doubts about Gaullist doctrine: the French leader perceived all international relations in terms of *Realpolitik* and was shocked by actions dictated by ideological obligations, in particular the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. De Gaulle had little comprehension of the US, regarding it as a polyglot country rather than a pure nation-state. Bohlen also takes de Gaulle to task for his disruption of the Western alliance, which served no practical purpose for France and only benefited the Russians. Bohlen is not optimistic about *détente* between the US and USSR. He tends to emphasize the ideological element in his analysis of Kremlin policy—the Bolsheviks, as he insists on calling them, still believe they are surrounded by hostile capitalist nations. He sees no nascent liberalization within the Soviet Union—in fact, the present leadership seems much more conservative than Khrushchev was . . ."

b. Soviet Aims and Objectives

(1) Miscellaneous Aspects

COOPERATION AS A FORM OF CONFLICT, by Franklyn Griffiths, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1974-1975) 481-499.

"The author examines the main tendencies within the Soviet Union on the question of co-operation with the West—tendencies which have

remained for many years, one being dominant now, another later. They are internally inconsistent and should be depicted in terms of conflicting tendencies. The reform tendency offers a basis for East-West cooperation. It seems desirable to withhold trade, credits, technology and capital increasingly until there is a marked reduction in the Soviet strategic and continued build-up and a greater Soviet willingness to negotiate at SALT and MBFR. Similarly, the Western powers should deny Moscow a conclusion to the CSCE until there are Soviet concessions at MBFR."

DÉTENTE IN SOVIET STRATEGY, in *American Security Council Washington Report*, (October 1975).

"For the Soviets, détente is intended to facilitate their attainment of ultimate, overall dominance over the West. This estimate examines Soviet progress toward achieving their strategic and tactical goals under détente, and makes judgments on implications and prospects for the future."

DÉTENTE THROUGH SOVIET EYES, by John Scott. New York, Radio Liberty Committee, 1974. 197 p.

Détente through Soviet eyes based on the author's experiences during a long trip through the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe last summer.

AN EXAMINATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, by Lt. Col. George F. Steger, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 8 (August 1973) 77-89.

"The environment of international relations has changed in the past few years from Cold War to what is gingerly called 'the détente atmosphere.' Rapprochement seems to be taking place between world powers, and fear of world conflict appears, to abate. For the military of the Western world, it is an uneasy time. Experience prompts the questions 'What does it mean-' 'Can we trust it-' The same experience prompts a skeptical response. Nevertheless, the new framework must be tested. In analyzing any situation, it is the soldier's preference to deal exclusively with facts. But we are interested in what the Soviets intend to do in the future, and on the world scene today, the facts are obtuse and distorted by manipulation; they do not speak for themselves. They must be examined, therefore, in the light of our knowledge of history and prevailing circumstances in the USSR if we would know the meaning of this new Soviet 'peace offensive.' Any anal-

ysis of Soviet intentions begins with Marxism/Leninism."

THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE: A CASE OF SOVIET LINKAGE, by Lothar Metze, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 364-384.

"More than a year ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed formally to conduct their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. It may therefore be opportune to take another look at the Soviet interpretation of the concept and its impact on Soviet behavior. For some time now, Soviet representatives have been emphasizing that peaceful coexistence does not mean ideological disarmament. What it does mean is typified in a recent Soviet textbook which declares, 'Peaceful co-existence of states with different social orders does not preclude, but on the contrary, presumes a decisive struggle against imperialist ideology.' This proposition is one of a series of doctrinal guidelines legitimizing the efforts of the Soviet regime to reap the benefits of détente and to act at the same time on the traditional assumption that a global 'victory of communism' will bring even greater gains in the long run. As a Politbureau member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (communist) Party put it in the 'World Marxist Review' of November 1972, 'The strategic purpose of peaceful coexistence is to assure favorable conditions for the worldwide victory of socialism.'"

NEW LIGHT ON SOVIET SUBVERSION, by Brian Crozier, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 3, no. 8 (11 April 1974) 1-3.

"Let us look again at the three levels of Soviet international subversion. At the top level, through diplomatic and less formal exchanges with Western leaders, the Russians aim to influence official thinking and public opinion towards détente, military disengagement and reductions in defence expenditure—while they themselves maintain and develop the military power of the Soviet Union."

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, by A. Chenbarov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 1 (1975) 8-14.

"Major shifts toward détente and peace in Europe have proved possible in recent years because of the increased influence of socialist countries on the course of international affairs. These shifts were promoted by the growing political realism of the ruling circles of West European countries, who understood the necessity of peaceful cooperation with the socialist states. The

steadfast shift in the balance of forces in favour of socialism sets the basis for positive changes in the relationships among European countries. The effectiveness of the socialist countries' impact on the solution of European issues in the spirit of peace has greatly increased, thanks to their growing unity and the cohesion and coordination of their foreign policy moves. This coordination is being carried out mainly within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The socialist countries formed a defensive alliance in 1955, countered the imperialist cold war policy with a united front of peace-loving forces, and upheld and consolidated the position of socialism in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation, established as a counter-balance to the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance, has played its own unique role in developing détente."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 145-149 plus.

"It seems difficult to generate a sustained, informative, dispassionate discussion about détente because of the inability or unwillingness of leading spokesmen to separate considerations of its costs and benefits from United States domestic politics and partisan propensities . . . Thus far, the fruits of détente for the Soviet Union are easy to identify; for the United States, the consequences are less obvious."

U.S.-SOVIET DÉTENTE: PAST AND FUTURE, by Vladimir Petrov. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975. 60 p. (Foreign Affairs Study 18.)

"In 1969, the Nixon administration and the leadership in the Soviet Union reached an 'understanding' which was formalized in a 1972 document, 'Basic Principles of Relations between the USA and the USSR.' . . . The basic purpose of détente is to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but the Soviets, Petrov says, do not intend to let it interfere with their other national interests. They still have an inherent mistrust of 'imperialists' and view the US cold war 'containment' policy as one designed to isolate the Soviet Union and deny it a major role in world affairs . . . The Soviet Union, Petrov continues, views détente in a broad context, not so much as an exclusive bilateral relationship with the US, but rather as a multilateral effort to attain 'normalization' with all capitalist countries (Western Europe, Japan, Canada and Iran) with whom it can deal as individual sovereignties . . . Petrov concludes that détente will continue to be pursued by both

countries through 'diplomatic political maneuvering,' so long as the two superpowers do not fully trust each other."

THE USSR AND EUROPE, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 1 (January-February 1974) 1-33.

The Destiny of Eastern Europe, by Adam B. Ulam; and the Problem of European Security, by Robert Legvold. "The last few years have witnessed major changes in the European environment, one of the most significant of which has been the emerging détente between the Eastern and Western segments of the continent. This development raises some key questions about the attitudes and perceptions of Soviet leaders. Why have they entered upon the course of détente, and how does détente bear upon the specific and continuing problems that they confront in the European context? The following articles address themselves to these questions within the framework of discussions of two important issues that have long been with Moscow: Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet approach to European security. Mr. Ulam argues that the Kremlin's desire to preserve the USSR's position in Eastern Europe, but to reduce the risks involved in that position, figured prominently in Soviet motivations for moving toward a détente. Mr. Legvold inquires into the Soviet leaders' conceptions of European security and the influence of these conceptions on their policies in the various current international security and arms-control negotiations; he concludes that while Moscow verbally maintains that Soviet security is compatible with that of Western Europe, it is unwilling at present to go beyond offering the West European states 'contextual' as opposed to 'basic' security."

WHAT IS IT RUSSIA WANTS—DÉTENTE OR A NEW ARMS RACE?, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 76, no. 12 (25 March 1974) 40-41.

"It's an anxious eye that U.S. is fastening on Moscow these days. The reasons why—as addressed by top military strategists—are reported by Joseph Froman, an Associate Executive Editor of 'U.S. News & World Report.' " Dim Outlook; Behind Russia's Stand; Where U.S. Leads; Key U.S. Programs; U.S. Deal on Arms Limitation.

WHY DO THE SOVIETS WANT DÉTENTE? by Michael M. Boll, in *Military Review*, (November 1974) 54-60.

"The link between Soviet domestic policy and its interest in détente is evident, Boll says, considering the country's need for Western assistance, particularly in the area of industrial automation—an area in which the Soviet Union is extremely deficient. To achieve its much-needed modernization, the USSR will also require Western assistance in the form of the credits, licenses and trade, which are at the foundation of the recent stress upon peaceful coexistence. At first glance, the one exception to Soviet efforts to blend domestic and foreign priorities appears to be in the area of defense. Since 1966 the Soviets have made a concerted effort to achieve nuclear parity with the US, despite their limited military allocations derived from a comparatively smaller GNP. However, Boll conjectures, parity may be prerequisite to pursuing the desired consumer prosperity via improved East-West relations. The present Soviet leadership, mindful of the Soviet loss of face during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis due to the nuclear imbalance at that time, and remembering the consequent end of Krushchev's reign, has no desire to create conditions which might foster a similar situation. Therefore, the Soviet interest in SALT, the European security conference and mutual force reductions, suggests a determination to insure the 'balance of terror' before diverting scarce resources from the military into the domestic economy. Further evidence of Soviet intent is seen in recent reports of its reduced expenditures for weapon procurements and overt Soviet interest in diminishing potential world trouble spots. Present evidence, Boll concludes, indicates that Soviet military policy is being subordinated to the long-term goal of domestic reorganization and consumer priority. Future military appropriations will confirm the extent of the Soviet commitment to détente and consumerism."

(2) *Implications for American and Western Defense*

CAN RUSSIA BE TRUSTED?, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 76, no. 19 (13 May 1974) 38-40 plus.

"Is an end to the Soviet-American arms race in sight? When can the U.S. safely withdraw troops from Europe? To spell out the defense problems this country still faces in a period of détente with Russia, Dr. Schlesinger came to the conference room of 'U.S. News & World Report' for this exclusive interview."

THE COST OF DÉTENTE: NO REST FOR

THE WARY, by H.A. DeWeerd, in *Army*, v. 24, no. 5 (May 1974) 17-20.

"Seeking peace as an end in itself, the West is clinging to a détente whose advantages have so far accrued to the Soviet Union with a corresponding diminution in the world position of the United States . . . NATO reluctance to assist the United States may have been increased by détente."

DÉTENTE: AN EVALUATION. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 26 p. (93d Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Committee on Armed Services, Committee Print.)

"A statement by a group of students of Soviet and international affairs which includes: Robert Conquest, Brian Crozier, John Erickson, Joseph Godson, Gregory Grossman, Leopold Labedz, Bernard Lewis, Richard Pipes, Leonard Schapiro, Edward Shils, and P. J. Vatikiotis . . . The American-Soviet détente is now several years old. Although formally it involves only the two super-powers, the overwhelming strength of their economies and military establishments ensures that their relations affect in one way or another the lives of the rest of humanity. The time has come to scrutinize the premises of the present détente and to appraise its consequences for the Western world. The following analysis has been prepared by a group of specialists in international affairs who share a deep sense of concern that the policy of détente as practiced so far has not been well-thought out in the West and that its net effect has been to erode the ability of the Western world to safeguard its values and its way of life. It is hoped that this analysis will stimulate a long-overdue discussion of a matter which, affecting as it does the condition of the world, must not be left exclusively to governments."

(LI)—DÉTENTE: DOES MBFR MEAN MUCH BETTER FOR RUSSIA, by Maj. John E. Thorne. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 43 p. (Research Study.)

"The United States is entering an era of negotiation and supposedly one of détente. We have concluded the SALT I interim agreement and are proceeding with SALT II, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. The inference to be drawn from the pub-

licity surrounding these negotiations is that the Russians may be willing to commit themselves to agreements that serve the national interest of the US as well as themselves. The author does not believe this is the case. The Russians have done nothing recently to indicate that past policies have been significantly altered. This paper will examine past and present Russian policies, the present negotiations, and the general environment in which they are being conducted."

DÉTENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY?, by Joseph Korb. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972. 302 p.

"Dr. Korb discusses in detail the changes in mood, policy and relationships that have ushered in a new era in intra-European relations. He gives major credit for the relaxation of tension to the Soviet bloc countries which have on numerous occasions submitted concrete proposals for the solution of critical problems; points out that this initiative has facilitated policies, such as West Germany's Ostpolitik, but has also weakened the political and cultural ties that have bound West Germany to the United States; and concludes that any designs for a stable European détente must be accompanied by a reduction of tensions between the superpowers themselves."

DÉTENTE OR ENTENTE, by Richard Rosecrance, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 53, no. 3 (April 1975) 464-481.

"The US-Soviet détente is neither fully understood nor certain to endure. The sheer complexity of détente balancing—holding the Soviet Union, China, the Western allies and Japan in a complicated network of associations with the United States which involve conflict as well as cooperation—may not last. Even if it could be sustained, some argue that American interests dictate that it should be dropped or radically modified. To others détente is an attitude, but not a policy. It represents a desirable and overdue recognition of realities in foreign policy—the need to achieve better relations with the Soviet Union and China. But it does not specify where the United States should go from there. Détente without a positive core of policy goals could jeopardize American relations with Japan and Western Europe without gaining any durable benefit from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet-American trade agreement makes it seem even less likely that the United States can

use détente as a means to extract important concessions from the U.S.S.R."

DÉTENTE: THE AMERICAN VIEW, by Henry Kissinger, in *Survival*, v. 17, no. 1 (January/February 1975) 35-42.

"Soviet-American détente cannot be defined in one or two summit meetings or in agreements: it is a process, an evolving relationship. Against the background of mounting criticism of current American détente policy in the United States and growing scepticism whether the efforts of détente policy are justified by its results, the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, has defined American détente strategy before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The text, which has only been slightly shortened is reprinted . . . [here]."

IS THIS DÉTENTE? by Melvin R. Laird, in *Reader's Digest*, (July 1975).

"Over the past several years, the United States has made major concessions and numerous gestures of goodwill to induce the Soviet Union to help defuse world powder kegs that could explode into war. We still hope that such efforts will eventually succeed. Certainly, everyone hopes to avoid renewal of Cold War confrontations. But it would be dangerously foolish to confuse hope with reality. Therefore, I am now persuaded that the American people ought to be told some unpleasant facts about the true status of détente, so that they can intelligently judge the Kremlin's current intentions. The facts are that, in recent months, the U.S.S.R.—secretly and openly—has repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock détente and threaten the free world. Let's look at six deeply troubling actions. [Mr. Laird concludes] SALT I prevents us from using defensive weapons within our capability to insure our survival. Now SALT II threatens to undercut the only safeguard the disarmament lobby has consented to grant us—our offensive firepower. If the illusion of détente is allowed to control our policies much longer, we could wind up with no effective defenses at all."

SALT AND THE AMERICAN MOOD, by Colin S. Gray, in *Strategic Review*, (Summer 1975).

"SALT may be intended primarily to bolster détente, but unless the strategic detail of SALT agreements are both equitable and sufficiently robust as to withstand the eroding effect of new technology, then SALT will damage politi-

cal relations in years to come. The U.S. is caught in the paradox that SALT must succeed (or be seen to succeed) if the superpower détente is to remain alive but a strategically meaningful SALT II treaty is beyond attainment. A remarkable feature of post-Vladivostok debate in the U.S. is that the pro-SALT constituency has shrunk very markedly. The Vladivostok accords are responsive neither to the strategic anxieties of defense-minded analysts, nor to the 'control the arms race' concerns of the arms control community. The Vladivostok 'guidelines,' with minor exceptions, are certainly neutral, in that they do not place the U.S. under unique constraints (unlike SALT I), but they do legitimize strategic developments of which the Soviet Union should be better able to take advantage (because of the throw weight asymmetry). We do not know what SALT is about, but as of mid-1975 it is beginning to be very clear indeed that SALT is not about arms control, it is not about improving U.S. defense posture and it certainly is not about enmeshing the Soviet Union in a seamless web of détente relationships. Recent changes in U.S. strategic doctrine are, in and of themselves, desirable, but it is unclear as yet that the U.S. will take sufficiently seriously the possible political implications of what SALT II will permit the Soviet Union to accomplish. Over the long term, the U.S. surely will react appropriately, but there may be a period wherein the Soviet Union is unconvinced of the merits of this judgment."

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF DÉTENTE AND ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS, by Roger Hamburg, in *Naval War College Review*, (May-June 1975).

"Détente is one of the most popular and paradoxical terms currently in vogue in diplomatic circles—a term that can be simultaneously stretched to provide a base for arms agreement, trade negotiations, or Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East. Obviously a precise definition of détente is impossible, given its current usage, yet it can be analyzed under four broad categories: 'submergence, convergence, divergence, and emergence,' each of which can give an entirely different perspective to the flow of international politics or to a particular event in question."

SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING, 1917-1962; SOME HISTORY REEXAMINED, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 6 (February 1972) 24-34.

"Some observers have characterized the current mood surrounding relations between the superpowers as moving toward 'détente,' while others have decried the ever-growing Soviet military might, both strategic and conventional, claiming it represents the principal threat to Western security. The crucial issue in this vital contemporary debate is clearly the question of Soviet intent. Indeed, future policy decisions cannot be made without first resolving this point. Tentative answers to these vexing questions can perhaps best be reached by first investigating Soviet strategic thought as it has evolved within the matrix of Russian historical experience."

(*) STRATEGY FOR THE WEST: AMERICAN ALLIED RELATIONS IN TRANSITION, ed. by Richard B. Foster and others. New York, Crane, Russak and Company, 1974. 258 p.

"This series of essays is devoted to an examination of the nature of the Soviet threat to Europe and the United States and the different ways of responding to it. It is useful background for the East-West negotiations currently in progress."

c. *Soviet-American (and Other) Conferences and Summits*

(1) *Nixon-Brezhnev Summits, 1972-1974.*

A NEW MILESTONE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by Y. Nikolayev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 9 (September 1974) 3-15.

"Another USSR-USA summit meeting, the third in two recent years, has just taken place in Moscow. As during the earlier meeting of this kind, the talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States constituted the main event in international affairs. Governments, public opinion, the press and the radio in all countries followed the Moscow summit very closely. All people of goodwill and the supporters of peace and détente awaited news from Moscow with great hope. At the same time, those who are staking everything on the preservation of tensions and who are trying to thrust the world back into another cold war could only sit back and anxiously nurse their animosity. The international situation that had developed by the beginning of the recent Moscow negotiations was characterised by a number of new features in comparison with the one obtaining before Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the USA last year. The process of international

détente continued to gain momentum. At an electoral meeting on June 14, 1974, Leonid Brezhnev declared: 'The favourable changes in the world situation are primarily the result of the influence on the course of events exerted by the socialist world, its successes, its power and its example. It is a result of the purposeful and coordinated policy of the socialist community'."

PRESIDENT NIXON VISITS NATO HEADQUARTERS AND THE SOVIET UNION, in *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. 71, no. 1831 (29 July 1974) 165-173.

"President Nixon left Washington on June 25 for a visit to Belgium and the Soviet Union. While in Brussels June 25-27, he met with NATO heads of government and signed the Declaration on Atlantic Relations."

SOVIET - AMERICAN AGREEMENTS, JUNE, 1973, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 173-177.

"During the Washington, D.C., summit meeting between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the week of June 18, 1973, several agreements, protocols, and a convention were signed. The texts of the agreements of scientific cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy, on the prevention of nuclear war, on cooperation in studies of the world's oceans, and on cooperation in transportation [appear] in full."

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MOSCOW SUMMIT OF 1972, by Jiri Valenta, in *SAIS Review*, v. 17, no. 2 (Winter 1973) 15-20.

"Despite the U.S. blockade of North Vietnamese ports, the Soviet Politburo decided to go ahead with the planned summit meeting between the ruling troika—Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin—and President Nixon. What underlay this decision to accept the humiliation of receiving Nixon in Moscow under such peculiar and painful circumstances? One factor influencing the Soviet decision-making process with regard to the Moscow meeting was Soviet concern over political developments in West Germany."

(2) *Ford-Brezhnev Summit, 1975 (Vladivostok Agreements)*

BEYOND VLADIVOSTOK: THE FEASIBILITY AND THE POLITICS OF ARMS REDUCTION, by Luther J. Carter, in *Science Magazine*, (11 April 1975) 16 plus.

"The Vladivostok agreement, which actually would allow the United States and the Soviet Union to add thousands of deliverable weapons to their strategic forces, is perceived by its defenders as one establishing ceilings from which eventual arms reductions could be made. No other claim can be made for it except the speculative one that, without the Vladivostok ceilings, the spiral of arms deployments would know no restraint whatever. Thus, the degree of enthusiasm that can be mustered for this agreement—which will not be ready for signing until the terms of verification have been successfully negotiated in Geneva—depends less on what it would provide than on the possibilities that lie beyond it . . . Two earlier articles (31 January and 21 February) discussed nuclear disarmament and arms control efforts from the early postwar period up through the first two phases of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), culminating in the Moscow agreements of 1972 and the Vladivostok agreement in principle of November 1974. A third article (14 March) reviewed the capabilities of the 'verification' technology for monitoring compliance with arms control accords."

HOW TO LIMIT STRATEGIC WEAPONS UNDER THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, by Edward M. Kennedy, in *Center Report*, v. 8, no. 2 (April 1975) 30-31.

"The Vladivostok Agreement as concluded by President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in November of 1974 is clearly inadequate as a final expression of efforts to limit the development and production of strategic armaments, Senator Edward M. Kennedy contends in the following comments written in response to an inquiry by CENTER REPORT. He suggests a series of steps which need to be taken 'if Vladivostok is not simply to permit a qualitative arms race that will make the agreed ceiling almost meaningless'."

MAYBE NO AGREEMENT WOULD BE BETTER, by James E. Dornan, in *Armed Forces Journal*, v. 112, no. 5 (January 1975)

The author attempts to show that the Vladivostok accord may make the Soviets stronger at the expense of the U.S. "The Vladivostok accord . . . appears to be another manifestation of Mr. Kissinger's belief that any agreement with the Soviets is better than none because agreements contribute something called the 'momentum of détente.' It may be time to reevaluate this contention; indeed, there are several good reasons for arguing that no agreement would be better than

this one. At the very least, there are good reasons to urge that the American negotiators be sent back to the table to gain Soviet acceptance of an arms control treaty which truly enhances the strategic security of both powers."

THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS, by Michael Nacht, in *Survival*, v. 17, no. 3 (May/June 1975).

"Vladivostok is viewed with discomfort precisely because of its failure to deal with the technological issues that are increasingly perceived to be the central focus of the arms competition: the number of MIRV-equipped warheads and their yield/accuracy characteristic, mobile launchers, strategic cruise missiles, and the relative counterforce capabilities of Soviet and American strategic forces. For it is where we are headed rather than where we are that is of greatest concern. It is the activity at the margin, therefore, that deserves our attention."

THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD AND SALT II, by Paul H. Nitze, in *The Review of Politics*, v. 37, no. 2 (April 1975) 147-160.

"After the summit meeting in Moscow in June 1974, Dr. Kissinger called for a national debate on the issue of strategic arms and arms control. No such debate has taken place. It has been overtaken by the more immediate issues of inflation, the liquidity of the international banking system, and the extent to which Arab oil profits can be reduced, offset or recycled. But these more immediate issues are, in turn, dependent on what happens in the Middle East with its triple problem of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, the oil weapon, and Soviet ambitions to control the World's economic jugular, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The ability of the United States favorably to influence the resolution of these issues depends upon the strength of its ties with other countries with similar interests and its economic and military potential. Thus, we are once more brought face to face with the interdependence of our economic and our national security policies."

VLADIVOSTOK ARMS RACE, by Doron Bar-Levov, in *Nation Magazine*, (12 April 1975) 15 plus.

"Despite the furore over the arms accord recently concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, one essential point has been missed. Critics as well as supporters have been

arguing about force levels and costs and whether 'we gave away too much to the Russians.' No one, however, seems to have asked the real question: does the United States need strategic arms limitation agreements at all? The answer appears to be no."

THE VLADIVOSTOK MEETING: IMPORTANT PROGRESS, by Y. Nikoloyev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 2 (February 1975) 3-9.

"A working meeting between General Secretary of the CC CPSU Leonid Brezhnev and President of the United States Gerald Ford took place near Vladivostok, the capital of the Soviet Maritime Region. These were the first talks between the General Secretary and the new President of the USA, the second Soviet-American summit meeting in 1974 and the fourth since the present summit-level Soviet American dialogue began. There is now every reason to say that this dialogue has become an inseparable and essential component of the process of relaxation of international tension. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how a real turn from tension to détente could have taken place without a radical restructuring of relations between the USSR and the USA on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence. As we know, each of the two states has broad political influence in the world and a powerful economic and military potential."

(3) *Helsinki Summit, 1975*
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)

(a) *Miscellaneous Aspects*

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, July 25, 1975. 3 p. (News Release.)

"A statement by President Ford prior to his departure July 25, 1975 for the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe via Bonn, Warsaw, and Krakow, and subsequent visits to Romania and Yugoslavia."

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. Washington, The Department of State, 1975. 4 p. (News Release.)

"President Gerald R. Ford addressed . . . [these] remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Finlandia Hall, August 1, 1975."

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, by Joseph Harned and others, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1973) 7-54.

"In this issue the Atlantic Community Quarterly presents in full a research paper—in three chapters—prepared by five authors in consultation with an Advisory Committee of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Here are examined in detail the issues for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: the issues in Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: and conclusions that might be derived therefrom. Both the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions are expected to begin during the current year in a major shift in emphasis in East-West relations."

FORD PROBES BREZHNEV'S IRON CURTAIN, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 5 (4 August 1975) 14-15.

"The Helsinki summit—a step to greater freedom for East Europe or a victory for Soviet imperialism? The President will see answers on his latest mission overseas. There is a bold purpose behind President Ford's first foray into Russia's satellite empire. The aim to demonstrate that the U.S. is not writing off Eastern Europe as an exclusive preserve of the Soviet Union. By going behind the Iron Curtain, Mr. Ford intends to stamp a clear U.S. interpretation on the agreement that he and 34 other heads of state were to sign at the Helsinki summit starting July 30. The Helsinki document is widely viewed as formal ratification of Europe's post-World War II frontiers and of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. President Ford is intent on challenging that assumption."

HELSINKI DOCUMENT NEUTRALIZES NATO, in *Human Events*, (9 August 1975).

"President Ford traveled to Helsinki last week, conferred with Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev and then signed, along with heads of state from 34 other nations, a 100-page document that has greatly cheered the leaders of the Kremlin. And no wonder . . . The worst aspect of the agreement, in our opinion, is not Western recognition of the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire or the furthering of the myth of détente, but the fact that the language in the Helsinki docu-

ment will tend to neutralize NATO and render it defenseless against Soviet machinations."

SOVIET UNION: 'AN EARNEST, CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY,' in *Time*, v. 106, no. 3 (21 July 1975) 32 plus.

"When the 35-nation European Security Conference convenes in Helsinki—possibly at the end of July—it will mark the fulfillment of one of Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev's major foreign policy goals. The conference will not only put the stamp of legitimacy on Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, but will also be visible evidence of the détente between East and West on which Brezhnev has staked his reputation. TIME Correspondent John Shaw's three-year residence in the Soviet Union as Moscow bureau chief has spanned nearly the entire era of détente. Shortly before leaving the Russian capital for reassignment, he cabled the following summing-up of the U.S.S.R. in the mid-70s: As the Brezhnev era draws to a close—the Party Chief is expected to retire next year—the prospects for the Kremlin have rarely looked so promising. In the eleven years of Brezhnev's reign, Moscow has achieved nuclear and hence political parity with the U.S., improved its image in the world, and extended trade and influence in Western Europe while maintaining political and economic control of Eastern Europe."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, by Mojmir Povolny, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 1 (Spring 1974) 201-230.

"Since the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union has pursued three main goals in her relations with Western Europe. First, from Potsdam through the fateful year of the Czechoslovak d'état and the Berlin blockade, to Khrushchev's threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and his renewed pressure on West Berlin, to the conclusion of the nonaggression pact with the Federal Republic of Germany and proposals for a European security conference, the Soviet regime has sought maintenance of the status quo and Western legitimization of its supremacy in Eastern Europe. Second, the Soviets have never accepted their exclusion from Western Europe. Their early support for, and manipulation of, the West European communist parties and fellow-traveling movements, their diplomacy in Paris, London, and eventually in Bonn, their fight against West European integration, and their promise of a bright and stable future for Western Europe should it open up to the East on their con-

ditions, bear witness to an active Westpolitik in search of the extension of Soviet influence. Third, the Soviets have understood that the American presence in Western Europe has severely circumscribed their freedom of maneuver in pursuit of the first two goals. Consequently, their battle against the Marshall Plan and NATO, the 1954 proposal for a European system of collective security, the persistent pressure for an all-European conference, and all the lesser moves in between have aimed at excluding the United States from playing a role in Europe. In the second half of the 1960's all these threads were woven into the single scheme for a European security conference. The time appeared to be propitious for such a move . . . This essay will argue that in proposing a European security conference the Soviet Union has been promoting a substitute for a peace conference on Germany, the latter, in its traditional form, having been outdated by the course of post-war developments."

A STAR-STUDDER SUMMIT SPECTACULAR, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 5 (4 August 1975) 16-18 plus.

"It was show time in Helsinki. This week's summit spectacular might be titled 'Goodbye to World War II.' Others thought of it as 'Dreams of Détente.' Still others would prefer to call it 'Much Ado About Nothing.' 'The Grand Illusion' or perhaps even 'The Decline of the West.' A few days before the show opened, the conference received some bad reviews from critics who labeled it 'The Betrayal of Eastern Europe.' But fortunately they will not be present at the premiere to put a damper on the show . . . The Helsinki meeting was bound to provoke skepticism, coming as it does less than a week after the end of the Apollo-Soyuz flight, another extravaganza that seemed more important for political show business than for substance. Unlike the Congress of Vienna . . . the Helsinki congress—the final phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—will probably not be remembered by history as much of a landmark. Its main official business will be the signing of a 100-page, 30,000-word joint declaration that is known so far as simply the 'Final Act.'"

(b) *The Soviet View*

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: A SUCCESSFUL BEGINNING, by L. Vidyasova, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 9 (1973) 11-17.

"The international détente has been gathering momentum and acquiring ever greater scope. The first week of July was marked by yet another international event of primary importance: the first stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place in Helsinki. At the Finlandia Hall of Congresses, the Foreign Ministers of 33 European countries and the USA and Canada held an exchange of news on various aspects on the question of consolidating peace and security in Europe as well as in respect to the further work of the Conference. The Ministers adopted the final recommendations including the agenda and assignments for the working bodies of the Conference, the rules of procedure and other regulations concerning the Conference. It was agreed that the second stage of the Conference, in the course of which working committees are to prepare the final documents, will open in Geneva on September 18. The third and culminating stage of the Conference which should adopt decisions will be of particular importance. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are of the opinion that this stage should be held on a summit level, and are convinced that it could be set for the end of this year."

THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, by N. Yuriev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 10 (1973) 15-22.

"The Soviet Union attaches fundamental importance to the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It considers that the Conference must become an important landmark along Europe's path toward a new historical phase, a phase of development marked by peaceful coexistence and beneficial cooperation. This aim is promoted by the main political task of the Conference—to lay the foundations of enduring security and cooperation in Europe. The Conference agenda, approved at its first stage in Helsinki, makes it possible to raise key questions of safeguarding security on our continent . . . The Soviet draft outlines the basic principles agreed upon by all participants in the multilateral consultations in Helsinki: sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, cooperation among states and conscientious observance of commitments under international law."

PROBLEMS OF NORTH EUROPEAN SECURITY, by Y. Goloshubov, in *New Times (Moscow)*, no. 4 (27 January 1971) 20-21.

"There are now favourable conditions in Europe for active preparation of a continent-wide security and co-operation conference. The greater the importance of the Finnish government's proposal of last November that preparatory meetings of representatives of interested states on matters relating to holding the conference should begin in Helsinki. The Soviet government observed with satisfaction in its reply that this proposal was a positive step contributing to practical preparation of the conference. The Finnish proposal was welcomed at the December meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. It was also received with approval in all the North European countries. The Finnish initiative demonstrates anew the great importance of the activity of all countries, big and small, in strengthening European peace . . . Scandinavia is an integral part of Europe, and its security is intimately bound up with that of Europe as a whole. And so the Scandinavian peoples have no less an interest than others in normalizing the political climate of the entire continent, a thing for which favourable conditions now exist. The firmer the foundations of peace in Europe, the more secure will be the peace of the North. Thus, the contribution this or that northern country makes to the common cause of European security serves its own national interests too."

d. *Economic Aspects*

DÉTENTE AND DOLLARS; DOING BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS, by Marshall I. Goldman. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1975. 337 p.

Lessons from the Past and Prospects for the Future; How Much Can the Soviet Union Pay?; How—and How Not—to Deal with the Russians; Appendices.

DÉTENTE: PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, AUGUST 22 TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1974, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OCTOBER 24, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 52 p.

(LI)—UNITED STATES TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION: EFFECTS ON UNITED

STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, by Maj. Robert R. Dockum. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 58 p. (Research Study.)

"The purpose of this writing is to consider the endurance of détente as a function of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis is that well-being is significantly enhanced through trade, and that this enhancement of well-being will be a major incentive for ensuring détente. Three conclusions are that détente has been strengthened by real and prospective East-West trade, that expanded US trade with the Soviet Union can be a proper US economic national security policy, and that expanded trade is complimentary of any long-run US military policy—including a policy for an expanded US military."

e. *Détente and the Middle East Crisis*

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS, by Michael Curtis, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 403-427.

"Only in the Middle East has the Soviet Union, by her startling behavior, called into being a situation in which her forces are actively engaged in hostilities, confronting the United States as well as Israel, and produced a crisis that threatens world peace."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OCTOBER 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DÉTENTE, by Foy D. Kohler and others. Washington, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 131 p.

"The tough policy pursued by the Soviets in the Middle East crisis revealed how they see the meaning of détente."

f. *Détente and Its Effects on Soviet and Chinese Communism*

COMMUNISM AND DÉTENTE, in *Journal or International Affairs*, v. 28, no. 2 (October 1974) 133-228.

"During the past several years, détente has been one of the most widely discussed topics in the field of international politics. Most writings concerning this issue have dealt with changing relations among the superpowers and other groups of states. Détente has been discussed in terms of the SALT talks, increasing commercial ties between the Soviet and Western blocs, the development of relations with the People's

Republic of China, etc. This issue of the JOURNAL approaches the study of détente from a slightly different direction—that of détente as an influence on the theory and practice of communism. The articles which follow examine various communist parties (and, when necessary, related non-communist groups as well) to determine what effect American-Soviet-Chinese détente has had on their ideology, leadership, domestic posture, and foreign affairs . . . Charles Gati analyzes the effects of détente on Eastern Europe. Reflecting the coincidence of party and state policies in communist-ruled nations, Gati dwells first on improved relations with the West and then on the position of the East European communist states as satellites of the Soviet Union. He points out that on the whole détente has not resulted in a relaxation of Soviet dominance. Rather, controls have if anything been strengthened—events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 are seen as a normal and repeatable expression of Soviet determination not to allow any interference with its hegemony over East Europe."

THE IMPACT OF DÉTENTE ON CHINESE AND SOVIET COMMUNISM, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 28, no. 2 (1974) 133-157.

"Walter Clemens discusses détente as it relates to the two largest and most important communist parties, those of the Soviet Union and China. After providing a definition of détente as it is understood by the Soviets and Chinese, Clemens summarizes the international developments that led to the adoption of détente policies. He then looks at events within the CPSU and the CCP, dealing particularly with the positions of Brezhnev and Chou En-lai, as well as the ideological justifications that have allowed the Soviets and Chinese to deal with the supposedly most hated foe of communism, the United States. Clemens concludes by drawing up a balance sheet of détente's accomplishments thus far, and poses questions that must be considered for the future."

2. Arms Control and Disarmament

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

AMERICAN ARMS AND A CHANGING EUROPE; DILEMMAS OF DETERRENCE AND DISARMAMENT, by Warner R. Schilling and others. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. 218 p.

"This book analyzes the problems and choices the United States will face in the decade ahead in the pursuit of three goals: European

security, strategic security, and arms control. The major focus of the analysis is on the forms that future European security arrangements may take and how American choices in arms and arms control policy can affect those arrangements. But policies for European security cannot be divorced from those for America's strategic security, and the analysis also considers the changes that may occur in the Soviet-American strategic balance and how they may affect both European security arrangements and the opportunities for strategic arms control. The authors examine the major military, economic, and political trends and developments that may materialize in Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union over the next decade and how these trends and developments may affect present European security arrangements; identify the pivotal variables that make possible eight different model security arrangements in Europe; and explain how prospective trends and developments could combine to lead to one or another of these eight model forms. The analytical purpose of the book is to delimit the range of possible futures and within that range to identify the main choices the United States will confront over the next decade in its effort to maintain both the European balance of power and the Soviet-American balance of terror. The policy purpose is to prescribe arms and arms control policies that can reduce the political and military costs and risks entailed in the pursuit of these objectives, particularly in an era of détente in Europe and parity in the Soviet-American strategic balance, without jeopardizing either the opportunities for strategic arms control or the effectiveness of the American political and military commitment to the defense of Western Europe. 'American Arms and a Changing Europe' reports the conclusions of a major research project undertaken by the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University on problems of European security. A number of background papers written for the project, upon which the present volume is partly based, have been published in a companion volume, 'European Security and the Atlantic System'."

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS; TEXTS AND HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament agency, 1975. 159 p. (Publication 77.)

Geneva Protocol; The Antarctic Treaty; "Hot Line" Agreement; Limited Test Ban Treaty; Outer Space Treaty; Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Seabed Arms Control Treaty; "Accidents Measures" Agreement; Biological Weapons Convention; SALT; ABM Treaty; Threshold Test Ban and Protocol; etc.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, by J. I. Coffey, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973) 132-154.

"Proposals for arms control in Europe are not new. Ever since the end of World War II there have been a plethora of suggestions for the disengagement of forces, the establishment of denuclearized or demilitarized zones, reductions in troop strength, and cutbacks in levels of weapons. What is perhaps new is that suggestions for arms control which previously received short shrift are now commanding respectful attention—if not yet wholehearted support. The reasons for these changing attitudes vary, both among states and between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Broadly speaking, NATO members see arms control in Europe as reflecting some degree of progress toward a détente and as facilitating the further improvement of relations between East and West . . . If the United States and the USSR demonstrate their prudence, cement their understandings with improvements in relations, and involve their allies in these measures, a new sense of security may develop, one that will be more meaningful and longer-lasting than any based on the military balance in Europe."

FORD SPELLS OUT THE ARMS AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 77, no. 25 (16 December 1974) 82 plus.

"From the transcript of President Ford's nationally televised news conference on December 2, 1974.—Will the new Soviet-American arms accord bring a cut in U.S. defense spending? Does it give the edge to Russia in nuclear weapons?"

(LI)—THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OPTIONS, by Col. John A. Callanan. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College. 1972. 49 p. (Professional Study.)

"Comments on contemporary and historical views of arms control and disarmament, including the objectives and purposes of arms control and disarmaments, provide a background for identifying current U.S. and U.S.S.R. systems and the balance of strategic forces. The characteristics of deployed systems are examined to determine

the systems characteristics most reasonably subject to controls. The needs for agreement and those agreements that have been achieved by the superpowers describe the environment for meaningful negotiations on strategic force level controls. The author describes some of the problems associated with the elimination of the U.S. biological weapons option and the impact of this decision on the remaining options of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Probable controls of delivery vehicles are discussed in terms of possible arms limitations agreements that would not upset a stable power balance. Concluding comments suggest some areas where arms control agreements could be mutually beneficial to the superpowers."

SHIFTS IN SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POSTURE, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 7 (July 1971) 28-36.

"While the Kremlin has kept alive its general support for an all-European security conference since the 1950's, the formal Soviet position on arms control has turned from emphasis on Europe to strategic arms limitations, both to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and to curb the superpower arms race. Soviet proposals from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's were aimed squarely at preventing or limiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, at establishing observation posts to inhibit planning for surprise attack, and at other problems relating to the confrontation between two armed camps in Europe. We can see the last signs of Soviet interest in such measures in the major memoranda outlining official priorities in arms control issued in 1964 and 1965. By comparing these documents with their counterparts in 1968 and 1969, we can see the trend away from Europe to a focus on strategic arms problems."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: ARMS LIMITATION POLICY. London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970. 48 p. (Adelphi Papers, no. 65.)

The Scope for Soviet-American Agreement, by Hedley Bull; The Effect of Strategic Agreements on European-American Relations, by Wilhelm Grewe; Parity, Superiority or Sufficiency? Some Remarks on the Nature and Future of the Soviet-American Strategic Relationship, by Johan Jörgen Holst; Innovation and Restraint, by Charles M. Herzfeld.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL, by James E. Dougherty, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 737-777.

"There is always a temptation, in analyzing one specific aspect of a nation's policy, to treat it as if it were the central focus of policymakers' thought at all times. Undoubtedly Soviet leaders are quite interested in strategic arms limitations and other arms control negotiations (such as the talks directed toward MBFR—mutual and balanced force reductions). They have a variety of reasons for this, including economic implications, relationship to détente diplomacy, and above all, consequences for Soviet national security and the eventual outcome of the worldwide struggle between political-ideological systems in an era of 'peaceful coexistence.' . . . In reflecting on the Soviet approach to the armaments problem, therefore, we should attempt to put the matter in some historical-conceptual perspective instead of relying upon apparently significant semantic shifts in the latest speech or communique issuing like an infallible pronouncement from the Third Rome."

THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL, by Lawrence T. Caldwell, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 150–154 plus.

"SALT II and MFR agreements should not be sacrificed for elusive, if desirable, goals like the alteration of the political system of the Soviet Union. To accept that goal, perhaps even in terms of 'freer movement of peoples and ideas,' is to regress toward the cold war and toward an incalculably more dangerous world."

(*) —THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A SUPERPOWER DILEMMA, by Roman Kolkowicz and others. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 212 p.

"An analysis of the perceptions, incentives, motivations and constraints that shape Soviet arms control policies. Included are chapters on Soviet policy and nuclear proliferation, the issue of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), and Soviet arms control policies toward China and Western Europe."

(*) —THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL: FROM COLD WAR TO INTERDEPENDENCE, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1973. 180 p.

"This . . . approach to Soviet-American arms-control negotiations, though somewhat overly systemic, argues persuasively for a gradual and ameliorative approach toward détente through interdependence."

WESTERN ARMS CONTROL POLICIES IN EUROPE SEEN FROM THE EAST, by W. Multan and A. Towpik, in *Survival*, v. 16, no. 3 (May/June 1974) 127–128.

"Formal negotiations for the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Eastern Europe have been going on between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries since 31 October 1973. Not surprisingly in these negotiations the motives of the participants are unlikely to be the same, and both East and West are influenced in their own negotiating positions by what they believe to be the other side's opinion. In the following article, based on a paper prepared for a small conference held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in November 1973, two Polish scholars state what they understand West European motives to be in the sphere of Arms Control. Dr. W. Multan is Scientific Secretary and Dr. A. Towpik Head of the Disarmament and Arms Control Section of the Polish Institute for International Affairs, Warsaw."

WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1974. Stockholm, International Peace Research Institute, 1974. 520 p.

"This fifth account of the major quantitative and qualitative changes that take place in the world's arsenals seems as far away as ever from being able to record any overall downward trend in spending on weapons of destruction. In fact, it points out that although military spending has remained roughly constant since 1968 (after allowing for inflation) at about \$200 billion, the trend has been towards a wider distribution. While the large share taken by the USA, USSR, UK and France has declined somewhat, the share of other countries has risen, thus the arms race is increasingly a global phenomenon. But undoubtedly the greatest threat to mankind comes from nuclear weapons, and here, unfortunately, the picture is no brighter. The Yearbook says that in 1973 alone there were 29 nuclear tests. And, despite SALT agreements, the two superpowers continued to make significant advances, both quantitative and qualitative, in their advanced nuclear weapons programmes in 1973. Of course this situation could be significantly changed by progress towards a SALT II agreement."

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1974, by Ruth Leger Sivard. New York, Institute for World Order, 1974. 30 p.

The information in text, chart, and table form includes data on the USSR and other East European countries, among many others in the world.

WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRADE 1963-1973. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975. 123 p. (Publication 74.)

The information is provided for all the major countries of the world including those of NATO and the Warsaw act. Trends in World Military Expenditures; Developed and Developing Worlds; World Arms Trade; Relative Burden. With statistical notes and statistical tables.

b. *The Soviet View*

INTERNATIONAL DÉTENTE AND DISARMAMENT, by V. Israelyan, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 5 (1974) 24-29.

"The favourable changes that have recently taken place in international relations and the growing improvement in the international political atmosphere paved the way for fresh steps aimed at establishing a more stable peace, consolidating the positive changes in world affairs and making them irreversible. The international détente, in particular, helps to create favourable prerequisites for tackling disarmament, one of the key problems of our day. Let us put it bluntly: if the arms race was the ugly offspring of the cold war, détente should naturally lead to disarmament, that is, to stopping the material preparations for war and utilising the resources thus released for economic and social development that would benefit all nations. In his speech at the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev stated: 'It goes without saying that the further extension of the arms race by the aggressive circles of imperialism, on the one hand, and the relaxation of international tension that has set in, on the other, are two processes running in opposite directions. The two cannot develop endlessly along what might be called parallel lines'."

NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ON DISARMAMENT, by V. Israelyan, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 11 (November 1974) 19-25.

"The struggle to end the arms race and achieve disarmament constitutes one of the main lines of the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The USSR sought to achieve this aim when it was the only socialist state,

against which was ranged the entire capitalist world. This remains the goal of the USSR today, when there exists a radical change in the relationship of forces in the world arena of favour of socialism. The international situation taking shape in the world, the détente, and the normalisation of relations between states belonging to different socio-political systems create favourable conditions for making progress along this path. In turn, the steps taken to limit armaments and achieve disarmament in the past few years, such as the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and the Soviet-American agreements on limiting strategic armaments help to deepen and extend the international détente. The tasks in the sphere of disarmament formulated in the Peace Programme, as worked out by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, have been embodied in the past few years in the concrete proposals advanced by the Soviet Union on the international scene. They have become the basis of many current negotiations on disarmament."

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPAGANDA AND THE STRANGE CASE OF MARSHAL GRECHKO. STAFF STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 108 p. (93d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Print.)

"The documentation which has been compiled in this study is significant and timely because of the light it throws on the Communist disarmament propaganda campaign, and on the staggering Soviet arms buildup which has been the counterpart of this campaign. This propaganda campaign is of interest to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee since it involves the entire Communist propaganda apparatus, domestic and international, including its numerous front organizations and its carefully fostered infiltrations in reputable non-Communist organizations with public influence. The study and the accompanying documentation are also significant because of the enormous personal importance of Marshal A. A. Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister since April 1967. Even before his elevation to the Soviet Politburo in April 1973, Soviet experts in the West had come to regard Grechko as the single most powerful man in the Soviet military

establishment and as the principal driving force behind the Soviet military buildup. His inclusion in the Politburo now makes it clear that, beyond his military influence and power, Grechko also commands an exceptional degree of political power in the ranks of the Soviet government. The record of Marshal Grechko argues strongly against the widespread assumption that there exists a cleavage, or potential cleavage, between the military and the civilian in the Soviet government. In the single person of Grechko, indeed, we find all the essential elements of Soviet policy exemplified and unified—the arms buildup, the expansionist diplomacy which has accompanied this buildup, and the propaganda drive to achieve agreements and objectives that will impair Western defense capabilities and undermine Western unity, at the same time as it encourages an almost somnolent feeling of security in the countries of the free world.”

USSR FOREIGN POLICY; ARMS LIMITATION AND OTHER TREATIES, by Andrei A. Gromyko, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v. 41, no. 2 (1 November 1974) 34–39.

Delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations, N.Y., 24 September 1974.—“As regards the Soviet Union, we throw onto the scales of peace the entire influence of our State and the whole authority of our policy. It was so before, and so it will continue to be. Those who are earnestly seeking for ways to establish and consolidate peaceful relations and to settle disputed problems at the negotiating table can definitely count on the reliable cooperation of the Soviet Union. For over half a century our country has been consistently pursuing a policy of peace, a policy of rebuffing aggression and safeguarding the rights of peoples, as that policy was formulated by V. I. Lenin. In present-day conditions too the struggle for peace means for us not an abstract category but concrete efforts to give practical effect to the foreign policy guidelines laid down by the 24th Congress of the CPSU. This is an expression of the Soviet people's will for peace and of their uncompromising determination to make it stronger. Implementation of the decisions of the Congress—the Program of Peace and Cooperation—has already yielded tangible results in the improvement of the international situation. This is clear to any impartial observer. It is equally clear that the current positive changes are to everyone's benefit. Indeed, if there is an area where the fundamental interests of all nations, without exception, converge, then it is the

maintenance of peace. The Soviet Union pursues its policies in close coordination with our allies and friends. The socialist community of States unites its participants in a common creative effort—the building of an advanced society which by its very nature rejects war. It is not fortuitous that many major peaceful initiatives have been sponsored by the socialist countries. The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the State Members of the Warsaw Treaty last April reaffirmed their determination to fight for the triumph of the ideals of peace and of economic and social progress of peoples.”

c. *Control of Naval Armaments*

THE CONTROL OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS; PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES, by Barry M. Beechman. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975. 100 p.

The author “reviews previous attempts to control navies through negotiation, describes alternative approaches, and outlines several specific proposals. Examining each aspect of the issue from the perspectives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and interested third powers, he concludes that the most promising approach to naval arms control would be to strive for either of two kinds of agreement: one that would establish ceilings on number and tonnage of warships in three separate categories, or one that would limit the size and duration of naval deployment in the Indian Ocean. He warns, however, that any naval arms control agreement implies complicated tradeoffs between risks and benefits that need to be shrewdly assessed in the context of contemporary international politics.”

d. *Mutual Hostage Relationship Between USSR and U.S.*

THE MUTUAL-HOSTAGE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICA AND RUSSIA, by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 1 (October 1973) 109–118.

“For nearly two decades the strategic nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and the United States have been great enough for each to hold the other's civilian population as hostage against a devastating nuclear attack. Living with this situation has not been and will not be easy: it has become, quite simply, one of the major tensions of modern life. Yet the mutual-hostage relationship has been given credit, and probably justly so, for the prevention of massive world wars. During the last few years, this relationship

has been exposed to broader public scrutiny as a result of the SALT I negotiations and treaty, and a number of articles and statements have appeared criticizing U.S. policy with regard to the situation."

e. *Troop Reduction*

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND FORCE REDUCTIONS, by Capt. John C. Reppert, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 10 (October 1974) 24-29.

"More than a year has passed since representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO first sat down together at the conference table in Vienna to discuss the possibility of mutual force reductions in Central Europe. While the first concrete agreement on reductions has yet to be reached, a review of the Soviet military press for the past year suggests a clear lack of enthusiasm by the Soviet military leadership toward the talks. Further, the talks have rekindled a number of sensitive problems for the military leadership. The two areas where this has been most acute are the psychological preparedness of Soviet troops and the apparent questioning by some elements of the military concerning their proper role in deciding the military aspects of détente. The first and most obvious aspect of the Soviet military's public reaction to the force reduction talks has been the general lack of enthusiasm toward them."

SYMMETRICAL FORCE REDUCTIONS VERSUS EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY, by Henry M. V. Buntinx, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 5 (October-November 1970) 29-33.

"As long as Western Europe remains only a loose conglomerate, NATO must not be weakened. In Europe itself only the Soviet Union stands to win from a withdrawal of the USA and from an eventual autonomous but fragmented European balance. Such a Western Europe would soon fall a victim to the 'superior relation of forces of Communism', which means that Moscow would switch over to the underground techniques of subversion. This possibility is a real one, according to the missionary and charismatic impetus inherent in its para-religion. In short, the Communists want a formalistic all-embracing design scheme and the abolition of the alliances, whilst NATO opts for a gradual and pragmatic approach, stage by stage."

U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE: ISSUES,

COSTS, AND CHOICES, by John Newhouse and others. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1971. 177 p.

"In light of current Congressional efforts to have the number of American military forces in Europe cut back, made notable by the Mansfield Resolution, this is a timely assessment of the complex economic, military and political factors which require consideration before such a step might be taken. The authors attempt to answer such crucial questions as: Does improvement of the East-West political environment mean that the Soviet threat to Western Europe is diminishing? Is there a stable military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe, and how important to that balance are U.S. forces? What do American forces actually cost, and how could the burden be reduced?"

3. *Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): The Illusion and the Realities*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1975. HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PART I. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 800 p.

Among many others, provides some information on the following: Prepositioning Equipment in Europe; SALT Talks; NATO Obligations; etc.

THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, by Hedley Bull, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1973. 50 p. (A publication of The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, no. 15.)

"This paper presents an . . . analysis of the Agreements, which were signed in Moscow in 1972. Professor Bull seeks to estimate the value of the Agreements in relation to the objectives of arms control set out more than a decade ago in his . . . work 'The Control of the Arms Race,' and to assess their significance for the political and strategic relations among the major powers. His findings are based on research and conversations in America, Europe and Japan."

THE NEW NUCLEAR DEBATE: SENSE OR NONSENSE?, by Ted Greenwood and Michael

L. Nacht, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 4 (July 1974) 761-780.

"There is a widespread and deep-seated dissatisfaction today with many of the fundamental premises underlying American strategic weapons policy. The dissatisfaction stems in part from disappointment with the terms of the arms-control agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union at the Moscow summit meeting in May 1972. The treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistics missile systems is sometimes said to provide little more than a codification of the immoral relationship in which the population of each super-power is left hostage to the strategic nuclear forces of the other. The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons is faulted for conceding numerical superiority to the Soviet Union. The inability of political accords to keep pace with technological innovation, it is argued, is rendering strategic arms-control agreements obsolescent almost before the ink dries. In part, too, the dissatisfaction stems from the vigor of Soviet strategic weapons programs and from apparent Soviet intransigence at the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). Other aspects of Soviet policy—their stance during and subsequent to the 1973 war in the Middle East and their continued rigidity in dealing with the question of human rights within their own society—while perhaps logically distinct from strategic issues, nevertheless reinforce a general skepticism of Russian intentions."

THE RACE TO OBLIVION; THE SUPER-POWERS TALK PEACE WHILE PREPARING FOR WAR, by Milton Leitenberg, in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, v. 30, no. 7 (September 1974) 8-20.

"Some exceedingly peculiar developments have been taking place along with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Under its rubric, or at least concomitant with it, both the United States and the Soviet Union have prepared for the deployment of their respective next generation of strategic nuclear delivery systems. The next stages for each are not equivalent—United States strategic weapon systems are still far more advanced than are those of the Soviet Union—but each side is embarking on a new stage of armament development."

(LI)—SALT AND THE RESULTING U.S. AIR FORCE POSTURE, by Lt. Col. Edward J. Palanek. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Com-

mand and Staff College, 1973. 53 p. (Professional Study.)

"Remarks on U.S. and Soviet objectives in the SALT negotiations precede a review of the three documents signed in the SALT I agreements. There follows a discussion of the Soviet threat, extension of applicable portions of Soviet foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine, and a blending of these considerations in order to develop an appropriate Air Force posture. This resulting Air Force posture is keyed to an increasing assertion of Soviet global presence and influence. It provides for an enhanced flexibility and technological superiority in nuclear weapon systems, and a much broader range of conventional force options as a result of increased mobility, weapon system diversification, and active force mission integration with reserve units."

SALT LEXICON. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1974. 19 p. (ACDA Publication No. 71.)

"Designed to provide a reference to the acronyms, words, and phrases associated with the strategic arms limitation negotiations and to clarify concepts and answer some questions which are raised in this context."

SALT: THE ILLUSION AND THE REALITY, by Bruce D. Hamlett, in *Strategic Review*, (Summer 1975).

"There are major differences in the Soviet and the American concepts of deterrence and strategic forces, as well as in their understanding of the requirements and implications of détente. While the Soviet defense posture emphasizes both war-avoidance and war-waging capabilities via assured survival, the United States' approach concentrates on war-avoidance through assured destruction capabilities. While the Soviets view détente as a tactic to be used in the process of changing the status quo, the Americans view détente as a desired end. Because of these differences, the SALT negotiations and agreements have resulted in an international situation offering clear threats to long-run American security. An evaluation of SALT thus far must conclude that: 1) concern with presidential electoral politics has caused both Ford and Nixon to make unwise and unnecessary concessions to the Soviet Union; 2) nuclear parity has provided the Soviets with superiority in the contemporary 'correlation of forces'; 3) through the process of nuclear arms control negotiation, the Soviet Union has moved from a position of inferiority in capabilities to a position of clear

potential superiority; and 4) the Soviet Union is now in a position to resist any American pressure for its withdrawal from conflicts in the Middle East, Asia and Europe."

SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS—1960–68: A PRELUDE FOR SALT, by Lt. Col. Eric W. Hayden, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 5 (January 1972) 65–82.

"Few issues are of such universally recognized significance to the future well-being of all mankind as is the question of strategic arms control. While we may well be standing on the threshold of a most far-reaching arms agreement today, the postwar history of arms negotiations has been marked by few bright spots. The . . . analysis of the progress achieved in the sixties and the motivations of the two superpowers which underlie it serve to put today's SALT bargaining in a more comprehensible light."

b. SALT I

ASSESSING THE MOSCOW SALT AGREEMENTS, by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 2 (Summer 1972) 341–360.

"An ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles were signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev on May 26, 1972. Even though great powers have often negotiated and broken international agreements in response to their changing interests, these accords have been hailed, respectively by their supporters and opponents, as the beginning of a new era of peaceful coexistence between the superpowers, and as a mold which would lock the United States into permanent status as a second-rate power. Therefore, it is appropriate to inquire whether the agreements signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow contribute to international security and the security of the United States, or at least do not detract from existing security. Do they, in fact, restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Do they lead directly to superpower détente or improve the prospects for further agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union? Do they facilitate the reduction of military spending in favor of domestic needs? This article analyzes the outcome of SALT Phase I and seeks tentative answers to such questions."

BEYOND SALT ONE, by Herbert Scoville, Jr., in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 3 (April 1972) 488–500.

"Although President Nixon's goal of achieving an initial agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) before the end of 1971 failed to be realized, it still appears likely that at least some limitations will be negotiated by the time that he and Premier Kosygin meet in Moscow in May. After SALT recessed in Vienna the President reported in his state of the world message on February ninth that a consensus is developing that there should be a treaty setting comprehensive limitations on anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and an interim agreement to freeze certain offensive arms . . . An initial agreement at SALT, even if limited in scope, can mark the beginning of a new era in the nuclear weapons age. Opportunities will be opened up not only for halting the upward march of the arms race, but also for redirecting it downward so that the risks of a nuclear conflagration are reduced and the economic burdens of weapons programs lightened. Many of the new measures proposed will not be arrived at easily. Strong pressures for new weapons programs as hedges against possible treaty violations will have to be resisted vigorously. Complacency after an initial agreement must not be allowed to slow the drive toward further limitations."

REFLECTIONS ON SALT: THE LEGACY OF THE 1968 NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, by Jerry Parker. Los Angeles, Calif., State University, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1973. 14 p. (Occasional Papers Series No. 1.)

"The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have generated a great deal of popular support in America and Russia, but they are in danger of being oversold by their enthusiasts. Most commentators have analyzed SALT I only with respect to its impact on the ongoing strategic relationship between the two superpowers. Few have systematically examined its potential impact on the rest of the world. Let us then view SALT from that vantage point."

SALT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, ed by Morton A. Kaplan. Morristown, General Learning Press, 1973. 251 p.

". . . Kaplan and eight contributors discuss the general nature of arms control problems, factors influencing the negotiations and the political context of SALT. These discussions were originally presented as papers during the winter of 1970 and early spring of 1971 at the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar held at the University

of Chicago. Despite the fact that, except for Kaplan's, they were prepared before the SALT agreements of 1972, their basic contents generally has not become outdated or overtaken by events. On balance, they are relevant to understanding the current SALT negotiations by helping to clarify the underlying issues and broad concepts to be dealt with by the present and future negotiations . . ."

SALT: THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND, ed. by Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander. New York, Free Press, 1974. 361 p.

"Book on the SALT I accords, in which ten recognized experts explore all facets of SALT: the policy-making process in Washington and Moscow; the perspectives on SALT I as viewed from Europe, China and Japan; the U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic arsenals and the details of the agreements; and the task ahead in SALT II and beyond. Glossary, bibliography and appendix."

THE SOVIET STRATEGIC CHALLENGE UNDER SALT I, by Benjamin S. Lambeth, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 150-155.

"Writing of the significance of Salt I, this specialist notes that the agreement 'symbolizes the formal acceptance by both [the United States and the Soviet Union] . . . of the desirability of a staple mutual deterrence relationship' . . ."

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT, 1972, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 181-183 plus.

"On May 26, in Moscow, while United States President Richard Nixon was visiting the Soviet Union, the President and Soviet General Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed a treaty agreeing to limit antiballistic missile systems, an interim agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons and a protocol attached to the interim agreement. The texts of the three documents [are presented here] in full."

TECHNOLOGY AND THE NATO-WARSAW PACT STRATEGIC BALANCE, by Jozef Wilczynski, in *Australian Outlook*, v. 27, no. 3 (December 1973) 286-306.

"The far-reaching impact of the scientific and technical revolution, the rapid industrialization in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the uncertainties surrounding the administration of strategic controls in East-West trade, all bring up

the intriguing question of the relative strengths of the two most formidable military alliances confronting each other today. This question has assumed new significance in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the USA and the USSR, which led to the first agreement in May, 1972, mildly limiting the arms race in terms of volume but not necessarily in respect of technological quality. As is well known, further negotiations have been resumed since that time. In this article we shall examine the objectives and effects of the Western strategic embargo, the flow of technology between the nations of the two military alliances, the military-industrial establishment in the Warsaw Pact countries and finally we shall discuss the military strengths and weaknesses of the two blocs. The spotlight in this article is focused on the Warsaw Pact."

c. SALT II

PROSPECTS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, in *Survival*, v. 16, no. 2 (March/April 1974) 54-74.

Contents: MIRV Control Is Still Possible; Soviet Interests and MIRV Control; SALT II—A Soviet View; and Reducing the Overkill.

SALT AFTER VLADIVOSTOK, by Gerard C. Smith, in *Journal of International Affairs*, v. 29, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 7-18.

"A surprise result of the 1974 Vladivostok 'working' meeting between President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev was the joint US-Soviet statement foreshadowing a definite agreement limiting offensive strategic arms. Some confusion accompanied announcement of its provisions and the accord has met a good deal of criticism. This article will discuss the accord and consider certain other strategic arms control issues."

SALT; AN ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL, by Henry M. Jackson, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v. 40, no. 6 (1 January 1974) 169-172.

"A few weeks ago the Soviet Union proposed a draft treaty at the SALT talks in Geneva. This Soviet proposal, which is so one-sided as to be completely unacceptable to the United States, actually represents a step backwards in the search for a more stable strategic balance and a more peaceful world. With this unfortunate step in the wrong direction, the SALT talks have reached an impasse. I believe, Mr. President, that we ought to make a determined effort to end this impasse by moving from arms control proposals that serve the interests of one side only to a proposal for

serious and far-reaching disarmament that would leave both sides in a position of strategic equality. To accomplish this objective I have formulated a specific proposal—one that would mean an immediate reduction in the strategic arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union so that the combined intercontinental strategic forces of the two countries would be reduced by about one-third."

SALT AND THE SOVIET MILITARY, by Raymond L. Garthoff, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 1 (January-February 1975) 21-37.

"In November 1969 the USSR and the United States commenced formal talks on the limitation of strategic arms. These talks, commonly known as SALT, led in May 1972 to a treaty between the two powers restricting the deployment of antiballistic missile systems and to an interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. During the subsequent phase of the negotiations, popularly called SALT II, the exchanges have focused on further restrictions on strategic offensive weapons systems, and in this connection General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford reached agreement in Vladivostok in November 1974 on the basis for negotiating during 1975 a 10-year limitation agreement covering such offensive arms. The talks themselves have been private, and the diplomatic record remains closed. But the following article presents observation and reflections on one important aspect of SALT by a direct participant in the negotiations for more than three years, written from his own personal and informed perspective."

SALT II AND OFFENSIVE FORCE LEVELS, by Richard Burt, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1974) 465-481.

"One of the most vexing problems facing negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is the existence of asymmetries in the U.S. and Soviet offensive strategic nuclear arsenals. A variety of factors—history, bureaucracy, strategy and technology—have caused the two powers to proceed at different rates of force modernization while, at the same time, placing different emphasis on the various components of their strategic forces . . . These asymmetries were dealt with at SALT I by agreeing to a temporary ceiling on offensive strategic missiles (the Interim Agreement) that generally ignored U.S.-Soviet differences in strategic force design and composition. The result is that the guidelines for SALT II

agreed upon at the June 14-18, 1973 summit in Washington to (1) achieve permanent ceilings on offensive strategic forces, (2) control qualitative aspects of offensive weaponry, and (3) provide for the eventual reduction of forces, pose difficult challenges for negotiators at the second round of the talks—challenges that negotiators were unable to overcome during the June summit in Moscow . . . At SALT II, an agreement on mutual aggregate ceilings would entail an expansion of the Interim Agreement's 'freedom to mix' sanction, which permits, but does not require, the replacement of older ICBM's with modern SLBM's. A general aggregate ceiling would allow the substitution of forces in one category for those in another, restricted only by a comprehensive mutual ceiling placed on a selected index of offensive power. (Using the measure of launcher numbers, the Interim Agreement permits 'one-way' substitution; under an aggregate ceiling scheme, ICBM's SLBM's and bombers could be freely traded.) Thus, aggregate ceilings would seem to allow each side the opportunity to tailor its strategic inventory to its own technological capability and perceived strategic and geopolitical needs (including third-power threats), while creating an overall situation of offensive parity. In this light, it is worth examining the problem of reaching such an agreement."

SALT II—PROBLEM, AND PROSPECTS, by Henry T. Simmons, in *International Defense Review*, no. 4 (August 1975).

"Gaping differences have emerged between the US and the Soviet Union on the interpretation of several major features of the Vladivostok aide memoire, which sets the framework for a new interim agreement between the two powers on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The Vladivostok agreement, signed last November 24 by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, is deceptively simple and clearcut on its face . . . But serious problems have developed between the two sides in reaching agreement on criteria for verification of when a weapon is 'MIRVed,' and in determining which weapons are to be counted as strategic delivery vehicles . . . While the obstacles to effective control cruise missiles are severe, failure to come to grips with these new weapons could imperil the basic concept of strategic arms equivalence and agreed limitations on total strategic power. Pressure to escalate forces in the non-controlled part of the strategic weapons spectrum would become overwhelming for both parties, and this in turn would

reduce the credibility and value of any agreement to curb other strategic forces . . . It is clear, however, that a new high-level negotiating effort will be required to clear up the yawning uncertainties posed by the Vladivostok aide memoire, not to mention some of the more disconcerting trends in modern weapons technology."

SALT II—SOME PRINCIPLES, by Arthur G. B. Metcalf, in *Strategic Review*, v. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 6-17.

"The author discusses the prospects and pitfalls of SALT II negotiations in the post-SALT I environment. His analysis of the realities of strategic arms limitation agreements points out certain guiding principles and suggests a break with past orthodoxies. A critical examination of what constitutes equity and balance in strategic terms is urged as essential to avoidance of irreversible miscalculation in the potentially determinative arena of strategic power."

SALT II. THE SEARCH FOR FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT, by Joseph Kruzel, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 334-363.

"During the first six months after SALT II convened in Geneva on November 21, 1972, the two sides devoted themselves largely to exploratory discussions. It became clear during these early talks that some framework was needed to guide the negotiations. Without such a framework, SALT II could easily be reduced to a forum for unproductive exchanges of propaganda. When Secretary Brezhnev visited the United States in June 1973, the two sides agreed that a statement of general principles could give new impetus to the stalled negotiations. Accordingly, the 'Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms' were signed on June 21, 1973 with both leaders expressing the hope that these new guidelines would establish a framework making it possible to reach agreement sometime in 1974. The two delegations have since returned to Geneva, and presumably are hard at work on their appointed tasks of converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent treaty. What should we expect from their deliberations? What are the issues confronting the two sides in SALT II, and what are the prospects for negotiating mutually acceptable solutions to these issues?"

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION (JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, 24 NOVEMBER

1974), in *Survival*, v. 17, no. 1 (January/February 1975) 32-34.

"As a result of their working meeting on 23 and 24 November 1974, the President of the United States and the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union agreed to work for a new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. While incorporating 'the relevant provisions' of the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Offensive Systems of May 1972, the new agreement's major aspect would be to put a new ceiling on the overall number of strategic delivery vehicles on both sides and a limitation on the number of land- and sea-based missiles that can be equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). The overall ceiling for strategic delivery systems has been fixed at 2,400 for each side, and the permitted number of launchers equipped with MIRV at 1,320. This basic understanding will now have to be translated into a workable agreement, and negotiations started in January 1975. The text of the Statement is reprinted . . . [here] together with the relevant parts of the Press statement by the US Secretary of State on 24 November 1974."

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS: A STOCKTAKING, by Kenneth Booth, in *World Survey*, no. 73 (January 1975) 18 p.

"Explains the complicated procedures and results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, including the Ford-Brezhnev agreement in Vladivostok in November 1974."

d. *Implications of SALT Agreements*

IMPLICATIONS OF SALT AGREEMENT DETAILED, in *Aviation Week*, (15 September 1975).

"Henry S. Rowen, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget and president of the Rand Corp., recently testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations on the implications of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) process between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Mr. Rowen, now professor of urban management and public policy at Stanford University, discussed in detail the advantages gained by the Soviets in the SALT I and Vladivostok agreements and potential pitfalls in the drafting of SALT II. Because of its implications, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY is reprinting

the statement. The initial portion of the statement . . . [is included here]. The final portion will appear in a subsequent issue."

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SALT AGREEMENTS IN THE 1970s, by Col. Charles L. Brindel, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 6 (June 1975) 39-48.

Background Negotiations That Led to SALT; Prospects and Possible Effects of SALT; Measuring Success of SALT; The Influence of Public Opinion and the News Media on SALT; etc.

(*)—SALT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1970s, ed. by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973. 447 p.

"These fourteen original essays and five reports on symposium discussions deal with many aspects of the complex problem of arms control. Authors and topics included Robert Pfaltzgraff on the rationale for superpower arms control; Thomas W. Wolfe on Soviet interests in SALT; J. I. Coffey on American interests in limitation of strategic armaments; Robert R. Bowie on the bargaining aspects of arms control; Robert A. Scalapino on the American-Soviet-Chinese triangle and implications for arms control; William R. Kintner on arms control for a five-power world; Geoffrey Kemp and Ian Smart on SALT and European nuclear forces; Wynfred Joshua on SALT and the Middle East; James E. Dougherty on SALT and the future of International politics. The editors provide a final paper on 'The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements of 1972; Implications for International Security'."

e. *Monitoring Soviet Compliance and Violations*

(LI)—SALT II AND SOVIET COMPLIANCE, by Maj Gordon S. Bounds. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala, Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 97 p. (Research Study.)

"This paper identifies and analyzes the principal factors which would influence a possible Soviet decision to violate a SALT-II agreement reducing land-based ICBM's. The study assumes a particular agreement with respect to weapons levels. The major portion of this work is concerned with the reasons the Soviets might choose to violate the agreement, their capacity to do so, and the restraints they would encounter. Although the conclusions minimize the likelihood of a Soviet

violation, the recommendations are such as to urge great caution."

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT DEAL. HAVE WE BEEN HAD?, by Tad Szulc, in *New Republic*, (7 June 1975) 3 plus.

"The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over the implementation of the 1972 nuclear strategic arms' limitation agreements (SALT) are deepening and new ones are emerging around the 'tentative' accord for a second step in SALT that President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev reached in Vladivostok last November. This state of affairs, throwing a pall on the future of détente unless the basic SALT problems are promptly resolved, 'has been generally concealed . . . because of its enormous political sensitivity. That so many of these problems result from ambiguities that the US has accepted in the SALT treaty and the accompanying protocols is also a reflection on the quality of Secretary of State Kissinger's diplomacy. Besides Kissinger, wittingly or not, may have misled the Congress in explaining the 1972 pact.' As far as is known Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made virtually no progress in breaking the SALT deadlock when they met in Vienna in May. The standing US-Soviet Consultative Commission on SALT, which was to have resumed its secret discussions in Geneva on June 2, postponed its session for at least a month, possibly pending Kissinger's and Gromyko's scheduled new meeting in July. If they fail to settle the current controversy, not only SALT but détente will be in considerable trouble."

U.S.-SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT; THE MONITORING OF JOINT COMPLIANCE, by James L. Buckley, in *Vital Speeches of the Day*, v. 41, no. 3 (15 November 1974) 66-68.

"Next week I will be setting forth on a brief pilgrimage to the Soviet Union by way of Poland not so much to worship at the altars of détente (for this would be premature), as to seek to educate myself as to some of the problems that lie in the way of its achievement. For it is of critical importance that we make the necessary distinctions between the hope for a lasting relaxation of tensions between East and West and the conditions that must be met if that hope is to be translated into the reality we all seek . . . There is one area of overriding importance, however, that I will not in the nature of things be able to investigate while in the Soviet Union. I speak of the extent to which the Russians are abiding by

the spirit and the letter of the SALT I accords, for this is central to an assessment of current strategic realities and Soviet intentions. What I would like to discuss with you today is my growing concern over the shape and nature of the current SALT II negotiations in light of information I have received in the last few days from knowledgeable individuals in and out of government that bears directly on the question of Soviet compliance with the existing agreements for the limitation of strategic weapons. On the basis of what I have learned, I believe that it is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Union has been engaged in patterns of activity that at worst constitute deliberate breaches of the SALT I accords, and at best represent a stretching of every ambiguity and advantage in those accords in ways that raise serious questions as to Soviet intentions in the continuing negotiations for limitations on strategic weapons."

C. Soviet Global Aims and Objectives: By Country and Region

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, by Aaron D. Thrush, in *Air Force Magazine*, (September 1970) 116-120.

"Since WW II, Soviet political and military strategies have consistently pursued the Marxist-Leninist ideological objective—the world-wide advance of communism—tempered by the preservation of Soviet security. Other factors, however, such as capabilities, opportunities, personalities, internal group interests, and national pride, have also influenced the formulation of these interwoven strategies. Stalin, after WW II, attempted to expand Soviet influence and hegemony wherever prospects seemed favorable, but cautiously retreated from situations that might escalate into nuclear confrontation with America . . . After Stalin's death, Soviet strategists changed the emphasis from economics to armed conflict itself, permitting discussion of nuclear weapons and the decisiveness of an initial nuclear campaign. This, in turn, led to a growing belief that the USSR might not have to fight a major nuclear war unless it chose to do so. Recognizing the importance of nuclear weapons, Khrushchev, in 1956, proclaimed that war was no longer inevitable and that 'peaceful coexistence' might continue until communism finally triumphed . . . In the latter half of the '60s, Khrushchev's successors reduced cutbacks in general purpose forces and began modernizing the Army, Navy and Air Force,

combining the 'balanced forces' and nuclear strategies. Such a combination lends itself to support of wars of national liberation while answering the Soviet expectation that, in a general war, the final victory will depend on the use of large-scale frontal ground defenses in the annihilation of the enemy forces and the occupation of the enemy homeland. Furthermore, current Soviet leaders have shown little tendency to shed the Marxist-Leninist ideological objectives of furthering world communism."

THE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE, by Foy D. Kohler, in *Ordnance*, (September-October 1971) 118-120.

"Ambassador Kohler traces Soviet ideology from Lenin to the present, maintaining it has undergone no basic change . . . Soviet leaders are also imbued with the traditional Russian attitudes towards vulnerability and the relativity of power: you are stronger if your opponent is weaker (one reason they want the US out of European bases). Despite the great need for capital investment for their underdeveloped lands, the Soviets try to rival us in their military and space efforts. Although their GNP is less than half of ours, they spend 13% of it on military expenditures while we spend 8.7% on ours. One reason for this is the great shock they received when they discovered during the Cuban crisis that bluff is not certain to work in international relations. Kohler relates that in December 1966, when he discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin the possibility of avoiding a new arms spiral with ABMs—which led to the start of the SALT—Dobrynin replied: 'What do you want to do, freeze us into a position of inferiority?' Kohler does not believe that the Soviets' program of the past two years to build up their ICBM level will continue; they had to have as many as possible to continue the SALT with a feeling of equality. However, he believes they will continue their investment in their naval program, especially submarines, after which they will probably build a bomber force of considerable size, since they are very impressed with our Strategic Air Force."

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Richard Lowenthal, in *Survival* (January-February 1972) 2-7.

"Lowenthal notes that Russia emerged from WW II as a world power second only to the US; and though a technological gap still exists between the two, Russia has since reached a state of overall parity with the US in armaments. It

still maintains its East European empire despite numerous serious crises, but its Chinese ally has become a rival and potential enemy. Russia's foreign policy has adjusted to changing world situations, from imposing forcible transformations on society to gradually but determinedly increasing Russia's prosperity and power. Russia is interested in expansion but aware that the international system cannot be overthrown by worldwide revolution. Its claimed commitment to peaceful coexistence allows it to avoid nuclear war while continuing to promote limited conflict and maintaining its control at home and in Eastern Europe. Lowenthal believes Soviet long-term strategy toward China is basically defensive in that it aims to: (1) inhibit the growth of China's power by containing its influence in Asia, and (2) stabilize the Russo-Chinese border by military measures and, if possible, negotiated agreements . . . Lowenthal concludes that no rapprochement can be secure or complete in a fundamentally unstable world. Settlements between the US and Russia are hampered by the difficulty of negotiations about arms limitation and each side's desire to preserve its own security in the Middle East and Mediterranean. In addition, recent American monetary actions may affect the Western Alliance and the ability of the nations concerned to conduct a common policy. If Western cohesion worsens, Russia can be expected to reevaluate its opportunities and priorities."

FINLANDIZATION IS NOT A CURSE WORD, by Anne Fried, in *Worldview*, v. 16, no. 1 (January 1973) 17-21.

"The story of one nation's determined pursuit of her own way in something short of the best of all possible worlds . . . In almost all the literature about the future of Europe, whether hopeful or doom-laden, it is assumed that a Europe of real independence or of genuine partnership with other nations is not possible. Europe, we are told, can only be shaped by the struggle between the two superpowers. More particularly, wherever the U.S. withdraws we can be sure the USSR will move in, thus creating the unhappy situation which the international press has come to describe as Finlandization. But what does Finlandization mean? What, really, does it have to do with Finland? Anyone familiar with Finnish character and political history suspects that talk about Finlandization reflects either a gross misunderstanding of a country's determination to maintain independence, neutrality and, if possible, peace in Europe, or deliberate anti-Soviet propa-

ganda. Such propaganda is common abroad as well as in certain political circles in Finland. To answer a slogan with a slogan, one may challenge talk about Finlandization with the title of the first chapter of Max Jacobson's book 'Finnish Neutrality: The Rebellious Pawn.' . . . While Finlandization seems to Russia a dangerous example, it serves as a desirable model to East European states. To a Western diplomat I questioned about it, Finlandization, incorrectly used, implied a process of progressive deterioration in the degree of independence and autonomous choice exercised by Finland due to Soviet pressure. Correct use of the word would underscore the great strides Finland has made in the field of constructive neutrality, within the structure of the northern balance."

THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE FROM MOSCOW, by T. W. Wolfe. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., March 1973. 17 p. (P-4978.)

"An appraisal of the foreign policy and strategic considerations that help shape the USSR's posture in the seventies and its strategic relationship with the U.S. in the SALT negotiations. The international setting of two rival superpowers in a nuclear age has been replaced by unclarified conditions of global competition and adjustment. The Soviets' recourse to détente and intricate negotiations reflects their intent to take advantage of new opportunities, while consolidating old Soviet positions and easing domestic difficulties. One major consideration is who came out best in the SALT I negotiations. Did the U.S. allay the Soviets' fears of Safeguard, while giving them headroom in ICBMs and SLBMs to develop an even greater threat to the survivability of U.S. forces? Another question is whether, despite the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have fully embraced the American concept of mutual assured destruction. (Prepared for presentation at the National Defence College, Kingston, Ontario, April 3, 1973.)."

INTERNATIONAL R&D TERMS AND POLICIES: AN ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US. Washington, Aerospace Industries Association of America, 1972. 56 p.

"The USSR, Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Japan support active R&D programs which continue to grow in scope and funding. However, the US program is almost stagnant. In terms of expenditure, the American program has more than doubled since 1960, but most of this

growth took place before 1968. Expenditures have remained constant since 1968; considering inflation and the higher costs of advanced technology, this constant expenditure represents a declining R&D capability. Since 1966, the growth rate of government R&D funding has dropped from 9% to less than 1%, and increases in non-federal funding have not been able to compensate for the drop in federal money. Other nations are increasing their R&D programs. In France the R&D program grows about 13% per year, while the growth rate is 25% in Japan and 30% to 40% in West Germany. Furthermore, other nations tend to concentrate on economic problems while the US devotes over half of its R&D effort to defense and space . . . One of the problem areas is aerospace. The US currently supplies about 80% of the world's civilian aircraft; the large US market permits longer production runs, lower unit costs, and a wide variety of aircraft. However, West European nations are trying to meet the American challenge through cooperation in R&D and developing new types of Aircraft for which there is no American counterpart. Soviet R&D represents a threat to American technological superiority. The Soviet program has more than doubled since 1960 and is concentrated on defense and space, with perhaps 20% going to civilian problems. The USSR spends \$10 to 13 billion more than the US on R&D per year and the growth rate of its program is estimated at 9 to 13% . . . The US needs a technological strategy and policy which define and support national R&D goals. Other free world nations focus on areas offering economic and social benefits; the US might do well to follow their lead in becoming more selective and specialized in its approach to R&D. For example, the US could concentrate on areas in which its trade position is threatened and on new technologies such as pollution control."

MOSCOW'S OPTIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD, by Vernon V. Aspaturian, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1972) 1-20.

"During the past four years there has been a dramatic transformation in the fortunes of Soviet foreign policy and a remarkable revitalization of Soviet decisiveness and self-assurance in foreign affairs. The Soviet leadership appears to have overcome much of its previous feelings of inferiority and inadequacy in facing up to the manifold issues that confronted it both as a global power and as the leader of an ecumenical revolutionary movement. Only in dealing with the Chi-

nese do the Soviet leaders fail to exude the self-confidence they have acquired over the past four years and instead continue to betray signs of irresolution, uncertainty of purpose, and indecisiveness. There are good explanations for these distinctive Soviet postures in dealing with the West and with China, just as there was considerable warrant for the irresolution and demoralization that characterized the Soviet leadership in foreign affairs between 1961 and 1968."

THE PEACETIME STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION, London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1973. 83 p.

"The basic assumption of this study is that Western societies are vulnerable to Soviet subversion, espionage, and exploitation in a period of détente. It describes the Soviet government as autocratic, revolutionary, using 'peaceful coexistence' for ideological ends, obsessed with security, and having an intricate espionage machinery. The USSR's objectives are to prevail in its rivalry with China, obtain Western technology and a diminution of the arms race, legitimize and consolidate its hold on East Europe, and extend its influence over West Europe. Its methods in accomplishing these objectives are subversion and penetration; encouragement of divisions in the West, and tying the West European economy to the Soviet Union . . ."

THE REVISED "TWO CAMPS" DOCTRINE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by R. Judson Mitchell, in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 21-34.

"In the last several years Soviet foreign policy analysis has been dominated by a revised 'two camps' doctrine which differs both qualitatively and quantitatively from the old Stalinist formulation of 'two camps' and offers a striking contrast to the 'three camps' and 'peace zone' analysis of the Khrushchev era. The 'two camps' doctrine of Stalin's day was intimately connected with the concept of 'capitalist encirclement' . . . The new 'two camps' approach involves an intensification of struggle between systems. However, the basic strategic considerations governing Khrushchev's formulation of 'peaceful coexistence' are still applicable. Nuclear war must be avoided and any moves tending to lower tensions that might escalate into nuclear confrontation serve the interests of both camps. But, as indicated above, the capitalists, faced with increasing contradictions, have adopted more subtle tactics of subversion. The struggle now becomes, more than ever before,

one of ideological conflict. Since the 'objective factors' have receded into the background (these allegedly favor the socialists but are no longer necessarily decisive), the strength of the socialist camp vis-à-vis the capitalist is today largely determined by the degree of its ideological uniformity and internal organizational cohesion. The continuing efforts to reach agreements with the United States under 'peaceful coexistence' have been integrated with this analysis."

THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, by Avigdor Haselkorn, in *Orbis*, v. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 213-254.

"The purpose of the present article is to prove the existence of a strategic link tying together the Warsaw Pact treaty, the Middle East treaties—including the recent Treaty of Friendship the Soviets signed with Somalia, and those expected with Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)—and the Indo-Soviet treaty. By demonstrating the performance of various strategic mutual-support functions between these security subsystems, I expect to show that a Soviet collective security system is far from being an illusive Grand Design and, in fact, is largely in place, and may well be extended in the future. To illustrate the point, we will examine two groups of interactions: the Warsaw Pact-Middle East subsystem and the Middle East-Indian subsystem. The strategic mutual-support functions to consider in these instances are of three types: (1) logistic support, i.e., the supply of military advisers, equipment and bases; (2) defensive support, i.e., a threat of direct military intervention by one subsystem in support of another—obviously an option that could be used only with regard to cases in which a part of the collective security system had been put in jeopardy; and (3) offensive options, i.e., situations in which the security system could be utilized to initiate large-scale military operations against an enemy of the Soviet Union."

THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST: HER CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS. London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970. 108 p.

"A report of a seminar sponsored jointly by Southampton University and the Royal United Service Institution and held at Milford-on-Sea between Monday 23rd March and Wednesday 25th March 1970."

(*)—**THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS**,

1964-1972, by W. W. Kulski. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1973. 526 p.

"Professor Kulski investigates Soviet foreign policy since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, to July 1972. By utilizing only Russian sources, he seeks to acquaint the reader with Soviet views, not with Western interpretations of those views. Of particular concern is the relationship between official Marxist-Leninist ideology and the national interests of the Soviet Union, to which he devotes a major section of the book."

U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Yuan-li Wu. New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975. 214 p.

Includes, among other information, textual as well as statistical data vis-à-vis the USSR, China, and the U.S.

THE USSR: BEYOND ITS ZENITH? by Stefan T. Possony, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 87-103.

"There is no substantial evidence to support the contention that the Kremlin has jettisoned its objective of world conquest (or world revolution). If one afternoon the Politburo or the Soviet leadership decides to launch a global nuclear attack the next morning, and if it obtains the support of the three or four leading military figures, that attack can and will be launched. On a lower level of violence, the Soviet leaders still adhere to their conviction that they must support and instigate 'wars of national liberation.' Their undertakings in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia are testaments of that conviction. In sum, Stalin's strategies and objectives have been modernized, not abandoned. Many observers contend that the present Soviet leadership is, qualitatively speaking, inferior to that of Lenin and Stalin when measured by their willpower, their willingness to take risks, and their commitment to ultimate revolutionary goals. I disagree. In my opinion the current Soviet leadership is as intelligent as its predecessors. A notable difference is that it lacks Stalin's irrationality and madness. The present leaders are more dangerous and better equipped than were the old ultra-ideologues. Moreover, they are great calculators and probably prudent enough not to rush into a major conflict until the odds are clearly on their side."

THE USSR, THE USA AND CHINA IN THE SEVENTIES, by Vernon D. Appaturian, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 1 (January 1974) 50-63.

"In the course of the 1970s, it will become increasingly apparent that the basic foundations of a post-Cold War international system are being laid. After more than 30 years of inconclusive general conflict, marked by civil and local wars, domestic social convulsions and revolutions, eyeball to eyeball confrontations, an ever-spiraling arms race, and prolonged attempts unilaterally to impose conflicting, ideologically inspired visions of world order and justice upon the globe, the major actors in the international system have apparently decided independently that a new post-Cold War world order must be founded upon a fresh consensus which transcends competing and conflicting—not merely different—ideological and social systems. The emerging world order will not follow a war in which one group of powers emerges victorious and imposes its will upon another group, but will, rather, result from a nuclear stalemate and a stable balance of terror . . . Among the first casualties of the 1970s will be messianic foreign policies and global strategies, as the US and the USSR reduce their commitments and China and the other states expand their foreign policy horizons. The very concept 'global power' may become obsolete."

VENTURES IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 3 (May-June 1972) 1-40.

Contents: Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development, by Kiichi Saeki; Moscow and South Asia, by William J. Barnds; and The Persian Gulf—Cradle of Conflict? by D. C. Watt. "During recent years, analysts and scholars have discerned a growing disposition on the part of the USSR to operate in world affairs primarily as a state with global interests and concerns. This approach has involved the Soviet Union with an expanding spectrum of international forces and has greatly increased the complexity of its dealings with the outside world. The three articles . . . discuss aspects of this evolving situation. Mr. Saeki describes the protracted negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo looking toward cooperation in Siberian economic development. Mr. Barnds explores the USSR's emergence as a major factor in South Asian affairs and its likely future course on the subcontinent. And, finally, Mr. Watt examines the dilemmas that confront Moscow in the Persian Gulf area as British power recedes from there—dilemmas born of both local conditions and Sino-Soviet rivalry."

WHO IS THE IMPERIALIST? Washington,

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, n.d. 51 p.

Graphically and statistically provides information on the various aspects of Soviet Territorial expansion as well as Chinese vs. Soviet imperialism.

WORLD ROLE OF THE U.S.S.R., by Marshall D. Shulman, in *The National Security Affairs Forum*, (Spring 1974) 19-30.

"There are two things that need to be kept in mind in approaching the Soviet Union in the present period. One is a sense of the historical background. We are dealing with a country which has come upon the stage of world politics in a phase of national growth somewhat belatedly in relation to the major industrial countries of the world, a country which is going through a phase of national growth somewhat like that through which the main countries of Europe and the United States went in either the last century or this century. In that mysterious process, the reasons for which are not wholly understood, nations sometimes have a burst of energy in their development. The Soviet Union is now going through that kind of stage of development and is reaching out on the world stage for a place for itself as a superpower against the existing configuration of power distribution in the world. It sees itself as entitled to a role as a superpower pressing against the existing distribution of influence."

2. *Antarctica: Major Bases and Territorial Claims*

ANTARCTIC MAJOR BASES, in *The Europa Year Book, 1975: A World Survey; Volume II—Africa, The Americas, Asia, Australasia*. London, Europa Publications Limited, 1975. p. 42.

Includes major bases and territorial claims of the USSR, among others.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, in *The Europa Year Book, 1975: A World Survey; Volume II—Africa, The Americas, Asia, Australasia*. London, Europa Publications Limited, 1975. p. 43.

Summary of Treaty whose signatory was the USSR, among others.

3. *Arctic and North European Regions: Soviet Aims and Objectives.*
(See also Map Appendix)

THE DEFENSE OF NORTHWEST EUROPE AND THE NORTH SEA, by Maj. Gen. J. L.

Moulton, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 97, no. 819 (May 1971) 70-97.

"The defense of Northwest Europe will require powerful armies. But without logistic support, most of which must come through the North Sea, those armies will be as nothing. To assure that such support can pass through the North Sea will be one of the tasks of the North Sea navies . . . Six NATO nations have coastlines on the North Sea, Norway, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain. As long as the threat of Western escalation to nuclear war remains credible, it is not very likely that any of them could be detached from NATO by brute force. If for any reason Western resort to nuclear weapons became incredible and the danger of conventional attack became immediate, pacifist pressure towards non-resistance might be intensified, but, as was seen after Munich and thirty years later when again a hostile army marched into Czechoslovakia, the display of naked force alerts those who, like so many in the Western democracies, would otherwise prefer to ignore unpleasant possibilities . . . A neutral and weakly armed Scandinavia, unable to expect NATO support and dependent on an isolated Sweden, would find itself under pressure to accept Russian surveillance systems spreading to Spitzbergen, the Faeroes, and Iceland, and might eventually be reduced to the semi-satellite status of Finland. The only stable alternative to the adherence of Scandinavian members to NATO seems, therefore, to be a neutral Scandinavian bloc armed more heavily than Sweden is today and in some way guaranteed by what was left of NATO against isolation and blockade. It could hardly be either as cheap or as effective as the present arrangement."

LAPP DÉTENTE, by Nika Hazelton, in *National Review*, (15 March 1974) 327.

"Kirkenes, Norway—I've always been fascinated by the way things look and work, and as I came to northern Norway for a series of articles, I thought I would like to see the beginning of the Iron Curtain, and how the border between Norway and the USSR is run . . . Up here the Iron Curtain is merely a short reindeer fence and a 12-yard clearing . . . The local population is well disposed toward the Russians, largely because of the experience of 1944."

NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK—VITAL BUT INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE, by

Stefan Geisenheyner, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 54, no. 7 (July 1971) 56-61.

"Also critical to the security of the Western alliance are the approaches from the north, which in tactical terms can be considered equally important. This article . . . draws a gloomy profile of the forces guarding . . . NATO'S Northern Flank . . . The broad term, 'northern flank,' applies to the southern littoral of the Baltic Sea, which includes the coastlines of Germany, Denmark, and its Baltic islands; the Norwegian coast from Oslo to the North Cape; and, finally, the approximately 100 miles of land frontier between the USSR and Norway, located far above the Arctic Circle, west of Murmansk. The strategic value of this northern flank rests on two vital anchors. The first is NATO's blocking position in the western Baltic, which serves to contain the Soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. The second is the North Cape region, stretching from Narvik to the Soviet border. NATO forces in that area would counter any Soviet thrust toward the west through northern Norway. They also could threaten Murmansk, the USSR's only year-round, ice-free harbor in the west with free access to the open seas. The Norwegian coastline between these two anchors is of only minor strategic value."

NORDIC BALANCE IN THE 1970s, by Col. Albert Leo Romaneski, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 8 (August 1973) 32-41.

"'Nordic Balance is a theory of regional equilibrium maintained by the Nordic nations between the major power blocs of NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact by reasons of geography, political, military, and economic factors, and most importantly, by the roles of the Nordic countries themselves.' . . . Soviet activities in the Mediterranean have focused the attention of the Western Alliance there. The Arab-Israeli dispute has heightened the tension and the danger of a major power confrontation on this southern flank of NATO. By contrast, little or nothing is being written or discussed about the growing Soviet naval threat on NATO's northern flank and more particularly about the Nordic region, largely because few crises have arisen in this area. Nordic balance is a delicate phenomenon which operates only within the limits of relatively low level crises confined primarily to the Nordic area."

THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE NORTH; MARGINS OF WESTERN SAFETY IN THE NORWEGIAN

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SEA ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC ARE WEARING THIN, by Eivind Berdal, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 19, no. 1 (February-March 1974) 58-64.

"The quantitative and qualitative growth of Soviet military power has been remarkable in recent years, and nowhere in the world has the discrepancy between sheer military might and professed intentions become more glaring than in the North. Governments and public opinion in the three countries of NATO's Northern European Command, Norway, Denmark and Germany, are becoming increasingly aware of this disturbing trend . . . The Director of Research of the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Johan Jorgen Holst, described the Soviet build-up in an article in the following words: 'It is the intention of the Soviets to push their Naval defence line outwards to Iceland and the Faroes. If this is a likely development, then it indicates that the Russians would, to an increasing degree, come to regard the Norwegian Sea as a Soviet lake, behind which, of course, Norway would lie.' This has not come to pass yet: Indigenous forces, combined with powerful NATO reinforcements in emergencies, are there to keep the balance. But a potential 'Mare Sovieticum' must have crossed the mind of the Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli when, in a remarkable departure from normal reticence about Soviet Military activity, he told United Press international in an interview in July 1971: 'The Soviet Union has carried out a colossal military build-up on the Northern Flank of NATO, where her military forces are greater than ever before with the possible exception of the Second World War. It is quite clear that the Soviet military build-up, not far from the Norwegian border, is not a bilateral Norwegian-Soviet issue, but part of a global strategy of the Soviet Union. The fact that such great military strength is deployed so near to our country underlines the seriousness of the international strategic situation.'"

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTHERN CAP, by B. C. Cuthbertson, in *Royal United Service Institution Journal*, v. 117, no. 666 (June 1972) 45-48.

"The term 'northern cap,' used to describe the northern regions of Fenno-Scandinavia and north-western Russia, first came into common use in the fifties. In its strategical use it includes those parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Soviet Union north of the 66th Parallel and extending

from the Norwegian Sea in the west to the White Sea in the east. Also included are the ocean areas and islands (notably the Svalbard archipelago) between the northern coasts of these four countries and the North Pole. The term 'northern cap' should not be confused with the NATO use of the term 'northern flank' which includes the complete NATO front line from northern Germany to North Cape in Finnmark, the northernmost point of mainland Norway . . . The most fundamental change in the strategic significance of the northern cap came with the large expansion of the Soviet Northern Fleet and the general growth of the maritime power of the Soviet Union. The Northern Fleet is today the largest of the four Soviet fleets and contains over 50 per cent of the Soviet submarines. Its operations have gradually expanded westward and now extend to all the Norwegian Sea and into the Atlantic. In case of war or in a crisis situation it seems probable that a Soviet 'forward defensive zone' would be established in the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroe Islands gap covering the access routes to and from the Atlantic. The Norwegian Sea affords the Soviet Union with its most important transit zone for its strategic missile carrying submarines. However, the Soviets have no bases in the area to support operations in the Norwegian Sea. Air cover is severely limited by the increased range of naval operations. There is some dispute about whether there is harbour space not only for the Northern Fleet but also the fishing and merchant fleets that use the ports on the Kola Peninsula. The general consensus is that there is a space problem but how serious it is remains a matter for speculation. More important than the presumed lack of harbour space is that geography seriously restricts operations of the Northern Fleet . . . Strategically, Swedish Lappland has little to offer the Soviets except depth if they controlled north Norway. The Swedes have made it abundantly clear that they would not fight to preserve the territorial integrity of north Norway; their aim would be only to preserve their own neutrality. In the last two decades there has been an increasing effort to provide for the security of north Norway and its flanking waters without being provocative. Geography complicates Norwegian defence planning."

TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE SOVIET POSITION, by S. M. Olenicoff. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., July 1972. 52 p. (R-907-ARPA.)

al contents: Arctic Basin Territorial
 Claims: Soviet Reactions to U.S. Activities in the
 Arctic Current Soviet Position on Arctic
 Waters: The "Soviet Sector" Claim; Territorial
 Waters: The Soviet Arctic; Internal Waters of
 the Arctic; Closed Seas; The Northern Sea
 Route With bibliography.

THREAT TO THE NORTH EURO-
 PEAN COMMAND, by Col. K. A. Kristensen, in
Journal of Modern African Studies, v. 18, no. 1 (February-
 March 1980) 32-39.

"The Northern European Command (EC), because of its geography, climate and political environment, is a complex military area. This article, before reviewing the potential threat to the NEC, will attempt to describe these features which make the NEC, in a military sense, a unique area in Europe . . . A glance at the map will show that, except at the peripheries of the Command, the NEC is screened from the USSR by two neutral countries, Sweden and Finland. Sweden which shares a common border with Norway over most of its length, follows a policy of non-alignment in peace to permit neutrality in war. Her own armed forces are substantial, however, should her neutrality be challenged. Finland's situation, with her relatively short common border with Norway and her long common border with Russia, is very different. The 'Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance' with the Soviet Union restricts her armed forces to a level which could pose little opposition to the Soviets should they wish to make use of Finnish territory. Thus Finland's situation might be better described as one of enforced neutrality."

4. Aims in Africa

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

ASPECTS OF SOVIET-AFRICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, by G. Rubinstein, in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, v. 8, no. 3 (October 1970) 389-404.

"The last decade has witnessed a rapid development of economic relations between the Soviet Union and independent African countries. In examining certain economic and geographical aspects of this development, it should be borne in mind that Soviet-African economic relations are a quite new trend in world affairs . . . At present, the U.S.S.R. has direct economic contacts with the majority of independent African states, accounting for 75 per cent of the continent's population. These economic relations take two interre-

lated forms: trade, and economic, scientific, and technical co-operation. The principles of Soviet foreign economic policy are equality, non-interference, mutual advantage, and assistance to the developing countries in building their national economies."

CHINESE AND SOVIET AID TO AFRICA, ed. by Warren Weinstein. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 290 p.

Of special interest to the DA PAM on USSR are the following selected chapters of this book: Soviet Economic Aid to Africa—1959-72; Soviet Bloc-Ghanaian Relations Since the Downfall of Nkrumah; Soviet Aid to Guinea and Nigeria; Naval Strategy and Aid Policy—A Study of Soviet-Somali Relations; Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa—An African View. With tables, figures, and map.

(LI)—COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by Maj. William B. Guild. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1970. 62 p. (Research Study no. 0580-70.)

"Communist China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been actively attempting to gain political and economic influence in the Sub-Saharan area of Africa. In the majority of the Black African nations their efforts initially been relatively successful but have not withstood the test of time. This study outlines the successes and failures of the communists and offers the reader a present day evaluation that the communists currently have little influence in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa."

(LI)—THE DECLINE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE SUDAN, by Maj. William M. MacArthur, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1973. 58 p. (Research Study.)

"During 1967-71 the Soviet Union willingly sacrificed Sudanese Communist Party interests in order to foster state-to-state influence over the Sudan. However, on 19 July 1971, the Sudanese Communist Party overthrew the Government of the Sudan, and the Soviet Union, having not fully analyzed the variables, prematurely sacrificed its influence with the Sudanese government for communist party interests. On 22 July 1971, anti-communist leaders once again regained power, and Soviet influence was virtually eliminated from the Sudan. This loss to the Soviet Union is assessed as being significant when viewed in rela-

tion to its overall Red Sea and Indian Ocean strategies."

(LI)—ETHIOPIA AND THE RUSSIAN THREAT, by Maj. Gary O. Moles. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1970. 91 p. (Research Study No. 0970-70.)

"The spread of Russian influence and increase in Soviet communist activity throughout South Asia, the Mideast, and Africa present a threat to the ancient Empire of Ethiopia. The political conditions in Ethiopia and Russia's African policy are investigated in this study to establish a background for analysis of the Soviet Union's involvement. The importance of Ethiopia in the Russians' expansionist movement, direct Soviet involvement, and related external pressures are examined. The study concludes that the Russians will likely intensify their drive to upset the present regime and will continue covert assistance to Eritrean separatist movements to satisfy their objectives."

SOVIET POLICY IN WEST AFRICA, by Robert Legvold. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970. 372 p.

"A study of Soviet interest in and policy toward Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal in the years from 1957 to 1968."

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD BLACK AFRICA: THE FOCUS ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION, by Helen Desfosses Cohn. New York, Praeger, 1972. 316 p.

"Theory and practice during the 1960s, from Khrushchev's adventures in the Congo to the more cautious policies of Brezhnev."

(LI)—SUDANESE COMMUNISM: A BLOW TO SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN SEEKING THIRD WORLD LEADERSHIP, by Maj. William W. Lofgren, Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 112 p. (Research Study.)

"This paper studies the relationship between local Communist organizations and local nationalistic regimes with their impact on Soviet military objectives in the Third World. The study examines the Sudanese Communist party and the effects of the Communist coup and subsequent counter-coup of July 1971. It contends that this attempted Communist takeover proved to be an embarrassing and humiliating experience for the Soviet Union. The evidence shows that Moscow

was not involved in Sudanese Communist intentions to overthrow the Nimeri regime, and, in fact, probably was unaware of the proposed action. Nevertheless, the Soviets suffered a loss of prestige in seeking Third World leadership."

b. *Soviet Policy and Presence in Somalia and Angola*

ANGOLA: THE RUSSIANS HAVE COME, in *Newsweek*, v. 86, no. 22 (1 December 1975) 56 plus.

"In the two weeks since Angola became independent, hundreds of Soviet military 'technicians' have poured into the former Portuguese colony . . . They have brought along vast quantities of munitions and have been joined by thousands of Cuban soldiers to bolster their client . . . In the past, the Soviets have generally stamped 'Top Secret' on their support of Third World Communist movements. But the operation in Luanda is wide open."

SOMALIA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Dennis Chaplin, in *Military Review*, v. 55, no. 7 (July 1975) 3-9.

"As Western colonial power and bases recede, the Soviet Navy seems to be moving in and staking claims . . . In the Mediterranean, the Soviet aim was to establish bases on NATO's Southern flank, a transparent enough military objective. But, in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet naval activity is more complex in its relation to NATO, and this is worth discussing. A significant focal point for this discussion is Somalia. Somalia has received over 60 Soviet ship visits since 1968, indicating a level of interest in that area which can only arouse NATO suspicions. To all intents and purposes, the summer of 1974 saw decisive moves suggesting that the USSR plans to cultivate Somalia into a military base for Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean."

SOMALIA: THE RUSSIANS ON AFRICA'S HORN, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 3 (21 July 1975) 29-30.

"Outside of Eastern Europe, perhaps the Soviet Union's most notable satellite in the world today is the African republic of Somalia. A drought-stricken country of 3 million people, which achieved independence in 1960, Somalia has a 1,700-mile coastline on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, hard by the shipping lanes over which oil from the Persian Gulf is carried to

Western Europe and the U.S. Testifying before Congress recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger disclosed that the Soviets were building an important missile facility at the Somali port of Berbera. Although Schlesinger backed up his charge by releasing U.S. reconnaissance photos of the Berbera buildup, the Somali government denied the accusation and invited U.S. Congressmen to see for themselves. Last week, after a trip to Berbera, Oklahoma Republican Senator Dewey Bartlett concluded that Schlesinger's facts were essentially correct."

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, by Brian Crozier, in *Conflict Studies*, no. 54 (February 1975) 3-19.

"The expanding Soviet presence in the Democratic Republic of Somalia amounts, on the evidence of factual reports from that country, analysed in this study, to a process of gradual satellisation. Somalia's recent case-history may be compared with that of Cuba, or perhaps with Egypt before the mass expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972. Although the strength of Moslem feeling is an obstacle to Communist penetration Soviet influence now extends over nearly all sectors of Somali administration. The Somali National Security Service was set up under Soviet advice and KGB agents are involved in its management; there are Soviet advisers in the President's office, and in the ministries dealing with propaganda, education, finance and economy. In the armed services, Soviet influence is pervasive."

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, by J. Bowyer Bell, in *Orbis* (Summer 1975).

"Between 1970 and 1971 Soviet naval vessels made seven visits to the ports of the Persian Gulf, but twice as many to Berbera in the Somalia Democratic Republic. The littoral states of the Gulf dominate the international oil flow. Saudi Arabia alone produces six million barrels a day with 145 billion barrels in proven reserves. The rivalries and aspirations of the Gulf states have given rise to massive arms deals, extreme tension, intensive maneuvers by the huge transnational oil cartels, manipulation from abroad, and the prospect that local conflict might disrupt much of the world's oil supplies. The stability of the regimes in Baghdad and Teheran and elsewhere in the region is a matter of considerable moment in Washington and Moscow. In fact, in a world with escalating energy needs, the Gulf would appear to be a lodestone for great-power interest. Ber-

bera, on the other hand, is a huddled sprawl of low buildings under a blistering sun in a land devoid of resources and charm, an obscure entrepot for nomadic tribes dealing in hides and camels. Berbera and Somalia obviously hold an attraction for the Soviets that transcends conventional analysis. Yet their appeal is not unrelated to the Gulf, for recently the Soviets have fashioned a presence in the Horn of Africa that may hold serious implications not only for the Gulf's stability but for the future balance in the Indian Ocean. Berbera has become something more than a way-station for camels, if still something less than a lodestone for great-power interest."

5. Asia (Including Southeast Asia)

THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Dick Wislon. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 206 p.

Part III, which deals with External Attitudes, provides the Soviet position, in Chapter 12.

NOW—A TOUGHER U.S.; INTERVIEW WITH JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 78, no. 21 (26 May 1975) 24-27.

"Impact of Indo-China's fall is reshaping U.S. attitudes. Mideast, Russia, China, Europe all will be affected . . . An assessment of what lies ahead for America."

RUSSIAN INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: OUTLINES AND SOURCES 1803-1970, by R. Qusted, in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, v. 1, no. 2 (September 1970) 48-60.

"The establishment of diplomatic ties by the Soviet Union with all countries of Southeast Asia except the Philippines and South Vietnam, and the growing influence sought by it in the area, indicates that the publication of more work on Russian relations with Southeast Asia would be of interest, and it is the purpose of this article to survey the course of these relations to date, to see what general picture emerges and what possibilities of further research exist." The Tsarist Period 1803-1917; The Tsarist Consulate in Singapore; Tsarist Russia and Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Philippines, Indo-China; Tsarist Russian Scholarship on Southeast Asia; Soviet Relations with Southeast Asia; etc.

THE SEA OF OKHOTSK; USSR'S GREAT LAKE? by Deam W. Given, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 96, no. 9 (September 1970) 46-51.

This article addresses itself to the question of "What will the United States do—What can we do?"—if, as now seems a definite possibility, the Russians officially declare Okhotsk to be a closed or territorial sea? . . . Recently, Tokyo has been making high-level diplomatic overtures to . . . Moscow for the return of its northern territories, i.e., the Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Iturup Islands and the Habomai group . . . The Soviet Union thus far has turned a deaf ear. A measure of Moscow's resolve in this matter can be gleaned from a recent *Izvestia* announcement: ". . . the question of to whom the Kuriles belong has been settled once and for all, and any attempt to reshape the postwar frontiers will hardly be of any benefit to Japan'."

THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA, by Alexander O. Ghebhardt, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 12 (December 1974) 19-33.

"Soviet foreign policy in Asia has been the subject of much attention recently, yet no comprehensive study has been undertaken. Most studies deal with Soviet relations in a specific region such as the Indian sub-Continent, Japan or China and, because of this focus on regional aspects, have so far failed to consider the wider implications of Soviet moves and motives and their impact on the newly emerging balance of power. With few exceptions, scant attention has been paid to the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia and the response of the Asian governments to this idea. The presence of the Russian Navy in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan has received wide coverage, but no attempt has been made to relate either the Soviet naval expansion to the collective security proposal or the USSR's military capabilities and diplomatic initiatives to the position of various Asian states. Strategic parity between the two superpowers and its relevance to the Asian Continent is another important factor in the newly emerging balance of power. This article will discuss current and future options for Soviet policymaking in Asia and the Pacific, taking into account the points raised above."

SOVIET THINKING ON ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY, by Bhabani Sen Gupta, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 5, no. 2 (October 1972) 173-195.

"The concept of a collective security system for Asia seems to have been firmly placed on the foreign policy agenda of the Soviet Government. Indeed, it has passed in last year or so from the

realm of a concept to that of an achievable goal of Soviet foreign policy. The conclusion is based on evidence that the concept has been fashioned into a projectional and bargaining item in Moscow's diplomatic interactions with a variety of Asian countries. Furthermore, Soviet analysts have taken up the task of systematically projecting the idea of a collective Asian security system in their mass circulation newspapers and journals."

(*)—**THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA**, by Geoffrey Jukes. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973. 304 p.

"This . . . survey of Soviet policy toward South and Southeast Asia since the mid-1950's focuses principally on strategic and political relationships. The author believes that strategic considerations do not loom large in Soviet policy toward the Indian Ocean area, but foresees increasing attempts to link the non-aligned countries there to the U.S.S.R., in some as yet undefined political community."

6. *Australia*

THE SOVIET UNION AND AUSTRALIA, by Y. Lahuk, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 4 (April 1975) 21-25.

"Soviet-Australian relations have a more than 30-year history, but it cannot yet be said that it is rich in traditions. This is true not only because of the many thousands of kilometres separating our countries. Over a long period of time the cold war also had its effect. However, a basis for developing Soviet-Australian relations did exist, and the USSR has always displayed its readiness to establish and expand equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with Australia. The relaxation of international tension and the establishment of the principles of peaceful co-existence in relations between states that have been achieved under the influence of the peace policy pursued by the USSR and other socialist countries have also had a positive effect on Soviet-Australian relations. New trends are now characteristic of these relations, a concrete expression of which was the visit of Australia's Prime Minister Edward Gough Whitlam to the USSR in January 1975, the first such visit by an Australian Prime Minister in the history of Soviet-Australian relations. The visit enabled the two sides to review the results of the work already accomplished in many fields of cooperation and to outline ways and

means of raising their relations to a new and higher level."

7. *Balkan States (See also WTO Below)*

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS, by John C. Campbell, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 4 (July-August 1974) 1-16.

"Like Central Europe, the Balkan area lies on the borderline between the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It has been affected, inevitably, by the changing relationship between the two superpowers and by the general transformation taking shape in Europe since the governments led by Brezhnev, Brandt, and Nixon, in 1969, initiated the reciprocal moves that produced the series of treaties, declarations, summit meetings, and multilateral negotiations cumulatively making up what is today called 'détente' or 'peaceful coexistence.' Yet, in the Balkans, all is not so peaceful or serene or stable as one might have expected in view of this general trend . . . It is an area in which the dynamism of Soviet policy is obviously increasing. At the same time, neither in declaration nor in action is that policy a model of clarity or consistency—especially as we watch it take shape in a series of separate compartments. Détente in central Europe; rapprochement with Yugoslavia and preparation for what comes after Tito; pressure on Rumania; and insistence on a role in the Cyprus affair—how do these individual elements of Soviet Balkan policy fit together? The approach of this article is to look first at the broader horizons as viewed from Moscow—global competition with rival powers, strategy in Europe and in the Middle East—and then to take up the more critical bilateral and regional problems. As will be seen, the picture that emerges is one that affords no grounds for relaxation or complacency on the part of any of the parties concerned, including the Soviet Union."

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, by Stephen Clissold, in *Conflict Studies* no. 57 (April 1975) 4-19.

"Marshal Tito is now in his eighty-third year. Under his leadership, Yugoslavia has become something anomalous and intolerable to the Stalinists—the first Communist State to step outside the Moscow-controlled camp. It remains to be seen whether, once the helmsman who has so firmly held the tiller for nearly three decades at length relaxes his grip, his country will still be able to keep to this difficult course. Will the post-Tito era see Yugoslavia return, by choice or through coercion, to full dependence on Moscow?

Pressures from Moscow have indeed manifested themselves more than once during the past few years. The latest instance of a plot, uncovered last September, was by an illegal group of 'Cominformists'—a term clearly implying an attempt at closer relations with the USSR and the return to a form of Stalinism at home. It seems likely that both clandestine and overt pressures from the Soviet Union will be multiplied and intensified during the early phase of the post-Tito era. For the sake of détente, however, the Russians are likely to maintain at least a semblance of 'correct' State-to-State relations. In the background, but never far from sight, the threat of military invasion will be kept in reserve. This study analyses the post-Tito options after tracing the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since the outbreak of World War II."

8. *Bangladesh*

MOSCOW AND BANGLADESH, by Bhabani Sen Gupta, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 2 (March-April 1975) 56-68.

"In March 1974, the last two of eleven Soviet minesweepers which had been engaged in harbor-clearing operations in the shipping channel of Chittagong and Cox's Bazar left the waters of Bangladesh. The ships were part of a 20-unit fleet sent by the Soviet Union two years earlier, at the request of the new People's Republic of Bangladesh, to clear ports in the strategic Bay of Bengal of the mines and sunken ships left in the wake of the Republic's tumultuous birth in 1971. In two years, the Soviet fleet had salvaged 17 vessels, ranging from a 15,000-ton freighter to small coastal ships and barges—and what is more, it had carried out the entire operation free of charge. Yet, when the last of the Soviet ships left four months ahead of schedule, the Bangladesh government seemed more relieved at their departure than grateful for their services, while Soviet representatives were reportedly in a state of some aggravation. According to Calcutta's leading newspaper, *The Statesman*, some Bangladesh officials had begun to feel 'rather uncomfortable' about the 'prolonged presence' of the Soviet force, surmising that it might be one reason for China's continued refusal to recognize the new republic and maintaining that the Russians were using Chittagong as a 'foothold' for keeping watch on the Indian Ocean."

9. *Berlin*

AGREEMENT ON BERLIN: A STUDY OF THE 1970-72 QUADRIPARTITE NEGOTIA-

TIONS, by Dennis L. Bark. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974. 131 p. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 10.)

"Analysis of the process power which led to the conclusion in September 1971 of the first four-power agreement on Berlin in twenty-two years. It examines the agreement itself and the reasons why Berlin, the powder keg of Europe, has been the focus of so much attention for so long. Bark emphasizes that the agreement has substantially diminished the tensions which have been so much a part of the daily lives of Berliners since 1945. He cautions that many of the issues of the Berlin question are still complex and that some are likely to be the subject of future dispute. He concludes, however, that the agreement represents a major contribution to the establishment of more stable relations between West and East in Europe. For the student of foreign affairs, this examination of the difficult process of negotiation and agreement on Berlin presents an intriguing case study of the diplomacy of détente in the decade of the 1970s."

10. *The Caribbean*

COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN. TESTIMONY OF ZULEMA BREGADO GUTIERREZ, HOSE DIAZ HERNADES, AND JUAN DIAZ LOPEZ. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, PART 25, OCTOBER 15, 1971. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971. pp. 1687-1723.

THE GROWING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICO-MILITARY IMPACT UPON THE UNITED STATES, by Lt. Comdr. Jack L. Roberts, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 23, no. 10 (June 1971) 31-42.

"Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean over the past several months has been centered on the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. Traditionally an area of immediate concern to the United States, the Caribbean and countries along its littoral today have become increasingly more politically volatile as a result of frustrated ambitions for

modernization. The article focuses on the significance of increased Soviet military presence in this area as it relates both to American security interests and the wider arena of world politics."

11. *Chile*

NEW CHALLENGE FOR CHILE AFTER A MARXIST BINGE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 75, no. 13 (24 September 1973) 44-45.

"What brought it all on? And now—what next? Joseph Benham of the International Staff of 'U.S. News & World Report' was on the scene in Santiago, Chile, in the days leading up to the coup, then flew to Argentina, where he cabled this dispatch." Also: What Allende's Fall Means to U.S., Russia, and Fidel Castro.

USSR-CHILE: FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, no. 3 (March 1973) 76-78.

"The official visit to the Soviet Union, December 6-9, 1972, by President Salvador Allende-Gossens of Chile and his talks with Soviet Party and State leaders, graphically demonstrated fruitfully developing Soviet-Chilean relations based on the principles of respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs and mutual benefit."

12. *Communist China: Soviet Aims and Objectives*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

FORD'S DUTY TRIP TO PEKING, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 22 (1 December 1975) 25-26 plus.

Among many other things, touches on Communist China's sensitivity to Soviet-American détente, and "to any sign of U.S. softening toward the Soviet Union."

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, by Ian Clark, in *Orbis*, (Summer 1973) 480-492.

"The US move toward rapprochement with China (PRC) is viewed by the Soviet Union as a response to America's weakening global position and its domestic and foreign policy crises, according to Prof. Clark. The Soviets object to it, though they have apparently decided to 'make do.' They fear that a possible US-PRC contacts as a threat to Asian independence and warns the Asians that they are but pawns and that the US and the PRC are seeking to carve out spheres of influence for each other in Asia. Both countries are capable

of sacrificing their ideological causes, as in Bangladesh and Vietnam, to the goal of normalizing relations with each other. The Soviet fear that the global power balance has been shifted, to its disadvantage, prompts much of the criticism, says Clark. The USSR believes the key to peace lies in its bilateral relations with the US. In the light of the new US-PRC rapprochement, the USSR needs to be reassured of the primacy of its relations with the US."

b. *Soviet-Chinese Rift (For Disputed Boundaries See Map Appendix)*

CHANGING SOVIET POLICIES AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, by Robert C. Horn, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 2 (Summer 1973) 493-526.

"This study's primary purpose is to analyze these changing Soviet and Chinese policies and the resurgent competition between the two powers in Southeast Asia from 1965 through mid-1972, basing the analysis on a prior consideration of Moscow's goals in the area and the intertwining of national regional (endogenous) and international (exogenous) determinants that have led to the changes. The major theme is that Moscow's policies, successes and failures from the late 1950's through 1965 were determined largely by the role of China, and that this has continued to be the case, if less directly, since 1965. Moreover, since 1969 the Soviet-Chinese competition has intensified, and 'escalation' appears to be the likely prognosis."

CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, JANUARY-MAY 1975. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 44 p. (International Relations Committee Print.)

This Committee Print, which includes a section on U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations, is updated monthly by the Congressional Research Services' Foreign Affairs Division of the Library of Congress. These are published each month in a cumulative edition for the period beginning January 1 of the current calendar year.

(*)—THE COLDEST WAR: RUSSIA'S GAME IN CHINA, by C. L. Sulzberger. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974. 113 p.

"In this investigation of Sino-Soviet relations especially after the Lin Piao affair of 1972, Sulzberger concludes that while no Soviet military demonstration toward China is likely, Moscow is

actively seeking to establish a pro-Soviet clique in China strong enough to compete for power after Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai pass from the scene. He also gives evidence of a post-Lin purge in China in response to the Soviet campaign. As in Sulzberger's other books, anecdotes and stories to profit from the Sino-Soviet dispute are examined in a chapter entitled 'Uncle Sam Joins the Game'."

CONFLICT ON THE USSURI: A CLASH OF NATIONALISMS, by Harold C. Hinton, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, nos. 1-2 (January-April 1971) 45-59.

"The armed clashes which took place between Soviet and Chinese border troops on a small disputed island on the USSURI River boundary between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969 unquestionably marked the most serious escalation to date of the conflict that has been going on between the two major Communist powers ever since the late 1950's."

CONTAINMENT: AMERICAN AND SOVIET VERSIONS, by William Welch, in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, v. 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1973) 215-240.

"In discussions of Soviet external relations, as indeed of relations among nations in general, we have begun recently to hear Soviet policy toward one of the great protagonists on the international scene—China—described as a policy of containment. The term does not yet have common currency. But it is cropping up with increasing frequency in the literature and will, I venture, continue to do so in days to come. This article surveys the behavior to which those who use the term are calling attention. It first describes what the Soviets have been saying about and doing to the Chinese. It then draws comparisons with the American behavior that gave birth to the term, ending with some general reflections upon the comparison. The subject is too large to be treated satisfactorily within ordinary limits of time and space. The paper therefore concentrates upon what I believe to be its more important aspect—Soviet conduct toward China's Soviet and Himalayan borders—touching only briefly on Soviet conduct affecting the Southeast and other borders, and China's position in the international Communist movement and global order."

(LI)—EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET SPLIT ON VIETNAM WAR, by Maj. Frank W. Curtis. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and

Staff College, 1970. 56 p. (Research Study No. 0365-70.)

"This study analyzes the separate interests that Moscow and Peking have in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and whether the Sino-Soviet split may affect the war in Vietnam and influence the Government in Hanoi. The study concludes that the conflict between Russia and China has had little effect on the war and the Hanoi leadership. Conversely, the war and the independent line held by Hanoi has widened the split. The study also concludes that a single, strong leader will replace Ho Chi Minh, and the present pro-Moscow—pro-Chinese factions will depolarize under his leadership."

MAOISM VERSUS KHRUSHCHEVISM: TEN YEARS, by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 385 (September 1973) 102-105 plus.

"Of the two Communist antagonists, the Soviet Union continues to achieve the greater successes. This is natural, since it commands . . . not only . . . great military power . . . but vast supplies of energy materials and industrial raw materials that give it major importance for industrialized countries. Thus in economics, its chosen field of competition, the U.S.S.R. occupies a notably more favorable position than China."

MULTIPOLARITY, ALLIANCES, AND U.S.-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS, by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 720-736.

"If alliances were fundamental to American policy in the recent past, what is their role in the international system of the 1970's? Do U.S. efforts to reach political accommodations with both the Soviet Union and China render less important the preservation of existing alliances? Can the United States, as the leading member of several alliances, prevent their erosion as it engages in new forms of diplomacy with powers against which the alliances were formed? Are alliances, as symbols of continuity in relationships among nations, compatible with foreign policies based on maneuverability and flexibility and betokening a less bipolar international system? How can existing alliances be updated or transformed, to make them more responsive to the major issues now facing their members?"

POWER: THE CRUCIBLE OF CONFLICT IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, by Maj.

Harry G. Summers, Jr., in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 3 (March 1971) 56-66.

Armed Clashes; The Next War?; Split Analyzed; World View; National Humiliation; Historical Perspective; Strategic Forces; Chinese Manpower; War Forecast; Political Element; Brezhnev Doctrine; etc.

(*)—**REALIGNMENT OF WORLD POWER: THE RUSSO-CHINESE SCHISM**, by Oton Ambroz. New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. 2 v.

"Dr. Ambroz . . . traces developments in Sino-Soviet relations, chronicles the struggle between these two . . . communist powers, analyzes the causes for it, shows how the Russians and Chinese have disliked each other for centuries on the popular and governmental levels, and assesses the impact of this rift on world affairs."

RED GIANTS BATTLE OVER ASIA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 71, no. 12 (20 September 1971) 42-45.

"Military aid . . . trade pacts . . . subversion. These are only some of the weapons in a potentially explosive rivalry for dominance in South Asia [and elsewhere]. James N. Wallace of 'U.S. News & World Report' toured the area for an on-the-scene report of what's at stake." He reports where Russia and China vie for supremacy. For instance, "Russia is offering new economic aid to Burma."

THE RED NAVY'S ROLE IN SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, by J. K. Holloway, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 99, no. 9 (September 1973) 18-24.

"The days of bombarding Chinese ports and 'patrolling' Chinese rivers are over; but the Soviet Navy can employ several low-key, low-risk gambits to psychologically harass Peking."

(LI)—**THE RED RUPTURE: SINO-SOVIET**, by Col. Arthur B. Carroll. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1970. 10 p. (Professional Study No. 3890.)

"Some of the basic difficulties between Russia and Red China are reviewed in the light of the history, culture, geography, race, and national interests of the two nations. The depth and severity of these differences coupled with modern weapons poses to each so serious a threat from the other as to make stable relations most difficult. The author suggests that these two giants are

bound in an inextricable dilemma and foresees war between them as the most likely outcome."

RUSSIA AND CHINA: CONTROLLED CONFLICT, by Richard Lowenthal, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 3 (April 1971) 507-518.

"It is now eleven years since an ideological dispute between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties burst into the open on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, and almost eight years since the pattern of world affairs became definitely 'triangular' with the open break between the two leading communist powers. Since then, the view of some Western dogmatists that personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung for the control of 'world communism' was the only cause of the rift was plainly refuted as it continued after Khrushchev's fall; but at the opposite extreme, forecasts about tension between the two communist giants building up steadily toward nuclear war appear hardly more plausible at the present time. What events have tended to show so far is rather the persistence of controlled conflict between Moscow and Peking, with the ups and downs of crisis and relative détente familiar from other great-power conflicts of the nuclear age. A new wave of speculation has been generated in recent months by the efforts at a normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations and the subsequent revival of bitter polemics over the Polish December crisis, by the shifts in the Chinese party leadership since the end of the cultural revolution; and by the approach of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. These may justify one more attempt to analyze the factors underlying that strange relationship and its possible impact on the future."

(LI)—THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY, by Maj. Jerry R. Bedingfield. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 59 p. (Research Study.)

"The Sino-Soviet rift is one of the most important developments in the history of international relations. What used to be a two-headed communist monolith is now a divided camp with violent disagreements over ideology and their common borders. The seriousness of the dispute can be seen in the 1969 Ussuri River incident. This study examines the causes of the border dispute, speculates on its future and discusses its impact on United States foreign policy. The report concludes that the Sino-Soviet dispute will continue

and offers interesting possibilities for a forward-looking United States foreign policy."

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT: HOW SOON?, by Dennis Chaplin, in *RUSI Journal for Defence Studies*, v. 119, no. 3 (September 1974) 55-57.

"There are fears in China that 1974 or 1975 could be the critical phase of relations between herself and the USSR, a phase which could mean the outbreak of the major hostilities which have been threatening to descend upon the 6,500 km long frontier since the end of the 1960s. The bloody conflicts of the Ussuri and in Sinkiang in 1939 marked a level of escalation far removed from the previous minor skirmishes, fisticuffs, obstructionism and slanging matches representative of a difference of opinion. As China becomes stronger in terms of nuclear capability, the likelihood of a conflict for territorial gain (or territorial revision in Chinese eyes) becomes more realistic. The author's recent discussions with Chinese students on the question of an impending conflict indicate very real fears over this and the following article gives expression to the Communist Chinese attitude to the confrontation. As well as increasing its military presence in eastern Europe to keep NATO and the occasionally recalcitrant satellite states in check, the USSR is currently also expanding its military striking power on the border with China. Since the Ussuri and Sinkiang encounters, the Soviet Army has increased its frontier divisions from 16 to 49, providing a manpower concentration of 483,000 well-trained and equipped troops who are evidently there for purposes other than reinforcing the customs control."

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN SOVIET EYES, by Harry Gelman in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 145-149 plus.

"How has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union changed in the 1970's? What is the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union? . . . Analyzing the Sino-Soviet conflict, [the] article notes that 'the rivalry of the national and state interests of the two countries . . . has grown more crude and naked, and is steadily expanding everywhere on the political, economic, and military level.'"

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE, by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 373 (September 1972) 114-117 plus.

"The Sino-Soviet relationship will probably not recover the intimacy it had in the 1950's, but it will perhaps prove steadier and more enduring."

THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES, by Harry G. Gelber, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 118-133.

"During the past decade the fluctuations in Sino-Soviet relations have become an important element in the global balance of power. As early as 1960 the unity of purpose and policy formerly thought to unite Moscow and Peking had clearly deteriorated. Since then their disputes have ranged from mild disagreements to armed clashes along their borders in Asia. This relationship and predictions about its future have greatly influenced the foreign and defense policies of Japan, the United States, the nations of South and Southeast Asia, and perhaps even of countries in Europe and the Middle East."

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Dick Wilson, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 5 (September-October 1974) 39-51.

"This article . . . [explores] the current dimensions of the rivalry, the factors that favor the one or the other power in waging it, and its likely shape in the future."

(*)—THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, by Tai Sung An. Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1973. 254 p.

"The territorial dimension of the rift between Moscow and Peking is . . . presented in this . . . study. Professor An traces the historical antecedents of the issue and provides partial texts of the key treaties that Russia imposed on China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The analysis . . . serves as an . . . introduction to the subject."

THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA: IS WAR INEVITABLE?, by Roger E. Kanet, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 145-149 plus.

"Explores the Soviet-Chinese relationship . . . For the remainder of the 1970's, it is unlikely that Soviet-Chinese relations will improve significantly, unless China or the Soviet Union is willing to compromise on the major issues which divide them. However, given the consequences of a nuclear exchange, it is highly improbable that the two will resort to war."

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION, by Harold C. Hinton, in *Orbis*, v. 19, no. 1 (Spring 1975) 25-46.

"The only major powers that are at all likely to go to war with each other in the near future are the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It is practically certain that were they to do so on a large scale the outcome, whatever its exact shape, would include a defeat for China, a serious destabilization of the Far Eastern balance, and a material setback to American interests . . . The Sino-Soviet confrontation remains as serious as ever in its potentialities. Indeed there are reasons to regard the 1974 and 1975 military campaigning seasons as one of the most tense and dangerous periods since 1969. It may be, therefore, that the United States should do more than it has done so far to promote its interests with respect to the Moscow-Peking confrontation."

(LI)—U.S. RESPONSE TO A SINO-SOVIET ARMED CONFLICT, by Maj. Arthur S. Dervaes III. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 77 p. (Research Study.)

"The modern relationship and the degree of tension existing between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been of considerable interest to analysts throughout the second half of this century. Within the past five years, the United States has played an integral role in this relationship, forming a great power triangle. This study examines the current Sino-Soviet relationship and determines the potential for violence between them resulting from their unresolved boundary dispute. An assessment is made of the new era of US relations with the Soviet Union and China and its impact upon a US response to possible Sino-Soviet hostilities."

13. Cuba

CASTRO AND MOSCOW: STRAINS ON THE TIE THAT BINDS, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 73, no. 19 (6 November 1972) 43-45.

"Cuba's economic debacle and Russia's disenchantment with its ally in the Caribbean—these are just parts of a pattern now becoming clear."

THE COOLING OF CASTRO, in *Newsweek*, v. 83, no. 6 (11 February 1974) 45.

This report of Brezhnev's visit to Cuba reflects 'current' Soviet-Cuban relations as they bear on U.S.-Cuban relations.

(LI)—CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION: A STUDY IN ZIGZAG, by Comdr. Jack L. Marshall. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of Cuban-Soviet relations during the thirteen Castro years. Key shifts in Cuban and Soviet policies in relation to each other are examined to determine the forces behind the policy changes and to evaluate the present policy in terms of the past and the future. The power is based primarily on speeches and writings of high ranking members of the Cuban and Soviet Governments during the period under study. Although almost completely dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic survival and military security since 1961, Cuba has pursued surprisingly independent policies. These policies have alternated between phases of close convergence and wide divergence with Soviet policy. Today, Cuban and Soviet policy are closely aligned. Whether Castro will continue his moderate, pro-Soviet Latin American policy or return to his policy of violent revolution is not determinable at this time. However, the study can conclude: first, the Cuban Revolution is Fidel's revolution and where it goes depends almost entirely on where he goes; second, the Soviets have learned the dangers of Latin American nationalism and have no desire to support another Cuba; finally, Castro's support for guerrilla warfare in Latin America provided a basis for closer United States-Latin American relations."

(LI)—THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS—THE SOVIET VIEW, by Lt. Comdr. Lawrence A. Lantzer, Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"In October 1962, the United States challenged the Soviet over the issue of Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles in Cuba. This paper examines Soviet reasoning behind the plan to place nuclear ballistic missiles in Cuba, the process of arriving at the decision and its implementation. Effects of the crisis are studied to determine what the unsuccessful venture cost the Soviet Union and what benefits the rest of the world derived from it. Inability to resolve the Berlin issue, waning influence in the Communist world, faltering domestic programs, protection of the new Communist foothold in Cuba, and the exposure of the 'missile gap' as a myth added up to an overwhelming situation for the Soviet leaders. This precipitated the daring Soviet move. Having been forced to back down in Cuba, the Soviet Union lost prestige in the Com-

munist world and Latin America. Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split was now complete. Beneficial results were reduced East-West tensions and agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. Indirectly, resolution of the Cuban crisis benefited the Soviet Union by helping to drive France from NATO and providing the resolve to strengthen the Soviet Navy."

CURRENT CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS: THE CHALLENGE TO US POLICY, by Morris Rothenberg. Coral Gables, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 12 p.

"Rothenberg cites Castro's economic, domestic and foreign failures over the first ten years as the factors which forced him to a greater reliance on the USSR. This need for Soviet aid, in turn, forced him to adjust not only his foreign relations (especially in the Sino-Soviet dispute) but also his internal policies; in exchange for aid, he had to integrate the Cuban economy into the Soviet bloc . . . Cuba has no mutual aid pact with the USSR, although the Soviets have 'equipped and reequipped' the Cuban armed forces free of charge and Berzhnev has made many statements reaffirming Soviet solidarity with Cuba. Internally, with East European and Soviet support, the Cubans are endeavoring to enlarge the Communist Party, which is modeled along Soviet lines. The Russians are anxious to convince Castro that his alignment with the Soviet bloc enhances his world prestige. Rothenberg explains some of the reasons for all this expensive (\$1.5 to \$2 million a day) Soviet support of Cuba; the Russians use the Cuban example to demonstrate the legitimacy of the vision that communism is the 'wave of the future.' Strategically, its foothold in Cuba amplifies Soviet power vis-a-vis the West; it provides a base for operations in Latin America, especially if the US should leave Panama. Castro plays an important part in aggravating the strain in US-Latin American policy; acceptance of Cuba by the rest of the area legitimizes the Castro regime, further enhancing both Soviet and Cuban prestige. Finally, Castro has played a vital role in urging the Third World to a more pro-Soviet, anti-US, anti-Chinese stance . . . On the basis of his assessment of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, Rothenberg evaluates the prospects for renewed US-Cuban relations. The question, as he sees it is whether the US should accept the Soviet presence on the island and 'live with it,' or continue to try to discredit it, in hopes of eventually evicting it."

THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, by Robert F. Kennedy. New York, Norton, 1969. 224 p.

"Robert Kennedy's narrative of the Cuban missile crisis depicts a decisive, if narrowly-achieved, victory of diplomacy over war . . . It took great courage to avoid the pitfalls of 'super-patriotism' in the face of the USSR's brazen duplicity in placing offensive missiles in Cuba while publicly denying it . . . When an American U-2 pilot was shot down over Cuba by a SAM, the overwhelming consensus favored bombing the SAM sites. The President refused and further ordered all US missiles de-fused so that they could be fired only on his personal order. The Kennedy account of the missile crisis will make an excellent reference for future Presidents who will be faced with the awesome task of decision-making in the atomic age . . ."

14. *Eastern Europe (See also Section on WTO)*

EAST EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION, ed. by Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974. 254 p.

Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe and the Impact of Détente; European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict; Economic Impulses Toward Détente; The Military Dimension; East Germany—The Special Case; Foreign Policy Perspectives and European Security—Poland and Czechoslovakia; Hungary and European Security—Hunting with the Hounds; Rumania—The Difficulty of Maintaining an Autonomous Foreign Policy; Yugoslavia—Ideological Conformity and Political-Military Nonalignment; European Security and the Problem of Balkan Security.

(*)—THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES AFTER PRAGUE: SOVIET HEGEMONY, NATIONALISM, REGIONAL INTEGRATION? ed. by Jerzy Lukaszewski. Bruges, Belgium, De Tempel, for the College of Europe, 1970. 330 p.

"The papers in this volume were delivered in March 1969 at a symposium organized by the Commission of the European Communities and the Belgian Ministry of National Education and Culture. The contributors and their topics include Michel Tatu on the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the détente in Europe; Heinz Kuby on Eastern Europe in a bipolar world; John Pinder, John M. Montias and Vladislav Pavlat on COMECON and

obstacles to the economic integration of Eastern Europe; Ghita Ionescu and Eugen Lemberg on East European nationalism; Werner J. Feld on the utility of the EEC experience for Eastern Europe; and Zbigniew Brzezinski on prospects for the Soviet bloc after Prague."

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FORECASTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: PAPERS FROM THE 1972 VARNA CONFERENCE, ed. by Lilita Dzirkals and A. Ross Johnson. Santa Monica, Rand, June 1973. 51 p. (Report R-1272-PR.)

" . . . This report is a collection of summaries of Soviet and East European papers on prospective European security arrangements, prepared for the October 1972 Varna Conference of European institutes of international affairs. These papers provide a . . . formulation of public Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav views on present and future military, political, and economic aspects of European security . . ."

15. *Finland*

FINLAND'S POLITICS IN MOSCOW'S SHADOW, by Andreas Oplatka, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v. 23, no. 1 (April 1973) 4-7.

"Consideration for the uncommonly hypersensitive neighbor to the East is a leitmotif of Finnish policy. This April marks the 25th anniversary of the signing of a twice-renewed 'treaty of friendship and mutual defense' between Finland and the Soviet Union, and shortly before these lines were written the Finnish press carried unconfirmed reports that the Kremlin's troika of leaders would pay an official visit to Helsinki to mark the occasion. The pact, concluded in 1948, was suspected at first of serving Stalin's interest in muzzling Finland, but has unquestionably also served Finnish interests in the years gone by. One can hardly gainsay the official Helsinki position that the pact, and Moscow's confidence in Helsinki created by strict adherence to it, has given the country a period of undisrupted development. The fact that the Soviet Union dismantled its naval base at the gateway to the Finnish capital in 1955 and returned it to Finnish sovereignty, is still one of the more impressive examples to which anyone must point in trying to make out a case for the Kremlin's willingness to make concessions. But the pact with the Soviet Union involves two difficult problem areas for Finland."

USSR-FINLAND; THIRTY YEARS OF

GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS, by M. Seglin, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 12 (December 1974) 21-27.

"The 30th anniversary of Finland's withdrawal from the war, which fell on September 19, an event which constitutes a milestone in the history of Finland was extensively observed all over the country at numerous public meetings with the participation of government leaders. A Soviet government delegation, led by N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, went to Finland in October to attend the anniversary celebrations and also those marking the 30th anniversary of the Finland-USSR Society . . . The conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was a historic milestone along the path opened in September 1944. It formed a sound foundation for the rising edifice of Friendship and allround mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Finland. The fact that it was twice—in 1955 and 1970—extended for a 20-year term is an indication of its viability and mutual advantage for the Soviet and the Finnish peoples. It also retains everlasting significance in all its propositions under the new conditions shaping in Europe."

16. France

A NEW CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS, by Y. Zakharov, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 2 (February 1975) 10-15.

"A major international political event that took place in the latter part of 1974 was the working meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and President of the French Republic V. Giscard d'Estaing. The importance of this meeting is determined by the international weight and influence of both countries and the impact that their mutual relations have on the world situation. The political climate on the European continent and beyond it in many ways depends on how relations between the Soviet Union and France take shape in the political sphere and how active are their joint efforts in working for peace and cooperation. The truth of this assertion is confirmed by a multitude of concrete facts, including the long practical experience of diplomatic relations between the USSR and France, the 50th anniversary of the establishment of which was widely marked in both countries last year. As noted in a message of greetings from the Soviet leaders on the occasion of this

date, 'the entire history of the development of relations between the USSR and France has served as convincing confirmation of the lasting importance of Soviet-French accord, a great factor in European and world politics'."

USSR-FRANCE: TRADITIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, by A. Manfred, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 11 (November 1974) 51-61.

"It is fifty years since the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between France and the USSR. The significant role played by time, as the strictest and most impartial criterion of material and spiritual values, has been fully recognized since Descartes' lifetime. In our modern kaleidoscopic world a half-century is a vast historical epoch abounding in events of great importance frequently changing the destinies of millions of people, countries and continents. Fifty years in the 20th century is a sufficiently long period to determine and bring out the dominant and prevailing tendencies from among particular events, accidents and surprises of history. Moreover, 50 years constitutes a sufficient period for establishing, on the basis of experience, even some objective laws of development. Were the relations between the USSR and France always smooth and invariably friendly throughout the past 50 years? No, of course, not. History does not tolerate any embellishment or falsehood. It shows that in real life, in relations between the two independent sovereign states such ideal, smooth relations, never marked by anything negative, are hardly possible. It is quite natural, therefore, that in seeking to comprehend the results or lessons of long historical experience the task is not to probe for some unobtainable absolute, but to take into account and soberly analyse the prevailing tendencies on the basis of the facts. The task is to establish the tendencies which gained the upper hand in dissimilar, changing conditions, in varying situations and to decide whether these are tendencies of repulsion or mutual attraction. In other words, what turns out to be stronger, the spirit of friendship or of hostility? The policy of cooperation or the policy of alienation? That is the main question arising in any analysis of Soviet-French relations over the past five decades, with all the other concrete questions—and these are many—being largely derivative."

17. Great Britain

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE EFFECT OF IDEAS ON REALITY, by Duncan Wil-

son, in *International Affairs*, v. 50, no. 3 (July 1974) 380-393.

"The conduct of foreign policy is largely a question of reacting to various day-to-day stimuli. The reaction to them must often be quick. And the general trend of these reactions determines the philosophy behind our longer-term relations as much as vice versa. As is well known, the British diplomat's motto is ad hoc. Now, politicians and diplomats are subject to stimuli not only from abroad but also from those organs of publicity at home which partly determine and partly reflect public opinion. And we are all subject, more or less unconsciously, to the intellectual climate of the time. I shall make some references to the states of mind in which all of us have in recent years approached Anglo-Soviet relations. My main effort will, however, be to illustrate various public views of the Soviet Union, and to see how much account has been taken of them by those responsible for our foreign policy."

FRESH PHASE IN SOVIET-BRITISH RELATIONS, by I. Login, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 5 (May 1975) 15-19.

"The visit to the Soviet Union of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson which took place in February 1975 fully satisfied the urgent need for an exchange of views between the two countries. For quite a lengthy period there had been no contact at a sufficiently high level between the USSR and Great Britain, a situation that was not typical of the USSR's relations with the other big capitalist countries. For a number of reasons, the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states had, to some extent, slowed down in recent years. Harold Wilson's visit and his talks with the Soviet leaders have paved the way for a fresh phase in Soviet-British relations."

MOSCOW AND THE BRITISH REFERENDUM, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 13 (19 June 1975) 1-2.

"Soviet opposition to the Common Market and to Britain's continued membership has been strong and persistent. Has Moscow's attitude changed since the British referendum showed a clear majority in favour of the EEC? And what changes, if any, can be expected in Soviet policy towards Western European integration?"

SHELEPIN—AND COMPANY, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 6 (13 March 1975) 1-4.

"The scheduled visit to Britain in April of Aleksandr Shelepin, the Soviet trade union leader, as a guest of the Trades Union Congress has caused a considerable and wholly understandable outcry, mainly because Shelepin was formerly head of the KGB. An important point tends to be overlooked, however. Shelepin is a CPSU functionary, and his career pattern does not necessarily mean that he is any worse than his Politburo colleagues. Should not the natural repugnance felt by the British public at the thought of his arrival logically also be expressed at the prospect of General Secretary Brezhnev taking up the invitation extended by Harold Wilson during his recent visit to Moscow? Moreover, as the very concept of trade unions is quite different in the USSR from that in the West, is anything to be gained by having talks with whatever delegation Moscow finally decides to send? These matters clearly require closer examination."

18. Greece

DRAMA IN CYPRUS: NEW TEST FOR THE MAJOR POWERS, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 78, no. 5 (29 July 1974) 29-30.

"Suddenly Cyprus has become a cockpit of crisis. Greece and Turkey, U.S. and Russia, all have a big stake in a coup in a dangerous part of the world . . . Main interest of the Soviet Union was to ensure that Cyprus, less than 65 miles off the coast of Soviet-armed Syria, did not abandon the policy of 'nonalignment' practiced by Makarias."

MOSCOW'S ARM IN GREECE, by Brian Crozier, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 12 (5 June 1975) 1-2.

"The Soviet Union is behind the high-pitched campaign of speeches and street agitation now being waged to force the Karamanlis government to move still further from Greece's American ally and from NATO. The government is now renegotiating the status of the American forces and bases in Greece and reviewing its relationship with the Atlantic Alliance; Greece withdrew from the integrated NATO structure in protest against the failure of the Alliance to prevent the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in July last year."

19. India

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN INDIA, by Chester Bowles, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 4 (July 1971) 636-651.

"As in many other parts of the world, the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in India are widely assumed to be in 'conflict.' To what extent is this conflict genuine, and what are the implications for Asia in general and South Asia in particular?"

HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS: A POLITICAL REVIEW OF BRITISH, CHINESE, INDIAN AND RUSSIAN RIVALRIES, by Dorothy Woodman. New York, Praeger, 1969. 423 p.

"In this thorough and scholarly analysis of the current Sino-Indian border dispute in the Himalayan area, the author has made use of a wide variety of documentary sources, published and unpublished. Primary emphasis is placed upon the more contemporary historical period, commencing with the British efforts to open Tibet in the latter half of the 19th century and to obtain formal recognition of the northern boundaries of their Indian Empire. The role of neighboring states such as the Soviet Union and Pakistan, in the Sino-Indian dispute is also given some consideration."

INDIA, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION—A TRIANGULAR INTERACTION, by T. Karki Hussain, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 6, no. 1 (July 1973) 15-31.

"It is generally assumed that in large measure, it is the Soviet factor which has impeded the process of normalization in Sino-Indian relations. Within India itself, there are quite a few people who share this viewpoint. However the majority follows the official line which insists that Indo-Soviet ties in no way affect India's relations with China. On the other hand, till very recently the Chinese leaders have declared from time to time before foreign visitors that India's close links with the USSR, especially after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty invalidate any genuine desire on the part of its leaders to reconcile their differences with China. They have openly insinuated that India being in an inferior position to the Soviet Union could be used as a pawn of super-power politics to promote Soviet interests."

INDIA'S RUSSIAN NAVY, by Lt. Comdr. R. Kaul, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 96, no. 8 (August 1970) 38-45.

"India's 'independence' from Britain has resulted in an increasing dependence upon the Soviet Union for the provision of modern naval ships and aircraft . . . The Soviets undoubtedly

realize the importance of the denial of Western ingress to the Indian Ocean. But the West, having used the Indian Ocean's trade routes over a period of two centuries to attain their current affluence, appears to be taking for granted the control of the Indian Ocean. Within 20 years of the transfer of governing power from British to Indian hands, and despite the unprecedented goodwill created by the Mountbatten Mission, India has been through the full cycle, from complete subjugation by a Western power, to dependence of the Soviet Union for the provision of essential weapon systems for the three military services. As we enter the 1970's, this dependence is increasing and India's armed forces soon will have more aircraft, ships, and tanks of Soviet origin than those of the Western countries with whose weapons systems and tactical doctrine we have been so familiar. The Western powers are at least partially responsible for a situation wherein a potential friend has been forced to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance, and to pay for it in scarce gold."

IS INDIA A SOVIET ALLY? by M. R. Masani, in *Asian Affairs* (January-February 1974) 121-135.

"The Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 9, 1971 reflects the long-term state of cordial relations between India and the USSR, and puts these relations on a continuing basis . . . In examining the 'true' nature of the Treaty, Masani declares that it is, indeed, an alliance of the two countries . . . Masani views this alliance as limiting India's options and as isolating it from friendly nations such as Iran, Israel, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand . . . Since the Treaty, India has had second thoughts; many have urged it to edge away from the Soviets and so restore a better balance to this multipolar world."

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY, by Robert H. Donaldson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974. 338 p.

Marx and Lenin on India—Communist Theory and Practice Through 1924; The Soviet Approach to India in the Stalin Era; The Soviets and the CPI in Search of a Policy, 1945-1954; Doctrinal and Operational Changes, 1955-1959; From Tibet to Tashkent—The Challenge of China, 1959-1965; From Mediation to Alliance—Soviet Policy, 1966-1972. With bibliography.

(*)—**SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA: FROM STALIN TO BREZHNEV**, by J. A. Naik. Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1970. 201 p.

"An Indian scholar's analysis of the course of Soviet policy toward his country, chiefly in the last three decades."

b. *Soviet-India Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation (Including Its Implications)*

(LI)—THE INDIA-SOVIET UNION TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION: AN END TO NONALIGNMENT?, by Maj. Richard W. Cwynar. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 41 p. (Research Study.)

"In August 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed a 20 year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. It calls for economic, technological, and scientific cooperation between the signatories, as well as mutual military assistance if required by either party. This study considers the effects of the treaty on India and her avowed foreign policy of non-alignment and whether or not this foreign policy has any effect on US national security. It concludes that India is still following her policy of non-alignment, although she has become very dependent, economically and militarily, on the Soviet Union. It also concludes that a non-aligned India would be in the best interests of US national security."

THE INDO-SOVIET PACT; NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY, in *Atlas*, v. 20, no. 11 (December 1971) 36-38.

Reprinted from "The Mail," Madras—"The U.S.-China détente may have seemed an enlightened diplomatic stroke in many circles, but dismay characterized the reactions in India. The world's largest democracy considers China its biggest threat, and the close American and Chinese relations with Pakistan add to Indian anxieties. India breathed more easily after the signing of the friendship pact with the Soviet Union in August, and a great impetus was given the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India. Hiren Mukherjee, 64-year-old British-educated lawyer and historian, member of Parliament from Bengal, and deputy head of the Communist Party of India, analyzes the implications of the Treaty for 'The Mail' of Madras."

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND CHINA, by S. K. Ghosh, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 5, no. 2 (October 1972) 248-258.

"This article discusses the subject under

two broad headings—one, China as a factor contributing to the conclusion of the treaty in August 1971, and two, China's reaction to the treaty."

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, by Wing Comdr. Maharaj K. Chopra, in *Military Review*, v. 21, no. 12 (December 1971) 22-28.

"On 9 August 1971, India and the USSR signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation. For the Soviet Union, this was no unusual experience, for it has developed a wide network of treaty agreements the world over. Even India has been entering into agreements of one type or another during its 24 years of independence. However, for India, the Indo-Soviet Treaty is the first of its kind with security overtones, the first with a great power, and the first with international significance. In this respect, it marks a watershed in India's foreign policy outlook and relationship."

THE SOVIET-INDIAN TREATY, by Sisir Gupta, in *Survival*, v. 13, no. 11 (November 1971) 376-378.

Reprinted from: The Hindustan Times Sunday World, 22 August 1971.—"In last months issue of 'Survival' the text of the Soviet-Indian Treaty was reprinted (and compared with the Soviet/Egyptian Treaty). It has . . . been widely regarded as a departure from the Indian policy of non-alignment. The article . . . [here] addresses this point and makes a close analysis of the evolution of India's foreign policy."

TWO VIEWS OF THE INDO-RUSSIAN DEFENSE TREATY, by Easwar Sagar and Lawrence Griswold, in *Seapower* (November 1971) 28-36.

"On August 9, 1971, India and Russia entered into a 20-year 'Treaty of Friendship, Peace and cooperation.' Sagar plays down the importance of the treaty. He maintains that it is not directed at anyone in particular and that Mrs. Gandhi has traveled to Europe and to Washington to make this fact clear. He considers it significant that Mrs. Gandhi has also made a number of gestures toward Peking aimed at easing existing tensions. Indian leaders have repeatedly stated in recent weeks that the treaty does not open the way for the USSR to acquire any kind of bases on Indian territory. India has drawn closer to Moscow as a result of the treaty, but this is primarily a riposte against the developing Sino-Pakistan axis. The treaty also serves to allay India's apprehensions about the US dialogue with Peking . . .

According to Sagar, India has repeatedly told Moscow that it opposes the deployment of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. India has suggested to both the US and the USSR that the question of keeping the Indian Ocean free of strategic weapons be included in the SALT talks . . . Griswold is more pessimistic than Sagar about the treaty. He claims it means the end of neutrality for the Indian Ocean. Moreover, it is aimed at the potential and formal allies of the US on the Indian Ocean littoral, and contains aggressive tones completely out of place in a purely defensive alliance . . . By itself, the Indian Navy is not very strong. Other than its four (possibly eight) Russian attack submarines and its five PETYA-class destroyer escorts, the Indian fleet is obsolete. However, with the addition of Russian units, it could become a formidable force, operating from ex-British and Portuguese bases without hindrance. No NATO opposing fleets or bases now exist in the area. The British-American base at Diego Garcia is actually a 'communications station' and not a base in any real sense of the term. The Russians regularly send modern naval task forces into the Indian Ocean and have both bases and use of bases and refueling points half way down the East African Coast, as well as across the northern Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal. Despite New Delhi's denials, Griswold believes the Soviets have bases or base rights on Indian territory. From Aden and the Gulf of Oman, across the northern littoral of the Indian Ocean, to Port Blair in Andamans, the Russian Navy manages to show its flag—a gesture that could not be accomplished unless the nations so visited were hospitable or at least complaint . . .”

20. Japan

DEFROSTING THE KREMLIN-DWELLERS, by Toshio Yoshimura, in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, v. 67, no. 12 (19 March 1970) 29-30.

“It might be stalemate on the question of the return to Japan of some of the Kurile islands, but relations in other respects have rarely been so good.”

JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION, by T. C. Rhee, in *World Affairs*, v. 133, no. 3 December 1970) 240-256.

“Fundamental changes of paramount importance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union are beginning to take shape. Japan's continuing economic expansion and her rising po-

litical influence (possibly coupled with a massive military buildup) may well affect Moscow's desire to improve the present tenuous ties with the Japanese. In this, Moscow's primary objectives would be to wean Japan away from present ties with the United States and from the potential link with the Chinese. Despite the competition from China, it seems certain that Russia will attempt to accomplish improved relations with Japan through the simultaneous use of diplomatic pressures and economic inducements.”

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, by Donald C. Hellmann. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970. 202 p.

“Hellmann's book deals with Japanese foreign policy-making towards the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1956. Hellmann analyses the reasons for Japanese Prime Minister Ishiro Hatoyama's decision to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and describes how Hatoyama's party, the opposition, the public and various groups within Japan were involved in and reacted to his policy-making process.”

JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS: INTERACTION OF POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY, by Young C. Kim. Beverly Hills, Calif., SAGE Publications, 1974. 88 p. (The Washington Papers V. II, The Center for Strategic and International Studies.)

Security Dimension—The Soviet Union in Japan's Strategic Thinking; Political Dimension—The Territorial Dispute; Economic Dimension—Japan's Cooperation in Siberian Development Projects; The Future of Japanese-Soviet Relations. With references.

THE TIGER AND THE BEAR—JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Bruce J. Esposito, in *Military Review* (June 1973) 46-53.

“Dr. Esposito does not foresee a Japanese-Soviet rapprochement based on their joint development of Siberia, or a relationship which would tend to dominate East Asia and menace China. However, speculates Esposito, while there probably will be a limited détente between Japan and Russia, with some joint economic development of Siberia, it will take place amidst expanding trade relations between China and Japan. In short, China, not the Soviet Union, will be the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy in East Asia.

According to Esposito, there are several apparent constraints on any new relationship with Russia; Japan's geographic position in Asia and its cultural affinities to East Asia; its fear of communism; and its traditional feeling of suspicion and dislike which has several times over the last century led to direct armed confrontation . . . Esposito believes the Japanese-Soviet rapprochement will be a limited one. Expansion of trade relations and the possible resolution of the Northern Boundary question and the fishing problem in the North are certainly possible events in the medium termed period. However, Japan's contribution to the development of Siberia will be limited and slow. Mutual suspicion will remain, 'as a recent Japanese opinion poll indicates.' The basis of Japanese foreign policy will continue to be alliance with the U.S. The development of Japanese-Chinese economic and political relations will have a high priority and will be a major Japanese goal. It is not only geography, history and culture that influence Japanese attitudes toward China, but economic and security considerations as well."

21. *Latin America: Soviet Penetration, Influences, and Presence*

COMMUNIST STATES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AID AND TRADE IN 1972. Washington, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1973. 20 p.

Includes, among others, economic and military aid and trade with many countries of the world including the following of Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, etc.

A COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND CUBAN APPROACHES TO LATIN AMERICA, by Edward Gonzalez, in *Studies in Comparative Communism, An Interdisciplinary Journal*, v. 5,

"Soviet and Cuban approaches to Latin America have differed markedly in their respective perceptions and methods of analysis, state interests, and foreign policy instruments. Recent changes in Havana's relationship with Moscow, in Latin America itself, and in Castro's strategy toward some Latin American regimes have, however, brought Cuban and Soviet policies into closer alignment. In this writer's opinion, the shift in the Cuban position has been facilitated by the relative absence of ideological and class-bound constraints in Castro's approach to the Latin American revo-

lutionary movement, and by the emphasis upon revolutionary action and elitism contained in the Fidelista doctrine of guerrilla warfare. Committed earlier to guerrilla struggle as a method, the Cubans have thus been able to recognize the revolutionary potential of new military and civilian political elites now emerging in Peru and Chile, respectively."

THE FOREIGN POWERS IN LATIN AMERICA, by Herbert Goldhamer. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972. 321 p. (For the Rand Corp.)

An "analysis of the impact on Latin America of the important non-Hemispheric powers as well as the United States [and the USSR]."

LATIN AMERICA AND THE SOCIALIST WORLD: ECONOMIC TIES, by L. Chernorutskaya, in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, no. 6 (June 1973) 68-71.

"Trade and economic relations between Latin America countries and the Soviet Union: and other states of the socialist community have been notably expanded in recent years. It is fully natural that Cuba, the first Latin American country to take the road of building socialism, has the strongest and widest ties with these states. These ties have been further reinforced and assumed a comprehensive nature following Cuba's admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The striving of Latin American countries to develop economic relations with socialist states has been especially intensified in view of the financial and monetary crisis racking the capitalist world. This crisis hit Latin America which is economically closely tied to the USA and to the dollar."

LATIN AMERICA ASSERTS ITSELF, by D. Lozinov, in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, no. 12 (December 1972) 88-92.

"I have a varying knowledge of Latin American countries: in some I have spent weeks, in others months or years, but of a few I have unfortunately only a fleeting impression. However, despite the patchwork of my impressions of the different faces of all these lands, and my varying knowledge of the problems confronting all these countries together and each individually, I still have a very general feeling which helps to sum up everything I have heard and seen on that distant continent. It is that Latin America is now in search of a future of its own and of ways of escaping from foreign dependence."

(LI)—NON-ALIGNED MARXIST/SOCIALIST STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE—A THREAT TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY?, by Lt. Col. George F. Powers. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"An analysis of the threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere which would be created by the existence of non-aligned Marxist/Socialist states in Latin America. This evaluation is made by an analysis of the attitudes and policies of the Soviet Union, Latin America and the United States, focusing on the ideological rather than the economic or military threat. In the Communist world, nationalism has replaced international communism as the central dynamic for the formulation of national policy. The U.S.S.R. recognizing its own limitations, would be satisfied to 'neutralize' Latin America. Marxism is an accepted economic and developmental theory in Latin America, and United States opposition on ideological grounds will further Soviet objectives. The Latins generally do not see communism or the U.S.S.R. as immediate threats, consequently closer ties with the Soviet Bloc are inevitable. The United States must be pragmatic in its appraisal of the threat, discarding ideological differences. Latin America, regardless of ideology, can constitute a threat to the hemisphere only by alignment with an extra-continental power, which can only occur if the United States abdicates its role as the hemispheric power through blind adherence to a policy of ideological discrimination."

PERÓN'S RETURN, ALLENDE'S FALL AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA, by David C. Jordan, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 1025-1052.

"Soviet-controlled communism is the means for bringing a state within the political orbit of the Soviet Union or for getting another state to serve Soviet interests. In this sense of servants of Soviet imperialism communists had an important role in the return of Juan D. Perón and the fall of Salvador Allende. Both Argentina and Chile are part of the Soviet grand design for Latin America, in which Moscow has two major strategic interests: (1) to erode the land base of the United States' sea power and (2) to build up the land base for worldwide Soviet sea power. This is a long-term strategy; the Soviet Union does not expect to be successful immediately. Nonetheless the Kremlin pursues this goal in Latin America by both peaceful and violent means, as the politics of

Perón's return and of Allende's ouster and suicide illustrate."

(LI)—SOVIET BLOC INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE 1965, by Maj. Charles E. Hester. Newport, R.I., U.S. Naval War College, 1972. (Unpublished Thesis.)

"A broad study to identify the economic and political rapprochement existing between Latin America and Soviet and bloc countries since 1965 for the purpose of measuring the influence bloc countries have in Latin America and what future effect these relationships may have on political rearrangements or alliances within the Western Hemisphere. The paper includes Soviet policy toward Latin America, Cuban influence on Soviet policy, diplomatic, economic, and cultural relationships between the Soviet bloc and Latin America and a sampling of Soviet propaganda efforts. The paper finds that a significant increase in political and economic rapprochement has occurred between Latin America and the Soviet Union since 1965. It concludes that the Soviet Union and her allies are seeking to develop a platform, in Latin America, from which to launch her own struggle against U.S. influence in Latin America and at a time when anti-U.S. feeling exists in Latin America. Further, by increased rapprochement with Latin American countries, the Soviets can press for renewed and more effective diplomatic relations with Cuba."

SOVIET POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL FORMULATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA, by Wayne S. Smith, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1972) 1122-1146.

"Given the adversary relationship existing between the United States and the USSR, Moscow's activities in the Western Hemisphere, in and of themselves, warrant careful scrutiny . . . The conclusions of this survey: (1) The primary influence in the area. (2) Moscow's efforts to achieve this goal are essentially cautious and opportunistic. The Soviets prudently seek to take advantage of unrest and growing anti-Americanism, but they do not create these conditions. They have little capacity to do so. (3) Soviet efforts are not likely to play a significant role in determining the outcome of events in Latin America. The Soviet presence may at times become a complicating factor in U.S.-Latin American relations and occasionally even an irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations, but in both cases it is apt to remain something of a side issue. The central equation in the hemisphere is and will be U.S.-Latin American."

(LI)—SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, by Maj. Michael A. Nelson. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 19 p. (Research Study.)

"Since the Cuban revolution the Soviet Union has shown increasing interest in Latin America as a potentially vulnerable area of US influence. This article briefly reviews the history of Soviet policy in Latin America, assesses both the encouraging conditions and restraints for Soviet decision-makers, and describes the means by which Soviet policy is being implemented. The author concludes that the Soviet Union is enjoying a surprising degree of success in the region with a legal and pragmatic strategy which forsakes enthusiastic support of insurgency in favor of conventional diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations." See also: Soviet Policy in Latin America, by Maj. Michael A. Nelson, in *Air University Review*, v. 24, no. 1 (November-December 1972) 26-33.

SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, by Maj. Michael A. Nelson, in *Air University Review*, v. 24, no. 1 (November-December 1972) 26-33.

"The speed and ease of Fidel Castro's march to power in Cuba startled almost all of the world community. Even the Soviet Union, which inherited a windfall revolution there, must have been surprised that an almost unknown nation, in an area conceded to be within the influence of the United States, could swiftly upset the established order and become a Marxist ally. In the United States and in much of Latin America, the trauma of the Cuban conversion triggered deep concern that the Soviet Union would follow up Castro's initiative with waves of revolutionary activity throughout the hemisphere. Indeed, the Cuban Communists began almost at once to prepare for such operations. After a dozen years, though, it has become obvious that despite awakened Soviet interest in the region the massive Soviet support that was expected by many Westerners has not materialized. In fact, soon after the revolution an ill-concealed rift developed between Havana and Moscow over the advisability of exporting violent revolution to Latin America, the Kremlin contending that Guevarian insurgency amounted to risky and hopeless 'adventurism.' Although Castro has been more or less restrained by financial realities and by the success of the counterinsurgency effort, it is not safe to say that Soviet policies in Latin America are benign. On

the contrary, evidence suggests that the Soviet Union now believes more firmly than ever that its legalistic policies in Latin America are correctly suited to the conditions there and are more likely to achieve Soviet objectives than a multitude of violent insurgencies. There is a growing but cautious Soviet interest and optimism about the potential of Latin America as a pawn in the global power struggle. It is therefore critical that the Soviet strategy, along with the historical background and positive and negative considerations that shape it, be accurately recognized and understood."

SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE KHRUSHCHEV, by W. Raymond Duncan, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1971) 643-669.

"The purpose of this article is to probe Moscow's Latin American posture after Khrushchev by using the African-Asian setting as a departure point. Have the changes in general orientation observed by scholars been manifest in a new Soviet approach to Latin America? How have these changes been given effect. What are the implications of discernible change for future Soviet-Latin American relations? The approach will be (1) to identify briefly the basic trends in Soviet policy toward Africa and Asia during the middle and late 1960's, (2) to compare those trends with Soviet-Latin American affairs since Khrushchev, and (3) to examine Moscow's special connection with the one 'revolutionary' state in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba."

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA, by Ronald R. Pope, in *World Affairs*, v. 135, no. 2 (Fall 1972) 139-170

"Traditionally Russia has shown no great interest in the affairs of Latin America. Prior to 1917 the Russian government was preoccupied with Europe and Asia and for the most part ignored the Western Hemisphere. Lenin is reported to have observed that Latin America was too close to the United States to be ripe for revolution. It is only recently that Russian interest in the Western Hemisphere has become more apparent. The impetus for the current widely discussed Soviet involvement in the region was provided by Castro's rise to power in 1959. The USSR's Latin American Institute, for example, was established in 1961, and one of its departments is devoted to Cuba. As further testimony to recent Soviet interest, the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society was established in 1964, the USSR-Chile Society and

the USSR-Mexico Society were founded in 1966, and USSR-Uruguay Society was founded in 1968 . . . Current Soviet policy can be divided into her interests in 'progressive' governments, diplomatic relations, local communist parties, trade and aid, cultural exchange, 'showing the flag' (Soviet naval visits), and the content of her propaganda on Latin America. Information on diplomatic representation, trade statistics, and data on the relative amount of attention paid to Latin America by the Soviet Union, all utilized in this essay, represent the most reliable evidence currently available. But this information tells only a part of the story. For the rest one must rely on statements in the Soviet press and journals and on the fragmentary reports on actual Soviet activities in the Western Hemisphere."

(*)—SOVIET PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA, by Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg. Washington, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975. 204 p.

"A catalogue of Soviet moves—diplomatic, economic, propaganda—plus an . . . analysis of the strategy aimed at increasing Moscow's influence as Latin American becomes increasingly independent of the United States."

(*)—SOVIET PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA, by James Theberge. New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1974. 107 p.

"A brief . . . treatment of Soviet activities, interests and influence in the area."

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA 1918-1968: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, ed. by Stephen Clissold. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 313 p. (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

"A . . . volume of Soviet, Comintern and Latin American documents, with explanatory notes and an extended introduction."

THE SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICA, ed. by J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970. 190 p. (Published for the Institute for the Study of the USSR.)

Soviet Relations with Latin America Between the Wars; Impressions of the Soviet Impact on the Iberian World; Cultural Relations Between the Soviet Union and Latin America; Soviet Strategy in Latin America; Some Aspects of Soviet-Latin American Relations; New Stage

of the Peoples Struggle; Studies on Latin America by Soviet Political Economists; Brazilian Relations with Eastern Europe; The Place of Cuba in Soviet American Strategy; The Cuban Impact on Soviet Ideology and Strategy vis-à-vis the Third World; The Cuban Economy and the Soviet Bloc, 1963-1968—A Commentary; The Strategy of Castroism; Cuban Relations with the Communist World; The Castroist Challenge to Communism; Régis Debray—The Prophet of Castro Communism; Postscript.

URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: SOVIET VIEWS, by Roger Hamburg, in *Studies in Comparative Communism, and Interdisciplinary Journal*, v. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1972) 1-20.

"The Soviet government continues to express interest in expanding and improving ties with the several states of Latin America above and beyond the tie with Cuba. In this connection, Foreign Minister Gromyko has observed that in Latin America 'the inclination toward normalizing relations with the U.S.S.R. and developing trade, cultural exchanges and useful contacts is becoming more and more strongly manifest.' This only amplifies Prime Minister Kosygin's declaration that the Soviet government would 'seek paths of expanding relations with the states of Latin America and develop political, trade, and other contacts with them.' This Soviet interest, however, is accompanied by a perception of the Latin American developmental process which is at variance with the Soviet treatment of other underdeveloped countries and reflects the Soviet view that Latin America occupies a special place in the Third World . . . Urbanization in Latin America is evidenced by the pouring of large numbers of people into the political and administrative centers of the Latin American countries. Yet industrialization, which Moscow is pushing to create a disciplined, factory-oriented working force, has only begun in Latin America. The percentage of urban workers employed in industry is very low compared with the number of European countries, although it is much higher than in most of the Afro-Asian nations. Even if the wages of the existing workers decline—partly as a consequence of foreign competition, partly through inflation—the composition of the class changes 'because of the constant addition of rural immigrants who perceived a relative increase in environmental satisfaction'."

22. *The Mediterranean*

BEARS IN THE MED, by Col. Minter L. Wilson, Jr., in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v. 17, no. 2 (April-May 1972) 50-56.

"The Russian bear has tried the warm salt water of the Med and finds the temperature to her liking. In the Middle East and across the whole North African littoral, the Soviets are increasingly welcome, much to the concern of NATO and the West. Setbacks such as that suffered in the Sudan notwithstanding, the Soviets are seeking to drive south and seem determined to turn East and West. NATO's leaders have every reason to worry . . . What then is the military significance to NATO of the Soviet move into the Mediterranean?"

CHALLENGE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: CROSSROADS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Robert A. Kilmarx, in *Military Review*, v. 50, no. 11 (November 1970) 81-89.

"The importance of the Mediterranean Basin to US foreign policy is dynamically affected by the current US orientation toward international politics. It is sensitive to the outcome of competing conceptions concerning the role of the United States in the world and the relative importance that is placed on various domestic versus international priorities. Increasingly, US actions reflect a reconsideration of past policies aimed at containment of Communist expansion and the creation of favorable balances of power. This trend has resulted in greater selectivity in determining vital interests and a reappraisal of the ability of the United States to influence the congeniality of the international environment."

FRANCE, ALGERIA, AND THE SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Guy de Carmoy, in *Military Review*, v. 50, no. 3 (March 1970) 83-90.

"With the signing of the Evian agreements in 1962, France launched a policy of cooperation with Algeria. It was hoped this policy, which covered the principal sectors of the Algerian economy, would be exemplary so that it could become the pivot of a broader French policy toward the third world. Since 1963, Algeria has turned to the Soviet Union to help it fuse, in a modern army, the disparate elements which had contributed to its liberation."

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING—GATEWAY TO THE

ATLANTIC, by Boris Guriel, in *New Middle East*, no. 26 (November 1970) 20-23.

"The massive Soviet build-up in Egypt is not due to the Western menace to its Transcaucasian borders, since no such menace exists. Nor is it part of a Soviet scheme to impose the Soviet system on Egypt by force of arms. It follows that the reasons for the Soviet military build-up in Egypt are to be sought elsewhere, namely, in the new Soviet conception of global warfare . . . The Soviet military build-up in Egypt and the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean the harbingers of Soviet oceanic imperialism. And the blocked Suez Canal is a tangible obstruction to the realisation of the Soviet Navy's plan for oceanic supremacy."

(LI)—REGIONAL CONFLICT TO GLOBAL CONFRONTATION: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN PENETRATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST MEDITERRANEAN, by James M. Labriola. San Diego, San Diego State College, 1969. 229 p. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis.)

"The following analytical techniques are employed: strategic analysis to determine the nature of both Western and Eastern bloc interests in the region; historical analysis to demonstrate the establishment of a regional Western status quo of power and influence and subsequent Russian revisionist efforts; and conflict analysis to determine the resultant degree of cold war polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The conclusion discusses the present lines of division of the Middle East conflict and offers predictions as to further cold war polarization in the region."

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, by Ferdinand Otto Miksche, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 9 (September 1971) 62-65.

"Soviet arms shipments have been a decisive factor in the development of the current precarious situation in the Mediterranean. The volume of military equipment provided by the Soviet Union exceeds by far the quantities necessary for maintaining the status quo. Therefore, it acts not as a deterrent, but as a threat. This deliberately kindled arms race has upset the Western policy of maintaining a balance of power and has become the focal point of political events in the Arab world. Military aid has proved to be a more effective means of increasing Soviet political influence than other cold war methods. Recipient countries are dependent upon the Soviet Union for continued aid for maintenance, spare parts,

and training. By underwriting wars fought by others, the Soviets have succeeded in securing strategically important positions without risking a general clash with the Western Powers."

SOVIET POLICIES SOUTH AND EAST OF SUEZ, by T. B. Millar, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 1 (October 1970) 70-80.

"Whatever objectives the Soviet Union may have in the eastern Mediterranean, they must be presumed to be part of wider policies, and inevitably the effects of activities there extend far beyond the states immediately concerned. The sizable Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, coupled with access by the Soviet air force to bases in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere in North Africa, has changed the balance of forces in the region, making it quite quickly an area of confrontation comparable in many ways with that in continental Europe. Perhaps it is more dangerous because less easily delineated, and because it is tied into a passionate gladiatorial contest which neither the Russians nor the Americans can be wholly confident of controlling. The Israelis obviously, but also the Yugoslavs and Turks, must sleep less soundly in their beds. An examination of Soviet foreign policies since World War II suggests a readiness to take advantage of Western weakness wherever it concurs, both to further specific Soviet interests and to improve the Soviet-Western ratio. Concessions and mutually helpful arrangements are almost invariably accompanied by pressure exerted or tension generated somewhere else."

23. *The USSR and the Middle East*

a. *Aims, Objectives, and Influence: An Assessment*

THE BEAR THAT SWIMS LIKE A FISH, by Rear Adm. Kemp Talley, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 97, no. 2 (June 1971) 41-45.

"The grateful Arab states may repay the Soviet bear by permitting him to use the Suez Canal as a springboard to catapult himself into the Indian Ocean."

THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST; MOSCOW'S PURPOSES, by John C. Campbell, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 5 (September-October 1972) 40-54.

"The growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean has produced in the West a variety of explana-

tions and reactions. The latter range from alarm to vague concern to complacency. The former may flow from a general view of Soviet policy in the Brezhnev era (and before) or from a specific preoccupation with interests that are obviously affected—Western defense, concern for Israel or for the Arabs or for a settlement between them, access to Middle East oil, or whatever. If a Soviet grand strategy exists, then we must assume that the separate pieces of Soviet policy here and there in the Middle East are logically related to it."

HOW THE U.S.S.R. BROUGHT PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1972, by Genri Kissinger with Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in *War/Peace Report*, v. 10, no. 6 (June/July 1970) 14-20.

"This report by an 'adviser' to the Soviet Politburo tells the story of how an emerging crisis in the Middle East in 1972 was capitalized on by the U.S.S.R. to make peace in the area."

THE MIDDLE EAST AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Rolland Bushner. New York, The Council on Foreign Relations, July 14, 1971. 26 p.

"During the period February 14-April 20, 1971, the Council on Foreign Relations surveyed the views of nearly 1,500 members of its affiliated Committees on Foreign Relations in 34 major cities throughout the US on US policy toward the Middle East in light of the current state of US-Soviet relations. This survey was not based on a scientific sampling. Its value arises from the responsible positions that the respondents hold in their communities and the fact that they are among those Americans most interested in, and best informed about, foreign policy. They come from various walks of life, and include business executives, lawyers, educators, journalists, engineers, physicians, clergymen, labor leaders and ranchers. Recent Soviet activities in the Middle East, including naval movements and aid to Egypt, were regarded as a moderate or serious threat to the US by 93% of the respondents . . . The survey disclosed the importance the respondents attached to the SALT negotiations; 85% favored these efforts to establish a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union; of these, 44% (589) favored maintaining both nuclear and conventional deterrent forces while the discussions were going on while an almost equal number, 41% (557), favored decreasing our conventional forces during the discussions, including withdrawing some troops from Europe, to lessen chances of

US forces becoming involved in local conflicts. Almost 12% of the total favored pursuing detente wholeheartedly with the Russians and accepting their proposal for a European Security Conference. Only 3½% favored preventing the expansion of Russian power by relying on our military strength alone. As to the present direction of Soviet policy, 76% of the respondents believe that the USSR intends to increase its power and influence while reducing the US, but only 13% of them see the USSR as a military threat to the US and its allies and as a revolutionary power bent on expansion. One-half of one percent feel that the USSR is so absorbed in its domestic problems at home that it should not be a factor in US policy determinations. Only 10% of the respondents thought that US-USSR relations in general were worsening, as against 24% who thought they were improving and 66% who considered them to be the same as in the past few years. This brief summary deals only with generalities; the many subtleties in the varied responses can only be obtained by reading the entire 26 page report."

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET POLICY, by R. D. McLaurin. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975. 206 p.

Soviet Policy in the Middle East (Soviet Foreign Objectives—Framework for a Middle East Policy; Soviet Regional Objectives in the Middle East; Constraints on Soviet Policy in the Middle East); Soviet Activities in the Middle East (Political, Economic, Military, and Cultural Activities); Conclusions and Implications. With bibliography.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET STRATEGY, by Wynfred Joshua, in *Strategic Review*, v. 2, no. 2 (Spring 1974) 61-67.

"Ancient Russian dreams of hegemony in the Mediterranean and the Middle East approach fulfillment in the Soviet presence and influence in the area. Aside from the ideological struggle and the goal of removing U.S. influence from the region, the Soviet Union had more immediate needs for oil, for liberation from the restraints imposed by British imperial policy and for opening a new naval strategy with worldwide horizons. The Arab-Israeli conflict has provided a basis for expanding Soviet influence in the Arab states. Soviet aid to the Arab states and influence on U.S. policy made new gains in the October 1973 war. Despite the brilliant diplomatic success of

Secretary Kissinger's mediation, strategic success lay with the Soviet Union."

MOSCOW'S STORY OF SUCCESS—DESIGN OR ACCIDENT? by Lawrence Whetten, in *New Middle East*, no. 23 (August 1970) 24-29.

"In the past several years the USSR has accomplished the astonishing feat of gaining general recognition from all interested parties of its parity of responsibility for regional stability in the Middle East. The apparent permanent nature of this historic feat raises the question of how the Soviet success was achieved: by Western default, by a more dynamic pursuit of traditional Tsarist aims, or by the adoption of both totally new objectives and methods for their implementation."

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS FOR THE KREMLIN'S DRIVE EAST, by R. M. Burrell, in *New Middle East*, no. 46 (July 1972) 9-13.

"R. M. Burrell, Lecturer in Contemporary Middle Eastern History at the School of Oriental and African Studies sees the last year as one of great success for Russia's policy in the Middle East."

(LI)—PEACE-KEEPING ROLES OF THE US AND USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Lt. Col. John D. Shoup. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 15 p. (Professional Study No. 4236.)

"A look at the roles the US and USSR played in keeping the peace in the Middle East from August 1970 through November 1970 as reported in the news media available to a reader in Montgomery, Alabama. The actions by the US and USSR might have been separate but the result was a joint effort in keeping the peace."

THE RUSSIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by David G. Nes, in *Middle East International*, no. 12 (March 1972) 12-13.

"During a brief period of seventeen years, the Soviet Union has established a political and military position in the Mediterranean similar to that enjoyed by Britain and the U.S. at the close of World War II. According to the most recent estimates of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Soviet Union—in return for having provided Egypt with a modern air defence system—has received facilities for its own use at a half-a-dozen locations . . . What is the ultimate Russian objective in the Middle East and what are her intentions towards

Israel—the strongest military power and now the only military ally of the U.S. in the area? To view any of this in a modern context, one has to recall certain principles of power which have pertained through the ages at this cross-roads of Europe, Asia and Africa.”

RUSSIANS VS. ARABS; THE AGE OF DISENCHANTMENT, by Walter Laqueur, in *Commentary*, v. 53, no. 4 (April 1972) 60–66.

“The Soviet attitude toward the Middle East is a curiously ambivalent one. Commentators in the Soviet press still refer to the area as the world’s greatest danger zone, but at the same time there are clear indications that, at least temporarily, the Middle East has been downgraded in the list of Soviet priorities . . . At present, the most Soviet leaders can reasonably hope for is to hold on to what gains they have made. The confidence of the early and middle 60’s has given way to a feeling of dissatisfaction and even to muted complaints. It is far too early to talk of a major setback, but there is certainly a great deal of soul-searching nowadays in Moscow, and with increasing frequency Soviet experts are asking what went wrong in the Middle East and why, and what, if anything, can be done about it. The basic problem facing the Russians in the Middle East—but not, of course, only in the Middle East—is that while they have become heavily involved politically and in some instances also militarily, they are not in full control of the conduct of affairs . . .”

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, by T. C. Rhee, in *NATO’s Fifteen Nations*, v. 15, no. 5 (October–November 1970) 70–74.

“The ever-growing military commitment of the Soviet Union and the concurrent ties being cultivated between Peking and the Palestine guerrillas are gradually but surely transplating the Sino-Soviet conflict into the region. This will not only complicate the crisis but dangerously reduce the precious flexibility of the Soviet Union—one element indispensable for any political solution. It is well at the outset to consider several factors to appreciate the serious implications of the Moscow-Peking rivalry in the Middle East. Firstly, while the Soviet Union at least politically recognizes the existence of Israel as a State, Peking does not. Secondly, if the Arab States still pay lip service to a political settlement under given conditions, the Palestine guerrillas (especially Yasir Arafat) show increasing signs

of intransigence and now emphatically rule out any political settlement. Thirdly, while it is presumed that the Soviet Union is trying to avoid a major confrontation with the United States through containing the regional crisis within manageable limits by working through Arab governments, the independent guerrilla organizations increasingly prefer the open-ended ‘People’s War’ concept of the Chinese type. So do the Chinese, who do not share the same stakes as the Russians in the area. Fourthly, the guerrillas—possibly already linked to Peking—pose grave threats to the very existence of several of the key Arab States such as Jordan and Lebanon. Given the serious conditions of the Sino-Soviet disputes, these factors will have dangerous implications for the Middle East.”

SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by George Lenczowski. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. 176 p.

“Dr. Lenczowski has provided a comprehensive and well-documented history and analysis of recent Soviet advances in the Middle East. He realistically warns of the political, economic, and military gains which the Soviets have made there at the expense of US influence; yet, he points out serious difficulties they have with the Middle Eastern countries, which have a basically pro-Western orientation. In particular, he maintains that Western policy toward Israel is the focal point of Arab disagreement with the West . . . The conclusion one draws from Lenczowski’s study is that the USSR’s greatest advances in the Middle East have been made since the 1967 war and the subsequent occupation of Arab lands by Israel. This has led to the overthrow of moderate governments and a growing alienation from the West. The USSR has exploited this alienation by trying to substitute itself for the diminishing Western presence in the area. Soviet advances in the Middle East, then, are not only a matter of Soviet decision and bilateral Soviet-Arab relations; Western postures and policies have also played a vital role. The Arab relationship with the US can be described as ‘unrequited love,’ since the Arab modernization process began with admiration and preference for the West. Franco-British imperialism and Western support for the state of Israel since 1948 marred this friendly relationship; but while Franco-British imperialism receded or vanished altogether, the controversy over Israel has remained as the focal point of Western-Arab disagreements. Since 1967, Arab

emphasis on the inadmissibility of the existence of Israel has given way to a new emphasis on the need to stop Israel's territorial expansion, with an implicit and at times explicit willingness in important Arab centers (Egypt, Jordan) to accept Israel as a reality. Lenczowski is convinced that to dissuade Arab countries from Soviet advances, 'the West should demonstrate, by word and by deed, that it is not hostile to the basic Arab aspirations of independence, territorial integrity, and development, and that it does not endorse schemes and policies aiming at territorial expansionism and demographic changes at the expense of the Arab peoples'."

SOVIET GLOBAL POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Uri Ra'anani, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 1 (September 1971) 19-29.

"The . . . analysis of Soviet foreign policy—dating generally from the death of Stalin and more particularly in the Middle East since the spring of 1967—stresses the importance of interpreting individual Soviet actions within the broader context of a continued Soviet attempt to alter the world's perception of the Russo-American power balance. Skillfully drawing upon various Soviet and East European published sources of political and strategic thought, together with the empirical evidence of Moscow's continued inability to protect its clients in the Third World, Professor Ra'anani provides the reader with a most enlightening insight into many of the motives underlying current Soviet policy in the Middle East."

(LI)—SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ, by Maj. Max R. Pierce. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 53 p. (Research Study.)

"The purpose of this study is twofold: to ascertain the objectives underlying Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and to determine the general nature of Soviet military and economic activities in the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The study covers the factors that tend to impede the growth of Soviet power in the region and provides an analysis of the general military and economic threat posed by the Soviet Union to the West in the Middle East."

(LI)—SOVIET MILITARY GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Maj. Alan C. Chase. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 79 p. (Research Study.)

"In a few short years (1955-1972) the Soviet Union has dramatically increased her influ-

ence and prestige in the Middle Eastern World at the expense of the United States. The purpose of this study is to examine Soviet military goals in the Middle East and how she pursues these goals through diplomatic means, her naval presence in the Mediterranean, and military aid to the Arabs. The author concludes that the Soviet Union is attempting to create a sphere of influence in the area. A basic tenet of the Soviet strategy is to avoid direct confrontation with the United States."

SOVIET MOTIVATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Maj. Jay C. Mumford, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 9 (September 1972) 40-49.

"The purpose of this article is to identify and investigate selected factors which motivate the Soviet Union in its Middle East involvement. Motivation is essentially a value application, and attempts at its investigation can easily lead to subjective evaluations, particularly in the Middle East where biased sources are numerous and issues are highly emotive. To minimize this hazard, the testing of a thesis using examination of specific Soviet actions and pronouncements will be made. The thesis of this article reasons that motivation for Soviet Middle East involvement is multifaceted, including an ever-changing mix of factors. The more critical are generally agreed by Soviet analysts to be security, ideology, economic and great power status. The examination of each factor in relation to concrete events should suggest its relative importance in the mix. The primary focus will be on that portion of the Middle East from the Arab Republic of Egypt to Iraq—the so-called Arab Middle East."

SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE MIDDLE EAST, by Wynfred Joshua. New York National Strategy Information Center, Inc., July 1970. 43 p.

"Through military assistance complemented by economic aid and diplomatic support, the USSR has gained varying degrees of leverage in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the two Yemens. Yet, the very success of Soviet penetration efforts have brought with it a number of problems that tend to reduce Soviet control over individual Arab states. In the enlistment of allies, the Soviets have frequently ignored local ambitions and rivalries. Aid to both Iran and Iraq is at cross purposes because the traditional contest between them for hegemony in the Persian Gulf is likely to intensify when the British withdraw in 1971. Similar contradictions exist in Soviet policies toward Iran and Egypt, whose relations have

been characterized more by competition than co-operation. Furthermore, Soviet ambitions to win a dominant position in southern Arabia and in southern Arabia and in the Persian Gulf are likely to be resented not only by Iran, but by Egypt as well. The UAR claims leadership of the Arab world and would strenuously object to a loss of influence to the Soviets in the Arabian Peninsula. The growing popularity of the Fedayeen in the Arab world has created additional problems for the Russians. Because of the commandos' relentless call for a military solution to the Arab-Israeli problem, the USSR is reluctant to provide them with anything more than verbal support. Yet, refusal to support the guerilla movements would leave this sector of Arab society open to Communist China, which has enthusiastically backed the commandos from the start. Russian policies have become increasingly tied to Nasser's remaining in office, and, while he still retains much of his hold over the Arab nations. Fedayeen activities threaten his position. His removal from office could eliminate the mainstay of Soviet power in the Middle East . . ."

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Oles M. Smolansky, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 155-157 plus.

"... The Soviet government is not likely, in the near future, to resurrect its former 'activist' policy in the Middle East. Instead, the area, including its Arab-Israeli sector, will probably enjoy the Kremlin's 'benign neglect,' much to the joy of Jerusalem and to the regret and indignation of the Arabs."

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS, by Hannes Adomeit, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 27, no. 2 (April 1975) 288-305.

"The subject matter is complex and vast, not only in geographical terms, embracing a triangle from Libya in the west of Afghanistan in the east and Yemen in the south. It also represents a rich field for inquiry in various other respects. Foremost, the Near and Middle East is a major testing ground for the meaning of détente, the Moscow and Washington agreements of May 1972, June 1973 and July 1974 and the actual mechanism of superpower consultation, cooperation or, as some prefer, 'collusion'. Yet, détente notwithstanding, the area has remained an important focus of political rivalry between the superpowers and, to an increasing degree, between the USSR and China. Conflict in the area sharpens the problem for the political implications of strategic parity

and the political utility and potential uses of Soviet military power. This problem is enhanced by increased Soviet intervention capabilities, such as greater airlift capacity and naval deployments, the imminent reopening of the Suez canal and the foreseeable link-up of the Soviet Union's eskadra in the Mediterranean with its naval presence in the Indian Ocean."

(*)—SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1970, by Robert O. Freedman. New York, Praeger, 1975. 198 p.

"A . . . step-by-step account of the ups and downs (mostly downs) of Soviet influence in the Middle East, with extensive excerpts from the Soviet press. The author . . . threads his way through some very complex situations . . . drawing conclusions . . . while waiting for more evidence."

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 101 p.

"The growth of Soviet naval power and the successes of Soviet political and diplomatic strategy in the Middle East have stimulated such a quantity of stories in press, journal, pamphlet and book that it is hard for a reader to keep his ears free of the alarms being sounded or to dig himself out from under the massive repetition. Here is the essence of the story: the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is fast approaching the strength of the Sixth Fleet; the use of port facilities and airfields in Egypt and Syria gives the Soviets the advantage of flexible power in the Eastern Mediterranean which the West formerly held; ties with Algeria bring Soviet power into the Western Mediterranean, threatening to outflank NATO; as the British withdraw east of Suez, Soviet ships make their appearance in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, along with Soviet influence at Aden and the Horn of Africa; US support of Israel and the radicalization of Arab politics are pushing one country after another from a Western to a Soviet alignment; and Soviet diplomacy toward Turkey and Iran has largely neutralized the northern tier as a barrier. One wonders if the United States or Western Europe has a particle of influence left. The story is generally true, if often exaggerated in the telling. It is not difficult to establish the facts; the real question is what they mean: inevitable disaster for the West, or perhaps a new balance which is still tolerable. Aaron Klieman cites the developments on the above list, though not all of them in such extreme form, and fills in the details. His is essentially a cool analytical

study, not a scare story, but the recitation of the record of Soviet advantages and gains nearly overwhelms his own counter-arguments to the effect that Soviet designs may come to grief through the weakness of the Arab base on which they are built, or may be held within limits by well conceived American policies."

(LI)—THE SOVIET SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST, by Maj. William E. Ellington. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 78 p. (Research Study.)

"The Middle East War of 1973 showed that a clearer understanding of Soviet objectives in the region is needed by US analysts, policymakers, and contingency planners. This study reviews the historical Russian interest in the area. Soviet-Arab relations since 1955, and the probable long- and mid-term Soviet objectives. The estimate is made that the primary Soviet short-term objective in early 1974 was to maintain and enhance Soviet influence in Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian-American reapproachment represents a major defeat for Soviet policy, and the Soviets will probably attempt to offset the defeat with gains in Syria and Lybia."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST, by N. Yakubov, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 9 (September 1974) 26-36.

"For over half a century, since its formation, the Soviet Union has unswervingly supported the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism, for freedom and national independence, for the consolidation of their sovereignty, for economic independence and social progress. This support has never been dictated by tactical considerations. Its source has always been the class character of the Soviet state. 'In keeping with Lenin's behests,' Leonid Brezhnev declared at a reception given for a Syrian Government delegation, 'the Soviet Union shall consistently continue, as it has always done, to support the liberation struggle of the peoples . . . Our policy has been and will be to undeviatingly oppose aggression and support the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples'."

(*)—THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV, by Oles M. Smolansky. Lewisburg, Penn., Bucknell University Press, 1974. 326 p.

"Professor Smolansky has written a . . .

book on Nikita Khrushchev's policy in the Arab world. He traces the evolution of Soviet policy and its adaptation to key developments in the Arab world, showing the interaction between Soviet policy and Arab domestic politics. The Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the creation and dissolution of the United Arab Republic, and Khrushchev's conflicts with Nasser are . . . analyzed."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB WORLD; DEFINING A NEW RELATIONSHIP, by Vladimir Katin, in *New Middle East*, no. 39 (December 1971) 16-18.

"The Soviet Union has always rendered all-round aid and support to the National Liberation Movement. This applies in full measure to the Arab states, the majority of which are actively co-operating with the Soviet Union in the foreign political arena and in the field of economy, culture, education and so on. This communality of views on the most vital issues of our time and the mutual desire to develop further co-operation were vividly demonstrated during the visits of Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to Algeria and Morocco, as well as during the official visit of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to the Soviet Union. In the official documents adopted as a result of the meeting and talks of the Soviet leaders with the heads of state and government of Algeria, Morocco and Egypt we find reflected all the basic ideas of Soviet policy—namely the struggle for peace and international cooperation adopted at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST—FACTS AND FICTION; A SOVIET VIEW, by Nikolai Borodin, in *New Middle East*, no. 34 (July 1971) 14-17.

"This article was written for the New Middle East in response to an invitation from the editor to the Soviet Embassy for an article 'explaining Soviet policy in the Middle East generally, and in relation to the Suez Canal and the Arab-Israel conflict in particular.' It was . . . [the] considered opinion that the objectives of Soviet policy should in the first instance, be explained by a spokesman for the Soviet Union. The . . . article has been specially prepared by Mr. Borodin in response to that request and it is printed, at the author's request, exactly as it was written, as an authoritative explanation of Soviet policy in the area without amendment in style or content."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE HIGH COST OF INFLUENCE, by

Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 5 (January 1972) 15-34.

"A common concern harbored by many Americans regarding the current Middle Eastern situation has been the ostensibly growing measure of Soviet influence over Arab regimes in the area. While influence is an extremely difficult factor to measure, evidence presented below would seem to suggest that the Soviets have paid dearly for whatever influence they managed to gain among the Arabs and that such influence may be of an exceedingly transitory nature."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1974. 302 p.

"Individual scholars take up separately Soviet relations with Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states. One of the editors, Vucinich, adds a comprehensive survey of Soviet writing on the Middle East."

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 1954-1968, by Walter Laqueur. New York, Macmillan, 1970.

"Between 1954 and 1968, the USSR became an important power in the Middle East, helping to define the conditions for peace and a balance of power in the area. During this time, it provided some \$4.5 billion of military equipment to the Arabs. However, after 1965, the Soviet investment in the Arabs began producing diminishing returns. The 1967 war was part of a chain reaction which the USSR had helped initiate, but it gradually lost control over its allies. It was able to save its prestige only by replacing the equipment that the Arabs lost during the war; over half the military aid provided during the 14-year period was given in the year following the war. The division which occurred between Soviet hawks and doves over the Middle East in 1967 probably continues today. The doves include the intelligentsia, and the Communist Party apparatchiks, the technocrats. They opposed the pro-Arab stand on the grounds that it was basically anti-Semitic, that it damaged the world communist movement since many communist parties did not support it, and that the money could be better used for the domestic economy. The hawks included the 'guardians of party orthodoxy,' those who disliked Jews, and those who felt that the USSR should adopt a more dynamic and expansive foreign policy. The Soviet programs of military and technical aid in the Middle East are designed to create a Soviet-trained elite, on the

assumption that it would remain oriented toward the East because of its training. However, exposure to Eastern training will not necessarily assure an Eastward orientation. Historically, the Arab regimes have found it in their interests to avoid exclusive dependence on one outside power, and they may pull away from the East just as they pull away from the Western colonizing powers. The USSR cannot afford another Arab defeat and is thus willing to cooperate with the West in keeping Middle East tensions below the level of a general war. But it is quite possible that the USSR will not be able to retain control of its Arab allies and may have become so deeply involved with them that it would be unable to avoid intervention in a future war."

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *Orbis*, v. 14, no. 3 (Fall 1970) 588-589.

"Ideology provides little clue to Soviet motivations. Particularly in the Middle East, the Soviets have cynically abandoned ideological purity for a willingness to cooperate with traditional and 'reactionary' rulers and regimes—kings, sheikhs and emirs—as well as with revolutionary forces. The fate of local communist parties apparently has not weighed heavily in the Kremlin's tactical decisions. If ideology still shapes Soviet Middle East policy, it is probably the old Marxist-Leninist prescription that revolutionary power prevails where weakness and internal dissatisfaction abound. In short, whether or not supported by ideology, Soviet policy in the Middle East seems to be animated by the tried-and-true rule of international competition: expand where the opportunity is ripe. In line with this rule, Soviet expectations probably range between minimum and maximum goals. Clearly, the minimum objective is to bring about the burial of historic Western influence in the area. The Kremlin has taken long strides toward this goal over the last five years by establishing a military-political presence in the Middle East and east of Suez. The maximum goal, equally clear, is Soviet domination of the region—a strategic position which would provide a springboard for the spread of Soviet influence into adjacent countries of Asia and Africa."

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 165-169 plus.

"The Soviet Union may be expected to expand its efforts to encourage a pro-Soviet orientation among the military elites controlling the in-

tensely nationalistic, increasingly xenophobic regimes of the Middle East. However, the establishment of a presence is not synonymous with the exercise of influence; customers are not necessarily clients; and aid does not automatically make permanent friends."

TRADITIONAL—AND OFTEN FORGOTTEN SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER; TWO STUDIES OF ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, in *New Middle East*, no. 22 (July 1970) 31–38.

"R. Ainsztein presents a novel and challenging view of contemporary Russian involvement in the Middle East. He argues that having rejected the internationalist ideals of communism the present Russian leaders have simply reverted to the policies of the Golden Horde in their relations with Egypt and their outflanking manoeuvre against Turkey and Iran. Mr. Ainsztein explores the historical background to this trend and its dangers for the present situation in the area. Walter Zander on the other hand, examines how, having resumed the old Tsarist policy of expansion into the Middle East, the Soviet leaders are using the Orthodox Church to strengthen their position in the area. As was the case in the 19th Century the Russians appear once more to be claiming the Holy Land to be as much their own as Holy Russia."

THE USSR AND ARAB COMMUNIST PARTIES—A CHILLING ACCOUNT OF GREAT POWER PENETRATION, by A. Yodfat, in *New Middle East*, no. 32 (May 1971) 29–33.

1. The Syrian Ba'ath and Moscow. 2. Iraqi Communists Call for National Front. 3. Jordanian Communists Oppose Overthrow of Regime. 4. Lebanon Speaks Out for Palestinian Rights. 5. Sudan—Important Posts Held by Communists.

THE USSR AND THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, by Uri Ra'anani, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 946–977.

The author attempts to analyze the "decision-making patterns in general and to examine a previous Soviet policy episode toward the Middle East in particular—a period for which, to use election jargon, 'all the returns were in' some time prior to the October War. In this way, it may be possible to reconstruct enough of the mold within which Soviet policy has been, and continues to be, shaped to make current Soviet behavior in the Middle East more readily comprehensible."

THE USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Robert A. Kilmarx and Alvin J. Cottrell, in *Air Force Magazine* (August 1970) 40–46.

"Every President since Harry Truman has taken the position that Middle East/Mediterranean stability is vital to US interests. Yet, as Soviet aggressiveness in the area has intensified, there has emerged in the US and elsewhere in the West a tendency to downgrade the strategic importance of the area. Counting on this lack of concern, the Soviets have chosen this region as the major arena in which to make political gains on the West and forge new correlations of power in the world. Only in this area has the Soviet Union shown a willingness to commit its military forces to support its political goals . . . As a result, the problem of countering Soviet military initiatives in the Middle East involve higher risks for the US than at any time or in any place since WW II. The deployment of US air units to the area is not sufficiently responsive to the threat. While it may be possible for the US to maintain some semblance of air balance in the Middle East for a brief period by providing fighter aircraft to Israel, the problem of maintaining a military balance throughout the Mediterranean region is more complex . . . As long as the US foreign policy approach in the area is piecemeal, these force disparities will be difficult to overcome. The US needs to develop and declare a more comprehensive Mediterranean strategy—not just a Middle East formulation. US commitments to the area should be made clear—those already made and those the US would be willing to make to preserve its vital interests. In pursuing an 'over-arching' regional strategy for the area, more emphasis should be placed on new linkages with allies and friendly countries in the region, the utility of supplementary alliance systems, and on coordinated exercises and planning with those NATO allies who are willing to defend the area . . ."

b. *Soviet Role in the 1973 Middle East War*

SOVIET AIMS AND THE MIDDLE EAST WAR, by Galia Golan, in *Survival*, v. 16, no. 3 (May/June 1974) 106–114.

"The Soviet Union knew in advance about the impending Egyptian and Syrian attacks on Israeli forces on 6 October 1973, but there is still no certainty as to whether she was fully informed or, and a party to, the actual preparations for the 1973 Middle East war. In a general sense

one may say that the Soviet Union prepared both the Egyptians and Syrians for war, insofar as she had been the major supplier of arms, equipment, advisers, training and military guidance—particularly since the war of 1967—and one may assume that Soviet advisers played a significant role in the exercises conducted with the amphibious equipment the Soviet Union supplied especially since 1970. In fact, however, the overall strategy employed by the unified Egyptian and Syrian command in the October war was somewhat different from classical Soviet military strategy.”

THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESS AND THE OCTOBER WAR, by Col. Martin J. Slominski, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 5 (May 1974) 39–47.

“The role of the USSR is the key in determining whether or not there is relaxation or heightening of international tensions. It is interesting to note what the official voice of the Soviet Armed Forces, Red Star, and other Soviet news media had to say about the hostilities in the Middle East which began 6 October 1973. Americans could have identified eight categories of information on this war from reading their papers and watching TV. These are advance warnings, daily situation reports, the role of Palestinian partisans, military aid to Israel, military aid to Arab countries, oil as a political weapon NATO country reactions and the alert of US Armed Forces. The manner in which information on these same topics was presented to the Soviet soldier provides insights, albeit limited, into official Soviet attitudes.”

UNITED STATES-EUROPE RELATIONS AND THE 1973 MIDDLE EAST WAR. HEARINGS BEFORE THE [SENATE] SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS, NOVEMBER 1, 1973, AND FEBRUARY 19, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 79 p.

With statements on: The Role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East Crisis.

c. *Middle East Oil in Soviet Foreign Policy*

OIL AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by John A. Berry, in *The Middle East Journal*, v. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1972) 149–160.

“The Soviet Union has recently taken an unexpected interest in Middle Eastern oil. During the decade of the 1950s and into the early 1960s, a Soviet surplus in oil permitted the USSR to export oil to world markets at an increasing rate. The Soviet's only interest in the Middle Eastern petroleum industry was in its contribution to Western military and industrial power. Not needing the region's oil for its own use, they sought to discredit the Western oil companies as agents of Western imperialism. ‘Oil,’ it was argued, ‘had for decades enslaved the peoples of the Middle East; was it not high time for them to be liberated from these shackles? Had not the people a better title to the huge revenues than the company shareholders? What better way to weaken the West than by encouraging the local governments to seek their independence of the oil companies by nationalization? Nevertheless, oil was not the most productive seed of discontent available. The growing Arab-Israeli conflict and the latent anti-Westernism of the Arabs proved far more susceptible to exploitation. The Soviet Union's concern for the security of its southern borders, exacerbated by the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, also played a critical role in drawing the USSR closer to the Arabs.”

OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF 'N SOVIET POLICY IN THE 1970s, by Abraham S. Becker. Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corp., December 1971. 45 p. (P-4743.)

“The security of Middle East oil supplies has been of great concern to the non-communist world since the Arab-Israel war in June 1967. The closure of the Suez Canal and the abortive attempt at an Arab boycott were only the prelude to ultimately more significant developments . . . The growing militancy of the oil producers heightened Western anxieties already aroused by the deepening involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East affairs. In one degree or another, the USSR seems to be active all over the region's map, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Moscow is the largest arms supplier of Algeria, the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and South Yemen. The Soviet navy makes its presence known not just in the Mediterranean Sea but also in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean as well, and, no doubt, would do so more often if not for the continued closure of the Suez Canal, Moscow extends clear verbal support to the main guerrilla movement in Oman and may be supplying arms as well. At the same time, friendly relations are sought with Turkey and Iran with whom trade and aid relations are

by now surprisingly extensive. But is the USSR interested in Middle East oil? For what purposes and under what circumstances?"

POLITICS, OIL AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, by R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell. Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973. 88 p. (Washington Paper no. 7.)

"Burrell and Cottrell assert that, as the Western nations and Japan increase their dependence on oil imports, the importance of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East and North Africa will intensify. Therefore, the US and its allies should no longer ignore the North African section of the Western Mediterranean (comprised of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) . . . The authors review the world oil supply and reserve situation, revealing that US reserves are such that its daily production has stabilized at 12 million barrels, even taking into account future production from the Alaskan fields. By 1980 the US will need an additional 14 million barrels a day (b/d), of which at least 7 million will have to come from the Middle Eastern and North African suppliers. West European demands are growing at a much faster rate than those of the US, and by 1980 30 million b/d are likely to be needed. Only 5 million b/d will come from Europe; the rest will have to come from the Middle East and North Africa—if they will sell. Japanese consumption, too, is increasing and by 1980 could reach 13 million b/d, of which 10 million would have to come from the Middle East and North Africa. The importance of North African oil, then, is quite evident. Information regarding USSR oil supplies and demands is at best sketchy, although it is known that at present the USSR is self-sufficient. However, its reserves are located far from industrial areas, and poor Soviet technology and high costs presently prohibit their development. Therefore, the authors maintain, the USSR will attempt to 'stockpile' Middle Eastern oil as a strategic maneuver, thus causing an even higher demand on the world's resources. The authors see little indications that alternate energy sources will be available in the foreseeable future, assuring a seller's market for the world's oil. The North African region is important to the NATO allies for reasons other than oil. The Western Mediterranean area, according to the authors, is now becoming an arena for potential US and USSR conflict, symbolized by the presence of their navies. The US Sixth Fleet, traditionally a symbol of the US commitment to protect the southern

flank of NATO, has become a psychologically important security blanket for the nations which border on the Mediterranean. Discussions about reducing the fleet produce panic; therefore, a US naval policy should be pursued to reinforce the 'rapidly deteriorating' Sixth Fleet. The Soviet Navy is increasingly modern and demonstrates the Soviet desire to minimize and ultimately terminate the US monopoly in the area . . ."

THE SOVIET NEED FOR MIDDLE EAST OIL, by Maj. Eugene J. DeNezza, in *Air University Review*, v. 22, no. 4 (May-June 1971) 52-57.

"A clear-cut distinction should be made between Soviet policy directed toward securing and insuring a supply of Middle East oil to satisfy U.S.S.R. requirements and Soviet policy toward Middle East oil in general. If the Soviet Union did achieve control over Middle East oil, she could seriously hurt the economies of the United States and its allies and exclude or threaten to exclude many countries from access to their oil supplies. Much has been written lately about Europe's emancipation from dependence on Middle East oil by discoveries in Alaska and elsewhere. It is more truthful to state that Europe can do without Middle East oil, at great expense for only a six-to-nine-month period. Therefore, it is conceivable that the U.S.S.R. may actively attempt to bring about the nationalization of oil by governments dominated by Moscow. It is even conceivable, but less likely, that the Soviets may attempt to set up satellite regimes on the East Europe model. However, if they take such actions, it will be to support a national goal over and above securing and insuring oil for their internal needs. In any event, the Soviets do have an interest in Middle East oil, and the West can no longer afford to ignore it. Soviet interest in Middle East oil must be added to their traditional interests in the area."

d. *Soviet-Egyptian Relations*

(1) *Miscellaneous Aspects*

IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN ALLIANCE, by Boris Guriel, in *New Middle East*, no. 17 (February 1970) 17-22.

"It is true that the Soviet-Egyptian alliance—bound to give Moscow a position of uncontested control in the Arab world—has not been the realization of Lenin's dreams of a Russian-led revolution in the colonial countries of Asia and Africa. But since Lenin's days the dream of

a world revolution has been largely forgotten and, as far as the rules of the Soviet Union are concerned, is not even any longer desirable. What matters finally to the men in the Kremlin is that thanks to Nasser, Soviet imperialism has been able to gain a firm foothold in the world of Islam."

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974: NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, APRIL 9, MAY 7, 14, 23, AND JUNE 27, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 202 p.

With statements on: Soviet-Egyptian Relations and Soviet Involvement in the Middle East.

MOSCOW AND CAIRO: CURRENTS OF INFLUENCE, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 4 (July-August 1974) 17-28.

"Egypt has been one of the two central targets (with India) of Soviet efforts to cultivate influence in the Third World. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has persistently supported Egypt for a changing combination of strategic, diplomatic, ideological, and Soviet domestic political reasons. By the late 1950's, the USSR had already become Egypt's mainstay among the great powers, and Egypt's dependence on Soviet help was only accentuated by Cairo's crushing defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 against Israel. Even Anwar Sadat's precipitate and humiliating expulsion of the bulk of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 did not cause Moscow to terminate the relationship. Soviet military aid programs continued, and from early 1973 on, Egypt—apparently with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia—was able to purchase all the weaponry it needed from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in October 1973 the USSR went along with Sadat's decision to go to war again against Israel and resupplied Egypt and Syria with massive quantities of arms at considerable jeopardy to other major Soviet policy pursuits. Finally, even though Cairo has since improved its relations with the United States dramatically, there are still no indications that Moscow is prepared to cut off the flow of arms supplies to Egypt despite its irritation over Cairo's shift. In light of this history, it is reasonable to presume that a consensus exists in the Kremlin concerning the desirability of the Soviet Union's Egyptian connection. But,

one may ask, has the game been worth the candle? We have no way of knowing how the Soviet leaders feel about this matter—they are not saying. What we can investigate, however, is the extent to which Soviet inputs into Egypt have, in fact, brought tangible returns. What have the last seven years of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship—the period of greatest Soviet investment—brought the Kremlin in terms of influence?"

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SADAT'S EGYPT, FROM THE DEATH OF NASSER TO THE FALL OF GENERAL SADEK, by Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 26, no. 3 (November-December 1973) 63-79.

"With the death of Abdul Gamel Nasser, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East received a severe blow. Begun in the early 1960's, the program had been predicated on the sale and finance of arms to a volatile leader in a hostile environment. Indeed, shortly after the succession of Anwar Sadat to power, this expensive attempt at influencing Arab politics became something of a nightmare for the Soviets. Internal Arab power struggles, an increasingly hostile Arab press, and ever more demanding requests on the part of Sadat culminated in the expulsion of Soviet forces from the U.A.R. in July of 1972. The lessons of this long-term fiasco are apparent, for when a state seeks to 'purchase' allies the question of mutual exploitation is bound to lead to enmity."

THE SOVIET UNION IN EGYPT, by Yair Evron, in *Survival*, (August 1970) 259-262.

"By the summer of 1970, Egypt and Israel had mistakenly engaged in military strategies which invited superpower involvement and consequently made their limited war 'uncontrollable.' Israel's 'deep penetration' bombing at the heart of Egypt in January of 1970 and Nasser's 'War of Attrition,' for example, invited Russia to become more involved militarily in Egypt. This Russian commitment to Egypt, according to the symmetry of relations between superpowers and their allies, enhanced the American commitment to Israel. Russia's involvement in Egypt is not necessarily part of a predetermined Soviet policy for obtaining objectives in the Middle East. Its interest in the Persian Gulf is at least as vital as its interest in Egypt, and Russia had already secured as much influence as it could possibly hope to achieve in Egypt. Also, considering the possible reactions the Egyptians and other Arab people might develop against the Soviet presence, such involve-

ment is a risk for Russia. Although it could be argued that Russia desired involvement in order to secure a naval base in Western Egypt, the immediate motivation was the creation of defensive measures against Israel's bombing. The outcome of this involvement could be escalation of the war, or a resurgence in the Middle East of traditional imperialism."

THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by David G. Nes, in *Military Review*, v. 52, no. 6 (June 1972) 80-85.

"During a brief period of 17 years, the Soviet Union has established a political and military position in the Mediterranean similar to that enjoyed by Britain and the United States at the close of World War II. In 1946, scarcely a Soviet was to be seen in the Middle East. Today, there are thousands in the United Arab Republic (UAR) alone, and a Soviet Fleet of 40 ships roams the Mediterranean. According to the most recent estimates of The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Soviet Union—in return for having provided the UAR with modern air defense system—has received facilities for its own use at half a dozen locations. These include naval access to Port Said, Alexandria and Matruh and exclusive aircraft use of the fields at Cairo West and Aswan."

(2) *Soviet Military Presence and Aid to Egypt*

(LI)—THE BEAR IN SHEIK'S CLOTHING, by Maj. Alfred W. Hansen. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1972. 82 p. (Research Study.)

"The Soviet Union has provided the Arab Republic of Egypt over \$5 billion in military aid. Ostensibly for defense, Soviet Air Force units deployed to Egypt aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict by adding to the Arab capability, Soviet airpower in the A.R.E. increases the U.S.S.R.'s diplomatic options in the region and poses a direct threat to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. This study analyzes Soviet military aid to the Egyptian Air Force in the context of history, Middle East oil, communist ideology, and Soviet foreign policy. The conclusions are that the Soviet Union is building an offensive military capability in Egypt that is part of its regional and global strategy."

(LI)—A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF EGYPT, by Maj. Chester J. Preisser, Jr. Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 62 p. (Research Study no. 1530-71.)

"This study is concerned with the nature and effects of the Soviet takeover of the air defense of Egypt. It addresses the question of whether the installation of a sophisticated anti-air missile system and the introduction of Soviet piloted MIG-21Js is an offensive or defensive move. Although the Soviet involvement in the Middle East is the most significant factor presented in this study, the conclusion indicate that the Soviets have provided the Egyptians with a potent offensive capability."

(LI)—EGYPT'S SHIELD: SOVIET AIR-POWER, by Maj. Jacob B. Waltermire, Jr. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 91 p. (Research Study No. 2070-71.)

"Soviet involvement in the Middle East is often considered to be the result of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This study investigates the role of Soviet airpower in Egypt to determine if it poses a threat to American Middle East interests. The initial involvement in Egypt was examined as well as the deployment and potential use of Soviet airpower in Egypt. The study concludes that the Soviet Union has global ambitions which require their influence over the Middle East. Such influence, if realized, will threaten America's Middle East interests. Egyptian-based Soviet power has a significant role in these endeavors."

THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN EGYPT, by Frederick J. Cox, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 22, no. 6 (February 1970) 45-53.

"Following the Egyptian defeat in 1967, the Soviet Government significantly increased both its aid and its presence in the Arab States. Today that presence is so great that the Egyptian Government has only limited control of its own armed forces. The possibility that Russia might obtain effective control of the Arab States is crucial for the United States, NATO, and the world balance of power."

RUSSIA'S PRESENCE IN EGYPT, in *Newsweek* (1 June 1970) 39.

Map showing SAM 3 sites and Russian-manned airfields, among other military installations in Egypt.

(3) *Egyptian Expulsion of Soviet Military Personnel*

AS RUSSIANS LEAVE EGYPT—WHO GAINS, WHO LOSES, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 73, no. 7 (14 August 1972) 45–46.

“Are far-reaching changes really on the way in the Mideast with the ouster of Russian military men from Egypt? If so, who stands to gain ground, who to lose? Egypt’s move against the Soviets in mid-July hit Western officials—including Americans—like a bombshell. Only now is the dust settling, enabling authorities to make the assessment [provided in this article].”

THE EGYPTIAN EXPULSION OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN JULY 1972—CAUSES AND IMPACT. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 39 p. (ASDIRS 4353.)

“On 18 July 1972, Egypt’s President Sadat announced that the functions of the Soviet military advisers in Egypt were terminated. Among the chief reasons were the friction between the Russians and the Egyptians arising over their respective adviser-advice roles and the Soviet refusal to provide offensive weapons in response to Egypt’s requests. The expulsion impacts reached far beyond the immediate area and may still be spreading. The Soviets suffered at least a temporary setback in their Middle East expansionistic policy. The hopes for a meaningful peace in the area have probably been favored since there is a decreased possibility of a big power confrontation and the military balance is so strongly in Israel’s favor that Egypt cannot soon undertake a precipitate action. There now exists a perhaps fleeting opportunity for the US to peacefully establish a presence in Egypt, the traditional head of the Arab world, which is believed to be in our interests.”

IVAN GO HOME, by Lawrence Griswold, in *Sea Power*, v. 15, no. 8 (September 1972) 6–13.

“On Saturday, July 8, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat expelled his Russian military and technical advisers from Egyptian soil—execution of the expulsion order was to begin on the 17th.” The author analyzes Russia’s exodus from Egypt.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, FROM THE EXODUS OF 1972 TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, by Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 27, no. 4 (January–February 1975) 32–53.

“Soviet policy in the Middle East—complicated, expensive, and often frustrating—met per-

haps its greatest setback on 18 July 1972 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced the termination of the mission of the Soviet military advisers and experts in Egypt. Undaunted however, Kremlin planners continued to pursue their goal of an ‘anti-imperialist’ Arab union dependent on Russian arms and amenable to Russian influence. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 apparently rewarded their efforts with success, but the long-sought prize of Arab sympathy was taken, if only temporarily, by their archival, the United States, via the diplomatic efforts of Henry Kissinger.”

e. *Soviet-Israeli Relations in Light of Arab-Israeli Conflict*

ISRAELI-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Surendra Bhutani, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 6, no. 1 (July 1973) 125–151.

“There is something unique about the relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. One can hardly think of a parallel or even something similar in the relations of either of these two countries with other countries. Israel came into existence with the help of the Great Powers including the USSR. Hence the survival of Israel depends to a large extent either on a consensus among the Great Powers or on the commitment of either of the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its establishment Israel has itself been involved in, and affected by, the competition of the Great Powers for supremacy in West Asia. In the post World War II era no Great Power, which aspired to play a major role in international affairs could afford to dispense with an active interest in West Asia and the Soviet Union was no exception to this. However, the Soviet relations with Israel were not determined solely by its policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict, but by the Soviet domestic policy in regard to its Jewish population and by its desire to appear in a favourable light before world opinion in regard to its treatments of Jews. On the other hand, because of its Zionist ideology, Israel has been deeply concerned about the Jewish community everywhere in the world and particularly about the Soviet Jewry.”

MOSCOW AND JERUSALEM, by Avigdor Dagan. London, Abelard-Schuman, 1970. 255 p.

“... Covers Soviet-Israeli relations from 1947 to the present ... Points out that although the USSR has switched from a pro-Israeli position to a pro-Arab stand, its goals in the Middle East

have remained constant—to eliminate Western influence and achieve Soviet domination of the Middle East. In 1947 the USSR supported Israel, which was then fighting the British, against the Arabs, who were pro-British. The Soviets believed they could gain a foothold in the Middle East through Israel, but Israel's foreign policy was designed to meet Israeli rather than Soviet goals. Moreover, Israel and the USSR disagreed from the beginning over the question of the Russian Jews. Israel repeatedly asked the USSR to permit its Jews to immigrate; the USSR saw this as a threat to Russian unity and tried to prevent all contact between Israel and Soviet Jews. The USSR apparently believed that it could maintain good relations with Israel despite its repression of Russian Jews. In 1949 the USSR expressed alarm over the possibility that Israel might join a Western alliance or allow Western military bases on its soil. Israel tried to avoid the appearance of support for the West but could not renounce the Western Tripartite Declaration that the nations of the Middle East needed military forces for national security and the defense of the region, with its promise of action to prevent violations of the ceasefire and its implicit promise of action to arms to Israel. The USSR believed the declaration was directed against Russia and could not be convinced that Israeli support of the declaration was based on its own security needs rather than hostility to the USSR. Soviet doubts over Israel's position were confirmed by Israel's support of the UN resolution on Korea. Convinced that Israel was not a reliable ally, the Soviets adopted a neutral policy on the Middle East, supporting direct negotiations between Arabs and Israelis but otherwise keeping silent on Middle East questions and abstaining from UN votes on the Middle East. They continued this policy for some time, maintaining formally correct relations with Israel except for a brief break in 1953. Meanwhile, Israel normalized its relations with Britain while Egypt turned against the British. By the end of 1953, Egypt had emerged as a major obstacle to Western plans for the Middle East and the USSR decided to strengthen Egypt. In 1954 the USSR used its veto in the Security Council against Israel for the first time and by the following year the USSR had adopted a clearly pro-Arab position, providing diplomatic and military aid. Israeli attempts to improve relations with the USSR failed . . . Russia will resume diplomatic relations with Israel when it can do so without losing prestige . . . The major factors in the future of Soviet-Israeli relations will be the USSR's in-

terest in peace and the US ability to push the USSR into thinking more seriously of keeping the peace."

THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, by Benjamin Shwadran, in *Current History*, v. 60, no. 353 (January 1971) 13-18 plus.

"The relentless outpouring of hatred against Israel and Zionism is in reality the expression of the deep Soviet frustration in the Middle East, writes this specialist, who notes that a careful examination reveals that even without the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would have been unable to make rapid progress in the Middle East . . ."

THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by David P. Forsythe, in *World Affairs*, v. 134, no. 2 (Fall 1971) 132-142.

"Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East entered a new phase in the period following the six-day war between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1967. The Soviets attempted to achieve influence over Arab decision making by embarking upon an extensive military aid program to the United Arab Republic (UAR), Iraq, and Syria. The United States government, after assessing the results of these efforts, apparently came to the conclusion that Soviet influence was so pervasive that it had become the crucial element in future Arab-Israeli relations, and that Soviet actions constituted a direct threat to United States interests in the region. This analysis focuses upon the policies the Soviets have followed to achieve influence, particularly over the United Arab Republic, and upon the obstacles the Soviet Union has encountered both from its allies on the left and its opponents on the right. The study concludes by reviewing the limitations upon Soviet influence and by assessing the probable future course of Soviet foreign policy in broad perspective. It should be noted that the focal point for analysis is on the output of Soviet policy, with relatively little attention given to the inputs of Kremlin politics."

THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by David P. Forsythe, in *Middle East Forum (Beirut)*, (Winter 1970-71) 29-39.

"United States policy-makers apparently hold a series of assumptions about Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first assumption is that from the extensive military aid program to principally the United Arab Republic and to

a lesser extent to Iraq and Syria the Soviets have achieved influence over Arab decisions and events. Secondly, Soviet influence is said to be so extensive as to be THE crucial element in the future of Arab-Israeli relations. And thirdly, this Soviet influence allegedly constitutes a direct threat to United States interests in the region. This article seeks to examine this series of assumptions from the 1967 war to the death of President Nasser in the fall of 1970. While the scope of inquiry is limited, there is some evidence that insight can be gained into the probable course of Soviet foreign policy in broader perspective. The focal point for analysis is on the output of Soviet policy toward the UAR, with relatively little attention to the inputs of Kremlin politics."

ZIONISM AT THE SERVICE OF IMPERIALISM, by V. Alexeyev and V. Ivananov, in *International Affairs (Moscow)*, no. 6 (June 1970) 57-62.

"Israel's aggression against the Arab countries has been going on for three years, and the responsibility for it falls squarely on the most reactionary circles of the imperialist powers, the USA above all. In its political plans, Washington has assigned to Israel the role of colonial overseer in the Middle East with the task of safeguarding the interests of the oil and arms monopolies. The 'six-day war' and the events that followed have laid bare the close ties between the Israeli ruling clique and international Zionism and imperialism, which have long been partners and allies in oppressing nations."

f. *Soviet Relations with Other Middle Eastern Countries*

HOW STRONG IS THE SOVIET HOLD ON THE LEBANON? by A. Y. Yodfat, in *New Middle East*, no. 20 (May 1970) 23-27.

"Since it became independent, the Lebanon has tried to see itself as part of the Western World, to avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab conflicts, and to maintain, in its internal policies, a balanced position between the claims of its Christian and Muslim communities . . . The Soviet view of the Lebanon has been summed up by a well-known Soviet journalist, who described it in 1967 as 'a Middle East appendage to Western business' lacking its own 'national economic base' . . . Lebanon remains, despite the economic crisis which followed the June War, an important economic centre in the Arab world, which the USSR would like to enter."

MOSCOW AND THE PERSIAN GULF: AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AMBITIONS AND POTENTIAL, by O. M. Smolansky, in *Orbis*, v. 14, no. 1 (Spring 1970) 92-105.

"Foreign policy decisions by a great power must rest upon a careful balancing of means and ends: the cost and availability of the requisites for achieving a specific objective weighed against the necessity or desirability of that goal. Apart from preserving its great-power status, other aspirations grow or decline in accordance with its ability to accomplish them. Therefore, in assessing Moscow's ambitions and potential in the Persian Gulf, it is imperative to avoid the view that these two phenomena are unrelated. As Soviet foreign policy in the underdeveloped world during the post-Stalin era indicates, there is a mutually interactive relationship between the USSR's aims and capabilities; pragmatism and realism are the order of the day."

NEW HORIZONS OF SOVIET-SYRIAN FRIENDSHIP, by R. Vasilyev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 7 (July 1974) 85-88.

"The official visit to the Soviet Union (April 11-16) by a Syrian Party and Government delegation, led by Secretary General of the Baath Party and President of the Republic Hafiz al Acad, was a major event in the development of Soviet-Syrian relations which was closely watched by world public opinion. The negotiations were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and were frank and friendly. The joint Soviet-Syrian statement notes that in the course of a constructive exchange of opinion 'the common stand of both parties on the key international problems, and their solidarity in the struggle for freedom, independence, social progress and lasting peace were reaffirmed.' It was natural that the Soviet-Syrian talks devoted much attention to the Middle East crisis. The situation in the Middle East remains tense. Despite the profound crisis resulting from the failure of its aggressive annexationist foreign policy line, Israel has continued to refuse to abide by the relevant UN decisions. It still hopes through manoeuvring to keep the occupied Arab territories and avoid a radical and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. In order to intensify pressure on the Arab countries, Israel has been committing aggressive acts against the Lebanon."

RUSSIA'S OTHER MIDDLE EAST PASTURE—IRAQ, by Aryeh Y. Yodfat, in *New Middle East*, no. 38 (November 1971) 26-29.

"The Soviet Union has established a presence in Iraq by supplying arms and economic and technical assistance. It has concluded favorable trade agreements and laid the foundations for entering the Iraqi oil industry. These were opportunities that the Soviet Union was determined not to miss by interfering in internal Iraqi affairs. The Soviet Union and Iraq now have agreements providing for Soviet technical assistance in developing the Iraqi oil industry and exploiting Iraq's oil resources, in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the construction of a shipyard, the carrying out of a survey of the Shatt al-Arab shipping channel and also for cultural exchanges and cooperation . . . For what the Soviet Union is trying to achieve at present is to gain the confidence of the current Ba'ath leadership and to use the close relations between the two countries in order to establish ties that will survive changes in regimes and leaders. This the Soviet leaders hope to achieve by creating a state of affairs in which there is a certain state of dependence by the Ba'ath regime on Soviet help."

SOVIET-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. London, Central Asian Research Center, 1973. 126 p.

"Prof. McLane provides a chronology and a written summary of the Soviet Union's relations with each of 16 Middle Eastern nations, as well as a chapter, from which this summary is drawn, devoted to the regional trends of Soviet involvement in the area. This work, he notes, is a record of ties rather than an interpretive study . . . The period he covers stops prior to the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviet advisors in 1972. However, he concludes by categorizing the Soviet objective in the Middle East as an attempt to 'cultivate progressive partners who might one day remake the entire Middle East in the Soviet image'."

TURKEY—DIVERSIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY, by Udo Steinbach, in *Aussen Politik*, (Winter 1973) 439-449.

"Turkey has long been the accepted bastion of the Western defense system on the Black Sea and the Aegean straits; however, since the late 1960s, according to Dr. Steinbach, Turkey's policy has been evolving from dependence on the West toward a more independent international stance. He cites many reasons for the change, including the general world atmosphere of détente, an internal change signaling a renewed interest in Turkey's non-Western heritage, and

anti-Americanism brought on in 1964 by the US denial of support should the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus escalate to involve the USSR. Evidences of its new foreign policy diversification are Turkey's new relations with the USSR, the Balkan countries of East Europe, the Arabic countries in the Middle East, its partners in CENTO, and its desires for bilateral rather than collective alliances and agreements . . ."

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND NATO, by Ferenc A. Vali. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 348 p.

"An account of the political history of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles, beginning with the Ottoman Empire and continuing through to Turkey's present membership in NATO. The author explains the changing geopolitical importance of the Turkish Straits to various powers, especially the Soviet Union. He provides an extensive appendix of documents relevant to the Straits between 1774 and 1964."

UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE 1970 JORDANIAN CRISIS. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 57 p. (ASDIRS 4377.)

"Covers the period January through September 1970, but concentrates on events in Jordan and the US-USSR military and diplomatic moves during September 1970. No attempt has been made to consider the tactical plan for the deployment of US forces. Research consisted primarily of examination of daily news accounts and periodicals for the period of time involved. The action taken by the United States in an effort to preclude broadening the scope of the conflict in the Middle East was the only feasible course to pursue."

THE USSR AND ARABIA, by Stephen Page. London, Central Asian Research Centre in Association with Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971. 151 p.

The development of Soviet policies and attitudes towards the countries of the Arabian Peninsula 1955-1970. With bibliography.

(LI)—YEMEN: RUSSIA'S STEPPING STONE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Maj. Corliss E. Zylstra. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 67 p. (Research Study.)

"This study evaluates the Soviet Union's foreign policy to the Yemen Arab Republic. It

attempts to determine the Soviet Union's motivation for pursuing relations with Yemen and reasons for their active involvement in the Yemen civil war in 1967. It concludes that initial Soviet interest in Yemen was opportunistic. But, as the Soviets gained confidence in their foreign policy in the late 60s, they became more aggressive and actively courted the Yemen Arab Republic because of its strategic proximity to the Indian Ocean."

g. *The Soviet Union, The Palestinians, and Other Revolutionaries*

CHANGING SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARAB RADICAL MOVEMENTS, by Lawrence L. Whetton, in *New Middle East*, no. 18 (March 1970) 20-27.

"The Soviet Union has sought in recent times to cultivate radical Middle Eastern political movements as instruments of its foreign policy. Two categories of political movements have been the most consistent objectives of Soviet policy: Arab Socialist or 'progressive' governments and Arab Communist parties. Soviet policy towards these two types of regional revolutionary groupings has been subjected to the traditional contradictions in the two planes of Soviet diplomacy usually associated with Moscow's relations with bourgeois regimes and local radical movements: protection of Soviet state interests and international Communist commitments.

MOSCOW AND THE PALESTINIANS: A NEW TOOL OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Augustus R. Norton. Coral Gables, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 26 p.

"Based on an analysis of recent Soviet statements and actions dealing with the Middle East, Norton notes an improved Soviet relationship with the Palestinians, indicating a possible intent to use the Palestinian issue as an instrument of policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, Norton suggests, this closer Soviet identification with, and support of, the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 'has been facilitated by indications of, in at least overt terms, a less extremist stance by the latter on immediate objectives and strategies.' Although Moscow continues to seek to erode US influence while strengthening its own in the Middle East negotiations, it now appears to be preparing for more long-term influence among revolutionary Arab elements and a possible Palestinian state."

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ARAB REVOLUTIONS: YEMEN, EGYPT, ALGERIA, IRAQ AND PALESTINE, by Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, in *Middle East Forum (Beirut)*, (Winter 1970-71) 41-65.

"Russian attempts at winning a foothold in the Middle East for the last two centuries have been numerous and well publicized by Britain and France who were bent on frustrating this Russian ambition, and until recently succeeded in doing so . . . In summary, the Soviet view of various Arab revolutions varied with the circumstances. On the whole Soviet verbal sympathy was evident in all, except perhaps in the case of the Egyptian revolution between 1952 and 1954. That is, until the Free Officers proved that they would not join western defenses regardless of agreements they concluded with Britain over Sudan and the Suez bases. The one Arab revolution they were naturally most enthusiastic about was the Iraqi revolution. That was because Iraq under the old regime was the Arab country that joined the Baghdad Pact which was aimed against the Soviet Union. Perhaps the one revolution they are still most cautious about is the Palestine revolution. This is so because that revolution is not yet considered completely legitimate by the Arab governments themselves. And perhaps because the Soviets are genuinely interested in a peaceful solution in Palestine and would like to avoid confrontation with the United States that could occur if the Palestine revolution 'gets out of hand'."

h. *Soviet vs. US Interests in the Middle East (See Below Under US)*

24. *Sovietization of Mongolia*

(LI)—SINO-SOVIET STAKES IN MONGOLIA, by Lt. Col. Henry H. Covington. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 70 p. (Research Study.)

"This study investigates the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet interest in the Mongolian People's Republic. Brief consideration is given to actual and potential Chinese and Soviet social, economic, and political interest in Mongolia; however, the author assumes the reader's primary interest is focused on Mongolia's military significance to Russia and China. In addition to general background information on the Mongolian People's Republic, the study includes a military terrain analysis of the Mongolian landmass and analyzes Mongolia's strategic and/or tactical

value to either China or Russia in the light of three hypothetical attacks launched through and adjacent to the territorial boundaries of Mongolia."

THE SOVIETIZATION OF MONGOLIA, by Henry S. Bradsher, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 50, no. 3 (April 1972) 545-553.

"Only France's aid to some of its former colonies in Africa came close to the per capita aid of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Mongolia. The Soviet Union has received in return political loyalty from Mongolia, but it has failed to get the small economic payments that it asked. Although details have not been made public, it appears that Mongolia has been unable in recent years to fulfill agreements to supply meat and other livestock products for the Soviet Far East. This failure has contributed to the general shortage of meat in the Soviet Union, one of the more noticeable shortcomings of the Brezhnev leadership's efforts to improve living conditions."

25. South Asia

INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS, by William J. Barnds. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972. 388 p. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

"Civil war, the demands of East Pakistan for autonomy or independence as Bangladesh, 10 million refugees, the tinderbox tensions between India and Pakistan, the wary stance of the major powers—to understand these unhappy developments of 1971, one needs insight into the past twenty-five years in South Asia. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' is a comprehensive analysis of international relations on the Asian subcontinent. In assessing the roles the major powers have played there, the book re-examines American policy toward India and Pakistan and suggests guidelines for the future. Out of the legacy of colonialism, the struggle for independence from Britain, and the Hindu-Muslim antagonism that led to partition and the bitter Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan have fashioned their distinctive foreign policies and set the course of events since 1947. With the onset of the cold war, India's nonalignment, and Pakistan's search for allies and security, the outside powers found scope for their own contest for influence among one-sixth of the world's population. The United States became a military ally of Pakistan's while simultaneously trying to maintain good relations with India by assisting its

efforts at modernization and development. The Soviet Union wooed India with economic aid and in other ways. China and India experienced a spurious friendship that deteriorated from sloganeering good will to acrimonious dispute over their borders. In the 1960s, the interrelations of the five powers changed kaleidoscopically. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 and contrasting international responses modified India's previous stance. For Pakistan, the second Kashmir war in 1965 brought disillusionment with its military alliances, new and close relations with China, and the profound domestic discontent that is working itself out today. The Soviet Union has greatly enhanced its influence on South Asian affairs with economic and military aid, while the United States has in many ways been disengaging. America's policy on the subcontinent—past, present, and prospective—is carefully considered in terms of its interests, the regional conflict, the enormous development problems, and the defense of South Asia. The United States is critically . . . taken to task for errors and omissions of policy, but its positive contributions are fully recognized. 'INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS' . . . covers the setting, the exercise, and the inherent limitations of the roles of the five principal powers." With selected bibliography, maps, and tables.

(LI)—SOVIET EXPANSION IN SOUTH ASIA, by Lt. Col. Charles C. Vogler. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1972. 68 p. (Professional Study.)

"This research report is an analysis of the current geopolitical situation on the Indian subcontinent. A brief discussion of the historical origins of India and Pakistan is followed by a detailed analysis of both the Kashmir and Bangladesh regional disputes. The report then examines Soviet penetration of the region followed by a discussion of the countervailing Chinese influence. The report concludes with a discussion of the realignment which will follow the latest Indo-Pakistani war."

26. Third World Nations

(*)—COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD, by Edward Taborsky. New York, Robert Speller & Sons, 1973. 500 p.

"An overall exposition and analysis of communist strategy in and toward the Third World. While emphasizing Soviet strategic doctrine and practice, the author pays attention to the contri-

butions of Communist China, Eastern Europe, and, where appropriate, Yugoslavia and Cuba. Separate chapters are devoted to participation in national democratic revolutions and fronts, fostering the class struggle and building up the proletariat, the mission of the local communist parties, utilizing the peasantry, the role of the bourgeoisie in communist strategy, exploiting the economic weapon, pursuit of cultural diplomacy, and the employment of violent methods, including guerrilla warfare."

(*)—THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, ed. by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Chicago, Aldine, 1971. 478 p.

"This . . . volume of readings on Soviet foreign policy is divided into sections on domestic determinants of policy, the role of ideology, the origins of the Cold War, Western diplomacy and competitive coexistence, and USSR relations with the Third World."

MOSCOW'S MILITARY AID TO THE THIRD WORLD, by Col. Eberhard Einbeck, in *Aussen Politik* (4th Qtr. 1971) 460-474.

"According to Col. Einbeck [West Germany] Russia has gained several strategic positions by providing military aid to Third World states, starting with Egypt in 1955. This aid has ranged from weapons, ammunition, operating instructions, and tactical training to assistance in building roads and airfields. Most aid goes to Asia, some to Africa, and a little to Latin America, primarily Cuba. In each country Moscow's military aid program has conflicted with those of the US and China. Most aid has been in the form of loans . . . Since 1955, support for Cairo has held a very special place in Moscow's overall program . . . One of Russia's politico-strategic aims is the re-opening of the Suez Canal in order to reach the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea . . . There have been setbacks in the Soviet program. Following the Nasser-inspired revolt in the Sudan aid was accepted, since it was required for the guerrilla war in Southern Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea; but Sudan's aloofness towards Soviet communism became increasingly evident, with Communist Party members being purged from the government. Libya has purchased a small shipment of arms from the Soviet Union, but paid for the supplies immediately in cash in order not to enter into any long-term ties with Russia. As to Ghana, the ousting of Nkrumah shocked Moscow. Russia has also suffered the communication problems which nec-

essarily occur between members of donor and recipient countries, and much of the military aid for guerrilla activity has lost its credibility now that most nations of the Third World have gained their independence. Russia hides a large amount of its aid. It is estimated that Russia supplies 90% of Warsaw Pact military aid to Third World countries and 74% of the Pact's general development aid. The Soviet Union has frequently used other Warsaw Pact partners as a front during arms transactions with other states. Soviet weapons are also offered at cheaper rates than those manufactured in the West; the Soviet Union grants such favorable payment conditions as longer repay periods, lower interest rates, and payment in local currency or in raw materials. Einbeck sees no indication that Soviet foreign policy, which is founded on expansion, has been modified. He believes military aid has proved to be a useful instrument for the USSR in gaining strategic positions in Asia and Africa. This 'partnership' relationship has enabled Moscow to maintain some control in these countries, and Moscow can be expected to maintain this expansive policy for the next few years."

SOVIET OIL AND THE THIRD WORLD, by Biplab Dasgupta, in *World Development*, v. 3, no. 5 (May 1975) 345-360.

"The paper explores various aspects of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries in the field of the oil industry. It begins with a historical account of the growth of the Soviet oil industry, and its ownership pattern. But the core of the essay is the role played by the 'Soviet oil offensive' in the 1960s and its successes in weakening the grip of the oil oligarchy of the seven major vertically-integrated international corporations on the world oil trade, in the disintegration of the world-parity-pricing system, and in the emergence of OPEC as a powerful factor in the political economy of world oil. In the final section, the paper assesses the role of Soviet oil exports in the present world context and the future."

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1970's, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 104-117.

"On June 7, 1969, Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, enunciated what is likely to be in the decade ahead the underlying Soviet approach toward the Third World, particularly toward Asia and the Middle East. The occasion was the Interna-

tional Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, a meeting Soviet leaders had finally succeeded in convening after almost six frustrating years of cajoling and pressuring foreign communist parties. After ritualistically warning of the continued danger from the forces of 'imperialism' (i.e., the West), Brezhnev dwelt on the increased importance of the nonaligned developing countries, noting that 'the fighters for national liberation and social emancipation in the contingents of the worldwide anti-imperialist front.' He observed with satisfaction the 'considerable changes' wrought in the 1960's in the 'alignment of forces in that part of the world' and the 'socialist orientation' of a number of new nations now following the noncapitalist path of development—changes made possible by 'cooperation between the progressive young states and the socialist countries'."

(*)—SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS: VOLUME II, SOVIET-ASIAN RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. 150 p.

"This is the second of a three-volume series in which McLane, professor of government at Dartmouth College, seeks to set forth 'the record of Soviet ties with Asia, Africa and the Middle East . . .' He reports on the intensity of Soviet dealings—political, military, economic, cultural and trade—with fourteen South and Southeast Asian nations. Following an introductory 'Regional Perspective' focusing on Soviet relations with Asia as a whole, he discusses relations with each Asian state in turn, and includes for each a chronology of relations with the USSR in the period before 1955 and for every year since."

(*)—SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS: VOLUME III, SOVIET-AFRICAN RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974. 190 p.

"This data bank on relations between the Soviet Union and African states provides a comprehensive set of tables covering the period through 1972. In large part derived from materials published in *Mizan*, the book examines the ties between the Soviet Union and each country and contains comments on each African country by the Soviet press along with succinct editorial notes by Professor McLane."

(*)—THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS, ed. by Roger E. Kent. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 302 p.

The authors attempt "to provide . . . a general overview of Soviet policy toward the developing nations and more detail on various aspects of that policy."

(*)—THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EMERGING NATIONS, by Harish Kapur. New York, Humanities Press, 1972. 214 p.

"Dr. Kapur's case study of Indian-Soviet relations from the Bolshevik revolution to the present examines the historical framework, fluctuations in the Soviet approach to New Delhi, changing Moscow-Peking-Delhi relations, and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The volume is designed as a study of the broader Soviet approach to the emerging nations, and other nations are occasionally mentioned in various contexts."

27. *Soviet-American Relations: Historical and Contemporary View*

(*)—AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AN INQUIRY INTO RECENT APPRAISALS FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, by William Welch. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970. 302 p.

"William Welch has set himself . . . [the following] tasks: discerning and classifying the various images of Soviet foreign policy that have been developed by the American academic community, analyzing how well founded these perceptions are, and prescribing remedies to improve them. The implication of this final task is that there are deficiencies and inadequacies in the thinking of American scholars on Soviet policy."

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: THEIR CONTENT AND PROSPECTS, by Radovan Vukadinović, in *Review of International Affairs, Belgrade*, v. 24, nos. 560-1 (5-20 August 1973) 12-14.

"American-Soviet relations have passed through several different phases, each containing the roots of both positive and negative trends which, after all, continue to make up that peculiar conglomeration of relations between the two most important states in the world. Theoreticians and analysts are now studying this rich experience of the past and the different phases in the evolution of American-Soviet relations to date in an attempt to anticipate the future behaviour of the two powers or, rather, the principal trends in their future relations. However, the exceedingly complex nature of these relations makes it very difficult to speculate about the future and even to analyse correctly present trends."

AN AMERICAN VIEW OF SOVIET FOR-

EIGN POLICY IN THE 1970's, by Foy D. Kohler, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 72-86.

"The question most frequently put to me by my fellow citizens is: 'Why does the Soviet Union continue to be so relentlessly hostile and aggressive toward the West and, in particular, toward the United States?' They say they cannot understand why this vast and still developing country does not turn inward and devote its energies and resources to its internal development, as the United States did in the last century. I reply that the answer is to be found in the nature of the Soviet political system. It is essential to understand that the USSR is ruled by a political minority that seized power some fifty-odd years ago and has hung on to it ever since . . . There are other fundamental forces at work in Russian society which have had a decisive influence on Soviet foreign, as well as domestic, policies in the past and which continue to operate . . . The doctrinal imperatives, the historic compulsion to expand Russian presence and influence, the need to contain social and economic pressures without sacrificing party control or priority political objectives—will continue to influence the decisions of Soviet leaders in their foreign policy in the 1970's. The degree of their influence will be affected by developments in the outside world and particularly by the posture and policies of the United States."

CHANGES AND CHANCES IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Hans J. Morganthau, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 3 (April 1971) 429-441.

"Our reactions to Soviet foreign policy have a way of jumping from one extreme to another, both in the long and short run, with more regard for changing superficial appearances than permanent objective factors . . . These extreme swings of the pendulum can also be observed in much shorter time plans . . . Yet beneath these fluctuations of mood and tactics the perennial question about the future of American-Soviet relations persists in demanding an answer: Is it possible to move from sterile confrontation to meaningful negotiations? While 20 years ago such a question was purely rhetorical since the negative answer was a foregone conclusion, it can now be asked seriously, and it deserves a serious answer, derived not from the changing mood of the day but from the objective factors which in the long run determine the relations among nations. What has happened during the last 20 years to account for the possibility of posing that crucial question seriously?"

(*)—THE COLD WAR BEGINS: SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFLICT OVER EASTERN EUROPE, by Lynn Etheridge Davis. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974. 427 p.

"This book is an examination of how the United States moved from a position of noninvolvement in Eastern Europe prior to World War II to active opposition to the Soviet Union's activities in the area during and after the war. Davis views the growth of conflict over post-World War II rules of the region as a major cause of the Cold War. The author argues . . . that the conflict over Eastern Europe had its origins in America's strict adherence to the general and somewhat vague principles of the Atlantic Charter enunciated by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941."

THE COURSE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970's, by Hubert H. Humphrey, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1971) 65-71.

"In order for an analysis of the development of Soviet foreign policy to be a useful aid in assessing Soviet policies for the future, we must avoid an overreliance on doctrine and ideologies to provide the answers. We in the United States have for too long equated communism with the Soviet Union, and as a result failed to recognize the fundamental nationalist behavior patterns of communist countries. Once it becomes common knowledge that communist states are nation-states at the same time they are communist, the pattern of our relations with these countries may change radically. Looking forward to that day, we should reconsider the development of Soviet foreign policy in the light of its nationalist motivations. I am not suggesting that the communist orientation of the Soviet Union be disregarded. The ideology of communism has been and will continue to be a significant factor in the Soviet American relations. It cannot be otherwise when the Soviet Union continues to hold fast to the doctrine of communism and, thus, to its inherent hostility toward countries that are not of the same ideology, particularly the United States. Communism is a twentieth-century religion, and the Soviet Union has not yet shown a willingness to relinquish her claim to embody the communist faith."

MOST-FAVORED-NATION AND LESS FAVORITE NATIONS, by Theodore C. Sorensen, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 2 (January 1974) 273-286.

"The Amendment submitted by Senator Henry Jackson to the Administration's pending Trade Reform bill, along with its counterpart in the House of Representatives, is a curious blend of foreign policy idealism and domestic politics. The exaggerated claims of both proponents and opponents in the long and often emotional debate over the Amendment cannot obscure the underlying issue, which is as old as the nation-state—whether and when should one nation apply pressure to alter those policies or practices of another which, if not exclusively 'internal' in impact, are at least not clearly within the traditional foreign policy realm. Although any amendment enjoying the formal sponsorship of nearly four-fifths of the members of the Senate and nearly two-thirds of the members of the House appears almost certain to be passed in one form or another, both the Congress and the Administration must now think through more carefully the implications and consequences of enacting the Amendment in its present form . . . The primary objective of the Amendment is the elimination of Soviet 'education' or exit taxes and other restrictions on the emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews . . . As a means of achieving this objective, however—even as a somewhat awkward vehicle for conveying congressional support for it—the Amendment, to say nothing of the debate thereon, has been less clearly focused. For in fact it attempts too much to be effective and too little to be effective and too little to be meaningful."

(*) — NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, by George H. Quester. New York, Dunellen, 1971. 327 p. (for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.)

"Historical analyses of the Soviet-American nuclear relationship since the end of World War II. The emphasis of this . . . book is analytical rather than policy-oriented."

ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, by G. A. Arbatov, in *Survival* (May-June 1973) 124-129.

"Dr. Arbatov maintains that the 'serious shifts' in Soviet-American relations since Pres. Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 are the 'natural consequence' of the major shift in the correlation of forces in the world arena, 'to a considerable extent created by the Soviet Union.' Any change in the correlation of forces in favor of 'imperialism' would lead not to détente but to an increase in tension. However, a change in the correlation

of forces in favor of socialism has served to strengthen the cause of peace and international security, and this has led to the improvement of the situation in Europe and the normalization of Soviet-American relations. Thus, although the 'class nature' of imperialist powers has not changed, they have had to adapt their internal and external policies to the objective realities of contemporary world changes . . . Arbatov cautions that mutual interest in preventing a nuclear war requires not simply an understanding on the renunciation of conscious attempts to unleash it, but a radical improvement on the whole system of international relations. It requires the liquidation of all breeding grounds of armed conflict, the creation of effective systems of collective security in Europe and Asia, and measures that can secure an extension of mutual understanding and cooperation between all states. Relations with the US, as with other capitalist countries, will remain, in the historical sense, relations of struggle, no matter how successful the process of normalization and détente." (Note: As the director of the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Georgi Arbatov is the Kremlin's No. 1 America watcher—and his views often reflect the latest Moscow line on relations with Washington.)

(*)—THE OTHER SIDE OF COEXISTENCE, by Albert L. Weeks. New York, Pitman, 1970, 304 p.

"An analysis of Soviet foreign policy, especially in respect to relations with the United States. As the author looks forward into the 1970s he finds Russia facing some crossroads and paradoxes—a common plight of states, it appears."

(*)—THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II, by Adam B. Ulam. New York, Viking, 1971. 405 p.

"The author of . . . studies of Bolshevism and Soviet foreign policy here traces the recent history of Soviet-U.S. relations. He finds few heroes on either side, but many foibles and misconceptions. A 'hard-headed analysis,' showing little patience for the new 'revisionist' school."

SHOWDOWN AT THE JERRY FORD CORRAL, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 19 (10 November 1975) 6-7.

Among other things, this article describes the effect on Soviet-US relations of Schlesinger's firing. "The Secretary's departure will be popular with the Soviets and may even . . . be just the

sacrificial offering needed to get SALT going again."

SOME PERSPECTIVE ON THE RECENT EXPANSION IN U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, by Edward T. Wilson, in *SAIS Review*, v. 17, no. 2 (Winter 1973) 8-15.

"Never in the memory of the present generation have the prospects for a real renaissance in Soviet-American trade been more encouraging. With such hitherto divisive issues as Vietnam and the arms race receding into the background, the historical context seems propitious; the top political leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union appear genuinely committed to a concerted policy of expanded economic ties; and, on the American side at least, the business community seems eager to implement this policy with concrete commercial transactions. The American press, for its part, has displayed no lack of zeal in heralding the arrival of a new era in East-West trade. In the midst of the rash of enthusiasm over the recent expansion in U.S.-Soviet commercial exchanges, it is useful to pause briefly and examine some of the underlying factors which have prompted this development and which will hopefully make expanded Soviet-American trade a permanent, if not prominent, feature of the international economic system. For the purpose of this discussion three types of considerations—psychological, historical, and practical—can be distinguished."

SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION: POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, by Thomas G. Paterson. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. 287 p.

"As the Cold War recedes into history, it has become more and more a subject of controversy in historical circles. Orthodox historians envision American policy in the postwar years as a struggle against flagrant communist aggression in Europe and Asia, while revisionists depict the US as acting in its political and economic self-interest to impose a *Pax Americana* on the rest of the world. In this 'war of words,' Prof. Paterson stands firmly with the revisionist side: it is his intention in his book to examine the question of reconstruction as a key factor in the embryonic Soviet-American rivalry . . . Beginning with the issue of a postwar loan to Russia, Paterson chronicles what he believes to be a consistently coercive American attitude towards the USSR. The withdrawal of the offer

of a loan and the abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease are thus portrayed as deliberate efforts to antagonize and browbeat the Soviets. The author cites Secretary of State Byrnes' comment that 'the only way to negotiate with the Russians is to hit them hard, and then negotiate.' By attempting to force an economic 'Open Door' in Eastern Europe, the US, Paterson argues, compelled Stalin to tighten his control over the satellite nations. He therefore places a large share of the blame for the division of Europe squarely on American shoulders . . . However valid or invalid Paterson's arguments might be, the debate on the origins of the Cold War is far from over. With no Russian documentation at hand, historians can only speculate as to the intentions of Stalin, Zhdanov, and Molotov. Paterson's book is one more contribution to a growing revisionist literature on the Cold War and its causes."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: A YEAR OF DÉTENTE?, by Roger E. Kanet, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 156-159.

"In spite of the more cordial relations between the superpowers during 1972 and the signing of the agreements in Moscow, both the Soviet Union and the United States are still engaged in a major conflict for power and influence."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS VIEWED BY LENIN, by M. Trush, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 7 (July 1974) 13-21.

"Lenin always regarded with great interest the North American United States, as the USA was then called in our country. His attention was drawn to the people of America, their swift advance to the foreground of history, the USA's transformation into the leading state of the capitalist world. Lenin was deeply interested in the country's history, politics and economics rapid technological growth, cultural development, the conditions of the farmers and the Black people. After the victory of the Great October Revolution in Russia and the creation of the first socialist state in history, Lenin repeatedly stressed the importance and necessity to establish normal and mutually advantageous relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence between the American and the Soviet peoples, between Moscow and Washington. Today, when as a result of negotiations and a number of significant agreements concluded in 1972 and 1973, a good foundation

has been laid for the normal development of USSR-USA relations, for strengthening mutually advantageous cooperation between our two countries, the vitality of the Leninist foreign policy, and Lenin's concepts in respect to Soviet-American relations are forcefully demonstrated. Likewise, the need to study the first steps taken by the Soviet state in applying Lenin's directives is underscored. Lenin's works, documents linked with his diplomatic activity and the foreign policy of the Soviet Government he headed, many of which became known only after the publication of his Complete Works, conclusively show that the Soviet Union has steadfastly advocated the normalisation of relations with the USA on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. They reveal that the Soviet Union has always arranged its relations with the United States proceeding from the desire for peace and respect for the American people."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970s, by David D. Finley, in *Military Review*, v. 53, no. 6 (June 1973) 3-12.

"My perspective on contemporary Soviet-American relations stems from some recent personal experience as well as continuing academic study. I had the opportunity to visit in Moscow and talk seriously with Soviet academics immediately after President Nixon's 'Haiphong' speech last year. I want to draw on those encounters to illustrate my views."

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 150-154 plus.

"It is premature to talk of a generation of steadily improving Soviet-American relations . . . Yet, given Brezhnev's serious domestic difficulties and his need for Western financial and technological assistance, and given President Nixon's need to recoup some of the political influence he has squandered as a consequence of the sordid Watergate revelations, there are grounds for a guarded optimism."

SOVIET-AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TIES, by I. Sheidina, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 12 (December 1974) 46-51.

"Since May 1972, when the first inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in science and technology in the history of Soviet-American relations was signed during the Soviet-American

summit meeting in Moscow, together with three closely allied agreements—on cooperation in protecting the environment, in exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and in medical science and public health—a long way has been travelled in this direction, which is all the more impressive, considering the earlier cold war period, which had in effect invalidated all business ties between the two countries. In June 1973, these agreements on scientific and technical cooperation were supplemented by four agreements: on cooperation in agriculture, transport, exploration of the World Ocean and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In June 1974, the range of Soviet-American agreements in scientific and technical areas was further extended, to include a long-term agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial and technical cooperation, agreements on cooperation in energetics, in housing and other types of building and in artificial-heart research and development. Thus, the efforts of just over two years have produced a complex of Soviet-American agreements in these fields, with Soviet-American scientific and technical ties resting on a sound contractual basis."

SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP: A NEW DIMENSION IN FOREIGN POLICY, by Maj. Jeffrey L. Scribner, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 8 (August 1971) 53-62.

" 'Remember that diplomacy without power is feeble, and power without diplomacy is destructive and blind . . . Remember that no nation's power is without limits, and hence that its policies must respect the power and interest of others.' Although Hans J. Morgenthau wrote these sentences for consumption by an American audience, the Soviets seem to have taken the major precepts of Morgenthau's realpolitik to heart in the development of their power potential to support their foreign policy. Historically the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been marked by a pragmatic use of the instruments available at any given period either to protect and consolidate the current Soviet position or to expand it to a new level which could then be protected and consolidated until the opportunity for further expansion appeared. This historical pattern of alternate expansion and consolidation continues its progression through the present moment and will do so in the future. At present, we seem to be witnessing the end of a period of consolidation and the beginning of a period of expansion—indicated most visibly by Soviet activity in the Middle East."

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by John C. Campbell, in *The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals*, v. 401, (May 1972) 126-133.

"No unchanging aim or strategy ordained by geography or ideology provides a full explanation of the course of Soviet policy in the Middle East. The Soviet presence has grown, notably in the past fifteen years, through opportunistic diplomacy, the deployment of military and especially naval power, and the expansion of influence in certain states through arms deliveries, economic aid, and political support. In general, the Soviet leaders have been successful in making their country a Middle East power, at the expense of positions previously held by Western powers. In the Northern Tier it has gained by normalizing its relations with Turkey and Iran. In the Arab-Israel zone it has established preponderant influence in a number of Arab states, taking advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of inter-Arab disputes. While Soviet-American rivalry in the region could lead to armed conflict, the greater likelihood is prolonged political competition. From that standpoint the Soviets may encounter many obstacles, especially the force of local nationalism. For those obstacles to be effective, however, the United States will have to maintain its own military presence and political interest in the region. The attainment of détente will depend both on negotiation and on balanced power."

US AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1957-66, ed. by John Donovan. New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1974. 218 p.

"This book presents a 'journalistic narrative of U.S. and Soviet involvement in the Middle East during the policy-forming years 1957-66.' Contents: Eisenhower Doctrine (1957); Suez, Sinai and Gaza (1957); Jordanian Crisis (1957); Syria under Leftist Control (1957); US Marines in Lebanon (1958); Iraqi Army Coup (1958) and Aftermath; Baghdad Pact Developments (1958-60); Nasser's Relations with US and USSR (1957-63); US and Soviet Policies Develop (1959-63); US and Soviet Policies Harden (1964-6).

THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Edward R. F. Sheehan, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 23, no. 10 (June 1971) 22-30.

"Written from the . . . perspective he has

gained as both a journalist and Embassy official in the Middle East since 1956, Mr. Sheehan presents a . . . perspective of today's political dilemma in that part of the world. The complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict are particularly incomprehensible to the outsider because of the psychologies of the peoples involved. Nevertheless, the United States must find an effective way to deal with the problem, other than providing Israel with more arms, if it is to retain any influence in the area."

28. *USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (See also Appendix)*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

EASTERN EUROPE: POLITICS, REVOLUTION, AND DIPLOMACY, by Henry L. Roberts. New York, Knopf, 1970. 324 p.

"A selection of the author's essays written since 1951 and dealing with the historiography, politics and diplomacy of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

A RELIABLE INSTRUMENT OF PEACE, by G. Zhukov, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 6 (June 1975) 48-56.

"On May 14, 1975, it was 20 years since the signing in Warsaw of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between eight European socialist countries. The anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation fell close to the 30th anniversary of the historic victory over fascism in Great Patriotic War. The coincidence of these two important dates is highly symbolic: the rout of fascism with the decisive role played by the Soviet Union exerted a most profound influence on the very course of world development, while the signing of the Warsaw Treaty marked an important stage in the strengthening of the world socialist system, which has become the decisive factor in the progress of human society."

b. *Challenges to Soviet Hegemony*

EUROPE'S NEW RENEGADE REDS, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 23 (8 December 1975) 32.

"What was to have been a final preparatory meeting for an all-Europe Communist summit conference early next year ended in a deadlock in East Berlin last month . . . What Moscow failed to take into consideration was the growing independence of some of the more powerful Western Communist Parties as well as Eastern Europe's two mavericks, Yugoslavia and Rumania. As a

result, European Communism has split into two camps."

THE RUMANIAN CHALLENGE TO SOVIET HEGEMONY, by F. Stephen Larrabee, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973) 227-246.

"Among the challenges to Soviet hegemony, the Rumanian one has been quite distinct. In contrast to the others, which were short-lived and provoked a definite Soviet response aimed at eradicating them, the Rumanian challenge has been sustained and has in fact broadened over time without provoking major punitive actions by the Soviet Union or its allies. This noteworthy achievement has been due, in large measure, to the Rumanian leadership's keen sense of the limits of permissible deviation. While the Rumanians have obstinately defended the basic principles of their foreign policy in the face of Soviet criticism and pressure, they have done so with an awareness of the limits to which that policy could be pushed."

RUSSIA IN EASTERN EUROPE: HEGEMONY WITHOUT SECURITY, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 49, no. 4 (July 1971) 682-697.

"Even in an age of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, the states of Eastern Europe now dominated by the Soviet Union constitute an important element of Soviet national security, a kind of 'cordon Stalinaire.' The one hundred million people, and the resources their governments command, contribute a significant increment to Soviet economic, technological and military power. Soviet control of these areas provides forward military bases and possession of the traditional invasion routes into Western Europe, especially across the northern plains. The Soviet position, in fact, constitutes a threat to the security of Western Europe, a pistol held at its head. The division of Europe and the perpetuation of tension have assisted the Soviet Union by restricting the role which West European states play in world politics and by increasing the American burden. At the same time, the Soviet position provides a veto over the unification of Germany and also over the reconstruction of Europe as a whole. Soviet control over East Germany maintains the fear of another Russian-German alliance and provides opportunities for Soviet diplomacy. It almost guarantees crises over West Berlin, in circumstances the Soviets choose. In short, Eastern Europe remains at the heart of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the NATO states."

TWENTY YEARS AFTER: THE CRISIS

OF SOVIET-TYPE SYSTEMS, by Zygmunt Bauman, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 6 (November-December 1971) 45-53.

"There was a time when the problem of effecting the transfer of political power from one generation of leaders to the next in a peaceful and orderly fashion—the so-called succession problem—was rightly viewed as the Achilles' heel of Soviet-type political systems. That time, however, now appears to have passed. Even though some Western observers of socialism might disagree, evidence has been accumulating for some time that a new pattern of 'peaceful' and legitimized succession is emerging in the Soviet-bloc countries and has even matured to the point where it is becoming solidly institutionalized. Its outward manifestations may still appear exotic and irregular to Western eyes in the dramatized form they take on when molded into news reports for Western readers, but the pattern has in fact—like the Apollo flights to the moon—already become routinely dull and almost commonplace. In essence, what appears to have happened is this. As a consequence of the growing modernization and differentiation of the Soviet-type socialist societies, their political elites have tended to become increasingly heterogeneous ideologically and organizationally. That is to say, there has been a proliferation of conflicting interest groups advocating different approaches to the goals and problems of these societies. At the same time, however, the integrating unity that formerly centered in organization and ideology has now been replaced by a new consensus centering on the 'rules of the game'—i.e., on what is the fair, just and proper method of resolving conflicts between rival interest groups and, in particular, of deciding which of the various contenders for political power has earned the right to rule."

WARSAW PACT: THE BROOD OF THE BEAR, by Lawrence Griswold, in *Sea Power*, v. 18, no. 4 (April 1975) 19-32.

"The USSR's 'allies' are that in name only; traditional nationalism and long-nurtured anti-Soviet resentments make them as much liability as asset."

c. Economic Aspects

ATOMIC ENERGY FOR PURPOSES IN THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, by Jozef Wilczynski, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 26, no. 4 (October 1974) 568-590.

"Much has been said in the West about Soviet nuclear developments in the military sphere and the nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the Warsaw Pact countries, but less attention has been given to the peaceful applications of atomic energy in these countries. Although up to the mid-1950s the Soviet nuclear programme was overwhelmingly dominated by military considerations, since that time atomic energy has been increasingly harnessed to economic uses, and the USSR has also decided to pass on some of this technology to other Warsaw Pact countries for peaceful applications. It is not generally realized that several nonmilitary uses of atomic energy were pioneered in these countries and that in some fields they are ahead of the most advanced capitalist nations. In this article we shall examine the considerations which have prompted the Warsaw Pact countries to turn to atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the cost of nuclear power, the extent of nuclear power developments, nuclear power reactors and equipment, other peaceful use of atomic energy, Soviet nuclear aid and diplomacy and the implications for the capitalist world. Special attention is given to comparisons with Western countries and to the latest and prospective developments."

(*)—COMECON: CHALLENGE TO THE WEST, by R. E. H. Mellor. New York, Van Nostrand/Reinhold, 1971. 152 p.

"Created as a Soviet counterstroke to the Marshall Plan, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) is the least studied and understood of the supranational European organizations. The major aims of the author . . . are to show why COMECON was formed and to review its main organizational developments and unfolding policies in relation to changing ideological views, communist bloc economic conditions, and pressures and influences from outside the bloc."

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE COMECON, by Stanislaw Wasowski, in *Orbis*, v. 16, no. 3 (Fall 1972) 760-779.

"Since its inception, the COMECON—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—has been affected by the pull of two opposing forces: one favors close economic cooperation and even centralization to provide both the benefits of international specialization and the means for a more tightly run communist bloc; the other favors separate national economic development, which would permit each country to determine its pattern and speed of growth and to preserve as much

of its limited sovereignty as possible. The balance between these two sets of forces has been continually changing; the present period is marked by the strengthening of the centripetal tendency but not, by any means, its decisive victory. Integration is now the order of the day. Communist leaders see it, although often for different reasons, as the solution to the major ills of the communist European economies. The East Europeans hope integration will help to remedy the bloc's underutilization of capacity, inadequate level of technological advance, capital scarcity, and insufficiency of raw materials. Moreover, in the minds of Soviet leaders and some in Eastern Europe, integration based on planning is designed to replace or impede the drive for 'liberal,' market-oriented reforms in the communist countries, as well as to provide stronger ties for the bloc."

(*)—ECONOMIC WARFARE IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC: A STUDY OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PRESSURE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, AND COMMUNIST CHINA, by Robert Owen Freedman. New York, Praeger, 1970. 192 p.

"Three case studies of attempts by Kremlin leaders to use economic weapons to threaten discontented clients. The experience with China is the most interesting. The author observes that in each case the Soviet Union escalated gradually, underestimated the capacity of the target country to resist successfully, and learned from its experiences."

WEST-EAST RELATIONS IN EUROPE: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES, by Roger Morgan, in *International Affairs*, (April 1973) 177-189.

". . . Predicts that the mid-1970s will see a concerted effort at 'institution-building' within West Europe and between East and West Europe. While the Common Market countries have committed themselves to the formation of a 'European Union' by 1980, any comparable integration on the pan-European scale is unlikely. Nevertheless, the idea of strengthening ties among all nations on the continent remains a popular attraction. Proponents of this view argue that such cooperation will bring the cold war officially to a close and serve as an obstacle to any potential recrudescency of bipolar rivalry. Morgan believes that progress in the integration of the European Economic Community will benefit a continental rapprochement because West European policy objectives

can be much more clearly articulated by the central authority of the EDC . . ."

WESTERN INVESTMENT IN COMMUNIST ECONOMIES; A SELECTED SURVEY ON ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, US SENATE, by John P. Hardt and others. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974, 83 p. (93d Congress, 2d Session, Committee Print.)

"The past isolation of the economies of the communist nations from Western influence has resulted largely from conscious state policies in both East and West. With the exceptions of short upsurges in commercial exchanges during the early 1930's to facilitate Soviet economic development and the Lend Lease period of World War II for defense against invasion, the East has minimized its economic dependence, and the West has acted to deny free Eastern access to Western advanced economic technology. The commercial relations that existed in spite of those restrictive policies were short run, limited to low technology exchange and small in volume. The policy has changed on both sides. Future East-West economic-relations may move toward a significant degree of interdependence. East-West economic relations begin to change over a decade ago but have especially accelerated since agreements at the various summits of the President of the United States with the leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Now both East and West are considering or have accepted principles of economic interdependence that promise to end the long period of economic separation of East and West. The significance of this new interdependence may be as much political as economic. Even though the level of trade turnover may be small by comparative international standards, the pressures for selective change on the economic systems in both East and West may be disproportionately high. Will the commercial relations be governed by rules of state trading monopolies of the East or market-oriented economic institutional guidelines of the West? Or will some half-way house of multinational, trans-ideological formulations be the vehicle of East-West economic exchange?"

29. West Germany

a. Miscellaneous Aspects

(LI)—OSTPOLITIK OR WESTPOLITIK?, by Maj. Richard F. Ficke, Jr. Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 138 p. (Research Study No. 0660-71.)

"For the first time since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has agreed to formal accommodation with the Federal Republic of Germany. To determine the reasons why, the study investigates the motives of Bonn and Moscow by tracing their relations since WW II with emphasis on Bonn's policy with the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and East Germany. Because of Soviet gains and the potential for further gains, the study concludes that Moscow's 'Westpolitik' more aptly describes the present situation in Europe, rather than Bonn's 'Ostpolitik'."

USSR-FRG: DEVELOPING RELATIONS, by V. Rostovtsev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 7 (July 1974) 45-54.

"The restructuring of relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG was a most important factor in normalising the situation in Europe. It would be no exaggeration to say that without fundamental changes in the relations between these two states, the détente in Europe would not have been as comprehensive and profound. That is understandable. During a period of a quarter-century after the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the FRG occupied opposite poles on most international issues. The key 'lines of tension' on the continent in the cold war period ran between the two countries. This applied, above all, to the main question, the postwar settlement in Europe. The line pursued by the West German ruling circles for the revision of the results of the Second World War and of European borders tended to seriously complicate the situation, causing almost permanent tension in international relations on the continent. The Soviet Union, true to the principles of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, consistently stood for a settlement of relations with the FRG, provided, of course, that Bonn adopted a firm stand on recognizing the territorial and political realities of postwar Europe. Andrei Gromyko, USSR Foreign Minister, told a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on July 10, 1969: 'There could be a turn in our relations, and we should like to see one, if the FRG takes the path of peace. This requires that plans of a revanche for the lost war should give way to an understanding that the future of the FRG, with its considerable economic and technical potentialities, lies in peaceful cooperation with all states, including the Soviet Union.'"

b. *Moscow-Bonn Nonaggression Treaty, 1970*

CHANGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE: THE BONN-MOSCOW TREATY OF AUGUST 1970, by Dennis L. Bark, in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1971) 625-642.

"That East-West relations in Europe are changing is evidenced most notably by Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and its offspring, the Soviet-West German treaty signed in August 1970. To some the treaty, betokening a reconciliation between the enemy of the Second World War and the victor of the East, seems a longed-for dream come true. To others, for various reasons, it appears to be a source of concern and even alarm. This difference of opinion is in no way surprising. Many men of good will in the West have clung for a long time to the hope that the crucial German problem between the West and the Soviet Union can be solved to everyone's satisfaction and that an era of peace and stability can be introduced in Central Europe. Yet the length of time spent in searching for a German settlement may be a substantial part of the reason why some have not greeted the prospective Bonn-Moscow treaty with jubilation. Perhaps critics are wary of claims made by the treaty's proponents that détente has suddenly been achieved on such a vexing and long-standing problem."

(LI)—THE MOSCOW-BONN PACT: IT'S IMPACT ON UNITED STATES' SECURITY, by Maj. Paul R. Carner. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 104 p. (Research Study No. 0305-71.)

"Actions by either West Germany or the Soviet Union can impact directly on the security of the United States. These two governments recently signed the Moscow-Bonn Treaty, and this action raised the question of a possible threat. The study evaluates that possibility by reviewing the post World War II era, analyzing American and Soviet actions, and discussing their impact on the Soviet-German Treaty. The study concludes that the Treaty will not be ratified and will end as a failure. This ending removes any direct threat to United States' security, although an indirect threat is present. The study further concludes that Soviet motives have not changed and recommends that future Soviet actions be closely monitored."

(LI)—SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RENUNCIATION-OF-FORCE TREATY, by Col. Donald

D. Klein. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 19 p. (Professional Study no. 4169.)

"A discussion of the change in Bonn's attitudes and policies from Adenauer to Brandt explains why détente with the East is now possible. Then a review of Brandt's previous attempts at détente with the satellite states shows why he decided he must deal directly with Moscow. A discussion of the possible factors influencing the Soviets completes the background for negotiations. Then a listing of the major points of the treaty and two accompanying letters lead to a discussion of the concessions made by both sides in the negotiations. An evaluation of the treaty's immediate result in reducing tension is balanced by a discussion of its probable impact in weakening the NATO nations individually and collectively. Further discussion shows that the treaty is a chance for peace only if the West remains strong enough to deter war."

(LI) — THE WEST-GERMAN-SOVIET NONAGGRESSION TREATY: OPPORTUNITY FOR DÉTENTE IN EUROPE?, by Lavon B. Strong. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1971. 21 p. (Professional Study No. 4247.)

"With the signing of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and West Germany on 12 August 1970, European boundaries attained firmness and permanence for the first time since 1937. The heart of the treaty is in the recognition by both countries of the territorial integrity of the present boundaries of Europe, which in fact legalizes the restructuring that took place following WW II. The treaty thus stamps approval on the permanent division of Europe, the loss by Germany of its eastern territories to Poland, and the existence of the (East) German Democratic Republic. The treaty has the effect of postponing the question of reunification indefinitely, leaving the settlement of issues centering on East and West German relationships, the status of Berlin, and the right of access to West Berlin as the most critical ones under negotiation. The paper argues that the time is propitious for achieving solid agreements on these questions, explains why, and suggests that with their settlement, a major obstacle will have been removed to significant reduction of tensions between East and West."

30. *Soviet West Politik*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

CONSTRAINTS ON EUROPEAN SECUR-

ITY: THE SOVIET FACTOR. McLean, Va., Research Analysis Corp., May 1970. RAC-R-106.)

"This study examines the Soviet Union's historic and current view of Europe's role in Soviet national security; the postwar Soviet attitude toward NATO, the US, and West Germany; and the postwar Soviet military strategy and posture as determinants shaping the Soviet attitude toward European security arrangements. In the context of the need to take these determinants into account in developing any mutually meaningful arrangements, the study addresses the strategic and political asymmetries between the US and the Soviet role and presence in Europe. It also examines 'the debate' within Soviet politico-military circles in relation to possible fundamental changes in Soviet views and policy toward Europe. Finally, the study addresses the implicational changes in Soviet views and policy toward Europe to date, of the current Soviet military posture and strategy, and of the possible changes in future Soviet policy for prospects of a genuine European security arrangement and US policy in Europe in general and its military presence in particular."

THE DIPLOMACY OF DÉTENTE: SOVIET EFFORTS IN WEST EUROPE, by Charles Gati and Tony Trister, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 160-164.

"... Whether the Soviet Union succeeds in denying West Europe as an active ally to the United States . . . depends largely on how responsive West Europeans are to the Soviet diplomacy of détente and whether the United States . . . can continue to sustain its genuine foreign policy interests in the 1970's."

EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TODAY, by Manlio Brosio, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 10, no. 3 (Fall 1972) 285-294.

"Manlio Brosio, until recently Secretary-General of NATO, takes a hard look at Soviet attitudes after the U.S.-Soviet summit conference, at the prospects for a European Security Conference, and at current possibilities for steps in the direction of West European unification. He is concerned that too many people may feel that the Soviet Union has moderated its goals after the summit, and also that some West European leaders may be so beguiled by the idea of pushing the U.S. out of Europe that they indirectly help the Soviets achieve their goals. These are not just idle

considerations, as he stresses that the time for some major decisions is rapidly approaching."

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: WAYS FORWARD, by Francois Duchêne, in *The World Today*, v. 27, no. 11 (November 1971) 457-462.

"The 'era of negotiations' between the adversaries of the cold war is well under way. Treaties between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and Poland have been signed. Agreement has been reached between the wartime allies on Berlin. The United States and the Soviet Union have jointly announced that they expect to be able to agree on the limitation of their anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviet Union has taken up suggestions made by NATO that the two cold-war alliances should negotiate mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe. A multilateral conference on Europe will surely follow. Short of the peace treaty which it seems will never consecrate the end of the second World War, these negotiations ratify an East-West agreement to disagree about the post-war dispensation at both the super-power and European levels. Like all agreements to disagree, this is full of ambiguities. Yet, whatever covert tensions and rivalries subsist, the period of post-war history experienced as cold war centered in Europe is plainly coming to a close. A new phase in Europe, and by extension in world politics, is beginning. In the West, this process is sometimes called 'détente'."

PORTUGAL'S LEFTIST-RUN ELECTION—MEANING TO U.S. AND RUSSIA, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 78, no. 17 (28 April 1957) 68-70.

"No matter who gets the votes, pro-Communist military officers will set Portugal's course." This assessment attempts to show where this could all lead.

THE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1945-1962. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 54 p. (ASDIRS 4347.)

"An examination of the period from World War II until the early sixties reveals many overtures toward solving the problem of European security by both East and West. However, both sides felt that European security was closely tied to and dependent upon the way in which a German peace treaty and the Berlin question were resolved, as well as the reunification of the two German states. The specter of communism moving into Western Europe on the bayonets of the Russian

Army haunted the West, while the USSR was deeply concerned over the rearmament of West Germany and her membership in the Western bloc."

SOVIET WESPOLITIK: MOTIVATION AND AIMS, by Andrew Gordon, in *Strategic Review*, v. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1974) 22-29.

"The Iron Curtain is the great socioeconomic divide of Europe. Two hostile systems confront each other. In Soviet perception, the conflict is between the socialist and capitalist systems, with national differences receding in importance. This systems conflict is seen as following the basic law of dialectics. Soviet policies and actions must conform to this law in order to be effective and permissible. The Soviet push for an all-European security system is the continuation of a design inaugurated at Berlin in 1954 with the proposal of the 'Molotov Plan.' The plan has been revised and renewed periodically as conditions allowed. The continuing Soviet purpose is to achieve U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Its designs were aided by the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Brandt. Soviet authorities ridicule talk of convergence, holding this to be the wishful thinking of the imperialists. 'Peaceful coexistence' is the continuation of struggle in a period of peace. Capitalist states remain the target of the socialist class struggle. The Soviet interest is above the United Nations Charter and international law. Immediate Soviet goals are to win ratification of the status quo in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of the United States from Europe, the harnessing of West European industrial production and the creation of a Soviet-dominated instrument for consultation on European problems. These measures would fulfill the guidance given by V. I. Lenin."

THE USSR AND THE WEST, 1972, by George W. Ball, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 10, no. 2 (Summer 1972) 188-193.

"George Ball, long-time Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, against undue optimism regarding the aims of, and the constraints on, the Soviet Union in Europe. He warns that the Russians have changed their tactics, realizing that frontal assaults only encourage Western unity, but that their goal of preeminence in Europe remains the same. He is pessimistic about Ostpolitik by West Germany or any one else, and about a European Security Conference, though he looks upon the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market as an important positive portent for the future."

WHAT FINLANDISATION MEANS, in *The Economist*, v. 248, no. 6780 (4 August 1973) 15-16.

"Other Europeans will have only themselves to blame if they get into the position that fate has thrust upon the Finns . . . the term 'finlandisation' is misleading and unfair to Finland, in an important respect. Finland has had little choice. Geography and history have so boxed it in that what is remarkable about it is its survival in freedom, not its inhibitions. If other West European countries allow themselves to be 'finlandised,' it will be by their own choice. If they choose to squander their strength and squabble away their cohesion, they may well sink one after another into a state of such feebleness that each in turn could be leant on and manipulated by the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, one can imagine that Russia would be quite happy to see them retain their democratic institutions and would refrain from such crude tactics as making territorial demands. Its priority demands would be the kind it makes on Finland: suppression of direct criticisms of Soviet policies and actions, discouragement of escapers, 'trustful cooperation' and all that, including the making of big deals designed to give Russia more economic leverage. The reduction of western Europe to such a condition would make it much easier for the Soviet rulers to hold down their own empire—and then, of course, in due time they would be tempted to expand it."

b. *Soviet Threat to Western Europe*

THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, ed. by John C. Garnett. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974. 134 p.

Papers presented at the National Defense College, Latimer (England), in September, 1972. "This book is a . . . study of European defense problems. Its time-scale is the immediate and medium-term future and it was promoted by the need to relate current European defense thinking to the significant changes which are taking place in European politics and East-West relations. The steady erosion of the Cold War, the new politics of détente, the improving superpower relationship and the changing attitude of the United States towards her European allies have all combined to create an environment of flux which has far-reaching implications for European defense. The writers thought it timely, therefore, to make some reassessment of the Soviet threat and to

examine the emerging European-American relationship as revealed by the Nixon Doctrine. Against this background they have tried to speculate about the military problems of NATO, the defense implications of the European Economic Community, and the problem of improving the effectiveness of the Western defense effort by collaboration in the field of weapon procurement. The writers have identified and analyzed some important problems, and, where possible, they have tried to suggest possible solutions."

THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, by Lord Gladwyn, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 51, no. 3 (April 1973) 588-597.

"As long as a substantial American force remains in Germany, giving rise to the assumption that if the Soviet Union attacked the allies in the West it would be the signal for a nuclear holocaust, the defense of Western Europe is in all probability assured. Nevertheless, in spite of statements to the contrary, we are always given to understand that there may, in the not too far distant future, be some partial withdrawal of American power and that, insofar as this may weaken the 'credibility' of the major deterrent, it will be necessary for the European members of the Alliance somehow to fill the ensuing gap. Already an effort to meet this American-implied demand has been made by the constitution of the so-called 'Eurogroup' (though France is not a member) and that is very much to the good. But might it be possible for Western Europe, one day, and if necessary, to be primarily responsible, within the Alliance, for its own defense? Most informed persons would unhesitatingly say no . . . The accepted philosophy at the moment seems to be that if there should be any aggressive move by the Warsaw Pact forces, whether in the central, the northern or the southern areas of NATO, it would be countered by a move having the same sort of weight behind it."

EUROPE'S PROBLEMS, EUROPE'S CHOICES, by George Kennan, in *Foreign Policy*, (Spring 1974) 3-16.

"... Analyzes Europe's fears that, in the face of the USSR's increasing strength and the 'undependability' of the US commitment Europe will eventually be forced to subordinate itself to the USSR. He identifies the two key elements of this fear as the credence given to overwhelming Soviet strength and the belief that military strength is concomitant with political subordi-

nation. Ignoring a comparison of strategic strength, the intricacies of which Kennan believes 'surpass any layman's facilities for judgment,' the common tendency to overestimate an enemy's strength. Russia, he notes, has always deployed a disproportionate number of troops to what the situation in Europe would demand, which makes for a potentially dangerous confrontation. But he reminds the Europeans of an earlier idea, which they had rejected, of using US troop withdrawals to get the USSR forces removed. In any case, he maintains that Europe's population and industrial resources could support an increase in its forces to match the Soviets, even though the Europeans have until now been unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices and to curb the inflation which has priced Europe out of military competition. Even in the unlikely event that the US withdraws its troops without a concurrent increase in Europe's military capabilities, Europe would not necessarily be forced to become subordinate to the USSR. Many countries weaker than the European group have been able to coexist with the superpowers without subordinating their policies. Indeed, Kennan continues, the spectre of the USSR compelling the NATO countries to do its bidding is 'ludicrous.' The USSR wants no trouble on its Western front, especially in view of the disputes with China on its East. Kennan concludes that Europe's fears are unfounded and its own conception of a gloomy future is a vision *not* forced on it by either the US or the USSR."

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945-1970, by Thomas W. Wolfe. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 534 p.

"This is . . . [a] contribution to the history of the cold war in Europe, especially through its detailed and well-documented examination of the Soviet position and viewpoint. The core of the book deals with the decade and a half of Khrushchev's rule and that of his successors; the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion is the crisis of the story . . . Ample attention is paid to military and strategic matters."

THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE, by P. H. Vigor and C. N. Donnelly, in *RUSI*, v. 120, no. 1 (March 1975).

"Any discussion under this general heading must begin by enquiring whether the chief reason for the stationing of large Soviet forces in Central Europe and the creation by the Soviet Union of the Warsaw Pact armies is essentially offensive or defensive. On the one hand it can be

argued very persuasively that the whole history of Russia, from the 10th century to the present day, is studded with instances of large-scale invasions of the Russian homeland, some with considerable success; one indeed was so successful that it allowed its perpetrators to conquer Russia completely and rule it for a couple of centuries. Following this line of reasoning, the Russians have every reason to be concerned with the defence of their homeland, and to conclude that their foreign and military policy today is essentially defensive. On the other it can be argued equally well that during this same period, Russia has continually expanded; that one of the major consequences of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917 was the intensification of that expansionism by a revolutionary philosophy which aimed to conquer the globe; one which still, 57 years later, confidently looks forward to Communist regimes being installed in all the countries of the world in the not too distant future. From this line of reasoning we might conclude that Soviet foreign and military policy is essentially offensive. Luckily, our present purpose does not

require us to decide which of these two answers is correct. It is sufficient to realise that, whether a war between East and West in Europe were to be born of an offensive or a defensive Soviet politico-military policy, or was merely the unhappy offspring of an East-West misunderstanding, the result would be that the Warsaw Pact forces would immediately embark on the offensive and aim to defeat the NATO forces on the field of battle in a short, sharp, decisive campaign. If any should doubt this, they have only to look at Soviet equipment and the reports of Soviet exercises to see that such a war is indeed the only war that the Pact forces are equipped and trained to fight, in addition to Soviet insistence that this is so, which is expressed in their military books and journals. If it is true that current Soviet military doctrine preaches the necessity of fighting a short war, as being the kind of war that the Russians are most likely to win in the context of hostilities in Europe, then the significance of the northern and the southern flanks of NATO becomes of secondary importance in the context of our presentation."

PART II

THE SOVIET NATION: LIFE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS UNDER COMMUNISM (See also Appendix)

V. The Soviet State: Government and Party (See also Chart in Appendix)

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

(*)—THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLITICS, by Robert J. Osborn. Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1974. 574 p.

"An inquiry into Soviet institutions and how they have worked from Lenin to Brezhnev, with emphasis on political choices . . . [an] analysis which asks the big questions and . . . [attempts to answer them.]"

(*)—GOVERNING SOVIET CITIES: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR, by William Taubman. New York, Praeger, 1973. 166 p.

"The author, a former exchange student at Moscow State University, examines urban development in the Soviet Union and concludes that it has been uneven, that housing and services lag behind industrial development, that noncity agencies have dominated city governments (soviets), and that city governments have been unable or unwilling to govern. Despite notable achievements in mass urban transit and medical care, Soviet city governments have lacked needed resources to solve other problems because central authorities, including industrial bureaucrats and the party apparatus, have concentrated their efforts on industrial growth at the expense of urban services."

PARTY AND SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION, by R. Judson Mitchell, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 170-174 plus.

"In the Soviet Union, 'Conservative policies are likely to continue, featuring stern repression of dissent and caution both in economic development at home and the expansion of national power abroad . . . The record of the post-Khrushchev years indicates that in any crisis powered by the essential conflict between totalitarian poli-

tics and social modernization, the party leadership will turn further to the right'."

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1975, ed. by Richard P. Stebins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1975. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations, including those of the USSR.

(LI)—SOVIET NATIONALISM: THREAD OR THREAT, by Maj. Anthony L. St Amant. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 66 p. (Research Study.)

"Communist ideology has long been considered to be a major determinant of Soviet foreign policy, while the concepts of nationalism and national interest have been thought to play a secondary role. This study examines that relationship relying primarily on an analysis of the role of nationalism from 1915 to the present. Included is a comparative analysis of ideology and national interest as they relate to specific contemporary issues."

THE SOVIET PARADIGM, by Roy D. Laird. New York, Free Press, 1970. 272 p.

"It is the author's thesis that 'the Soviet political system stands out as a unique paradigm of a successful centralized monohierarchical polity'."

SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE 1970's, ed. by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes. New York, Free Press, 1974. 401 p.

"Of ten timely essays, three have particular interest for students of international affairs: on the Soviet model as a development alternative for the Third World, on Soviet-East European relations, and on change in Communist systems."

(*)—THE SOVIET POLITY: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE USSR, by

John S. Reshetar, Jr., New York, Dodd, Mead, 1971. 412 p.

"This study of the Soviet political system treats initially of the USSR as a multinational empire, of Soviet political culture and the Russian political tradition, and of the ideological heritage. The author then describes the institutions and functioning of the system: the CPSU, its organization, membership, and the structure of power; the formal organs of government at the center and at republic and local levels; economic decision-making, social welfare services and the politics of cultural affairs; and issues in Soviet foreign policy."

THE WORLD THIS YEAR 1973; SUPPLEMENT TO THE POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD—GOVERNMENTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1973, ed. by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1973. 184 p. (For the Council on Foreign Relations.)

"Presenting the salient facts about the world's political arrangements at the beginning of 1973, this volume continues the series of annual political surveys inaugurated by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1927." There are two major sections in addition to appendixes: Governments; and Intergovernmental Organizations.

B. Communism and the Communist Party (See also Charts in Appendix)

CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS, ed. by Chalmers Johnson. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970. 368 p.

"Some 12 specialists tackle in their respective essays the problem of defining, identifying and measuring political and economic change in the world's 14 communist nations [including USSR]. Part of their effort is to work toward more appropriate theoretical models in dealing with community regimes."

(*)—CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM: THE SOVIET VIEW, by Leon Gouré and others. Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press, 1973. 168 p.

"This . . . documentary text focuses on the published Soviet position toward the concept of convergence—Western speculation that: ' . . . the differing societies of the United States and the Soviet Union are destined to move closer and closer together until they finally converge at some

in-between point, neither capitalist nor socialist but a hybrid of the two.' The 92 citations provided span the time period from 1963 to late 1972 and are from a wide variety of sources. Simply stated, the Soviet view is that the convergence cannot take place as long as the capitalist society continues to foster exploitation—in the name of private profit—of man by man."

THE LYSENKO AFFAIR, by David Joravsky. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970. 459 p.

"The root causes of the disasters symbolized by Lysenkoism."

(*)—RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1898–1964, ed. by Robert H. McNeal. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1974. 4 v.

"A documentary collection . . . on Russian and Soviet history. The four volumes are: 1, The Russian Democratic Labour Party, 1898–October 1917, ed. by Ralph Carter Elwood (306 p.); 2, The Early Soviet Period: 1917–1929, ed. by Richard Gregor (382 p.); 3, The Stalin Years: 1929–1953, ed. by Robert H. McNeal (280 p.); and 4, The Khrushchev Years, 1953–64, ed. by Grey Hodnett (328 p.). It should be noted that these are Party and not state documents, and that they deal with internal rather than international affairs."

SOCIALISM PLURALISM IN SOVIET AND ITALIAN COMMUNIST PERSPECTIVE: THE CHILEAN CATALYST, by Joan Barth Urban, in *Orbis*, v. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1974) 482–509.

"In recent years intramural communist polemics have been notable less for the controversy over peaceful versus violent revolution, so prominent in the early period of the Sino-Soviet dispute, than for dissension over the prospects for socialist pluralism. Socialist pluralism, in turn, has come to be broadly defined as the legitimacy of political opposition within a society whose leaders profess commitment to the Marxist-Leninist vision and the Bolshevik heritage. The aim of this article is to illustrate the contrasting attitudes toward socialist pluralism held by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the largest nonruling communist party in the West, the Italian Communist Party (PCI). This will be done by analyzing their divergent interpretations of the Allende phenomenon in Chile."

(*)—THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND SCANDINAVIAN COMMUNISM: THE NORWEGIAN CASE, by Trond Gilberg. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1973. 271 p.

"This . . . study of the relations between Russian communism and the Norwegian Party concludes that enforced subservience to Moscow squelched any real hope for a revolutionary movement in Norway. The author, a Norwegian-American scholar, sees this as a case study of the general problem of European radicalism in relation to Soviet communism."

SOVIET PARTY HISTORY: THE STALINIST LEGACY, by Sidney I. Ploss, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1972) 32-41.

"Since the death of Stalin the Soviet Union has undertaken a vast rewriting of the history of the Soviet Communist Party. Four different editions of a one-volume history of the CPSU—all compiled under the editorship of Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev—have been published (in 1959, 1962, 1969, and 1971) under the title of *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In addition, pursuant to a Central Committee decree of June 22, 1960, the first five volumes of a new multi-volume series bearing the same general title have appeared in print between 1964 and 1971—these under the editorship of P. N. Pospelov, a leading official of the CPSU's Institute of Marxism-Leninism."

THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 4 (July-August 1974) 1-35.

Keynote—Compromise, by Leonard Schapiro; Brezhnev and the Succession Issue, by Myron Rush; The Dilemma of Party Growth, by Darrell P. Hammer; Interparty Relations—The Limits of "Normalization," by Kevin Devlin. "After a year's delay, the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union finally met in Moscow from March 30 to April 9. It was a meeting convened to demonstrate the success of the current leadership's endeavors 'to close the ranks and present an appearance of unity,' as Leonard Schapiro points out in his essay on the Congress proceedings. Yet, despite all the efforts that were exerted to create an aura of harmony and unanimity many contentious issues remained unresolved and smoldering beneath the surface. Thus, the struggle for supremacy in the party,

pitting General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev against his fellow oligarchs in the Politburo, has by no means been decided by Brezhnev's attainment of his current status as undisputed primus: Mr. Rush's analysis cites evidence that the battle for the succession continues undiminished, with far-reaching implications for the distribution of political power in the party. Another issue fraught with potential for conflict was pointed up by the Congress decision to revoke current party membership cards and require members to apply for new ones. Mr. Hammer points out in the third of our series of articles on the Congress that this move lays the groundwork for an administrative purge of the party membership and may also be indicative of a growing concern on the part of the leadership over the impact of the party's dynamic numerical growth. Finally, Mr. Devlin examines the uneasy relationships between the CPSU and other CPs as reflected at the Congress and in the reactions of the latter parties to its proceedings."

C. Leaders and Leadership, Including Succession

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE NEW TSARS: RUSSIA UNDER STALIN'S HEIRS, by John Dornberg. Garden City, Doubleday, 1972. 470 p.

"Account of the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, by the former chief of Newsweek's Moscow bureau."

CONSENSUS IN RUSSIA, by Edward Crankshaw, in *New York Times Magazine*, (30 November 1975).

"The Soviet Union has reached the stage where it does not much matter who succeeds Brezhnev. The future will be a continuation of the present . . . Another 10 years must go by before Moscow's policies can be shaped by men who view the world as Russians rather than Leninists."

2. Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Others

THE BOLSHEVIK TRADITION, by Robert H. McNeal. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975. 210 p. (A Spectrum Book.)

"A concise history of Russian Communism from 1917 to the present day, viewed through the careers of . . . [Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev] . . . Blending history and biography,

the author demonstrates how the dominant personalities of . . . [each] contributed to making the party a stable political system for Russia since 1917."

BREZHNEV: ASCENT TO POWER, by Paul A. Smith, Jr., in *Orbis*, v. 15, no. 2 (Summer 1971) 576-608.

"The man whom the Soviet elite has chosen as its spokesman and most eminent member is well qualified to represent it. Before coming to power in 1964 he played, contrary to popular belief, an important behind-the-scenes role in domestic and international communist affairs for nearly fifteen years. Earlier, he had proved himself in some of the most important regional assignments available to a party official. Today, despite Mao's disaffection and troubles in Eastern Europe, Brezhnev remains heir to the mantle of authority in world communism created by Lenin, enlarged by Stalin, and defended by Khrushchev."

(*)—BREZHNEV: THE MASKS OF POWER, by John Dornberg. New York, Basic Books, 1974. 317 p.

"Sketching a series of portraits of Leonid Brezhnev against the changing panorama of the Soviet political landscape, John Dornberg, former chief of Newsweek magazine's Moscow bureau, has written a . . . biography of the man who is the central figure in the contemporary Soviet system. The book, a critical appraisal of the main political currents over the last 40 years, provides . . . insights into the complex interplay at the top of the Soviet political structure the last two decades."

JOSEPH STALIN: MAN AND LEGEND, by Ronald Hingley. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1974. 482.

"This . . . biography of Stalin . . . is somewhat overshadowed by those of Tucker and Ulam but has its own merits . . . Hingley 'gives the devil his due,' as the man who made Leninism work, the creator—for good or ill—of what the Soviet Union is today."

KHRUSHCHEV, BREZHNEV, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, by Jerome M. Gilson, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 5 (September-October 1972) 69-78.

"The story of constitutional reform in the Soviet Union is essentially the story of a reform that failed. Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 proposal to rewrite the 'Stalin' Constitution of 1936 was one

of his many attempts at policy innovation, but like so many others it was caught up in the web of conflict surrounding his leadership and remained unfulfilled when he was ousted in 1964. Two years later, the Brezhnev leadership revived the project but when abruptly buried it in a silence that continues unbroken to the present. Thus, in a system that contains many paradoxes, the central paradox remains that the 'supreme law' of the Soviet state—the 1936 Constitution—has been declared by the nation's own leaders, including Brezhnev, to be obsolete and virtually irrelevant to contemporary Soviet society. Despite this, the present leadership has left the old document intact and shows no apparent intention of replacing it."

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS. Boston, Little, Brown, 1970. 639 p.

"There are many things the author does not say, much that is self-serving, and much that is contradictory with known facts. Nevertheless, Edward Crankshaw states flatly that here is 'Khrushchev himself, quite unmistakably speaking,' and many experts, though conceding that the book is a patchwork job, none the less find it a fascinating exploration of the mazes that confuse any journey through the late Stalin years."

(*)—KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: THE LAST TESTAMENT, by Nikita S. Khrushchev. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1974. 602 p. (Translated and edited from Russian.)

This is a sequel to the first volume of Khrushchev's memoirs published in 1970. This volume is a continuance of the reminiscences which comprised the earlier work. Extensive tapes provide the basis for the text itself.

LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STALINISM, by Roy A. Medvedev. New York, Knopf, 1972. 566 p.

"This . . . book, which the author authorized to have published abroad, is a massive inquiry into the crimes and excesses of Stalinism and a strenuous effort, within the accepted framework of Marxism-Leninism, to analyze the reasons for this fearful phenomenon that held Russia in its grip for a generation. Much of the story will be familiar to the Western reader, but much will not. The first really serious and sustained effort by a Soviet scholar; . . . with useful explanatory material."

THE SEALED TRAIN, by Michael Pearson. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975. 320 p.

"Lenin's eight-month journey from exile to power."

SHELEPIN: THE BATTLE FOR POWER, by Robert Conquest, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4 no. 9 (24 April 1975) 1.

"The fiasco of Shelepin's visit to Britain seems to have provided his rivals with their opportunity. Indeed, in a sense the sending of this unwelcome visitor here may be seen as part of a conscious plan to set him up for political destruction. Nevertheless, none of this can be seen as more than an excuse, a tactic in the internecine political warfare which is now, as we had predicted earlier (see *Soviet Analyst* Vol. 3 No. 23), entering a decisive phase in the run-up to the XXVth Party Congress to be held in February 1976. For the fall of Shelepin may be sharply distinguished from previous removals from the Politburo in recent years—those of Shelest and of Voronov. In neither of those cases was the victim a candidate for supreme power; and in both major—but highly specific—policy problems were crucial (nationalism and agriculture respectively)."

SOVIET POLITICS: STABILITY OR IMMOBILISM?, by Judson Mitchell, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 155-159 plus.

"... 'The Brezhnevian pattern of social control has concealed and abetted a very real immobilism ... in Soviet society. A heavy price may be exacted in the future for the absence of more radical and more effective solutions to persistent general problems ... If the Soviet Union emerges, perhaps by default, as the world's greatest superpower, this will have a decisive impact on domestic stabilization, and Brezhnev's conservative leadership will be largely vindicated'."

THE SOVIET UNION UNDER BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN: THE TRANSITION YEARS, by John W. Strong. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971. 277 p.

"Essays by a number of scholars dealing with various facets of Soviet life and politics in the post-Khrushchev years."

(*)—**STALIN: THE HISTORY OF A DICTATOR**, by H. Montgomery Hyde. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972. 679 p.

"A ... biography reflecting much consultation of available sources but tending to be episodic and anecdotal rather than analytical in its approach to the ... subject."

(*)—**STALIN: THE MAN AND HIS ERA**, by Adam B. Ulam. New York, Viking, 1973. 760 p.

"Ulam's Stalin is the familiar tyrant, but this ... biography explores and analyzes other dimensions ... Ulam does not stress psychological interpretations, but his Stalin also emerges as a reflection of the movement and the society produced him. The author 'does not dodge the obscure or controversial issues, always injecting his best judgment or educated guess'."

3. Succession

THE BREZHNEV MYSTERY—WHO WILL RUN RUSSIA?, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 78, no. 6 (10 February 1975) 34-35.

"Will change of command in the Kremlin bring détente to a halt?" An assessment of the outlook.

COMMUNIST POWER STRUGGLES; WHAT CHANGES IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP?, by Victor Zorza, in *Current*, no. 171 (March 1975) 47-57.

"The fight that is now shaping up for the Brezhnev succession is likely to involve three men, among whom Andrei Kirilenko, who usually stands in for Brezhnev when the latter is away from Moscow, is preeminent." Three Chief Contenders; Shelepin Moves Up; The Experience Factor; The Hidden Debates; Détente and Its Critics; Always Two Camps.

(*)—**HOW COMMUNIST STATES CHANGE THEIR RULERS**, by Myron Rush. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974. 346 p.

"A comparative study ... In the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe the established positions of the Party apparatus and of its senior secretary have created something like an institutional pattern which conditions, if it does not determine, the outcome of succession crises, while in the states where the founder-hero is still in charge (e.g., China and Yugoslavia) the succession cannot be arranged in advance and great uncertainties lie ahead."

SOVIET INTERNAL POLITICS, by R. Judson Mitchell, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 163-167 plus.

"When the mantle of leadership passes, is it not possible that a younger leadership will respond to the pressures generated by developing Soviet society and move toward more liberal politics ...? Such a prospect is most unlikely."

SUCCESSION CONTINGENCIES IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Grey Hodnett, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 24, no. 2 (March-April 1975) 1-21.

"It is appropriate now, a decade after the ascent of L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin to the offices vacated by an ousted Nikita Khrushchev, to reconsider the problem of succession in the USSR in order to see what lessons can be drawn from what has been—in comparison with the recent experience of other major powers and past Soviet practice—a period of unexpectedly great leadership stability and outward unity. The succession problem is of particular interest in that it poses in concentrated form many of the central issues involved in the study of Soviet politics, including the nature of the connections between the leadership, the political system as a whole, and Soviet society."

D. Civil-Military Relations

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOVIET POLITICS, by Timothy J. Colton, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 160-163 plus.

"Barring unforeseen developments, the Soviet military establishment is unlikely to pose any major challenge to existing political arrangements. Its political participation is confined within reasonably clear limits..."

(LI)—**THE SOVIET MILITARY AND POLICY MAKING IN THE USSR**, by Comdr. Max G. Branscomb. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air War College, 1974. 45 p. (Professional Study.)

"This is a study of the relationship between the Soviet military and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with respect to the amount of influence the military as an institution and the various groups within the military can bring to bear upon national decision making. A description of the theoretical models used to study Soviet interest group articulation and a history of the methods and problems of Party control of the military is included together with the author's evaluation of the current military relationship with the political leadership and likely future trends. Although the military's vast size, its organization, and its importance as an instrument of national power gives it political clout to sway decisions in its favor, Party control is tightening and the rate of military growth can be expected to level off."

WHO CONTROLS WHOM IN MOSCOW?, by William E. Odom, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 19 (Summer 1975) 109-123.

"If we reflect on history, we realize that although military considerations have dominated Soviet foreign policy-making, Soviet marshals and generals have not. In other words, striving for military power and the exercise of that power have been key elements of Soviet policy, but this has not meant that military officers have become the key decision-makers—or decision-blockers—in Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore, there are grounds for believing that there is genuine enthusiasm for Brezhnev's policy of détente in the informed ranks of the military, whereas opposition is most likely to be found in the economic bureaus. This becomes clear when we review the military's role in Soviet foreign policy from four perspectives: (1) political/cultural, (2) economic, (3) technological, and (4) elite/institutional."

E. Interest Groups in Soviet Politics

(*)—**INTEREST GROUPS IN SOVIET POLITICS**, ed. by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971. 433 p.

"Until recently most scholars assumed that policymaking in the Soviet Union was entirely in the hands of the top party leadership... It is now more widely agreed that there is group participation in policy deliberation which has broadened from time to time since Stalin's death. Furthermore, during the past few years Western scholars have shown an increasing readiness to accept the interest group approach as a valid tool for the study of Soviet politics. Using this mode of analysis, the contributors to 'Interest Groups in Soviet Politics' examine seven groups at the upper and middle levels of the Soviet social structure: the party 'apparatchiki,' the security police, the military, industrial managers, economists, writers and jurists. In each case, the discussion focuses primarily on the operations of the group at the national level during the post-Stalin era."

POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE USSR, by David Lane. New York, Random House, 1971. 616 p.

"This... survey, while designed as a textbook, has the advantage of emphasizing some of the significant sociological features: class, status, pressure groups and family functions."

F. Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses of the Soviet System

THE SOVIET SYSTEM; PETRIFICATION OR PLURALISM?, by Jerry F. Hough, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 2 (March-April 1972) 25-45.

"During the last years of the Khrushchev era, scholars vigorously debated the nature of the power relationships within the Soviet Communist Party Presidium, but their images of the relationship between the leadership—however defined—and the rest of society were usually quite similar. Whether the scholar spoke of an 'administered society,' an 'organizational society,' or an 'ideological system,' he summarized the Soviet system as 'a command-dominated society,' as one in which there is 'totalitarianism without terror,' as one in which the political system is 'used by the political leaders to create a new society along the lines of their own beliefs and aspirations.' Even iconoclastic models were not very iconoclastic on this point. The so-called 'conflict model' focused almost exclusively upon conflicts within the leadership and, in so doing, created the strong impression that all persons below the very top were acted upon rather than having any impact on the resolution of conflicts. Similarly, Alfred Meyer's 'bureaucratic model' presented an image of modern bureaucratic society very similar to that of Herbert Marcuse and Barrington Moore. Such a society, he argued, 'is characterized [in all countries] by the prevalence of certain totalitarian features,' including 'the imposition of ceaseless social change unwanted by the constituents.' Since the fall of Khrushchev, the situation has changed drastically. Although thus far there is wide agreement about the collective nature of the leadership within the Politburo, the basic consensus about the nature of the political system as a whole has disappeared. Now there are a number of competing images or models of the system, and scholarly uncertainty is further reflected in the fact that these images themselves are often quite ambiguous."

UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS: A CITIZEN'S PRIMER, by Foy D. Kohler. New York, Harper and Row, 1970. 441 p.

"On the basis of his extended diplomatic career, including a number of years in Moscow—as Counselor of Embassy (1947-49) and Ambassador (1962-66)—Mr. Kohler surveys the history and nature of the Soviet system. He is . . . 'anti-revisionist' in his view of the origins and the continuation of the cold war."

VULNERABILITIES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, by Allan C. Brownfeld, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 803-818.

"At a time when the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of détente toward the United States and Western Europe, life is becoming increasingly harsh and repressive for the Russian people. It is ironic that many in the West take Soviet assurances of peaceful intentions at face value, while ignoring the real evidence which leads to a far different conclusion . . . If ever a system manifested its internal vulnerabilities and weaknesses, it is the system currently in power in the Soviet Union. While Soviet military and technological advances have led many in the West to believe that the USSR is maneuvering in today's complex world from a position of strength, the fact remains that the Moscow leadership speaks only for itself and can in no sense claim to represent the people it governs. In a time of trouble, it can expect little support. Instead, the religious feelings and national identities present beneath the surface of the imposed collectivism of Soviet rule are always ready to emerge. This can hardly be a comforting thought to the regime in the Kremlin."

VI. The Land and the People (See also Map Appendix)

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

CITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, by Chauncy D. Harris. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970. 484 p.

"A . . . study of the 'economic functions, size relations, distributional patterns, and growth' of the some 1,247 cities and towns of the U.S.S.R."

THE EUROPE YEAR BOOK, 1975, A WORLD SURVEY; VOLUME I—PART I INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PART II EUROPE. London, Europa Publications Limited, 1975. 1478 p.

Provides the following type of information on the USSR, among many other countries of the world: location, climate, language, religion, recent history, and communications, social welfare, education, tourism, sport, space research, area and population, agriculture, mining, industry, national economic development, finance, external trade, the constitution, judicial system, the press, publishing, atomic energy, etc.

(*)—HANDBOOK OF SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA, ed. by Ellen Mickiewicz. New York, The Free Press, 1973. 225 p.

"As Karl W. Deutsch observes in his forward, 'The idea of using quantitative data as indicators of the structure, performance, and development of a political system is old.' With the cooperation of a number of leading specialists on the Soviet Union, Professor Mickiewicz has brought together . . . a collection of data on demography, agriculture, housing, production, health, education, elite recruitment and mobilization, communication, and international interaction in Soviet society."

(*)—SIBERIA AND THE PACIFIC: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE PROSPECTS, by Paul Dibb. New York, Praeger, 1972. 288 p.

"Siberia, stretching from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, is depicted as an area whose future impact may in some ways compare in historic dimensions with that occasioned by the economic development of North America. The author, a senior economist in the Australian Department of Defense, systematically analyzes the Eastern Siberian and Soviet Far Eastern economy sector by sector, and examines the prospects for increased Siberian trade with Japan, North Korea and other Pacific trading partners at a time when Soviet trade with China has been curtailed."

STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, September 1973. 20 p. (Geographic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

Provides nomenclature used by the US Government for the 148 independent nations on the world scene. Also included are general data on the capital, area, and population of each nation. This bulletin contains similar data for nonindependent states. Two appendices list the nations which have become independent since World War II. The world map locates all countries described in the text.

(*)—UKRAINE: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA: VOLUME II, ed. by Volodymyr Kubi-jovyc. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971. 1394 p. (For the Ukranian National Association.)

"This second and concluding volume . . . (Volume I appeared in 1963), covers the fields of law, church, scholarship and education, publishing, the arts, economy, health and medicine, armed forces, and Ukrainians abroad."

WORLD MARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS; EUROPE, ed. by Louis Barron. New York, Harper & Row, 1971. 340 p.

A practical guide to the geographic, historical, political, social, and economic status of all nations, their international relationships, and the United Nations system. For each country the following information is provided; location, size, and extent; topography; climate; flora and fauna; population; ethnic groups; language; religion; transportation; communications; history; government; political parties; local government; judicial systems; armed forces; migration; international cooperation; economy; income; labor; agriculture; animal husbandry; fishing; forestry; mining; energy and power; industry; domestic trade; foreign trade; balance of payments; banking; insurance; securities; public finance; taxation; custom and duties; foreign investments; economic policy; health; social welfare; housing; education; libraries and museums; organizations; press; tourism; bibliography; etc.

B. Demographic Aspects (See also Table in Appendix)

WORLD BANK ATLAS; POPULATION PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES. 9th ed. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1974. 22 p.

A series of tables providing this information for the various countries of the world.

WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE; WORLD POPULATION YEAR 1974. Washington, Department of State, January 1974. Unpaged. (Publication 8749.)

In order to focus international attention on the vital problems of world population growth, the United Nations has designated 1974 as World Population Year. A World Population Conference has been called for August 1974. This pamphlet provides background information on the problem in all of its phases, where and how it is accelerating the most, what is being done, etc.

C. The Soviet Nationalities and Minorities (See also Map Appendix)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE DIALECTICS OF NATIONALISM IN THE USSR, by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 3 (May-June 1974) 1-22.

"Addressing the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the spring of 1971, General Secretary Leonid Brezh-

nev proudly affirmed the emergence of a new Soviet socialist nation forged from the ethnic mosaic of the old Russian Empire. 'In the years of socialist construction,' he declared, 'a new historical community of people—the Soviet people—arose in our country.' Close examination of Soviet society reveals, however, that this statement reflects more official desiderata than reality, for it can be argued that an increasingly assertive ethnic nationalism among the non-Russian minorities of the USSR has emerged as a major conflict area in Soviet domestic politics. Not only has the traditional sense of separate identity on the part of major ethnic groups failed to disappear, but it has begun to transform itself into modern nationalism. This development—unanticipated and contrary to the basic assumptions of Marxism-Leninism—appears to constitute a challenge to the party leadership. Furthermore, in responding to this challenge, the CPSU leaders have yet to formulate policies capable of effectively reversing the trend whereby national polarization of the various Soviet peoples has advanced faster than their common consciousness of a new Soviet nationhood."

(*)—HANDBOOK OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES, ed. by Zev Katz and others. New York, Macmillan, The Free Press, 1975. 481 p.

Prepared at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this . . . handbook deals with seventeen Soviet nationalities—fifteen of which have their own Union republics, plus the Tatars and Jews. One chapter is devoted to each nationality, and all (except for the Russian chapter) are written to a uniform outline: territory, economy, history, demography, culture, external relations, language, media, education, cultural and scientific institutions, attitude formation, views of scholars, and current evidences of nationalism. The appendix contains a set of comparative tables for all nationalities."

NATIONALITIES AT RISK IN CSCE, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 4, no. 15 (17 July 1975) 1-4.

"Recent troubles with the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR have greatly contributed to the Soviet leadership's determination to gain general recognition at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for the boundaries of their rule. In Basket One Western negotiators have naturally enough tended to concentrate on the East European countries which

fell under Soviet domination as a result of the last war. But Brezhnev and his colleagues are aware that their control over even the republics of the USSR—an area greater than the empire of the Tsars—has never been legally justified, and they are convinced that the July 30 summit at Helsinki could bring that recognition of their right to rule which so far world opinion has denied them. Clearly if the leaders of Western Europe and North America place their signatures beside that of Brezhnev on a document guaranteeing inter alia sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, the implication is that these principles are at present actually being observed in the USSR. The expectation in the Kremlin is that nationalists in the non-Russian republics will lose hope of gaining even some small degree of independence should they once believe that the West has no intention of supporting their aspirations."

(*)—SOVIET NATIONALITY PROBLEMS, ed. by Edward Allworth. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971. 296 p.

"The ten papers published in this book, originally presented to the research Seminar on Soviet Nationality Problems at Columbia University, examine several aspects of this critical Soviet domestic issue: Tsarist imperial policies; three historical stages of Soviet communism and nationalism; political implications and statutory recognition of nationality differences; Islamic and local consciousness and ethnic identity among Soviet nationalities; and the mixing of Russian and Soviet nationalities and its demographic impact."

SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY AND DISSENT IN THE UKRAINE, by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, in *The World Today*, v. 30, no. 5 (May 1974) 214-226.

"The recent expulsion of the Nobel prize-winning novelist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, from the USSR and the gaoling of the writer, Victor Khaustov, have again focused attention on the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union. The policy towards the Ukrainian national rights movement, examined . . . [here], is another link in what the distinguished Soviet physicist, Andrei Sakharov, has called 'the long chain of repressions of people for their opinions'."

THE SOVIET WEST; INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONALITY AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, ed. by Ralph S. Clem. New York, Praeger, 1975. 161 p.

Vitality of the Nationalities in the Soviet West; Language and Literature in Estonia; Moldavians or Romanians?; The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality; The Integration of Ukrainians into Modernized Society in the Ukrainian SSR; Soviet Efforts at the Socio-economic Integration of Latvians; Party Response to Lithuanian Unrest; Fifty Years of Soviet Federalism in Belorussia; Youth in the Lithuanian SSR and the Question of Nationality Divisiveness; Military-Patriotic Campaign in Estonia; and figures, maps, tables, and selected bibliography.

2. *Soviet Treatment of Jews*

THE JEWS IN SOVIET RUSSIA SINCE 1917, ed. by Lionel Kochan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 357 p. (For the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London.)

"A . . . volume of essays dealing with various aspects of the situation of the Jews in the Soviet period of Russian history."

(*)—THE SILENT MILLIONS, by Joel Cang. New York, Taplinger, 1970. 246 p.

"A brief history of Soviet Jewry by a British journalist."

THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF JEWS, by Harry G. Shaffer. New York, Praeger, 1974. 231 p.

"After a brief survey by the author, the bulk of this book consists of 'readings' intended to expose the reader to a large number of diametrically opposed views, so that he may discover how complex the issues really are."

SOVIET UNION: RANSOM FOR SOVIET JEWS? in *Time*, v. 100, no. 13 (25 September 1972) 31.

The story of the levies being placed by the Soviet government on Jews who desire to leave the country. Also the reaction of Israel which has been involved in absorbing Soviet Jewry and is concerned with the levies being placed on Soviet Jews.

D. Environmental Problems

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE USSR, by Keith Bush, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 4 (July-August 1972) 21-31.

"The USSR has not escaped the environmental problems to which all industrializing nations have fallen prey. The incidence and scale of environmental disruption (ED) in the Soviet Union have been diligently chronicled in a number

of Western studies. Insofar as the extent and overall intensity of pollution can be quantified, most observers would agree that the natural resources of the USSR have not been affected to the same degree as those of many advanced Western countries. This is attributable to a number of factors—e.g., the lower stage of development of many sectors of the Soviet economy and the relatively low population density, even in the more populated portions of the country west of the Ural Mountains. The present study will attempt to examine these and other factors which have contributed to a different pattern of environmental disruption in the USSR and to discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages possessed by the Soviet political system and command economy in formulating and implementing corrective measures."

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE USSR: THE DIVERGENCE OF THEORY AND PRACTICE, by John M. Kramer, in *The Journal of Politics*, v. 36, no. 4 (November 1974) 886-899.

"The Soviets do not deny that the Russian environment has also experienced some deterioration as a consequence of industrialization. However, they do suggest that the socialist system is far superior to its capitalist counterpart in controlling and minimizing the adverse consequences of industrialization—even if it cannot completely eliminate them . . . The . . . analysis examines the validity of the Soviet argument by focusing on various aspects of environmental disruption in the USSR. Our examination suggests that the reality of the Soviet system differs substantially from the theory of a centrally planned monolithic state pursuing the 'true' interests of society. In particular, government bureaucracies in the Soviet Union appear to be the functional equivalent of the capitalist entrepreneur who greedily pursues his private gains to society's detriment. The Soviets have in fact tacitly recognized that a divergence exists between theory and practice, and have labeled the phenomenon 'departmentalism.' In Soviet usage, the term refers to the tendency of bureaucracies to formulate and pursue policies from their own narrow functional perspective and ignore or devote insufficient attention to the interests of the system as a whole."

(*)—THE SPOILS OF PROGRESS: ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Marshall I. Goldman. Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1972. 372 p.

"A major purpose of this book is to document the fact that the Soviet Union suffers envi-

ronmental disruption as extensive as our own. Professor Goldman . . . believes the speed of industrialization and not the form of government is the cause of the problem. Both the disadvantages and the advantages of state control are discussed in the process of analyzing how the current situation has come about. The conclusion is that, while Soviet priorities lie with production rather than conservation, there are state controls which could be applied to make the Soviet Union one of the most successful conservationist nations."

USSR-USA: COOPERATION IN PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, by Y. Izrael and B. Kuoshinnikov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 3 (March 1975) 30-37.

"The Soviet Union has been taking an active part in the work of specialised international governmental and non-governmental organisations and in carrying out programmes of environmental protection, like UNESCO, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Environmental Programme and others. The USSR has also actively promoted the preparation and inclusion of international conventions and treaties aimed to protect the environment on a global scale. It also has a number of agreements on bilateral cooperation in this sphere. An important milestone in the development of the USSR's close contacts with the capitalist countries in this sphere was the Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, signed in Moscow in May 1972. It contains a very extensive list of lines for cooperation, ranging virtually over every aspect of the problem, and is unprecedented in the scale of environmental cooperation between the two countries."

E. Historical Aspects

(*)—A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, by Georg von Rauch. 6th ed. New York, Praeger, 1972. 541 p.

"This sixth edition of a standard text on the history of the USSR carries the story forward from the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 to the aftermath of the Twenty-fourth in 1971."

JAPANESE STRATEGY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-5, by Col. Robert L. Kirwan, in *Military Review*, v. 51, no. 2 (February 1971) 73-81.

"Between the American Civil War and World War I, the war which had the greatest im-

pact on the course of world history was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. While historians have dwelt at length on the causes of the war and the events which it set in motion, the military aspects of the war have received only limited treatment. Yet this war affords a fertile field for the study of how military strategy must be geared to the attainment of political ends . . . When reviewing the reasons for Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in light of this accepted fact, one factor stands out. Japan's success was due to the collapse of Russia's will to fight rather than to the attainment of the ultimate military objective that Japanese strategy had fixed as necessary to achieve its political ends."

THE LAST SECRET, by Nicholas Bethell. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1974. 224 p.

"The . . . book tells the story of the tragic and little known episode which Alexander Solzhenitsyn has described as 'truly the last secret of the Second World War,' the forcible repatriation of over two million men, women, and children who found themselves in Allied hands in Europe in 1944-47 . . . Some of the victims had openly fought on the German side but the majority were simply prisoners of war who had collaborated as little as possible. Some had not lived in Russia since the Revolution and no longer held Soviet passports. Many were confirmed anti-Stalinists and passionately wanted to remain in the West, going to desperate lengths to avoid repatriation. Knowing that their return would mean either execution or imprisonment in a labor camp, many chose suicide to avoid being sent back to Russia."

RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST: A CONTEMPORARY CHRONICLE, 1953-1966, by Fred Halliday. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 360 p.

"A . . . selection of the late Isaac Deutscher's articles and essays on current affairs from 1953 to 1966."

(*)—RUSSIAN HISTORY ATLAS, by Martin Gilbert. New York, Macmillan, 1972. 200 p.

"This . . . historical atlas contains 146 maps of the USSR and its predecessor political entities, from an 800 BC map of the origins of the Slavs to a 1970 map of the Soviet-Chinese borderlands. There are maps on a variety of topics; famine, trade, rebellion, places of exile, wars, invasions, expansion, nationalities, World War II German plans for Russia, the Cuban missile crisis, and Soviet naval strength in 1970."

RUSSIA: HOPES AND FEARS, by Alexander Werth. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969. 352 p.

"This . . . book . . . attempts to sum up Soviet progress in the years since World War II. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia while the book was at the printers added a somewhat 'bittersweet flavor' to the text."

THE RUSSIAN TRADITION, by Tibor Szamuely. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974. 443 p.

"This book explodes the traditional Western notion of the Soviet system as a radically new phenomenon, a profound and total transformation of an entire society looking beyond the blood-stained drama of the 1917 revolution. Tibor Szamuely reveals the underlying consistency of Russian history. It is this basic pattern, circular and repetitive, that is laid bare in this brilliantly sustained analysis of a state and a society in continual crisis. The book is a masterful demonstration of how the frequent turmoils and changes since medieval times have had an essentially superficial effect on this vast continent, leading ultimately to the intensification, under new forms, of the old authoritarian structure. The author brings the widest possible lens to Russian history, focusing first on the structure and the machinery of the Russian state from medieval times, and second on the growth within the system of a revolutionary traditionalism—a contradiction in terms such as only Russia could sustain. Dr. Szamuely unravels the strands of domestic and emigre theorizing and dissects the uniquely Russian capacity to seek revolution and discover regression, to invoke liberty merely to reinforce repression."

VLASOV, by Sven Steenberg. New York, Knopf, 1970. 230 p.

"An account of the story of General Andrei Vlasov, a Soviet war hero who defected and attempted to organize a movement for the overthrow of the Stalinist regime."

VII. The Soviet Way of Life

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

SOCIOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Zev Katz, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 3 (May-June 1971) 22-40.

"After a long period of total suppression under Stalin, sociology has experienced a gradual rebirth in the Soviet Union in the last decade and

a half until today it has become one of the most active—if not yet fully legitimized—fields of scientific inquiry . . . As relatively little has yet been written in the West about this highly significant development, it seems appropriate here to inquire into the reasons for the renaissance of sociology in the USSR; to survey the institutions engaged in sociological research, the principal areas of study, and some of the findings in these areas; and finally to offer an assessment of the broader implications of the development of sociology for the future evolution of Soviet society. What, then, has brought about the reemergence of sociology in the Soviet Union after its long relegation to the status of a proscribed 'bourgeois pseudo-science'?"

(*)—SOVIET COMMUNISM AND THE SOCIALIST VISION, ed. by Julius Jacobson. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1972. 363 p.

"The essays discuss a variety of . . . themes: the dissident Soviet intelligentsia; the persistence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet world; the manipulative function of law; the corruption of Communist party bureaucracies; and the socio-political bases of the short-lived liberalization in Czechoslovakia in early 1968."

(*)—SOVIET SOCIAL POLICIES: WELFARE, EQUALITY, AND COMMUNITY, by Robert J. Osborn. Homewood, Ill., Dorsey Press, 1970. 294 p.

"An inquiry into the way the Soviet government influences the peoples' 'choices' in such matters as expenditures, education, jobs and residence."

B. The Soviet State, Society, and the Individual

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET SOCIETY, by Victor Boras, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 173-176 plus.

According to the author: "Soviet society is experiencing many of the changes common to industrializing societies . . . The Soviet citizen enjoys more education, better health care, and a higher standard of living than ever before."

(*)—THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA: A POLITICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL VIEW, by Robert G. Wesson. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1974. 228 p.

"The author of this political interpretation of Russian and Soviet history offers a . . . synthe-

sis that explains Muscovite expansionism in terms of spatial politics, ethnic tensions, and an accepted tradition of despotic rule. Professor Wesson makes understandable the many contradictions that have shaped the Russian system . . . Wesson notes that 'the Soviet system is held the more tightly by the fear that yielding anything means endangering all.' While dissolution seems improbable, decay and stagnation are not, because of the innate conservatism of the ruling elite. Yet, as the U.S.S.R. becomes more enmeshed with the non-Communist world unanticipated catalysts may make for a greater mellowing."

(*)—SOVIET AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: A COMPARISON, by Paul Hollander. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973. 476 p.

"A sociologist by training, Professor Hollander . . . stresses sociological rather than political phenomena . . . He discusses Soviet and American perceptions of each other, political institutions, the techniques and practice of coercion, propaganda, education, the family, social stratification, and social problems."

(*)—THE SOVIET RUSSIAN STATE, by Robert G. Wesson. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1972. 404 p.

"In preparing this study of the Soviet system, the author states that he found two broad themes most helpful: its multinational character which sets the Soviet realm apart from all others, especially those in the West, and its maturation from revolutionary impulses and social upheaval into a settled authoritarian state. Professor Wesson, of the University of California at Santa Barbara, discusses in chronological order the old regime, the revolutionary era, the making of the state from 1917 to 1939, and the transition from Stalinism to collective leadership. Chapters five to fourteen are devoted to treatment of the rationale of power and uses of ideology; the party's organization, management and functions; governmental structure; the economy and economic planning; the 'psychocultural front,' education, the arts, science, religion and public opinion; coercion and the law; the military; national minorities; relations with the bloc; and the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, its modernization and prospects."

SOVIET SOCIETY IN FLUX, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 23, no. 6 (November-December 1974) 1-33.

The Rural Exodus, by David E. Powell;

Urban Expansion, by W. A. Douglas Jackson; and Manpower Management, by Murray Feshbach. "In recent years, the USSR, like many other advanced industrial states, has experienced increasing problems as an outgrowth of industrialization and the process of urbanization that has accompanied it. But the Soviet government's strong dedication to quick economic development and the country's specific political system have given these problems distinctive forms. The following three articles deal with some of the most important of the problems. Mr. Powell explores the character of the continuing heavy migration from the countryside and the mounting difficulties that it has been posing for the Soviet leadership. Mr. Jackson looks at the consequences of rapid urbanization and the complexities of city planning and management. And Mr. Feshbach describes the apparently expanding institutional controls over labor mobility by which the government is seeking to combat massive turnover, maldistribution, and underutilization of labor in the Soviet economy."

2. Class and Inequality in Soviet Society

(*)—CLASS AND SOCIETY IN SOVIET RUSSIA, by Mervyn Matthews. New York, Walker and Company, 1973. 377 p.

"This is a . . . study of the growth and structure of Soviet society from 1914 to the present. There are chapters dealing with the demographic background, the official Soviet theory of classes and social development, the peasantry, the urban workers, education, youth, and the intelligentsia. Most of the material has been gleaned from recently published Soviet sources."

IN CLASSLESS RUSSIA, "SOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS," by James N. Wallace, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 5 (4 August 1975) 35-36.

"Equality in the Soviet Union seems to be going into reverse. Reason: rise of an elite group enjoying a way of life denied the masses."

WOMEN IN THE USSR, by Lotta Lennon, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 4 (July-August 1971) 47-58.

"Everywhere women feel dissatisfaction with their unequal lot, and there is general agreement among observers that, in fact, much remains to be done to achieve equal status for women in all societies—whether underdeveloped or developed, Communist or non-Communist. It is

against this reality that one must assess the claim of the Soviet Union that its women have actually achieved genuine equality with men. We shall examine this claim not with the purpose of making invidious comparisons (for women in the USSR have doubtless made significant strides) but in order to clarify the true situation of Soviet women which underlies the official myth."

C. Corruption and Deviance in Soviet Society

CORRUPTION IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, by Steven J. Staats, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 21, no. 1 (January-February 1972) 40-47.

"Corruption is present in varying degrees and forms in all but the most primitive societies. Certainly, the Soviet Union has not been immune. The national, regional and local press of the USSR contains myriad accounts of bribery, falsification of reports, party-state complicity in concealing corruption, misuse of public office and state funds, and patronage and nepotism in personnel appointments. The persistence with which the various forms of corruption have appeared as objects of criticism throughout the postwar period attests to the deep roots of this phenomenon in the Soviet political soil."

(*)—DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY: CRIME, DELINQUENCY, AND ALCOHOLISM, by Walter D. Connor. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972. 327 p.

"Professor Connor provides the first comprehensive analysis of three types of primarily apolitical deviance in Soviet society . . . One important observation is that differing views exist within the Soviet establishment on how to cope with the growing manifestations of deviance, and how these are handled is as much a political as a social problem for the leadership. This is a . . . contribution to our knowledge of Soviet society."

D. Dissent and Dissidents

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE HEIRS OF STALIN: DISSIDENCE AND THE SOVIET REGIME, 1953-1970, by Abraham Rothberg. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972. 450 p.

"Account of the Soviet leadership's responses to artistic, political and scientific dissidence since Stalin's death."

THE POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET DISSENT, by Nils

H. Wessell, in *Orbis*, v. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 793-802.

"For the American observer of the contemporary Russian scene, the fluctuating Soviet campaign against internal dissent raises a number of critical questions. First, is the Soviet Union becoming more 'liberal,' as suggested by relaxed emigration rules for Soviet Jews, or is Soviet policy tightening, as evidenced by the renewed denunciations of such intellectuals as Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn? Second, how strong is the dissident movement in the Soviet Union and what are the movement's prospects? Third, does the Soviet-American détente serve to promote internal relaxation in the Soviet system, or does it, on the contrary, render compensatory repression all the more likely? Fourth, can the United States and should it, exert pressure to alleviate domestic conditions in the Soviet Union?"

SOVIET DISSENT; ITS SOURCES AND SIGNIFICANCE, by Maj. Ralph C. Gauer, in *Air University Review*, v. 25, no. 1 (November-December 1973) 45-53.

"Western military and political analysts interested in Communist systems continue to pay considerable attention to citizens' demands as evidence of satisfaction or dissatisfaction within the political system, 'demands' meaning the citizens' expression that a value decision with respect to a given subject should, or should not, be made by those in authority. This continuing analysis of citizen demands is now concentrating on the widely reported expansion of the Soviet 'dissent movement.' However, many current studies of the function of citizen demands in Communist systems seem to have a serious inherent weakness within themselves. As they focus on dissent, these studies acquire a negative quality, and at times they convey the unexpressed belief that the current Soviet political system is inherently less capable of response to valid citizen demands than is the democratic model. These studies likewise appear to assume that the domestic environment surrounding the democratic model is or should be equally valid and applicable to the Soviet political system. Further, our traditional conception of a Communist state challenges the thought that citizens perform an important function in levying demands on Communist political systems."

2. Paul Litvinov and Vladimir Bukovsky

DISSENT IN RUSSIA, by Abraham Brum-

berg, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 52, no. 4 (July 1974) 781-798.

"The first chapter in the history of open political dissent in post-Khrushchev (or for that matter in post-Stalin) Russia may be said to have begun in October 1967. At that time . . . Paul Litvinov . . . threw down the gauntlet to the Soviet authorities by openly distributing the final statement made at his closed trial three months earlier by Vladimir Bukovsky, a young dissident, arrested and sentenced to three years in a forced labor camp . . . During the following three years, Soviet dissent took on many new . . . forms . . . The period 1969-1972 (and to a considerable extent the present, too) has been characterized by . . . [an] increase in links between the Soviet dissenters and the outside world . . . [The author asks] What . . . are some of the conclusions that may be drawn regarding the current and future state of dissent in the U.S.S.R., as well as some of the lessons for the West?"

3. *Andrei Amalrik*

INVOLUNTARY JOURNEY TO SIBERIA, by Andrei Amalrik. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970. 297 p.

"The . . . author of 'Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?' reports on his imprisonment, trial and exile to Siberia in the mid-1960s . . . He has since been rearrested, tried and imprisoned."

WILL THE SOVIET UNION SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?, by Andrei Amalrik. New York, Harper and Row, 1970. 93 p.

"A young Russian writer's bleakly apocalyptic view of the Soviet future. It was only published abroad, and Amalrik was subsequently incarcerated."

4. *Valery Chalidze*

(*)—TO DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION, by Valery Chalidze. New York, Random House, 1974. 340 p.

"The power of this work comes from its documented description of the struggle for human rights in which the author himself was active, supplementing his discussion of the legal system, censorship, and denial of civil and minority rights."

5. *Zhores Medvedev*

(*)—THE MEDVEDEV PAPERS: THE

PLIGHT OF SOVIET SCIENCE TODAY, by Zhores A. Medvedev. London, Macmillan, 1971. 470 p.

"This book . . . is both a personal document on the problems of Soviet science and a plea for the rationalization of the Soviet bureaucratic system. Medvedev does not oppose the Soviet system, but he finds its preoccupation with red tape and secrecy both frustrating and wasteful. The book is a translation of two samizdat manuscripts, 'Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World,' and 'Secrecy of Correspondence Is Guaranteed by Law.' The central theme of both is the waste and duplication brought about by the restrictions on travel and communication imposed on Soviet scientists by the bureaucracy—less often deliverately than as a result of the 'normal' irrational functioning of the system."

6. *Andrei Sakharov*

THE INTOLERABLE ANDREI SAKHAROV, by Hedrick Smith, in *New York Times Magazine* (4 November 1973) 42-41.

"Andrei Sakharov's importance as a theoretical physicist and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb is today much diminished by his importance as a major voice of dissent within the Soviet Union, according to Mr. Smith who interviewed him recently. Because of the Western support Sakharov's protests receive, he has become an eminent, albeit unofficial, concern in questions dealing with Soviet foreign policy. A mild-mannered man, Sakharov only recently came to view as a major dissenter within the Soviet intelligentsia, yet he wields such influence that his urging that the US reconsider its proposed trade relations with the USSR is being heeded by many US senators . . . In conclusion, Smith characterizes Sakharov as a symbol of 'the liberalization that the West would like to see and that the Soviet leadership is determined to prevent.' The question as to whether the West will continue to heed his advice before he is permanently silenced remains unanswered."

MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD, by Andrei D. Sakharov. New York, Vintage Books, Random House, 1975. 109 p.

Sakharov is a Soviet physicist who "writes about the dangers of détente, the practical problems of arms control and the continuing injustice and repression in his native country."

SAKHAROV: A DISSIDENT WARNS

AGAINST DÉTENTE, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 5 (4 August 1975) 23-24 plus.

"Ever since the Kremlin exiled Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the West 17 months ago, Russia's leading resident political dissenter has been Andrei Sakharov. A world-renowned nuclear physicist who was instrumental in the development of the U.S.S.R.'s hydrogen bomb, Sakharov, during the past decade, has emerged as a leader of the human rights movement within the Soviet Union. Last month Sakharov completed a 20,000-word essay titled 'My Country and the World,' which will be published in the U.S. by Alfred A. Knopf later this year. In his introduction, Sakharov describes this new book as an updating of his widely publicized 1968 manifesto, 'Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,' in which he called for rapprochement between the Communist and capitalist systems. The physicist writes that he decided to undertake the new project largely as a result of a discussion about detente in his Moscow apartment last November with New York's . . . Senator James Buckley ('the first U.S. Government figure who considered it possible to meet with me'). In sending the typescript of the essay to the West, Sakharov asked that excerpts be published before the opening of the European Security Conference in Helsinki this week."

SOVIET UNION: THE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 22 (1 December 1975) 47.

"Russians learned for the first time last week that Physicist Andrei Sakharov's application to visit Oslo to receive his Nobel Prize for Peace had been refused . . . Sakharov has charged that the denial of a visa is a 'flagrant violation' of the principles of last August's European Conference accord at Helsinki where the U.S.S.R. agreed to 'facilitate wider travel' for its citizens . . . Some brave Russians put themselves in jeopardy by supporting Sakharov."

7. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn

[AFL-CIO-SPONSORED SOLZHENITSYN SPEECHES], in *AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News*, v. 30, no. 7-8 (July-August 1975) 32 p.

"Under the sponsorship of the AFL-CIO, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn delivered two addresses to the American people—in Washington on June 30 and in New York City on July 9. This special issue of the *Free Trade Union News* is devoted entirely to these . . . presentations."

FROM UNDER THE RUBBLE, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1974. 308 p.

"Solzhenitsyn and six dissidents . . . living in the USSR [at publication time] . . . have joined in writing this extraordinary book. It is at once a devastating attack on the Soviet regime, a moral indictment of the liberal West, and a Christian manifesto calling for a new society, one whose dominant values would be spiritual rather than economic." The authors call for a "world-wide," nonviolent revolution.

E. Soviet State Security and Repression in the Soviet Union (For Slave Labor Camps Map and State Security Chart See Appendixes)

ALEXANDER DOLGUN'S STORY: AN AMERICAN IN THE GULAG, by Alexander Dolgun and Patrick Watson. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975. 370 p.

"The Soviet system has been made grimly specific with the story of Alexander Dolgun, an American survivor of the torture cells and slave labor camps . . . Dolgun's account of his seven-and-a-half years as one of an estimated 17 million Soviet political prisoners is less harrowing than that of the interrogation period simply because it concentrates on his efforts to beat the system, nurse his wrecked health, and improve his prospects for survival as a hardened slave laborer. After Stalin died, Dolgun was returned to Moscow, under restriction not to contact the US Embassy. He found that his mother had been driven mad during his imprisonment and his father was barely surviving in a small Soviet town. Only his sister, who had left Moscow soon after WW II, had escaped the family disaster; it was she who finally moved the US government to take care of one of its own. Dolgun, his Russian wife and their young son were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1971. They now live in Washington where he works for HEW. His story reflects the toughness of the human spirit."

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION, by Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. New York, Harper and Row, 1974. 660 p.

"The terrifying record of one part of the Soviet historical experience, itself now making its own and its author's place in Soviet—or, as he might prefer, Russian—history. Whether read as history or literature, personal testimony, in-

dictment, or declaration of faith, it must be read as one of the great works of our time."

REPORT ON TORTURE. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975. 285 p. (Amnesty International.)

Chapter 3 on World Survey of Torture Provides information on the UUSR, among others.

(*)—THE USES OF TERROR: THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE 1917-1970, by Boris Levytsky. New York, Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972. 349 p.

"This English translation of a serious history of the Soviet political police carries the story down to mid-1970."

USSR LABOR CAMPS. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1973. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973. 3 pts.

The testimony of these hearings "indicates that millions, probably tens of millions, of people in the Soviet Union are slaves to their brutal government. Why? Because they have dared to speak out against the brutal policies of a totalitarian government and proudly proclaim their belief in their God and their faith." See maps in appendixes.

F. Church and State in the Soviet Union

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects (See also Map Appendix)*

(*)—CHURCH, STATE AND OPPOSITION IN THE U.S.S.R., by Gerhard Simon. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974. 248 p.

"This study, . . . translated from German, provides a great deal of . . . information about the plight of the churches in the U.S.S.R. Two chapters describe the Russian church on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution. The heart of the book is the three chapters on church-state relations and religious persecution today. The documents are translations from Russian of underground reports and information on the precarious situation of religious individuals and groups."

A MARXIST PROPHECY THAT WENT

WRONG—RELIGION WON'T DIE, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 12 (22 September 1975) 57-58.

"For many Russians, going to church is an act of courage that risks economic reprisals, if not far worse. Yet tens of millions are keeping the faith. James N. Wallace of . . . [the] Moscow Bureau of [U.S. News & World Report] examines the reasons."

2. *Religion as a Tool of Foreign Policy*

(*)—RELIGION AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1970, by William C. Fletcher. London, Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973. 179 p.

"Starting from the premise that religion is not a major factor in Soviet foreign policy (because religion is a Marxist-Leninist state is an ideological anomaly), the Director of Slavic and Soviet Area Studies at the University of Kansas shows that it has been an effective adjunct to Soviet efforts to influence public opinion throughout the world. The author traces Soviet efforts to use religious organizations to consolidate communist hegemony in Eastern Europe and to advance the communist cause through the international peace movement. Special attention is paid to the Prague Christian Peace Conference and to Soviet policies toward Islam, Buddhism, Roman Catholicism and the World Council of Churches."

G. Education

(*)—MODERNIZATION AND DIVERSITY IN SOVIET EDUCATION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NATIONALITY GROUPS, by Jaan Pennar and others. New York, Praeger, 1971. 395 p.

"This . . . study suggests that the high priority assigned by Soviet leaders to education may help to explain the USSR's impressive economic development. Furthermore, 'An examination of education in the different national republics seems to suggest that diversity, rather than uniformity, has resulted, that the Soviet Union has achieved a school system built on parallel, rather than central lines.' Apart from brief historical sketches of educational development under the Czars and the Soviets, the work features case studies of the situation in several of the Soviet republics; the Russian SESR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic States, the Caucasian SSR's and certain Central Asian ones as well."

H. The Soviet Press, Censorship, and Domestic Propaganda

SOVIET POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: DEVELOPMENTS IN MASS MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA SINCE STALIN, by Gayle Durham Hollander. New York, Praeger, 1972. 244 p.

"An inquiry into the process the sociologists call 'political socialization,' and how it works from above through agit-prop and the mass media."

VIII. National Economy: The Myth, the Reality, and the Potential

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

E.I.U. [ECONOMIC] WORLD OUTLOOK, 1974. London, The Economist Intelligence Unit, February 1974. 112 p.

"A guide to economic prospects world wide this year, the 1974 issue of World Outlook brings together in one volume the individual forecasts of likely trends in 150 countries [including the USSR] published in the EIU's Quarterly Economic Reviews in the last quarter of 1973. These forecasts are revised in the light of the latest developments. From them a world picture is distilled."

(*)—POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC DEBATE: FROM BUKHARIN TO THE MODERN REFORMERS, by Moshe Lewin. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974. 373 p.

"An attempt to relate current economic thought and debate in the U.S.S.R. to the views and controversies of the earlier periods of NEP, Stalinist command economy and Bukharinist heresy, and post-Stalin experimentation. The author then tackles . . . the whole question of party, state, and economy, and the possibility of some new coalition of political forces."

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Abraham Katz. New York, Praeger, 1972. 230 p.

"A brief survey of basic economic policies since 1917, followed by analysis of the reforms of 1965 and their outcome. The theme is the tension between two imperatives: of the totalitarian system and that of rational economic relationships."

THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EUROPE, by Marie

Lavigne. White Plains, N. Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1974. 396 p.

The Structure of the Socialist Economies; Operational Mechanisms in the Socialist Economies; Socialist Economies and International Relations. With general bibliography.

SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM AT AN IMPASSE, by Gertrude E. Schroeder, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 4 (July-August 1971) 36-46.

"The deliberations of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan published in Pravda of April 11, 1971, clearly indicate that the Soviet party leadership intends to continue the economic reform initiated in 1965 essentially as now constituted. What is not so clear to the casual observer is that the reform in its present form is a much attenuated version of the program launched with great fanfare five and a half years ago by the then-new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. At that time, the reform was deemed to rank in importance with Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy) and Stalin's introduction of five-year plans. It will be the purpose of this study to examine briefly the promise of 1965 and to document the withering away of this program, step by step, until it now virtually melts into the familiar, still flourishing landscape of the centralized Soviet command system."

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW, by Jan S. Prybyla, in *Current History*, v. 63, no. 374 (October 1972) 175-180 plus.

"In the 1970's, the Soviet economy has to produce not just more but more efficiently; it must make better goods more cheaply. In the last analysis, the problem of efficiency . . . concerns the very nature of the economic system."

THE SOVIET ECONOMY: NEW ERA OR THE OLD ERROR?, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 168-172 plus.

"How long can the Soviets fall back on foreign technology and managerial support, especially if there are limits to how much the Soviet Union can pay? . . . As long as [the Soviet planners] are reluctant to make fundamental changes in their scale of priorities and their operations, they are unlikely to be very successful—no matter how much they buy from the West and Japan."

U.S.S.R., in *E.I.U. Quarterly Economic Review* [London], no. 3 (1973) 11 p.

The Political Scene; The Economy; Trade; and Statistical Tables on Foreign Trade including Exports and Imports.

U.S.S.R. ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT 1973, in *E.I.U. Quarterly Economic Review* [London], (1973). 16 p.

Government and General; Population; National Accounts; Currency; Agriculture; Industry, Mining, Fuel and Power; Transport and Communications; Finance; Foreign Trade; Weights and Measures; Bibliography.

WORLD BANK/IDA; ANNUAL REPORT 1974-75. Washington, World/Bank International Development Association, 1974. 144 p.

In the section reviewing the year's activities by region.

B. Economic Planning and Development (See also Map Appendix)

JOINT INVESTMENT ACTIVITY OF CMEA COUNTRIES, by A. Lebedinkos, in *International affairs*, Moscow, no. 1 (January 1975) 15-22.

"The silver jubilee of CMEA once again graphically demonstrated the growing might of the countries of the socialist community, the superiority of the methods of socialist economic management and the increasing role of their experience in equal cooperation and mutual assistance. Implementation of the Comprehensive Programme for the further extension and improvement of cooperation and development of socialist economic integration promotes the attainment by CMEA countries, on the basis of the socialist mode of production and an ever fuller use of the possibilities of the international division of labour, of high and stable rates of growth of the economy. It was pointed out in the decision of the 28th CMEA Session that industrial production of its member countries increased 12-fold in 25 years. Investments—funds applied to reconstruct the operating and building new enterprises and other large projects—hold an important place in the accomplishment of large-scale tasks and the efficient use of available resources for the economic development of CMEA countries. Construction extends and improves the production machine and creates the material prerequisites for the steady growth of labour productivity."

(LI)—SOVIET DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE STALIN, by Maj.

Howard V. Keighler III. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 94 p. (Research Study No. 1090-71.)

"Current thinking of numerous authors would seem to indicate that changes in the Soviet economic system are creating an improved living standard for the average Soviet citizen. The writer analyzed the period 1953-1970 to determine what changes had transpired and what effect the changes had on the average Soviet. To obtain a focus, the author looked at production of consumer goods, industrial changes, agricultural changes and progress in social benefits. The analysis also considered the political era in which these changes happened. The study concludes that there has been a sporadic increase in Soviet living standards since Stalin's death."

(*)—SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, by Raymond Hutchings. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1971. 314 p.

"A concise account of the origins, progress and characteristics of Soviet economic development."

SOVIET LONG-TERM CONSUMPTION PLANNING: DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO RATIONAL NEED, by Phillip Weitzman, in *Soviet Studies*, v. 26, no. 3 (July 1974) 305-321.

"In order to shed light on this controversy [on consumption planning] this article will discuss the normative method of planning consumption through an examination of the three basic groups of norms: 1) the physiological norms of nutrition and their associated rational norms of consumption of foodstuffs; 2) the rational wardrobe and resulting rational norms of consumption of fabrics, clothing and footwear; and 3) the conditionally accepted norms for services and consumer durables and the rational family budget. The debate surrounding the norms will be put in the context of existing consumption standards in the Soviet Union and other developed countries, particularly the United States."

C. Labor

THE GOLDBRICK SOCIETY, by Jay Axelbank, in *Newsweek*, v. 84, no. 5 (29 July 1974) 52.

"Russia's labor productivity is perhaps the lowest in the industrial world, and officials admit that worker efficiency is below norms in about a third of the nation's enterprises . . . Nothing . . . sums up the prevailing public attitude toward labor in the U.S.S.R. than the . . . remark of a

Soviet scientist: 'We have the ultimate freedom in this country—the freedom not to work.'

(*)—THE NEW WORKER IN SOVIET RUSSIA, by Irving R. Levine. New York, Macmillan, 1973. 191 p.

"Traces . . . the changing condition of the Russian worker under the various regimes since Peter the Great . . . Concludes that although many Russian workers are dissatisfied today by shortages, crowded housing and bureaucratic red tape, they are convinced that their system is preferable to all others and that the future will bring improvements in their way of life."

D. Agriculture

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE: FROM ALEXANDER II to KHRUSHCHEV, by Lazar Volin. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970. 644 p.

"A . . . study of Russian agriculture in both the imperial and Soviet periods."

(*)—MEN VERSUS SYSTEMS, by Arthur E. Adams and Jan S. Adams. New York, Free Press, 1971. 327 p.

"A comparative study of the agricultural systems of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, based in part on the authors' personal observations and interviews in 1967."

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURE, by Roy D. Laird, in *Problems of Communism*, v. 20, no. 5 (September-October 1971) 31-40.

"A point of diminishing returns seems to have been reached in Soviet agriculture, and further progress toward increased per capita output of food is highly problematic. The evidence supporting this gloomy forecast falls under three general heads: 1) an appraisal of the Soviet Union's objective potential for meeting its ambitious goals, with particular emphasis on examination of the prospects for the pivotal grain sector in light of the USSR's performance in 1960-70 and of comparative North American experience; 2) an assessment of the impact of the post-Khrushchev reforms in agriculture and the dim prospect for further policy innovations; and 3) an analysis of the costs still to be borne by Soviet agriculture as a result of unwavering adherence to the Stalinist collectivized system of rural management. This

multiple approach affords us the opportunity to examine all the major factors entering into the complex equation which is Soviet agriculture."

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY; TOWARD THE ABOLITION OF COLLECTIVE FARMS, by Stephen Osofsky. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974. 300 p.

Continuity and Change in the Post-Khrushchev Era; Soviet Agriculture Today—Problems and Prospects for Reform. With bibliography.

(*)—THE SOVIET RURAL COMMUNITY, ed by James R. Millar. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971. 420 p.

"A . . . symposium of studies on Soviet agricultural policy, rural administration and trends in village life."

2. Soviet Purchases of US Grain (See Appendix for Chart on US-USSR Grain Production)

SALES OF GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION. HEARING BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, OCTOBER 8, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 72 p.

WILL US BAIL OUT RUSSIA?, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v. 79, no. 8 (25 August 1975) 16-18.

"There is no doubt that Moscow needs a lot more grain to cover this year's crop disaster. U.S. soon has some big decisions to make."

E. Soviet Economic Dependence on the West

THE BREZHNEV GAME, in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v. 11, no. 3 (Fall 1973) 335-338.

"The combination of a two-front cold war and an unsatisfactory performance of the Soviet economy may have been at the root of Mr. Brezhnev's 'smile campaign' vis-à-vis the West. The Soviet leader has apparently recognized that the economic weaknesses of his nation can only be overcome through massive and extended assistance by the capitalist democracies of the free world. In an era marked by the 'paradox of peace' which permits economic conflicts between Western nations to surface, the Soviet leader

attempts to capitalize on these contradictions and gradually turns the balance of power in favor of the USSR.

WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1945 to 1965, by Antony C. Sutton. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 482 p.

"The theme of this work . . . is the total dependence of the U.S.S.R. on Western technology, and the refusal of Western governments to recognize this and draw the necessary lessons from it."

F. Industry (See also Map Appendix)

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE ROLE OF THE CPSU IN INDUSTRIAL DECISION-MAKING, 1917-1970, by William J. Conyngham. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 378 p.

"A . . . study of the Party's techniques of control and of the shifts in its positions and its methods with changing economic conditions and changing leadership."

A PLANT THAT COULD CHANGE THE SHAPE OF SOVIET INDUSTRY, by Herbert E. Meyer, in *Fortune*, v. 90, no. 5 (November 1974) 150-156 plus.

"Soviet planners are gambling \$5 billion on the world's largest truck plant, which they hope will break the transportation bottleneck that has been limiting the country's economic growth. The plant will incorporate about a half billion dollars' worth of U.S. technology and machinery. Alongside the plant, the Russians are erecting a massive company town for a population of 250,000. The annual production of 150,000 heavy-duty trucks at Kama won't of itself solve the U.S.S.R.'s deep-seated economic problems. The country's road system remains primitive, and the Russians have yet to learn how to make efficient use of the trucks they already have. But the mammoth project is also the chief testing ground for an unheralded industrial reform: the creation of 'production associations,' which function like large, vertically integrated manufacturing corporations. If things go well at Kama, the reform could eventually change the management structure of Soviet industry."

ZIMMERMANN'S WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES, by W. N. Peach and James A. Constantin. 3rd ed. New York, Harper & Row, 1972. 525 p.

This book which contains numerous tables provides information on resources and industries of many countries of the world.

G. Energy, Oil, and Other Resources (See also Map Appendix)

CHANGING SOVIET OIL INTERESTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, by Maj. C. Powell Hutton, in *Naval War College Review*, v. 24, no. 2 (October 1971) 76-93.

"Best available estimates reveal that the Soviet Union will not be able to produce sufficient oil to meet her needs. While this deficiency can be met several ways, one logical alternative, on which Moscow has already embarked, is the exploitation of Mideast oil. The hazards of this move to the West are more than the loss of a small portion of the world oil trade, as in today's seller's market, a small 'margin' might be enough to give the Soviets a key economic and potential lever for use not only in the Middle East, but against the free world as well. The West must view these developments realistically and, with enough foresight, it can prevent the Soviet Union from exercising this dominant control."

CONSERVATION IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Philip R. Pryde. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972. 301 p.

"A geographer writes on the history, theory and practice of the Soviet Union in conserving its natural resources, weighing those factors which are general to all countries and those which are peculiar to the Soviet system of government."

ENERGY AND SCARCE WORLD RESOURCES, in *Current History*, (July/August 1975) 1-64.

"This second of a two-part symposium on world resources contains nine articles which examine the world's energy needs and resources and evaluate the prospects for meeting world energy requirements in the late twentieth century. Individual subjects covered include: America's future in energy; oil and the OPEC members; energy self-sufficiency in the Soviet Union; the energy needs of West Europe, Japan and Australasia; the oil-dependent developing countries; China's energy resources and prospects; mineral resources in the new international order; development of alternative energy sources; and the question of international controls on scarce resources."

INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK, in *World Oil*, v. 175, no. 3 (15 August 1972) 5-140.

27th Annual issue on major country-by-country gas/oil search and development.

OILFIELDS OF THE WORLD, by E. N. Tiratsoo. 1st ed. Beaconsfield, England, Scientific Press Ltd., 1973., 376 p.

Chapter 4 is devoted to Eastern Europe and the USSR. With maps and tables.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN A WORLD OF SHORTAGES, by Marshall I. Goldman, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 164-168 plus.

"... The Soviet Union has weathered the raw material crisis better than the other industrialized countries. In fact, in many ways during 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Union seems to have improved its relative standing."

(*)—THE SOVIET ENERGY BALANCE: NATURAL GAS, OTHER FOSSIL FUELS, AND ALTERNATIVE POWER SOURCES, by Iain F. Elliot. New York, Praeger, 1974. 277 p.

"A detailed study of the Soviet energy picture as it has developed in recent decades, as it stands now, and as it may look in the year 2000. Separate chapters deal with natural gas, oil, coal, peat, oil shale, alternative power sources, and utilization of fuel. Relying mainly on Soviet data, the author provides more than 100 tables and graphs and over a dozen maps, and offers comparisons with US energy sources. He concludes that although the USSR is fortunate to possess adequate reserves of many kinds of fuel, 'the basic problem is that some 90 per cent of the total energy resources lie east of the Urals, while population and industry are concentrated in the Urals and in the European part of the USSR'."

SOVIET OIL EXPORTS: A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS?, by R. M. Burrell, in *Soviet Analyst*, v. 3, no. 8 (11 April 1974) 3-5.

"The Soviet oil export drive has formerly fallen neatly into two parts: trade with eastern European satellites and other communist states, which was primarily strategic in its motivation; and the trade conducted with other European states as a means of earning hard currencies. Indeed the export of crude oil and petroleum products has been the Soviet Union's largest single source of hard currencies for many years.

In the light of the recent spectacular increase in world oil prices—a trend which Soviet broadcasts in Arabic to the Middle East have commended—there is some evidence that the USSR may be beginning to look for new markets among the oil-deficient countries of the Third World. These are the countries which will suffer most from rising oil prices because their reserves of foreign exchange are already under strain while their development plans demand larger oil imports. The quantities involved, however, are comparatively small, and to meet at least a significant percentage of them is well within Soviet capabilities. The price rise may therefore provide Moscow with an opportunity to widen its trading patterns and, indirectly, increase its political influence in certain carefully selected Third World countries. An analysis of recent Soviet activity in India would seem to confirm that this idea has attractive possibilities for Moscow."

USSR—ENERGY POLICY AND MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, by Werner Gumpel, in *Aussen Politik*, (1st Quarter 1974) 31-41.

"The Soviet Union faces problems stemming from the Middle East war and the worldwide energy crisis, although according to Dr. Gumpel, while it will have to alter its energy policies, it stands to gain, as well... The political repercussions of the world energy crisis for the USSR seem as advantageous as the economic ones are, says Gumpel. Not only in its relations with the COMECON, but also through its arms sales to the Arabs, Russia has gained influence. In addition, the effects on the West of the Arab use of oil as an economic weapon point up the fact that the Soviets are 'economically and politically the biggest beneficiary from the world energy crisis'."

WORLD OIL OUTPUT CONTINUES RISE, in *World Oil*, v. 176, no. 3 (15 February 1973) 98 plus.

World crude oil production, by countries, 1972 and 1971.

WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '74, v. 20 (1974) 92 p.

An annual review of international oil operations. The first part deals with special reports and area studies, including a world summary and review, and reports on Europe, among many others.

H. Soviet Ocean Activities, and Merchant Marine and Shipbuilding (See also Under Soviet Sea Power)

(*)—THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET MERCHANT-SHIPPING POLICY, by Robert E. Athay. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 150 p.

"The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major naval power has received considerable attention in recent years. Much less coverage has been given to the development of the Soviet merchant fleet, which is now one of the most modern in the world. This . . . study discusses the contribution of Soviet shipping policy to the USSR's overall economic objectives. There are . . . chapters on voyage costs and economic benefits, especially as they relate to the Soviet balance of payments problem. While comparative analysis of costs, income and investment return is virtually impossible because of the paucity of relevant Soviet data, the author argues . . . that the merchant fleet is a net asset."

(LI)—IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MERCANTILE POWER, by Lt. Comdr. Robert W. Peacher. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1971. 64 p. (Research Study No. 1495-71.)

"The Soviet Union has invested a significantly large portion of her resources into the development of a large and effective merchant fleet. The ultimate objective for which this fleet was built is a matter of major concern to the Free World. This paper reviews Soviet activities that are related to the employment of this fleet in an attempt to portray the objectives of this employment. The paper concludes that the merchant fleet has become a primary instrument of the Soviet Union in its quest for world dominance."

LIMITS IN THE SEAS. NO. 36—NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, 1974. 141 p.

Provides this information for the major countries of the world.

THE SEA AND SOVIET DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION, by Robert E. Athay, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 5 (May 1972) 158-177.

"Expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet

began in earnest in the mid-1950s and accelerated rapidly. Since that time the Soviets have built and purchased from abroad more than 10 million dead-weight tons of merchant shipping, and their fleet now ranks as sixth largest in the world. Notwithstanding the rapid growth in the merchant fleet, the heavy orientation of the Soviet economy toward overland freight shipping for domestic use has continued. It is clear, therefore, that the decision of Soviet planners to acquire a large and modern merchant fleet sprang more from a desire to strengthen the country's external economic position than to facilitate domestic transport."

SOVIET MARINE TRANSPORT: INTERNATIONAL TIES, by G. Levikov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no. 6 (June 1975) 120-123.

"The Soviet Union has developed into a strong maritime power and is now a leader in international merchant shipping. The Soviet fleet has a tonnage of over 14 million, as compared with the 500,000 tons in 1924. In 1974, Soviet ships carried 190 million tons of freight. Every year, they call at over 1,100 ports in more than 100 countries. In addition, nearly 200 ships flying the flag of the USSR are engaged on runs along 47 foreign sea routes. Cooperation with the CMEA countries is central in the international ties of the Soviet Union's marine. The fraternal countries' joint efforts in improving the system of maritime shipping help to accelerate their foreign trade with each other, to extend the range of the goods carried and to cut back on transport costs."

SOVIET OCEAN ACTIVITIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY. Washington, Government Printing Office, 30 April 1975. 81 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print.)

Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce and the National Ocean Policy Study Pursuant to S. Res. 222. Contents: Soviet Policy for the Seven Seas; Soviet Fisheries Policy; Soviet Merchant Marine; Soviet Oceanography; Soviet Undersea Research Activities; Soviet Study—Offshore Oil and Gas; Soviet Marine Pollution Programs, Implications of Soviet Ocean Policy on U.S. Policy. With 23 tables.

SOVIET SHIPBUILDING AND SHIPYARDS, by Norman Polmar, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 98, no. 5 (May 1972) 272-280.

"The Soviet Union has a large, modern fleet of high-quality warships, supported by the world's largest ocean research and fishing fleets

and, in the number of ships, the world's second largest merchant marine. This massive Soviet thrust to the sea is essentially the product of the Soviet shipbuilding industry. Like Russian naval history, the Russian shipbuilding chronicle has been, until recently, unimpressive. Yet today, Soviet shipbuilding is a key element in the foreign, economic, and military policies of the Soviet Union."

I. Other Transportation

JANE'S FREIGHT CONTAINERS, 1974-75, ed. by Patrick Finlay. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1974. 717 p.

Information and photos of ports and inland transport, including information on USSR.

JANE'S SURFACE SKIMMERS; HOVERCRAFT AND HYDROFOILS, 1974-75, ed. by Roy McLeavy. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1974. 409 p.

Descriptions, technical data, and photos of such craft, including those of USSR.

JANE'S WORLD RAILWAYS, ed. by Henry Sampson. London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1973. 590 p.

J. Radio and Television Broadcasting

(*)—**RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN EASTERN EUROPE**, by Burton Paulu. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1974. 592 p.

"A . . . background book covering policy and practice in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia."

WORLD RADIO-TV HANDBOOK, 1972, ed. by J. M. Frost. 26th ed. New York, World Radio-TV Handbook, 1972. 384 p. [Continuing series.]

"A complete directory of international radio and television."

K. Foreign Trade (See also Chart in Appendix)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, 1972. New York, United Nations, 1972. 367 p.

A detailed collection of statistical tables including information on the entire world.

PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND FRANCE,

by L. Lokshin, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 5 (May 1975) 20-24.

"The Soviet-French working meeting at the summit level that took place in Rambouillet in December 1974 gave fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations in a whole number of fields. It helped considerably to expand and deepen the economic cooperation that is one of the foundations of relations between the USSR and France today. The documents signed in Rambouillet on economic and credit matters and, especially, the Agreement on Economic Cooperation covering the period 1975-79, provide a graphic example of the development of mutually beneficial economic relations between countries with different social systems. This point was made in a document issued by the CC CPSU Politburo, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers. What is the current state of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and France, and what is the outlook for its development?"

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET TRADE, by Philip S. Gillette, in *Current History*, v. 67, no. 398 (October 1974) 169-172 plus.

" . . . 'The foreign trade institutions of the Soviet Union and the United States will remain incompatible,' notes this specialist, who believes that 'a deradicalized Soviet Union will engage in piecemeal foreign-trade reform, retaining the basic structure of bureaucratic controls'."

THE RUSSIANS MEAN BUSINESS—ABOUT BUSINESS, by Hedrick Smith, in *The Reader's Digest*, v. 106, no. 634 (February 1975) 109-113.

"In their relentless hunt for Western technology, the 'tough, shrewd' traders of the Soviet Union have proved at least a match for their American counterparts."

(*)—**THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS**, by John Quigley. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1974. 256 p.

"Brief . . . history and description of how the system works, by an American legal scholar using extensive Soviet sources."

(*)—**SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND POLICY, 1918-1971**, by Glen Alden Smith. New York, Praeger, 1973. 371 p.

"Making extensive use of Russian-language sources Dr. Smith . . . has prepared a broad survey

of Soviet foreign trade policies, practices and prospects. He discusses the principles governing Soviet foreign trade, the organization for both operations and control, the financing and promotion of trade, trade relations with socialist nations and developing countries, Western restrictions on trade with the USSR, and the prospects for Soviet foreign trade. In the concluding chapter, he suggests actions to be taken by the West."

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL IMPORT PRIORITIES, WITH MARKETING CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXPORTING TO THE USSR, by Christopher E. Stowell and others. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 505 p.

Part I—Industrial Import Priorities in the USSR; Part II—Marketing Considerations for U.S. Exporters; Bibliography; Appendixes.

SOVIET-ITALIAN BUSINESS TIES, by V. Pavlovsky, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no. 1 (January 1975) 103–109.

"Commercial and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Italy are becoming ever more diverse in nature from year to year. Soviet-Italian business cooperation, resting on a mutually advantageous and long-term basis, covers extensive areas, acquiring qualitatively new and promising forms. Good evidence of this comes from the Agreement concluded between the Governments of the USSR and Italy on July 25, 1974, on the development of economic, industrial and technical cooperation over a ten-year period. It meets the present-day economic, industrial and technical requirements of both partners and helps to make the most effective use of the advantages of the international division of labour. The economic relations between the USSR and Italy are regulated by a number of earlier agreements, including the 1948 Treaty on Trade and Navigation, the 1966 Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, and the 1970 long-term trade agreement. The new Agreement stresses the desire of both parties to promote the further development both of relations between the two states and of cooperation in Europe."

SOVIET TRADE TURNS TO EUROPE, by Michael Kaser, in *Foreign Policy*, no. 19 (Summer 1975) 123–135.

"In January 14, 1975, the Soviet government refused to proceed with its 1972 trade agreement with the United States, ostensibly because of the provisions, attached by the U.S. Congress, on guaranteed Jewish emigration from the Soviet

Union. This refusal has been followed by particular Soviet attention to the potential for trade with the European communities. Discussions—which proved inconclusive—took place between the secretariats of the European Commission and of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in early February, and later that month a major economic agreement was signed with the United Kingdom. It has also drawn Comecon into still closer economic relations."

THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD TRADE, by O. Edmund Clubb, in *Worldview*, v. 17, no. 9 (September 1974) 21–25.

"At Moscow on June 29 President Nixon joined with Soviet leader Brezhnev in signing a ten-year pact. Building upon the three-year commercial agreement of October, 1972, between the two countries, the pact proposed the further promotion of Soviet-American commerce by providing a framework for the discovery of new economic opportunities and the fostering of trade activities, including cooperation by American and Soviet organizations in joint enterprises. In assessing the prospects of Soviet-American trade relations, it is essential to consider carefully the world economic situation, the Soviet Union's role as world trader, and also the stance of the United States vis-à-vis the contemplated commerce."

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET-JAPANESE TRADE, by Carl Modig. McLean, Va., Research Analysis Corp., April 1970. 95 p. (Report RAC-R-93.)

"Soviet-Japanese trade increased rapidly after 1956, when political constraints were removed, but its rate of growth has leveled off since the mid-1960's. The USSR usually enjoys a trade surplus, but both countries profit economically from the trade. Despite the large percentage of 'Strategic' items in the trade structure both ways, current low levels (as a percentage of the total trade of either country) of trade preclude the existence of any significant leverages that could be applied in the countries' political relations. Joint Siberian Development projects, if they should be consummated, would appreciably increase trade but would not appreciably change its traditional structure, which is Soviet raw materials in exchange for mostly Japanese producers' goods. However, prospects for large-scale joint Siberian development now seem only fair." With bibliography.

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, 1970–71. New York,

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1973. 856 p. (ST/STAT/SER.G/21.)

2. Soviet-American Economic Relations

AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE IN PERSPECTIVE, by Philip S. Gillette, in *Current History*, v. 65, no. 386 (October 1973) 158-162 plus.

"Despite . . . uncertainties, it does not seem unduly optimistic to expect at least a moderate growth in American-Soviet trade during the next few years. A much greater trade expansion involving large United States capital investments in Soviet raw materials, however, would seem to depend primarily on whether the two governments continue to subscribe to the broad political perspectives of the Nixon and Brezhnev leaderships despite domestic opponents of such trade."

ANOMALIES IN U.S.-SOVIET TRADE PROSPECTS, by Maj. William D. Halloran II, in *Military Review*, v. 54, no. 9 (September 1974) 68-79.

"The signing of the 'Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' on 29 May 1972 by President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, combined with the signing of a comprehensive set of trade agreements on 18 October 1972, opened a new era of economic relations between the two countries. At no time since World War II did the opportunity for improvement of their mutual commercial relations appear more promising. Despite the fact that there is little structural similarity between the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union, former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson submits that the two countries are 'by their very diversity natural trading partners.' This article examines the current status of U.S.-Soviet trade relationships and attempts to assess the military ramifications of such trade, as well as the prospects for future commercial relations. The primary purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the prospects of expanded trade in terms of benefits and/or risks to the United States."

APPARATCHIKS AND ENTREPRENEURS: U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS, by Raymond Vernon, in *Foreign Affairs*, v. 32, no. 2 (January 1974) 249-262.

"During two decades of cold war, the economic contacts between the United States and the U.S.S.R. were reduced to a bare minimum. On one

side of the iron curtain, the Soviet Union sat sullen and withdrawn. On the other side, the United States was busy imposing an Orwellian mesh of bureaucratic controls to choke off any initiatives that its own businessmen happened to offer . . . While welcoming the thaw in economic relations with the Soviet Union, I have always been troubled by the possibility that the United States might try to conduct those relations through the same laws, regulations, and institutions as they have applied to Canada or Italy or Taiwan . . . The use of concepts and institutions that are incompatible or incongruous in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union generates a double risk. In simple economic terms, the United States is likely to get less out of the relationship than it now expects. If that happens, the fragile foundations on which the mood of détente rests are likely to be burdened by still another heavy weight, along with the conflict in the Middle East, the frustrations of the slow-moving security and disarmament conferences, and other such difficulties . . . Some critical distinctions between the United States and the Soviet Union, bearing especially on their approaches to international economic relations, should be stressed.

DÉTENTE AND DOLLARS; DOING BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS, by Marshall I. Goldman. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1975. 337 p.

Lessons from the Past and Prospects for the Future; How Much can the Soviet Union Pay?; How—and How Not—to Deal with the Russians; Appendices.

(*)—THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, by James Henry Giffen. rev. ed. New York, Praeger, 1971. 366 p.

"This handbook . . . explains the Soviet planned economy and its methods of trade, and how the market and planned economies differ. Giffen treats the confusing and sometimes inconsistent U.S. import and export regulations, negotiations and contracts, other legal aspects of trade in America, and Soviet laws concerning trade. He also takes a transaction step by step through U.S. regulations and proposed legislation, the Soviet Communist Party, negotiating with the Soviets, the sales contract, financial considerations, and industrial property rights and licensing."

THE MEANING OF THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET MARITIME AGREEMENT, by Reginald A. Bourdon, in *Naval War College*

Review, v. 27, no. 2 (September-October 1974) 65-70.

"The United States-Soviet Maritime Agreement, signed in 1972, provides that equal and substantial shares of the oceanborne commerce between the two nations be carried on the national-flag vessels of each country. While strongly opposed by third-flag carriers as contrary to free trade principles, this provision appears to have given a diversity of carriage to the United States-Soviet trade seldom duplicated in other trades. In light of this fact and the many economic benefits derived by U.S.-flag vessels from the agreement, maritime policymakers must now reexamine U.S. policy regarding cargo sharing and determine its future applicability."

U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE; THE ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. A STAFF REPORT FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, DECEMBER 20, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 45 p.

USSR-US TRADE: THE SOVIET OBJECTIVES, by Joya Shekar, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v. 6, no. 1 (July 1973) 62-76.

"Keeping aside . . . economic benefits accruing to the US from trading with USSR, in this article we may examine what really accounts for the sudden enthusiasm shown by the Soviet Union to trade with its rival, the United States? What specific objectives the USSR intend to achieve from its expanded trade relations with the United States? Why, contrary to its historical tradition and the realities of geography, the Soviet Union emphasises trade with the US above that with West Europe and Japan especially when its trade with some of the EEC countries and Japan is growing very rapidly since the mid-sixties?"

WHY THAT SOVIET BUYING SPREE WON'T LAST, by Herbert E. Meyer, in *Fortune*, v. 91, no. 1 (January 1975) 94-97 plus.

"Trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has expanded enormously during the last few years, and official predictions in both countries are that it will continue to grow for years to come. But there are a number of reasons to suspect that the current wave of Soviet buying in the U.S.—which is really what this trading rela-

tionship has become—can't go on forever. The Russians can't afford to keep on buying so much expensive industrial equipment and high-level technology because they can't export enough to pay for it. Moreover, the Soviet system itself makes absorption of these U.S. imports slow and difficult. And there is some reason to fear that détente itself, and therefore trade, may not survive the tenure of Kremlin chief Leonid Brezhnev. One school of thought holds that the U.S. should stop all high-technology sales to the Russians right now. Another school advises U.S. businessmen to nail down as many sales as possible before the door starts closing."

IX. The State of Soviet Science and Technology

A. Miscellaneous Aspects

(*)—THE RUSSIAN SCIENTIST, by Albert Parry. New York, Macmillan, 1973. 196 p.

"A study of the development of Russian science, chronicled through capsule biographies of seven of Russia's greatest scientific minds: Lomonosov, Mendeleyev, Mechnikov, Pavlov, Tsiolkovsky and Kapitsa. The final thirty pages of the text are devoted to an assessment of modern Soviet science academies and the hardships Soviet scientists experience in working within the constraints of a brittle ideology. The book also contains a bibliography of Russian and English sources and features many photographs and drawings."

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Loren R. Graham. New York, Knopf, 1972. 584 p.

"This . . . study investigates the complex interplay between some of the leading themes of twentieth-century science and the principles of Marxist philosophy. Ranging from quantum mechanics to cybernetics and from relativity to genetics, Mr. Graham is far less concerned with such scandals as the Lysenko affair than with the serious intellectual endeavors of the best Soviet scientific minds."

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. U.S. SCIENTISTS ABROAD: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR PROGRAMS FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 163 p. (Committee Print.)

"This study examines major Federal programs which send abroad nongovernmental U.S. scientists and technical personnel to lecture, study, conduct research, or attend scientific meetings. Specifically treated are the senior Fulbright-Hays program; exchange programs administered by the National Science Foundation; and inter-Academy exchange programs with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China, administered by the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. In keeping with the objectives of the series of which it is one part, this study analyzes the interaction of foreign policy with the origins, administration and effectiveness of scientific exchange programs. One conclusion to emerge is that both scientific and diplomatic objectives may be enhanced by better interagency coordination, program planning and setting of priorities."

B. The Space Program (Including Apollo-Soyuz)

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

(LI)—A HISTORY OF SOVIET MANNED SPACE FLIGHT, by Maj. William L. Fuqua. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 36 p. (Research Study.)

"This study explores the major successes and failures of the Soviet manned space flight program. The report deals primarily with the more significant bioastronautical aspects of the Soviet program. The problems, successes and failures of the Vostok, Voshkod and Soyuz series are discussed in chronological order followed by a synopsis of the problems which will be associated with the manned orbiting laboratory. The Apollo-Soyuz joint cooperative venture, planned for June 1975, is discussed, since it indicates a significant trend for the future of Soviet manned space exploration."

THE KREMLIN AND THE COSMOS, by Nicholas Daniloff. New York, Knopf, 1972. 285 p.

"Daniloff gives a journalist's account of the development of the Russian space program."

SOVIET AEROSPACE ALMANAC, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 58, no. 3 (March 1975) 33-79.

Consists of the following: Soviet Aerospace Forces and Doctrine, by Col. William F. Scott; Deployment of Soviet Airpower (Map); The USSR's Sixteen Military Districts (Map); The Soviet Ministry of Defense (Chart); Command and Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces (Chart); Command and Staff of National Air Defense (Chart); Command and Staff of the Soviet Air Forces (Chart); The Soviet Drive for Aerospace Superiority, by Edgar Ulsamer; Soviet Aircraft Design and Construction Institutions; The Soviet Space Program, by Charles S. Sheldon II; Soviet Space Payloads—1957-74; Successful Launches to Orbit or Escape—1957-1974; Educating the Soviet Officer Corps, by Harriet Fast Scott; Officer Education and Training Schools for the Soviet Armed Forces; Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons, by John W. R. Taylor; Soviet Armed Forces—Facts and Figures; and Top Leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces.

THE SOVIET SPACE EFFORT: STILL INCREASING, by Edgar Ulsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 56, no. 10 (October 1973) 53-57.

"In this . . . report covering an AIR FORCE Magazine tour of Soviet aerospace facilities, the author reports on route- and equipment-planning of Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, and a visit to 'Star City,' the Soviet cosmonauts' home base and the future, temporary home of the US astronauts assigned to the upcoming joint Apollo-Soyuz Test Program . . ."

THE USSR LIFTS TECHNOLOGICAL CURTAIN, by Edgar Ulsamer, in *Air Force Magazine*, v. 56, no. 8 (August 1973) 24-29.

"While the Soviet Union continues its usual reticence regarding weapon system development and associated technologies, the current spirit of détente has led to a degree of openness in areas of basic and commercial technology that would have been considered unthinkable a year ago. In this article, AIR FORCE Magazine reports on a unique ten-day tour of Soviet aerospace facilities . . ."

2. Apollo-Soyuz Space Link-Up, 1975

APOLLO-SOYUZ: APPOINTMENT IN SPACE, in *Time*, v. 106, no. 3 (21 July 1975) 53-57.

The "complete" Apollo-Soyuz story: the background, the people involved, the details of the flight and linkup, etc.

DÉTENTE AT 140 MILES UP, in *U.S. News & World Report* (14 July 1975).

"On July 15, a Soyuz spacecraft is to be rocketed into orbit from Baikonur in central Russia. Seven and a half hours later, an Apollo ship will lift off from Cape Canaveral in Florida. Around noon on July 17, at 140 miles above Earth, the vehicles are to rendezvous and then dock in space. For the next two days, the American and Russian crews will share meals and work together. Jack McWethy, an Associate Editor of the magazine, who has been covering the space

program since the days of the moon landings, offers this assessment of what is involved."

U.S. AND RUSSIA GIRD FOR SPACE RENDEZVOUS, by Col. Edwin G. Pipp, in *Army*, v. 25, no. 3 (March 1975) 28-32.

"The July launches of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project will mark an important first in the history of international space exploration and according to some, could 'open a window' for future joint ventures . . . Both nations have strong military stakes in shot."

PART III

BIBLIOGRAPHIC AND OTHER AIDS TO FURTHER RESEARCH ON THE SOVIET UNION

X. Bibliographies

A. Miscellaneous Bibliographies

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in FINANCIAL CHECKS ON SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, by Franklyn D. Holzman. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., 1975. pp. 99-103.

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE RUSSIAN SCIENTIST, by Alberty Parry. New York, Macmillan, 1973.

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1973, ed. by Richard F. Stacer. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SOVIET VIEW OF WAR, PEACE AND NEUTRALITY, by P. H. Vigor. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. pp. 240-244.

"The Classics of Marxism-Leninism on the Subject of War; The Soviet View of War from 1917 to the Death of Stalin; The Soviet View of War from the Death of Stalin to 1968; The Soviet View of War from 1969 to 1972; and Soviet Critiques of 'Bourgeois' Wars and 'Bourgeois' Military Thinking."

B. Economic Aspects

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY; TOWARD THE ABOLITION OF COLLECTIVE FARMS, by Stephen Osofsky. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974. pp. 271-293.

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND POLICY, 1918-1971, by Glen Alden Smith. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET INDUSTRIAL IMPORT PRIORITIES, WITH MARKETING CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXPORTING TO THE USSR, by Christopher E. Stowell and others. New York, Praeger, 1975. pp. 382-426.

[GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EUROPE, by Marie Lavigne. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1974. pp. 390-392.

C. Foreign Policy

1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50-YEAR BIBLIOGRAPHY; NEW EVALUATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1920-1970, ed. by Byron Dexter and others. New York, R. R. Bowker Co., 1972. 936 p. (Pub. for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

Part Three, Section Three lists citations of books dealing with the following of the Middle East: Economic Problems; Turkey; Iran; Israel; The Arab World (Arabian Peninsula—Persian Gulf, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Jordan, Palestine, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Egypt, Sudan).

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Roger E. Kanet. Santa Barbara, California, ABC-Clio Press, 1974. 208 p.

A bibliography of English- and Russian-language publications 1967-1971.

(*)—[SUGGESTED REFERENCES], in ST. PETERSBURG AND MOSCOW: TSARIST AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1814-1974, by Barbara Jelavich. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1974.

2. Military Aspects of Foreign Policy

(*)—[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET STRATEGY—SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET POLICY-MAKING, by C. G. Jacobsen. Glasgow, The University Press, 1972.

3. The Soviet Union and Africa

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET-AFRICAN

RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. London, Central Asian Research Centre, 1974. pp. 187-190.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN SOCIALISM, by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. Rutherford, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969. pp. 249-268.

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[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET POLICY TOWARD BLACK AFRICA; THE FOCUS ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION, by Helen Defosses Cohn. New York, Praeger, Publishers, 1972. pp. 273-316.

4. *The Soviet Union and the Arctic*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ARCTIC: THE SOVIET POSITION, by S. M. Olenicoff. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp., 1972. pp. 44-52 (R-907-ARPA.)

5. *The Soviet Union and Asia*

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA, by Geoffrey Jukes. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.

6. *The Soviet Union and the Caribbean*

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7. *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE, by Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts. Washington, Department of the Army, 1971. 367 p. (DA PAM 550-8.)

"... Provides abstracts of unclassified articles and books on trends and developments in communist East Europe, including its role in the international communist movement, regional problems, strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact members, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the internal problems of the separate countries. It also provides descriptions of bibliographies, atlases, yearbooks, and encyclopedias, and includes numerous texts, charts, statistical tables, and maps contributed by several government agencies and research organizations."

8. *The Soviet Union and India*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in SOVIET POLICY

TOWARD INDIA—IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY, by Robert H. Donaldson. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1974. pp. 315-332.

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[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in MOSCOW AND JERUSALEM; TWENTY YEARS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET UNION (1947-1967), by Avicdor Dayan. London, Abelard-Schuman, 1970. pp. 249-251.

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(*)—[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV, by Oles M. Smolansky. Lewisburg, Penn., Bucknell University Press, 1974.

THE SOVIET UNION AS A MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *World Affairs*, v. 133, no. 4 (March 1971) 315-320.

10. *The Soviet Union and the Third World*

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD, by Edward Taborsky. New York, Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1973.

D. Church and State in the USSR

(*)—[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CHURCH, STATE AND OPPOSITION IN THE U.S.S.R., by Gerhard Simon. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

E. Russian and Soviet Seapower

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET SEA POWER, by Donald W. Mitchell. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974.

F. Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (KGB, etc.)

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET SECRET AGENTS*, by John Barron. New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1974. pp. 439-446.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES. VOLUME II—COVERING 1971 AND 1972; A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET PUBLICATIONS, WITH SOME ADDITIONAL TITLES FROM OTHER SOURCES. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. 345 p. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Committee Print.)

Soviet State Security; Soviet Military Intelligence; Partisans and Underground Activity; Articles on the 50th Anniversary of the State Security Service; Warnings Against Western Intelligence; and Soviet Intelligence Activities—A View from Other Sources.

G. Soviet State, Society, and the Individual

(*)—[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *CLASS AND SOCIETY IN SOVIET RUSSIA*, by Mervyn Matthews. New York, Walker and Co., 1973.

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[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE SOVIET WEST; INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONALITY AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION*, ed. by Ralph S. Clem. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. pp. 160-161.

H. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

SALT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS RACE. Los Angeles, California State University, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1972. 33 p. (Classroom Study Series, v. 1, no. 1.)

"A selected [bibliographical reference] list of research-study materials designed to acquaint

the student with the operatives of the Soviet-American disarmament dialogue."

XI. Atlases (See also Maps in Appendixes)

BRITANNICA ATLAS. Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1974. Various paging.

COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE. 106th ed. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1975. Various paging.

Note. The Army Library has a large and varied collection of atlases many of which deal with the USSR, among others.

HAMMOND CITATION WORLD ATLAS. Maplewood, N. J., Hammond Inc., 1973. 352 p.

Aside from covering the World and Polar Regions in general, the Atlas covers the specific areas.

OXFORD WORLD ATLAS. New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 1973. 190 p.

Ocean Maps (including the Atlantic Ocean); The Physical Environment (Including the Arctic Region and all of Europe); The Human Environment (including all of Europe); Topographic Maps; Urban Maps; and Thematic Maps.

(*)—PICTURE ATLAS OF THE ARCTIC, by R. Thoren. New York, American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1970. 449 p.

"The author has organized his book by area: the Arctic Ocean, drifting ice stations, Arctic Alaska . . . the Norwegian arctic islands, arctic Scandinavia and the Soviet Arctic. Discussed under each region are such topics as ice conditions, transportation, mineral resources, settlements, physical geography, etc." With bibliography.

XII. Miscellaneous

(*)—BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMINTERN, by Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, The Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 458 p.

"This volume contains 716 biographies of the comintern's personnel. Included are not only those individuals who comprised the comintern's directorate, but also those who spoke at the comintern congresses from 1919 to 1935; delegates to the enlarged plenary meetings of the executive committee from 1922 to 1933; members of the

comintern apparatus; leaders of the international organizations, and graduates of the four principal comintern schools. The data forming the basis of the biographies came from both official communist literature and from the authors' research as well as their personal contacts."

INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK AND STATEMEN'S WHO'S WHO, 1972. London, Burke's Peerage, 1972. Various paging.

Part One: International Organizations (United Nations, Specialized Agencies, Inter-Governmental Organizations, Other International and National Organizations); Organization of Foreign Ministries of Great Powers (Charts); Colored Map of the World. Part Two: States of the World (In Alphabetical Sequence); Part Three: Biographical Section.

MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL REPORT: THE WORLD AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW, in *World Affairs Report*.

The World Affairs Report is published quarterly by The California Institute of International Studies, Stanford, California. The regular feature, Moscow International Report: The World As Seen From Moscow, provides analyses of the Soviet Press, on a variety of subjects around the entire world.

PORTS OF THE WORLD 1974. 27th ed. London, Benn Brothers Limited, 1974. 867 p.

SOVIET AEROSPACE. Washington, Space Publications, Inc., 1975.

A weekly bulletin on the latest Soviet aerospace activities. This publication is in its fourth year.

SOVIET ANALYST. London, The Castle Press, 1975.

A fortnightly newsletter in its fourth year of publication dealing with a variety of subjects on the USSR, from: coexistence to nationality problems, oil and gas problems, the KGB, foreign relations, among many others.

(*)—WORLD COMMUNISM. A HANDBOOK: 1918-1965, ed. by Witold S. Sworakowski. Stanford, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 576 p.

"This guidebook provides summary data on every communist party in existence during the 1918-1965 period and on such organizations as the Balkan Communist Federation, Cominform and Comintern, Communist Youth International, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Warsaw Treaty Organization, World Federation of Trade Unions, and numerous front organizations. Information on each party and organization includes a brief history, structure, membership, relationship to Soviet leadership, press organs, party congresses, and a bibliography."

(*)—YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1973. ed. by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 651 p.

"With each passing year, the task of keeping abreast of changing developments in the Communist world becomes more difficult. This Yearbook, edited by Richard F. Staar, provides a comprehensive survey covering the calendar year 1972 of 'the organizational structure, internal development, domestic and foreign policies, and activity of Communist parties throughout the world.'"

APPENDIX A

THE NATURE OF MILITARY POWER

What is military power? We define it as the capability of a nation to employ armed forces effectively in support of national objectives by exerting influence on the performance of other nations.*

Some would assert that military power is the only effective power in the world today. There is, for instance, the perhaps apocryphal story of Stalin's contemptuous dismissal of the power of the Pope: "How many divisions does he have?" Stalin pretended, at least, to recognize no power but that of naked military force. And it was unquestionably the apparent willingness of the United States to use such force, if necessary, which caused him to withdraw from Persian Azerbaijan in 1946, and to call off the Berlin Blockade in 1949.

Stalin's successors, however, have revealed that they understand, and respect, other kinds of power, including that indefinable and unquantifiable influence which the Pope can still exert, even without divisions. They have also demonstrated considerable respect for the power of ideas. Sometimes this has been shown by modifying aspects of their autocratic and dictatorial rule of their own country and its satellite neighbors. Sometimes, also, they have shown that respect quite negatively, by armed aggression, as in Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Soviet leaders have also demonstrated an awareness of the importance of economic power. Khrushchev's famous threat to America: "We will bury you," made in 1956, shortly after he came to power, was a declaration of economic war combined with a promise to greatly increase Soviet economic power to match that of the United States. It is noteworthy, however, that either because he was impatient, or because he recognized that the promise was not achievable during his lifetime (if ever), he resorted to the more traditional Soviet concepts of power in 1962 by threatening the United States with Cuban-based nuclear blackmail. However, like Stalin before him, he backed down when he recognized that the United States was ready, if necessary, to employ superior nuclear and conventional power against the Soviet Union.

These three examples of power confrontation between the US and USSR—Azerbaijan, Berlin, and Cuba—suggest that, no matter how persuasive and influential non-military forms of

power may be, they cannot *in themselves*, and as a last resort of national policy, prevail against military power. Also, all three instances involved the use, or threatened use, of military forces actually in being.

There is, however, a very important difference between military power in being, and potential military power. Many relatively weak nations have been able to achieve their objectives, in peace and in war, despite the contrary objectives of more powerful neighbors, because the weaker nation could apply superior military strength readily available. Sparta earned a place in history by the careful cultivation of the maximum possible military strength from a small, sparsely populated area with scanty resources. Macedonia dominated the world briefly because the rulers of that otherwise undeveloped country created the most sophisticated military machine in the world for its time. A major factor in the rise of the Roman republic was the willingness of Rome's citizens to convert their resources into highly-organized military strength. The ability of Genghis Khan to implement a similar decision was the sole reason for the earthshaking conquests of the Mongols.

These historical examples must have been in the mind of a thoughtful American general, active a century ago, Winfield Scott Schofield, when he wrote: "Population and wealth do not constitute military strength. They are only the elements from which military strength may be developed in good time and by appropriate means. They are like the fat of the over-fed giant, which may be converted into muscle in due time by appropriate training. But it is too late for the giant to commence training after he has met his well-trained antagonist."*

In modern history, Japan in the first half of this century provides two classic case studies of the difference between actual and potential military power.

In 1904 Japan challenged Russia for dominance in northeast Asia. At that time the population of Russia was nearly 150 million, the population of Japan was 45 million; the total military strength of Japan was 280,000 troops (with 400,000 reserves); Russia had about 1,000,000 men in its active army (with perhaps double that number in reserves); the

*For a valuable theoretical discussion of military power, see Klaus Knorr, *Military Power and Potential*, Lexington, Mass., 1970.

*Annual Report, Secretary of War, 1887, GPO, Washington, D.C.

(Reprinted with permission from: *The Almanac of World Military Power*, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, US Army, Ret., Col. John A. C. Andrews, US Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes, 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.)

Japanese Navy had 59 warships (not counting 85 torpedo boats); Russia's navy was almost twice as large. A pygmy was defying a giant. Furthermore, the record of the war demonstrates that man-for-man, division-for-division, the Japanese on land had no discernible superiority in combat effectiveness. And, while their warships were slightly more modern, even there the man-for-man, ship-for-ship difference was not—in itself—enough to offset the tremendous Russian numerical superiority.

But most of this Russian military strength was not available to influence the outcome of a war fought in and near Manchuria. Even less relevant to such a war was the still greater disparity in manpower, economic, and industrial strength. Had Russia been willing, or able, to continue the fight, its potential power must inevitably have overwhelmed Japan. But Japanese military leaders were aware of the limitations of the 6,000 mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway, aware of the inability of Russia to unite its scattered fleets without overcoming a concentrated Japanese fleet stronger than any of them, and perhaps above all aware of internal social weaknesses in Russia. Thus they were confident that they could keep the war limited to their part of the world, that they could overwhelm in detail Russian piecemeal reinforcements, and that internal troubles would preclude determined Russian prosecution of the war. It was a close thing, but the Japanese calculations proved right.

A similar situation seemed to face Japan in 1941. The potential military strength of the United States was obviously far greater than anything Japan could possibly mobilize. The similarities of the 1904 and 1941 situations were remarkable, particularly in the exposure of a sizable naval force to a surprise pre-war attack, and in the existence of major internal divisions among the people of the larger and potentially more powerful opponent. And, as in 1904, in 1941 the Japanese had a substantial military superiority on land and sea in the part of the world they had selected as the theater of combat.

There were two major differences in these situations, however, which Japanese planners in 1941 did not sufficiently appreciate. The major internal divisions in the United States at that time were political, not social and socio-economic as they had been in Russia in 1904. The Japanese offensives in Manchuria in 1904 increased the divisive social pressures in Russia; the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor and Southeast Asia united the divergent political forces in America. Japanese planners also failed to recognize that geography and distance affect a land power differently from a naval power. The land masses of the Eastern Hemisphere effectively hobbled both the Russian Army and the Russian Navy by creating long and extremely limited and inflexible lines of communication both on land and on sea. The vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean were a barrier to American land and naval power (and air power, of course!) only so long as Japan could maintain sufficient force to interfere with American use of the sea as a broad and flexible line of communications.

On the other hand, as Alfred Thayer Mahan pointed out, although the seas afford great strategic flexibility and versatility to a maritime power, the absolute limiting effects of geography on the employment of its power are greater than for a continental power. This was demonstrated in Britain's many wars against continental powers in Europe, and against this country in both the Revolution and the War of 1812. This was one of the limiting factors affecting the United States effort in Vietnam recently.

From these random examples from history it is possible to draw some conclusions about the interrelationship of actual and potential military power as components of national power. The following are generally accepted as the classic elements of national power:

1. Natural resources
2. Industrial capacity
3. Social-political structure
4. Military strength

Another formulation, presented in an official publication of the US Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, lists the factors of national power as follows:

- Geographic (including location, configuration, topography, and size)
- Demographic (including rate of growth, age, and productivity)
- Economic (including mineral, agricultural, energy, and water resources, and the production policies for employing these resources)
- Organizational (including social and governmental structure and management skills and methods)
- Psychosocial (relating to attitudes, values, and motivation)
- Military (with consideration to national policy, military policies, forces in being, research and development, and education and training)

These two formulations of national power are really different ways of slicing the same loaf of bread—at least if “natural resources” in the first is assumed to include “geographic situation.” In either formulation, military strength, or power, comprises only one of several elements, or factors. Yet in terms of absolute national power, the others are significant in an ultimate test only to the extent that they contribute to potential *military* power and, more precisely, to the extent that they can be converted or mobilized to become *actual* military power.

Military power can be considered to have twelve characteristics:

1. Size of the armed forces;
2. Composition of the armed forces (in terms of balance or allocation of resources to the military services, and within services);

3. Quantity and performance of equipment or hardware;
4. Logistical reach, or range;
5. Availability of forces for effective employment;
6. Capability of performing sustained, active operations;
7. Mobilizable resources and productive capacity;
8. National willingness to employ force;
9. Leadership and doctrine;
10. Communications and control;
11. Military intelligence effectiveness;
12. Manpower quality in terms of skill, training, physical stamina, morale.

In his splendid study of *Military Power and Potential*, Dr. Klaus Knorr suggests that there are at least three different aspects of military power: (1) its exercise in war as by threat or by readiness, (2) its availability, and (3) its effectiveness.

He suggests that effectiveness is essentially a reflection of quality, and stresses the danger of "accepting the power of sheer numbers," or even of "superior industrial capability," by itself. This aspect of quality as a determinant of effective military power can raise disturbing questions in the minds of those who can recall how twice in this century Germany, overwhelmingly outmatched by the potential military power of its enemies, came alarmingly close to military victory.

There is a fourth aspect of military power, which Knorr recognizes, but which has been most aptly described by Dr. Henry Kissinger as its "usability." The concept of "usable" military power is quite a different thing from "actual" or "available" military power. Power can in fact be actual, it can be available, and yet still not conceivably, or credibly, or rationally usable in relation to certain national objectives. This idea of "usable" military power is to some extent a reflection of changed political attitudes in a post-colonial era world, but it is to an even greater extent a consequence of the existence of nuclear weapons with cataclysmic destructive power, weapons which are terribly important components of the military power of the nations that possess them. But the use of nuclear weapons is credible only in support of the most fundamental national objectives. Thus, a tremendous

proportion of American power, vital in any confrontation between the US and USSR, was simply not usable in Vietnam against either the Vietcong or North Vietnam.

A slightly different perspective of this concept of "usable" military power can be found in another recent historical example involving the United States. In January 1968, the North Korean Navy attacked and seized on the high seas the American electronic intelligence vessel USS *Pueblo*. In earlier times a major power would have responded to such an insult by sending a naval task force to inflict a certain amount of punishment upon such a brash, small power. In fact, in 1871, the US did respond in just such a fashion when earlier Koreans seized and destroyed an American vessel stranded off the Korean coast.

It should be noted that the United States was not reluctant to respond forcefully to much more blatant Korean lawlessness 97 years later because the United States was afraid of North Korea, or lacked the means to inflict the punishment. It is doubtful if we were inhibited seriously by the possibility of some censure in the United Nations. We simply were unwilling to incur the risk, small though it might be, of precipitating a war which could become nuclear war with one of North Korea's neighbors, over an issue, or an objective, not worth such a risk, not vital to American national security.

This one example shows three new concepts affecting the employment of military power which have emerged as a result of the development of nuclear weapons. There is a higher "threshold" of response, inhibiting actions by a nuclear power which would have been taken as a matter of course by an insulted or damaged major nation in the pre-nuclear era. The raised "threshold" is a result (despite mixing of metaphors) of the "umbrella" of mutual nuclear deterrence, which permits smaller powers considerably more leeway in their dealings with greater powers than would have been possible in those earlier eras.

Finally, and most significant, there are limits on "usable" military power (conventional as well as nuclear) because of the existence of the threshold and the umbrella.

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Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

APPENDIX B

THE SOVIET UNION

**Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh
Respublik
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

POWER POTENTIAL STATISTICS

Area: 8,600,350 square miles
Population: 251,500,000
Total Active Armed Forces: 3,655,000 (including MVD
forces; 1.45% population)
Annual Military Expenditures: \$72.9 billion by Western
estimates (12.56% GNP)
Steel and Iron Production: 300 million metric tons
Fuel Production: Coal: 655 million metric tons
Crude Oil: 394 million metric tons
Refined Oil Products: 344 million metric tons
Electric Power Output: 800 billion kwh
Merchant Fleet: 6,575 ships; 16.2 million gross tons
Civil Air Fleet: at least 350 jet, 800 turboprop and 200
piston transports

DEFENSE STRUCTURE

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is a communist federative state comprising 15 Union Republics with control highly centralized in the government in Moscow. The elective Supreme Soviet is theoretically the supreme body of state authority. The 33-member Presidium, elected by the Supreme Soviet, includes prominent members of the Communist Party

(Reprinted with permission from: The Almanac of World Military Power, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, US Army, Ret., Col. John A. C. Andrews, US Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes. 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Va., T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.)

and rules between brief, occasional sessions of the Supreme Soviet; it appoints members of the Council of Ministers, appoints and dismisses the high command of the armed forces, and has authority to decree mobilization.

De facto, the ultimate power in the Soviet system is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The party imposes its will through the government apparatus. The most powerful policy-making organ in the Communist Party is the Politburo. The Secretariat of the party's Central Committee provides day-to-day executive and administrative direction for the entire party machine. Together, the Politburo and the Secretariat constitute the real seat of power in the USSR.

The Minister of National Defense — who is always a prominent Soviet officer and eminent member of the Communist Party — is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, of which there are five major components: Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense Forces, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The General Staff is responsible for operational and strategic planning, intelligence, mobilization plans, and coordination of preparedness of the major components of the Armed Forces. The Chief of the General Staff is a First Deputy Minister of Defense. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy is responsible for political indoctrination of the armed forces. Its chief is also a First Deputy Minister of Defense and has a direct channel to the Central Committee of the Party.

POLITICO-MILITARY POLICY

The modern communist government of the USSR apparently is following the general expansionist policy which was pursued by Russian governments during the four preceding centuries. But the slogans and rationale are far different from the Czarist imperialism which the Soviet government professes to detest. Expansion of the USSR in the past 35 years has taken the form of establishing vast spheres of influence and a determination to create buffer states that are not only friendly but completely subservient to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its menacing attitude toward Romania and Yugoslavia are dramatic evidence of the Soviet concern over geographic penetrability.

The major question which has divided the USSR from its World War II allies has been the problem of Germany and European security. The USSR would not agree to the Western proposal for the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections, and objected to the remilitarization of West Germany. In response to the admission of West Germany to NATO as a sovereign state in 1955, the Soviet Government announced the conclusion of a 20-year defense alliance (the Warsaw Treaty Organization) between the USSR and its seven European satellites: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Albania has since defected and is allied with Communist China).

Early Soviet scientific successes in space exploration and missile development did much to restore Soviet international prestige, so severely damaged by brutal suppression of the Hungarian rebellion. This prestige was further enhanced by Soviet accomplishments during the late 1950s in the improvement and stock-piling of nuclear weapons, modernization of the armed forces, and upgrading of their air defense system against possible strategic nuclear attack.

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front there have been extensive East-West discussions and negotiations for arms control and disarmament. The Soviet Union refuses to accept any form of effective inspection which would assure compliance with disarmament agreements. Even without inspection, in the open societies of the West, failure to comply would be immediately evident; in the closed Soviet society there would be no fool-proof way to ascertain compliance. Bearing in mind such Soviet activities as the shipment of missiles to Cuba, while denying this was being done, Western diplomatic leaders have been reluctant to accept any terms of disarmament which do not include adequate means of verification. A degree of accommodation of the opposing positions has been arrived at in the treaty and the interim executive agreement limiting the installation of anti-ballistic and offensive long-range missiles (ABMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs) resulting from the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and signed at Moscow in May 1972. Both documents, while silent on the subject of on-site inspection, state that "national technical means" for verification of compliance with the agreed terms will be employed (see US, Politico-Military Policy).

At the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna in the fall of 1973, the Warsaw Pact proposed a cut of 20,000 ground and air forces on both sides, followed by cuts of 5% in 1976 and 10% in 1977, in response to NATO's proposed cut of 15% and common ceiling of 700,000 ground forces. When the meetings adjourned in December, both sides were still opposed on all basic principles.

The arms limitation agreements have had little effect on the Soviet buildup of weapons. The USSR is rushing to build additional long-range offensive missiles which will bring the total to 2,359, permitted under the agreement. Four new types of long-range, land-based missiles are being developed. Two are designed to carry multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), which the Soviets tested for the first time in the summer of 1973.

In contrast to the rapid buildup of strategic offensive missiles during the past few years the Kremlin has apparently undergone a substantial change in its thinking in regard to the importance of ABM systems. The USSR led the call for serious limitation of ABM systems in the SALT talks. Moscow probably will not construct systems to the limit allowed by the treaty — two sites with 100 launchers each — but will limit itself to one site. Soviet strategy has apparently shifted to a greater offensive emphasis. The Kremlin abandoned active

defenses against ballistic missiles because of its inability to develop an effective system. Instead, damage limitation will be accomplished by developing counter-force ICBMs and SLBMs, and by increasing the importance attached to passive defense measures such as urban evacuation and shelter construction, which might successfully attenuate the effects of a nuclear exchange and permit continued operations even under the most adverse conditions.

From analysis of the considerable Soviet professional literature on strategy and military affairs, there are indications that in recent years the Soviets have shifted their military thinking away from total reliance on nuclear deterrence, and that they have evolved their strategy along combined conventional and nuclear lines.

While there has been a reappraisal of the problems of nuclear war there has been no basic revision of Soviet views on war. The debate has had conventional and nuclear phases, but the emphasis has been on balance. A multiple option concept envisages Soviet forces trained for general nuclear war, conventional operations, and operations in which nuclear weapons are employed on a limited scale.

The USSR is still prepared to start a war with simultaneous nuclear attacks (presumably a preemptive first strike) against both the continental United States and Western Europe. The nuclear blow against the United States would be aimed at the annihilation of its nuclear capabilities, smashing of its economy and of its state and military control centers, disruption of communications, and destruction of strategic reserves. The objective of the attack would be to eliminate US capability to deliver a second strike nuclear blow against the USSR, and to prevent American participation in the defense of Europe. The simultaneous nuclear attack against Western Europe would be followed by a massive invasion of Western Europe by Soviet ground forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons, with the objective the seizure of all of Europe.

The introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles has resulted in an extensive weapons research and development program. Groups of experts with high military rank and advanced academic degrees in military and related fields work ceaselessly in all areas of military science. A network of military, scientific, and party leaders controls and guides the drive for new and better weapons. The Supreme Military Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party controls weapons research and development, providing guidelines to the Ministry of Defense and the Academy of Sciences. Within the Ministry the General Staff is responsible for all military science programs. Its Military Science Directorate supervises and implements the programs, with the assistance of several institutions devoted to military science. Basic research is performed by six directorates, specializing in weapons, missiles, engineering, naval weapons, ships and aircraft. The military effort is also served by the Ministries of Defense Industry, Aviation Industry, and Automotive Industry. Original research for new weapons systems starts in

the Academy of Sciences or the Research Institutes of the General Staff. Prototypes are produced from approved designs at one of the plants. After being tested, an accepted prototype is admitted for serial production in one of the plants of the several ministries, depending upon its characteristics. The total development cycle for a complex weapon such as a missile is estimated to take six to eight years. The Soviet military research and development systems spend about \$9,000,000,000 annually.

The Soviet law on military service promulgated in 1967 reduced the length of conscripted service, which is universal, to two years for the Army, Air Force, and coastal and border defense units, and three for the Navy and units on coastal patrol vessels. Draftees with advanced education have only a one year obligation. The call up age is 18 years, with inductions in June and December. Compulsory pre-military training is carried out in schools, factories and collective farms by instructors from regular forces, providing many surplus officers with jobs and giving the potential conscript some rudimentary military training.

In an effort to prevent competent young officers from moving prematurely into the reserves, the law sets precise age limits on service, by age, rank and length of service. Marshals, generals of the army, admirals and colonel generals must retire at age 60, lieutenant generals and major generals at age 55, colonels at 50, lieutenant colonels and majors at 45, and captains and senior lieutenants at 40.

Educational requirements for Soviet officers are increasing steadily. More than 50 percent of the officer corps are technicians and engineers. There are 120 specialized military schools and 18 war colleges, with courses lasting from two to six years.

Soviet reinforcement planning allows for rapid mobilization of both reservists and active personnel in training units to bring the understrength divisions (about half the total) to full complement. These units would have to be moved from the interior by rail or road and in many cases it would take some time for them to become operational. Nevertheless the fact that the Soviet Union maintains so many formations, if only as skeletons, and that it has some 60 divisions in Europe alone, means that it can deploy a very large number of combat strength divisions in Central Europe within weeks of mobilization.

The Soviet Army insists on the primacy of offensive action, involving rapid movement by mobile forces to bring a heavy concentration of armor into the enemy rear. This doctrine calls for army units to attack from the line of march and to cover up to 70 miles in 24 hours, operating along independent axes. A Soviet field army holding a sector of 70 to 80 miles would attack on a front of about 30 miles, with divisional attack frontages of about seven miles each.

The overriding impression from a study of Soviet military literature is that the Soviet command is placing increasing reliance on airborne forces which it considers capable of

performing strategic missions independently, both in direct relation to the Soviet Union and possibly to protect its interests in more distant areas. In the last decade a great amount of money and time have been spent on developing transport aircraft, assault guns, multiple rocket launchers and other equipment for use by airborne troops. Transport capacity appears to be adequate to move from two to three fully equipped divisions in one lift.

The importance of the Soviet Navy in the Soviet military establishment has been increased by new technological developments, and the extension of Soviet power and interests beyond the land perimeters of the USSR. The navy's prime mission is to counter the direct threat posed by the maritime strike capability of the western nations, and particularly the United States. To counter aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines the Soviet Navy must move out of the confines of its four fleet areas (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific) to the high seas. At the same time it must maintain the capability of cooperating with the Soviet Army in coastal areas.

Although the organization of the Soviet Navy has not changed much since the end of World War II the strategic concept for its use is quite different. The cautious stationing of ships along the coast has given way to emphasis on global deployment. Soviet submarines from the Northern and Pacific Fleets are patrolling vast areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The fleet in the Mediterranean is showing the Soviet flag and tying up the US Sixth Fleet. There also is intensified Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The imminent reopening of the Suez Canal will increase the Soviet naval presence in the waters of the Middle and Far East. The significance of this, both strategically and economically in a world highly dependent upon the flow of oil from these areas, is enormous and will certainly have great impact on US as well as USSR military planning.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

The USSR has long and difficult borders. Its western frontier in Europe is crossed by two major natural invasion routes from the west with little or no truly defensive terrain. Maintaining the integrity of the long border across Asia presents overwhelming military and logistic problems.

The geopolitical situation poses threats to the USSR from potential enemies on two fronts, Germany in the west and China in the east. Viewed through Soviet eyes and the perspective of history, the danger of attack from the west cannot be ignored merely because Germany today is different from the nation which twice attacked Russia during this century. Although China currently is militarily weak, its potential is enormous, and there is abundant historic and ideological hostility toward the USSR. The possibility of future cooperation between Japan and China cannot be overlooked by Soviet strategists.

The deteriorating and explosive relationship between the USSR and the People's Republic of China has become an important element in the global balance of power. With the Chinese acquiring operational nuclear weapons, the Soviet strategic problem becomes more significant. Almost all cities and military and industrial complexes in the Soviet Far East and Central Asia are vulnerable to a surprise Chinese attack which could inflict heavy damage. Once the Chinese begin to deploy the new 3,500-mile range missiles they are already producing they will be capable of hitting Moscow and other major centers in European Russia. The Kremlin leaders and the Soviet high command face a difficult choice of strategic alternatives. They can unleash a preventive nuclear strike that would destroy China's nuclear capability and eventually overthrow the anti-Soviet government in Peking, or they can adopt a waiting, no action, policy, which would condemn Russians to live in danger from almost one billion Chinese, whose military strength and hostility is growing rapidly. Today, and in the immediate future, the USSR could attack China with reasonable expectation of destroying Peking's nuclear bases, with little risk of effective Chinese nuclear retaliation. The political damage to the USSR, and to international communism, however, would be enormous. On the other hand, in a few years the military risk of a Soviet preventive strike might be prohibitive.

Although Sino-Soviet war may not be imminent, there is good evidence of preparations for it on both sides of the 4,000-mile frontier. In the past several years the Soviets have expanded their forces in the area from 15 divisions to possibly as many as 50 motorized and tank divisions. This ground force of well over 800,000 men is supported by 75,000 border ground troops, more than 1,000 combat aircraft and the Amur River flotilla. Backing up these conventional forces are a substantial number of missiles with nuclear warheads.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The Soviet Union has provided substantial military assistance to all communist-controlled countries in the world, and to unaligned and leftist underdeveloped nations through a combination of sale, loan, and grant. It is estimated that the total value of military assistance provided by the USSR to 35 developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East since 1955 has been at least \$8 billion. Of this total, which does not include support provided in the October War of 1973, some 77 percent (\$6.2 billion) has gone to the Middle East and Asia. Egypt has received the largest amount — \$2.5 billion — with India and Iraq receiving about \$1 billion each. Nearly all of the \$1.1 billion sent to Southeast Asia went to Indonesia prior to 1966. Africa has received less than \$1 billion, \$400 million of it going to Algeria. No known military assistance was provided through 1973 to Latin American countries, except for Cuba. In conjunction with the military assistance program, approximately 30,000 military personnel from developing

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countries have received military training in the USSR since 1955. At present there are in Afghanistan some 200 Soviet military advisers, in Iraq 1,500, in Syria nearly 3,000, in Algeria over 1,000, in Sudan 500, in Yemen Arab Republic 400, in the People's Republic of Yemen 200, in Egypt about 1,000, in the Somali Republic 300, in Ceylon 100, and in India over 150. Cuba has the largest Soviet advisory and training mission among Communist countries, about 5,000 officers and NCOs.

ALLIANCES

In addition to being a member of the UN and the leading member of the Warsaw Pact Alliance, the USSR has bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with all other communist nations (including the People's Republic of China), with the exception of Albania.

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

Personnel: 350,000

Missile Inventory:

- c. 1600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): 288 SS-9, and 950+ SS-11; 210 SS-7 and SS-8; 100 SS-13. Ranges up to 7,000 miles. There are 91 silos under construction. Most missiles are liquid-fueled, resulting in a delayed reaction time. Some solid-fueled missiles are apparently now being deployed. Protection of launch sites is achieved by "hardening" in massive underground silos and by dispersion. Warhead yields range up to 25 megatons; some missiles have multiple warheads, but are not at this time believed to be independently targeted.
- c. 700 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs): 100 SS-5 and 600 SS-4. MRBMs have ranges up to 1,000 miles; IRBM ranges are up to 3,000 miles. These are deployed near Soviet land frontiers, and threaten Western Europe, Japan, and China. Most of these are also fixed emplacement, liquid-fueled missiles in hardened sites. These earlier systems will be supplemented, and eventually replaced by mobile, solid-fueled missiles (e.g., SS-14).

AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

Personnel: 500,000; about half in ground units (PVO-Voysk) and half in air operational units (PVO-Strany); ground units are supported by the Army; air units by the Air Force.

Antiaircraft Artillery Equipment:

light artillery pieces: 23mm and 57mm; for close-in defense 1,000 feet and below. Many of these are self-propelled, on tracked chassis, as the twin-barrelled ZSU-57/2, and the quadruple-barrelled ZSU-23/4.

medium artillery pieces: 85mm, 100mm, and 130mm; almost completely replaced by surface-to-air missiles.

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): 10,000: 5,000 SA-2, 5,000 other

SA-1 Guild*: roughly comparable to the US Nike-Ajax; still deployed around Moscow.

SA-2 Guideline: a two-stage missile, with a slant-range of 27 miles, intercept capability at altitudes from 1,000 to 80,000 feet. At least four versions exist (one for naval use) and the latest version is believed to have nuclear capability. The SA-2 has been used with ground forces.

SA-3 Goa: a two-stage missile, intended primarily for low-altitude air defense. Three versions known to exist — one for naval use. Some SA-3 units may be assigned to ground forces air defense; range about 15 miles.

SA-4 Ganef: twin-mounted on a tracked carrier, for use with ground forces, comparable in capabilities to Guideline but much more mobile.

SA-5 Griffon: a long-range SAM, also called Tallinn system, thought by some to have a limited ABM capability.

SA-6 Gainful: triple-mounted on a tracked carrier, probably intended as a low-altitude complement to Ganef with the ground forces.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM):

Galosh: a multi-stage missile now being deployed around Moscow; 64 launchers have missiles installed. It is presumed to have a range of several hundred miles with a warhead yield of more than one megaton. There are some indications that a more advanced version exists and will eventually replace some or all Galosh presently deployed.

*This and all other code names are assigned by NATO.

Fighter Aircraft:

3,000+ defensive interceptor and all weather fighters (MiG-17/19/21/25, Su-9/11, Yak-25/28 and Tu-28; most equipped with air-to-air missiles Alkali, Anab, Ash, Atoll, Awl)

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS):

10 modified Tu-114 Cleat turboprop transports (codenamed Moss by NATO) carry airborne detection radars to detect and track enemy aircraft while vectoring interceptors toward these targets.

ARMY

The Soviet Army is prepared for both nuclear and conventional war. It is trained to advance on a broad front at high speed. Infantry is provided with covered armored personnel carriers to facilitate advance across radioactive terrain. All major Soviet units are equipped with tactical nuclear missiles, and are also well equipped for offensive and defensive chemical warfare. The conventional fire-power of a Soviet division is comparable to that of a NATO division. Logistics, which was always the weakest point in the Soviet military system, is evidently being improved and adapted to the requirements of high speed advance and the extended range of operations. Soviet organizational doctrine provides for limited numbers of support troops in the divisions, which therefore are dependent on higher echelons for support.

Soviet divisions have three degrees of combat readiness. Category I, 35 to 50 percent of the total, are divisions at, or near full strength. These include the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe and most of those stationed on the Chinese border. Category II, about one-quarter of the total, are divisions at more than half-strength. Category III, the remaining one-quarter, are divisions at less than half-strength. All divisions have full equipment, but much of it in Categories II and III is in storage. In case of war, the Soviet Army will probably return to the World War II Front (army group) organization, with each front incorporating several combined arms armies, one or more tank armies, a tactical air army, missile and artillery units, airborne troops and special forces.

Major components of a motorized rifle division are three motorized rifle regiments, one medium tank regiment, one artillery regiment, one each rocket artillery, Frog (surface to surface missile), engineer, antiaircraft and signal battalion, a reconnaissance, helicopter, and chemical warfare company, and rear services units. All motorized rifle regiments have been upgraded in firepower and mobility. In addition, within the next few years most, if not all, Soviet divisions will be equipped with the T-62 main battle tank. Total strength is 10,485 men (1,094 officers, 9,391 enlisted), 188 tanks, 308 APCs, 48 howitzers, and 1,350 trucks.

The Soviet tank division consists of three medium tank regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, one each rocket launcher, Frog, antiaircraft, engineer, reconnaissance, and signal battalion, a helicopter company, and chemical warfare and rear services units. Total strength is 8,415 men, 316 tanks, c. 190 APCs, c. 1,300 trucks, and 10 to 15 helicopters.

Each airborne division has three airborne regiments, one artillery regiment, and one each engineer, multiple rocket launcher, signal, antiaircraft, medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalion. There are also indications that a tactical nuclear missile (Frog) battalion recently became an organic part of the airborne division.

The trend in the Soviet Army seems to be toward further perfection of the mobile striking forces and airborne forces. Operational and logistical exploitation of the helicopter, refinement of command and control, and management of the nuclear and conventional battle, including the concept of the automated battlefield, will increasingly occupy the attention of the Soviet command. There will be qualitative advances in conventional weapons and in the variety of nuclear missiles. Greater attention will be paid to officer training, especially in the technical fields.

Personnel: 1,750,000

Organization:

- 17 military and special military districts
- 102 motorized rifle divisions
- 51 tank divisions
- 7 airborne divisions

Numerous artillery, engineering, signal, antiaircraft, chemical and missile units

Deployment:

East Europe

- 31 divisions: 20 in Germany (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany) including 10 tank divisions; 4 in Hungary (Southern Group of Forces) including 2 tank divisions; 2 in Poland (Northern Group of Forces) including a tank division; 5 in Czechoslovakia (Central Group of Forces); all or most are in Category I, or full readiness status.

European USSR (west of Urals, north of Caucasus):

- 60 divisions: includes 22 tank divisions: about 28 divisions are in Category II, and 14 in Category III.

Central USSR (Siberia, between the Urals and Lake Baikal):

- 5 divisions: includes 2 tank divisions; all or most are Category III, below half-strength

Southern USSR (Trans-Caucasus, Turkestan):

- 28 divisions: includes 4 tank divisions; 2 divisions in Category I; 4 in Category II, and 5 in Category III.

Soviet Far East (east of Lake Baikal):

51 divisions: about 21, including 10 tank divisions, are in Category I, 21 are in Category II; 2 of the 33 Far East divisions are in Mongolia (Soviet Forces, Mongolia).

Major Equipment Inventory:

- 1,500+heavy tanks (T-10, modification of JS-2/3, with 122mm gun)
- 42,000+medium tanks (T-62, with 155mm gun, T-54 and T-55, both with 100mm gun)
- 1,500+light reconnaissance tanks (PT-76, amphibious, with 76mm gun)
- 30,000 APCs (BMP-76, BRDM, BTR-60, BTR-50, BTR-40, BTRM-1967, M-1970, etc.)
- 1,000 heavy artillery pieces (152mm and nuclear capable 203mm; many self-propelled)
- 3,000 medium artillery pieces (122mm and 130mm; many self-propelled)
- 8,000 light artillery pieces (85mm, ASU-85 ATK, and 100mm; many self-propelled)
- 5,000 antitank guns (57mm; some self-propelled ASU-57)
- 4,000 truck-mounted 240mm rocket launchers, multi-barrelled
- 1,000 light AAA pieces (14.5mm, 23mm, 37mm)
 - mobile tactical missiles (Scud, Shaddock, Salish, Frog, and Scaleboard; ranges of 15 to 500 miles)
 - antitank missiles (Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger)

Reserves: At least nine million trained reserves are available for mobilization; of these about 500,000 are probably earmarked to bring Category II and III divisions, and supporting units, up to strength. The remainder are available as replacements and to create new units. Training is reported to be haphazard and inadequate.

NAVY

With over 2,000 units the Soviet Navy ranks as the second largest in the world. The buildup in both scope and strength became obvious in the 1960s when new Soviet naval units started roaming all oceans. With the new Y-class submarines as its mainstay, the Soviet Navy is strong in surface ships, submarines and a naval air force. The Soviet Naval Air Force, except for helicopters, is based on shore.

The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy is directly under the Minister of Defense. The line of direct command

goes from the Commander in Chief to the fleets, flotillas, Naval Air Force, Naval Infantry, Naval Educational Directorate and the Rear Services.

The Soviet Navy has recently strengthened and reorganized its Naval Infantry (marines) to increase its capability for intervention and amphibious landings. It is well equipped, trained and led. The basic organizational structure of the Naval Infantry is the reinforced battalion (sometimes called regiment). Naval Infantry battalions are organized into brigades of three to five battalions each (comparable to a USMC Regimental Landing Team), an amphibious tank battalion and an amphibious assault unit (engineers and frogmen). Each fleet has at least one brigade.

Personnel: 500,000 (includes Naval Air Force of 100,000 and 20,000 Naval Infantry). About 200,000 are serving afloat.

Organization:

Four fleets: Baltic Sea, Black Sea/Mediterranean, Arctic Ocean/White Sea, Far East (Pacific)

Major Units:

Surface Ships:

- 1 45,000 ton aircraft carrier, *Kiev*
- 27 cruisers (CA, CLG)
 - 9 Kresta class (4 Kresta I and 5 Kresta II) with SS-N-10, (Shaddock) cruise SSMs, SA-N-1 and SA-N-3 (Goa) SAMs
 - 4 Kynda class (same armament as Kresta class)
 - 12 Sverdlov class (2 have SA-N-4 Ganef; 1 has SA-N-2 Guideline SAMs)
 - 2 other cruisers (Chapaev and Kirov class, used mainly for training)
- 2 helicopter carriers, *Moskva*, *Leningrad*, with SA-N-3 Sams and 20 Ka-25 ASW helicopters each)
- 101 destroyers (DD)
 - 3 Krivak class with SS-N-10 SSCM and SA-N-4 SAM
 - 5 Krupny class with SS-N-1 cruise SSMs
 - 4 Kildin class with SS-N-1 cruise SSMs
 - 15 Kashin class AA and ASW destroyers with SA-N-1 SAMs
 - 3 Kanin class with SA-N-1 SAMs
 - 26 Kotlin class AA and ASW destroyers (9 with SA-N-1 SAMs)
 - 45 Skory class AA and ASW destroyers

- 130 frigates and destroyer escorts (DL, DE)
- 258 coastal escorts and submarine chasers (PF, PC, SC)
- 186 fleet minesweepers (MSO)
- 121 coastal minesweepers (MLS)
- 115 Osa class patrol boats with Styx missiles (PTFG)
- 16 Komar class patrol boats with Styx missiles (PTFG)
- 301 fast patrol and torpedo boats (PTF, PT)
- 95 amphibious ships (LS)
- 139 amphibious craft (LCU, LCT)
- 1,000 auxiliaries and support ships
- numerous minesweepers and trawlers have been modified for gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT)

Submarines:

- 114 nuclear-powered submarines (SSN)
- 12 H-II class equipped to fire 3 SS-N-5 IRBMs
- 3 D class equipped to fire 12 SS-N-8 missiles
- 34 Y class equipped to fire 16 SS-N-6 missiles
- 39 C class equipped to fire 8 SS-N-7 cruise missiles, E-I and E-II class equipped to fire 6 to 8 SS-N-3 cruise missiles with a range of about 300 miles
- 26 N and V class attack submarines
- 316 conventionally-powered submarines (SS)
- 24 G class equipped to fire 3 SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 IRBMs
- 29 J and W class equipped to fire 2 to 4 SS-N-3 cruise missiles
- 263 B, F, Z, R, Q, and W class attack and training submarines

Submarine deployment

- Baltic Fleet: 60
- Arctic Fleet: 160 (including about half the missile-equipped submarines)
- Black Sea/Mediterranean Fleet: 50
- Far East Fleet: 105 (including about half the missile-equipped submarines)
- Remainder: deployment not known.

Naval Air Force (all land-based, except for 2 helicopter carriers):

- 770 combat aircraft
 - 400 Tu-16 Badger bomber/reconnaissance/tankers equipped with ASMs (Kipper or Kelt)
 - 60 Tu-22 Blinder bomber/recon-

naissance (Kitchen)

- 30 Il-38 May maritime reconnaissance aircraft
- 50 Tu-20 Bear long-range bomber/reconnaissance aircraft; some equipped with a Kangaroo ASM
- 50 Il-28 Beagle light reconnaissance/bombers
- 100 Mi-4 Hound and Ka-25A Hormone ASW helicopters
- 80 Be-12 Mail ASW flying boats (amphibian)
- 360 other aircraft
 - 210 miscellaneous transport aircraft
 - 150 trainer/support aircraft

Naval Infantry (Marines):

Personnel: 20,000

Deployment: One brigade in each of the four fleets

Reserves: An unknown number of reservists are available to bring the complements of all warships (some below full manning level) to war strength.

Major Naval Bases: Leningrad, Nikolayev, Sevastopol, Molotovsk, Murmansk, Vladivostok, Arkhangelsk

AIR FORCE

Tactical aviation with its ground attack and fighter-interceptor aircraft, light bombers and reconnaissance planes makes up the bulk of the Air Force. It is organized in 12 air armies. Long range aviation with nine air divisions is organized in three air armies, two of which are deployed in Europe and one in the Far East.

The Air Transport Command has over 2,000 transport planes. The largest aircraft in service is the Antonov AN-22 with a maximum range of nearly 6,000 nm, or over 2,500 nm with maximum load of 176,000 lb. Half of the Soviet transport aircraft are made up of An-12 (range 1,800 nm) and Il-18 (range 2,000 nm). Military transport can readily be augmented by nearly 400 Aeroflot (Soviet airline) aircraft, Tu-104s, Tu-114s, Tu-124s, and Tu-134s.

There has been no let-up in the pace of modernization in the Soviet Air Force. About 15 new types of Soviet aircraft have appeared in the past 10 years. In 1973 the USSR built nearly 1,800 planes, half of them fighters, the rest bombers, transports and helicopters.

Personnel: 255,000 (not including Air Defense units)

Organization:

Long-Range Air Force

Intercontinental Bomber Force (Mya-4 and Tu-20)

Medium Bomber Force (Tu-16 and Tu-22)

Tactical Air Force (a Tactical Air Army is based in each of these countries: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary)

Air Transport Command

Major Aircraft Types (not including Air Defense units):

6,840 combat aircraft

140 strategic bombers

40 Mya-4 Bison* long-range bombers

100 Tu-20 Bear* long-range turboprop bombers (about two-thirds armed with Kangaroo ASM)

700 medium bombers

200 Tu-22 Blinder supersonic bombers (about half with Kitchen ASM)

500 Tu-16 Badger bombers (about half armed with Kelt ASM)

4,000 fighter/fighter-bombers

MiG-17 Fresco

MiG-19 Farmer

MiG-21 Fishbed

MiG-23 Flogger

MiG-25 Foxbat

Su-7 Fitter

Yak-25 Flashlight

Yak-28P Firebar

2,000 tactical attack light bombers

Il-28 Beagle light bomber

Yak-28 Brewer supersonic light bomber

8,515 other aircraft

50 long-range tankers (converted Mya-4 and Tu-20 bombers)

1,700 short-, medium-, and long-range transports (Il-14 Crate, An-24 Coke, An-12 Cub, An-14 Clod, Il-18 Coot)

15 heavy transports (An-22 Cock)

1,750 helicopters (Mi-1 Hare, Mi-4 Hound, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-10 Harke, Mi-12)

4,950 miscellaneous trainer/support aircraft

50 tactical reconnaissance aircraft
Yak-26 Mangrove

Reserves: There is a highly trained air reserve totaling about 600,000 men. Also, most of the Aeroflot medium- and long-range civil airliners are convertible to military use.

Air Bases: There are about 500 air bases. Of these over 90 are in the Arctic or sub-Arctic regions. About two-thirds of the operational bases are in Europe.

PARAMILITARY

There are approximately 300,000 MVD internal security (125,000) and border troops (175,000); in addition, the Soviet DOSAAF (Volunteer Organization for Support of the Army, Air Force, and Navy) trains the population in basic military skills.

*One-syllable NATO code-names are for propeller (piston- or turbine-powered) aircraft; two-syllable names are for pure-jet.

APPENDIX C

USSR ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX D

Strategic-Nuclear Offensive Weapons Arsenals in Mid-1975

ICBMs-Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	U.S.	USSR
Total ICBMs:	1,054	1,590
"heavy"*	0	288
"old"	54	209
"light"	1,000	1,093
Fitted with multiple warheads (MRV)	0	some
Fitted with multiple, independently targetable warheads (MIRV)	550	some

SLBMs-Submarine-Borne Ballistic Missiles

Total SLBMs (incl. under conversion):	656	760
SLBMs on "modern nuclear submarines"*	656	676
SLBMs on "older nuclear submarines"*	0	24
SLBMs on diesel-electric submarines	0	60
Fitted with MRV	176	some
Fitted with MIRV, operational	352	0
SLBMs counted as "strategic" under SALT I and Vladivostok tentative agreement rules	656	700

Manned Long-Range Bombers

Total, gross inventories	498	210+
Operational, heavy	330	160
Modern medium bombers	66	50+
Bombers counted as "strategic" under SALT I and Vladivostok tentative agreement rules	498	160
Total offensive delivery vehicles defined as "strategic" under Vladivostok tentative agreement rules	2,208	2,450

*SALT I definitions

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APPENDIX E

U.S. AND USSR ICBMs: Salient Features and Numbers Deployed, 1975

		Year First Deployed	Number Operational	Warhead Systems		Throw- Weight 1,000 Lbs.
				Number of	Yield Mt./Kt.	
U.S.						
Minuteman-2		1966	450	1	1-2 Mt.	1
Minuteman-3		1970	550	3	170 Kt.	2
Titan-2		1962	54	1	9 Mt.	8
USSR						
"old"						
SS-7		1962	190	1	5 Mt.	3
SS-8		1963	19	1	5 Mt.	3
"light"						
SS-13		1969	60	1	1 Mt.	1
SS-16		1975	Some	1	1 Mt. +	1
"medium"						
SS-11 Mod. 1		1966	967	1	1-2 Mt.	1.5
SS-11 Mod. 3		1973	66	3 MRV	300 Kt.	1.5
SS-17		1975	10	4 MRV	1 Mt.	4.5
SS-19		1975	50	6 MIRV	300 Kt.	6
"heavy"						
SS-9 Mod. 2		1967	250	1	20 Mt.	12
SS-9 Mod. 4		1971	Some	3 MRV	5 Mt.	12
SS-18 Mod. 1		1974	10	1	20 Mt.	15
SS-18 Mod. 2		1976	---	6-8	2 Mt.	15
MRBMs	SS-4	1959	500+	1	1 Mt.	
IRBMs	SS-5	1961	100+	1	1 Mt.	

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APPENDIX F

U.S. and USSR

SLBM Forces:

Salient Features and Numbers in Inventory, mid-1975

Submarines

	<i>Propulsion</i>	<i>Year First Deployed</i>	<i>Number in Inventory</i>	<i>SLBM Tubes</i>
U.S.				
George Washington/ Ethan Allen (Polaris)	nuclear	1960	11	16
Lafayette Class (Poseidon)	nuclear	1962	30	16
USSR				
G-class*	diesel	1960	20	3
H-class	nuclear	1963	8	3
Y-class	nuclear	1968	34	16
D-I class	nuclear	1973	11	12
D-II class	nuclear	1976	0	20

SLBMs

	<i>Year First Deployed</i>	<i>Range N. Miles</i>	<i>Number in Inventory (Incl. under Conversion)</i>	<i>Warhead Systems Number of</i>	<i>Yield Mt./Kt.</i>
U.S.					
Polaris A-3	1964	2,500	176	3 MRV	200 Kt.
Poseidon C-3	1971	2,500	480	10 MIRV	40 Kt.
USSR					
SS-N-4	1960	300	24	1	1-2 Mt.
SS-N-5	1963	700	60**	1	1-2 Mt.
SS-N-6 Mod. 1	1968	1,300		1	1-2 Mt.
SS-N-6 Mod. 2	1974	1,600	544	1	1-2 Mt.
SS-N-6 Mod. 3	1974	1,600		3 MRV	200 Kt. (estimated)
SS-N-8	1973	4,200	132	1 (or MIRV)	2 Mt. +

* These boats are not defined as "strategic" under the SALT definitions.

** Of which 24 are housed in H-class boats and 36 in G-II class boats. (Only the former are counted in the official listing of strategic forces.)

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APPENDIX G

U.S. and USSR Manned Bomber Forces

	<i>Year First Deployed</i>	<i>Number mid-1975 Operational</i>	<i>Unrefueled Max. Range Statute Miles</i>	<i>Theoretical Max. Payload Pounds</i>
U.S.				
B-52 G&H	1959	255	12,500	75,000
B-52 D	1956	75	11,500	60,000
FB-111A	1969	66	3,800	37,500
B-1	1980 (?)	—	—	150,000
USSR				
Tu-95	1956	75	7,800	40,000
Mya-4	1956	85	6,000	20,000
Tu-16	1955	500+	4,000	20,000
Backfire	1974	50+	4,500	40,000

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APPENDIX H

Naval Ship Construction 1962-1972		
	USSR	U.S.
Major Surface Combatants	92	83
Ballistic Missile Submarines	32	32
Cruise Missile Submarines	51	—
Attack Submarines	54	43
Amphibious Warfare	80	51
Auxiliaries	42	37
Minor Combatants and Mine Warfare	560	17
Total	911	263

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APPENDIX I

Central NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces*

	<i>Forces (thousands)</i>	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Tactical Aircraft</i>
NATO Member**			
United States	190	2,100	240
United Kingdom	55	600	130
Canada	3	30	40
Belgium	65	375	140
Netherlands	77	500	160
West Germany (FRG)	340	2,950	600
Total	730	6,555	1,310
Warsaw Pact Member			
Soviet Union	460	7,850	1,250
Czechoslovakia	155	2,900	500
East Germany (DRG)	100	1,650	330
Poland	220	3,100	730
Total	935	15,500	2,810

* These forces are only the central ones in West Germany, the Benelux countries, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

** French forces of 58,000 in West Germany and France's 325 tanks and 400 aircraft are not shown in the table.

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background
NOTES

U.S.S.R.

department of state * september 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GEOGRAPHY

The U.S.S.R. is the largest country in the world. Its territory stretches

from the Baltic Sea across the northern Eurasian landmass to the Bering Strait, where an island belonging to the Soviet Union lies only 3 miles

from an island that is part of Alaska. Most of the U.S.S.R. is above 50° north latitude (that of Winnipeg, Canada). The latitude of Moscow is the same as that of southern Alaska.

PROFILE

Geography

AREA: 8,649,490 sq. mi. (about 2½ times the size of U.S.). CAPITAL: Moscow (pop. 7.5 million). OTHER CITIES: Leningrad (3.6 million), Kiev (1.8 million).

People

POPULATION: 253.3 million (Jan. 1975). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: Less than 1% (1975). DENSITY: 84 per sq. mi. (European part), 4 per sq. mi. (Eastern Siberia and Soviet Far East). ETHNIC GROUPS: 53% Russian, 17% Ukrainian, 4% Uzbek, 4% Belorussian (1970). RELIGIONS: 70% atheist; 18% Russian Orthodox; 9% Moslem; Jewish, Protestant, Georgian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Gregorian. LANGUAGES: Russian (official), 76% Slavic, 11% Altaic, 8% other Indo-European, 3% Uralian, 2% Caucasian. LITERACY: 98.5% (between 9-49 yrs. of age). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 70 yrs. (1974).

Government

TYPE: Federal Union (est. Dec. 30, 1922). DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1936. BRANCHES: Executive—U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Legislative—bicameral U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet (767-member Council of the Union, 750-member Council of Nationalities). Judicial—Supreme Court of U.S.S.R.

POLITICAL PARTY: Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18; direct, equal. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 15 Union Republics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 krais, 120 oblasts, 8 autonomous oblasts.

FLAG: Red with a yellow hammer and sickle below a yellow star in the upper left corner.

Economy

GNP: \$710 billion (1974, in 1974 U.S. dollars). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.2% (1974). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2,800 (in 1974 U.S. dollars). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 2.2% (1974).

AGRICULTURE: Land 9.3%. Labor 27%. Products—wheat, rye, corn, oats, potatoes, sugarbeets, linseed, sunflower seed, cotton and flax, cattle, pigs, sheep.

INDUSTRY: Labor 73%. Products—mining, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, fuels and power, building materials, chemicals, machine-building.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Fuel, waterpower, timber, manganese, lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, phosphate.

TRADE (1974, U.S.S.R. figures): Exports—\$27.4 billion: fuel, raw materials, machinery and equipment, semifinished products. Imports—\$24.9 billion: machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, crude materials, chemicals. Partners—G.D.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, F.R.G., Japan, Cuba, Finland, Romania, Italy, France.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 ruble=US\$1.45 (June 1975).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), Geneva Disarmament Conference, U.N. and several of its specialized agencies (IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO), Seabeds Committee, Warsaw Pact, Universal Copyright Convention.

In the west, from the Pripyet Marshes near the Polish border to the Ural Mountains, Soviet territory stretches over a broad plain broken by occasional low hills. Crossing this plain to the south are a number of rivers, of which the most important are the Dnieper, which empties into the Black Sea, and the Volga, which empties into the Caspian Sea. Between the Black and Caspian Seas lie the scenic Caucasus Mountains.


The low Urals mark the traditional division between European and Asiatic Russia. To the east are the vast Siberian lowlands and the deserts of central Asia. Beyond are the barren Siberian highlands and the mountain ranges of the Soviet Far East. Farther to the east lie higher mountain ranges, including the Pamirs, Altai, and Tien Shan.

The climate of the Soviet Union is varied but for the most part has long, cold winters and brief summers. In parts of the eastern Siberian tundra temperatures of -90° F have been recorded, and the January average is about -60° F. South of the tundra is a large forest belt covering more than half the country.

South of the forests are the steppes (prairies) where the soil is rich and dark and rainfall is abundant. The steppes make up 12 percent of the area of the U.S.S.R. and contain two-thirds of the arable land.

A small subtropical zone lies south

(Washington, Department of State, September 1975 (Publication 7842).)



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TRAVEL NOTES

Climate and Clothing—The climate of the Soviet Union is as varied as that of the United States. Winter travelers to European areas of the U.S.S.R. should bring their warmest clothes, boots, and hats. (Public buildings, hotels, and homes are well heated.) Hot weather generally occurs from June through August; Moscow summer temperatures often range into the 90's, and lightweight clothing is usually in order. Spring and early fall are unpredictable with snow flurries and temperatures in the 80's both possible in May and September.

Customs and Visas—A valid Soviet entry/exit visa is required of all American travelers to the U.S.S.R. Tourists, businessmen, and persons attending conferences or conventions in the U.S.S.R. should arrange their travel through one of the many U.S. or European travel agencies accredited by Intourist, the official Soviet travel agency. In addition to arranging all travel and hotel accommodations (which must be paid for in advance), the travel agent makes arrangements for visas as well.

A customs declaration must be completed on arrival, and baggage and personal effects are often examined closely by customs inspectors. No Soviet currency may be brought into or taken out of the U.S.S.R., and all other cur-

rency and valuables must be declared. The declaration, stamped by Soviet customs authorities, must be retained by the traveler and presented again on departure. Understating or not declaring currency or valuables can lead to confiscation. Currency exchange may only be carried out by official Soviet Government agencies and all receipts should be kept by the traveler. All offers to exchange money on the street or to buy personal clothing or other items should be refused: they are in violation of Soviet law.

Soviet customs authorities often confiscate religious objects or publications, particularly if more than one item is imported. Pornography, anti-Soviet publications, and the like may also be confiscated. Soviet authorities are extremely sensitive to attempts to bring in marijuana or narcotic drugs or to take out correspondence or other items for Soviet citizens.

Health—Adequate medical care is available in the larger cities, although some common medications are not. Methods of treatment and facilities often differ from those to which Americans are accustomed. Travelers in need of medical care should ask their hotel service bureau or their Intourist guide to direct them to the proper facility. Medical treatment is provided to foreigners without charge under most circumstances. No im-

munizations beyond those normally kept current in the United States are required for travelers to the U.S.S.R.

The U.S. Public Health Service has noted that many American visitors to the U.S.S.R., and particularly to Leningrad, have returned to the United States infected with the intestinal parasite *giardia lamblia*. The infection is probably contracted by consuming tap water or ice or drinks made from tap water. It is also possible that it may be transmitted by cold foods, such as salads. It is likely that bottled water is free from infection.

Telecommunications—International telephone and telegraph service is available throughout the U.S.S.R.

Transportation—Daily international flights are available from Moscow, Leningrad, and some other major Soviet cities to major cities in Europe. Direct connections are available to New York and Washington, D.C. A U.S. flag carrier flies to Moscow from New York several times a week.

Internal intercity transport is usually by plane (the Soviet Government airline, Aeroflot) or train. Trains are comfortable and clean on the well-traveled routes. The major Soviet cities (Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, among others) have subways as well as bus transportation. Taxis are difficult to obtain, and taxi drivers generally do not understand foreign languages.

of the steppes along the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. To the south-east in the deserts of central Asia rainfall amounts in some places to only 4 inches per year.

PEOPLE

The Soviet Union ranks third in the world in population (after the People's Republic of China and India). Moscow and Leningrad are its most populous cities; and Kiev, Tashkent, Baku, Kharkov, Gorky, Novosibirsk, Kuibyshev, and Sverdlovsk each have more than a million inhabitants.

More than 170 separate ethnic groups live within the borders of the U.S.S.R. Almost 75 percent of the total population are Eastern Slavs. More than two-thirds of the Slavs (slightly more than half the total population) are Russians; the rest are Ukrainians and Belorussians who live

in the southwestern and western sectors of the European part of the U.S.S.R. The remainder of the population includes peoples belonging to Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Caucasian, other Indo-European, and less numerous ethnic groups, including Eskimos.

More than 200 dialects and languages are spoken in the Soviet Union. Russian is the major one and is taught as a second language in areas where it is not primarily spoken.

Soviet children normally begin elementary school at age 7, following 1 or 2 (or more) years in state-operated nursery schools and kindergartens. The current goal is to provide compulsory 10-year schooling for all children between the ages of 7 and 17. Ten-year schooling is already the rule for most children, but in some smaller cities and particularly in rural areas only 7 to 8 years of general schooling are offered.

School programs are governed by ministries of education in the various Republics under the control and guidance of the national Ministry of Education established in July 1966. The programs show heavy emphasis on science, include the study of at least one foreign language, often English, and are permeated with political indoctrination. A limited number of elective subjects are being introduced on a trial basis for outstanding students in secondary schools. Otherwise, all students are expected to follow the same curriculum.

The Soviet Union also maintains an extensive network of vocational and professional schools with classes lasting from 6 months to 2 years. These schools are designed to supply industry and agriculture with semiskilled and skilled labor. In most cases students enter vocational schools after 7 to 8 years of general school; present

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policy envisions eventually providing all vocational students with a general secondary education as well. In addition, schools and institutes providing semiprofessional and professional training are available. These last from 2 to 5 years, are designed to produce "middle-grade specialists," and generally require complete secondary education for admission.

A small proportion of 10-year-school graduates may enroll in an institution of higher learning. Admission is highly competitive and is based on academic record, entrance examination scores, and, to some extent, on social and political background. A higher educational institution may be either a university, which is a center of general studies normally with a 5-year program, or a more specialized institute, where the course may last from 4 to 6 years. In either case the curriculum is only slightly less rigid than that of the general secondary schools,

and political indoctrination courses are required. The costs of higher education are paid by the state, and students are given small monthly stipends.

Upon completion of a university or institute course of study, most students go to work in areas and jobs specified by national planning authorities. Eventually, a small percentage of them may return to do postgraduate work in preparation for the advanced degrees of candidate of sciences or doctor of sciences.

HISTORY

Modern Russian history dates from March 1917 when Czar Nicholas II abdicated under pressure from representatives of the national legislature, who formed a provisional government. Like the Czarist regime, the new government continued its participation in World War I, which led to widespread economic and social dislocation and

popular discontent. On November 7, 1917, the government was overthrown by a revolutionary group known as the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, was named head of the first Soviet government. The new regime concluded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and the other Central Powers on March 3, 1918.

All land was declared the property of the state, and a rapid succession of decrees nationalized factories, banks, railroads, and other sectors of the economy. A bitter civil war ensued and lasted until 1921. The United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the United States sent military forces to Russia for a variety of reasons but withdrew them after it became apparent that the Bolshevik government would survive.

Lenin's death in 1924 intensified an intraparty struggle between groups led by Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of

the party, and his opponents, notably Leon Trotsky, Gregory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Nikolai Bukharin. Stalin defeated these and other rivals in the late 1920's and later had them executed or assassinated. Untold numbers of other Soviet political, military, economic, and cultural leaders were imprisoned, and many died in the purges of the 1930's.

In the interwar years the Soviet government tried to gain acceptance by other European countries. It succeeded only partially, however, because of activities of the Soviet-led Third Communist International (Comintern), founded in March 1919, which attempted through local communist organizations to undermine West European governments. Although Soviet Russia was recognized by a number of European countries in 1924 and by the United States in 1933, relations with these countries were strained.

In the spring of 1939 Stalin made tentative overtures to Nazi Germany, and in August of that year the Molotov Ribbentrop pact was signed at Moscow. This 10-year nonaggression treaty included secret provisions for the division of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States.

World War II and Its Aftermath

Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviets followed on September 17. By the end of that month Poland had been divided once again by Berlin and Moscow.

On November 28, 1939, the Soviet government abrogated its non-aggression pact with Finland, attacking it 2 days later. Bitter Finnish resistance was unable to stem the Soviet advance, and peace negotiations concluded on March 12, 1940, resulted in the cession of a large part of eastern Finland to the U.S.S.R.

In June 1940 Soviet troops occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in July the territory of the Baltic States was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. In July the U.S.S.R. also forcibly annexed two eastern Provinces of Romania—Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

Hitler's collaboration with the

Soviet Union was a temporary expedient designed to give him a free hand in the West. In September 1940, after British resistance led Germany to suspend plans for invasion of the British Isles, Hitler secretly prepared for an attack on the U.S.S.R. German forces attacked before dawn on June 22, 1941.

German troops advanced as far as Moscow, and 4 years of fighting with heavy casualties left widespread devastation in the European part of the Soviet Union. During the war Stalin permitted certain noncommunist elements of Russia's prerevolutionary past (e.g., the church) to play a larger role in society in an appeal to tradition and nationalism designed to engender patriotic support for the conduct of the war. Postwar reconstruction, however, brought a return to the oppressive policies of the 1930's.

Stalin's Death

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. As his successors maneuvered for power, they modified some of the more repressive aspects of his regime without, however, significantly altering its totalitarian structure. Nikita S. Khrushchev, installed as First Secretary of the communist party in September 1953, consolidated his power when he defeated an attempt by G. M. Malenkov, V. M. Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others to unseat him as party leader in June 1957.

At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 Khrushchev, in a secret speech, had denounced Stalin as a despot who had sacrificed much of the party's best talent through misdirected purges and mistaken military tactics. "De-Stalinization" was accompanied by rehabilitation of some political figures who had been purged, resubordination of the secret police to the party, and encouragement of controlled contacts with countries outside the Soviet bloc. Party rule remained supreme, but some discussion and controversy within the party was permitted.

Fall of Khrushchev

On October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was suddenly removed from power by his associates. The Soviet news agency,

TASS, announced that Khrushchev had resigned because of poor health and advanced age. Later press comment condemned his style of rule and confirmed the fact that his former associates had opposed the way in which he had exercised power.

Leonid I. Brezhnev assumed the post of First Secretary of the party (changed to "General Secretary" at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966) and Aleksei N. Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The new leaders took immediate steps to undo Khrushchev's more radical programs, such as the establishment of parallel party and government hierarchies for agricultural and industrial matters, and took pains to reassure the badly demoralized bureaucracy of its continued importance.

The Present Leadership

Brezhnev emerged from the 24th Party Congress (March-April 1971) as clearly the first among equals in a still collective leadership. Desire to build a more solid, institutional consensus for the policy decisions of this leadership was shown in April 1973 when heads of the army, secret police, and foreign ministry were given full membership in the ruling Politburo. Official actions under this leadership reflect the sharing of power among leaders reluctant to permit significant changes in the internal or external political status quo. While there has been some attempt to repair the damage inflicted on the image of Stalin during the Khrushchev era, there has been no return to the mass terror of the Stalin period. Indeed, the 24th Party Congress condemned both liberals, who would insist on further de-Stalinization, and neo-Stalinists, who would return to his style of rule.

GOVERNMENT

In the Soviet system ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the communist party. The party imposes its will through a government apparatus patterned superficially after Western political democracies but which has little real separation of powers. Government functions are dictated by the party, whose hege-

mony is explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution promulgated in 1936. The party makes state policy and supervises its implementation, and party influence and power pervade all phases of life.

One of the major tools at the disposal of the party to maintain its hegemony is the secret political police or KGB (Committee for State Security). This organization not only conducts intelligence operations abroad but also, through networks of agents and informers, keeps careful check on the political reliability of Soviet citizens at home and abroad. The KGB has declined in importance since the death of Stalin, but its pervasive presence is still felt by all Soviet citizens.

Since the death of Stalin, many of the most infamous forced labor camps have been closed, and the number of political prisoners significantly reduced. Nevertheless, the camps continue to function. Since 1966, moreover, increased publicity has been given to political trials and the sentencing of prominent dissident intellectuals and representatives of disadvantaged national minority groups. The regime has been especially sensitive to problems of intellectual and nationality dissidence in view of the threat to disciplinary bonds raised by East-West détente, demands for emigration, and Soviet citizens' increased contact with foreigners.

The Party

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a membership of about 15 million or about 6 percent of the total adult population. Party membership is the main avenue to positions of real authority in the Soviet system. Bound by rigid discipline, party members are expected to carry out faithfully those policies set by the party leaders.

The most powerful policymaking organ in the communist party is the Politburo of the party's Central Committee. The Politburo at present has 15 members, 7 candidate members, and 3 nonmember secretaries. The 10-member Secretariat of the party's Central Committee provides day-to-day executive and administrative direction for the entire party machine. Together, the Politburo and Secretar-

iat constitute the real seat of power in the Soviet government. The General Secretary (head of the Secretariat) traditionally holds the top position in the Soviet Communist Party. In October 1965 General Secretary Brezhnev was also appointed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a position which enables him to deal formally with members of foreign governments.

In theory the Politburo and Secretariat are accountable to the party's Central Committee. In fact, however, the Central Committee is largely a forum for presenting party policy to the most important members. Normally, it gives party policies unanimous approval. It is not in a position to initiate policy, although on rare occasions the Central Committee has been called on to mediate a serious deadlock which has developed within the Politburo. According to party statutes, the Central Committee should meet twice a year. It met rarely in Stalin's time but more frequently under Khrushchev and under the Brezhnev leadership. The membership includes 241 full members and 155 candidates.

The Party Congress is, in theory, the highest authority of the party. The party statutes call for a congress to be held every 5 years. The 24th Congress met in March and April 1971. The 25th is set for February 1976. Like the role of the Central Committee, the real role of the Party Congress is to give approval to policies set by the party leaders and to provide these policies with an aura of legitimacy. The Party Congress is also a forum for assessing achievements and describing future tasks.

Government Apparatus

The party operates through a government apparatus which has little independent authority. The legislative organ is the Supreme Soviet, which, in theory, is the highest authority in the Soviet Union. It has two coequal houses—the Council of the Union, presently with 767 members elected on the basis of population, and the Council of Nationalities with 750 members elected on the basis of territorial units. Elections are called for every 4 years. Only one deputy, approved by the party, runs from each constituency.

Between the biennial sessions of the Supreme Soviet, which last less than 5 days, formal power is vested in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet which currently has 36 members. Its chairman, Nikolai V. Podgorny, is ceremonial Chief of State. The Supreme Soviet names the highest executive organ of the government apparatus, the Council of Ministers. The Council, which at present has about 100 members, is the most important part of the government structure. Under party direction, it supervises the work of the ministries and other governmental bodies. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, equivalent to Prime Minister, is A. N. Kosygin.

Soviet Republics

Party and government organizations in each of the 15 constituent Union Republics are patterned after the central party and government organizations and are subject to policies and administrative direction from Moscow. They are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the last three into the U.S.S.R. It continues to maintain diplomatic relations with representatives of the last free governments of each of the Baltic States.

Principal Government Officials

Communist Party Politburo

Yuri V. Andropov
Leonid I. Brezhnev
Andrei A. Grechko
Viktor B. Grishin
Andrei A. Gromyko
Andrei P. Kirilenko
Aleksei N. Kosygin
Fedor D. Kulakov
Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev
Kirill T. Mazurov
Arvid Ya. Pelshe
Nikolai V. Podgorny
Dmitry S. Polyansky
Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky
Mikhail A. Suslov

Candidate Members

Petr N. Demichev
Petr M. Masherev
Boris N. Ponomarev
Sharaf R. Rashidov
Grigory V. Romanov
Mikhail S. Solomentsev
Dmitry F. Ustinov

Communist Party Secretariat

Leonid I. Brezhnev (General Secretary)
Vladimir I. Dolgikh
Ivan V. Kapitonov
Konstantin F. Katushev
Andrei P. Kirilenko
Fedor D. Kulakov
Boris N. Ponomarev
Mikhail A. Suslov
Dmitry F. Ustinov

Government Officials

Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet—Nikolai V. Podgorny
Chairman, Council of Ministers—Aleksei N. Kosygin
First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers—Kirill T. Mazurov
Chairman, State Planning Committee—Nikolai K. Baibakov
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Andrei A. Gromyko
Minister of Defense—Andrei A. Grechko
Ambassador to the U.S.—Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador to the U.N.—Yakov A. Malik

The Soviet Union maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1125 16th St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20036. The Embassy's consular office is located at 1609 Decatur St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20011.

ECONOMY

The Soviet Union is the world's second-ranking industrial power. Western observers estimate Soviet gross national product (GNP) for 1973 at the equivalent of about US\$661.4 billion (in 1972 U.S. prices) and per capita GNP at \$2,650. The U.S.S.R. has achieved considerable economic progress in the past 58 years by forcing the pace of basic industrialization which, until recent years, had been pursued at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods and services. Today the U.S.S.R. has a largely

self-sufficient economy with a broad industrial base and a largely self-developed technology. Except for such top-priority sectors as defense and space, however, Soviet technology still lags considerably behind developed Western countries. Current problems include the need to improve the system of planning and management, increase productivity and efficiency, continue to modernize the economy, and, in particular, increase agricultural production.

Major economic decisions in the U.S.S.R. are incorporated into annual and long-range plans. These plans cover all aspects of economic activity. Industrial and commercial enterprises are owned and operated by the state.

State control of the economic system is reinforced by financial and accounting controls. As sole effective proprietor in the economy, the state controls the budget, the banking system, and the accounting and statistical systems. The only source of credit is the state bank. The two largest sources of budget revenue are the profits of production enterprises, the bulk of which are appropriated by the state, and the "turnover tax," a levy on all transactions involving the sale of consumer goods and the provision of consumer services. Direct income taxation provides less than 10 percent of the state's total revenue.

A significant reorientation of economic policy followed Stalin's death. The traditional priority given heavy industry was not abandoned, but the regime devoted somewhat more of the country's resources to consumer goods, housing, and agriculture.

The 24th Party Congress in April 1971 approved the Ninth 5-Year Plan which will be completed this year. The plan calls for increases in agricultural production of 21 percent over the average of the preceding 5 years, 47 percent in industrial production, and an increase of 39 percent in national income. Increased emphasis was placed on consumer goods production. After a poor performance in 1972, mainly due to a disastrous grain harvest, the Soviet economy recovered sharply in 1973 and continued growth in 1974, but prospects for achieving high rates

of planned growth over the long term are not favorable. Low labor productivity, wasteful resource allocation, and difficulties in applying research and development in production remain major problems. There are indications that shortfalls in the plan resulted in cutbacks in consumer sector production. The Tenth 5 Year Plan is being drafted for presentation at the 25th Party Congress in early 1976. Indications are that the new plan will emphasize a higher standard of living and increased productivity.

Resources

Because of the great size of the U.S.S.R., some supplies of virtually every natural resource are available in the country. Energy resources, fuel and waterpower, are estimated to be at least 25 percent of the world's total. Timber and manganese resources are the largest in the world. The U.S.S.R. also has more than adequate supplies of lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, and phosphate. It lacks a large known domestic reserve of only two minerals, tin and uranium.

Trade

Total Soviet foreign trade (exports plus imports) amounted to an estimated \$52.3 billion in 1974 (U.S.S.R. figures). Soviet imports accounted for about 3.5 percent of the Soviet GNP. About three-fifths of Soviet trade is conducted with other communist countries, predominantly the other six East European members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic. This trade centers around Soviet provision of most East European needs of fuel and raw materials—although Soviet machinery exports are increasing—in return for East European machinery and equipment. Soviet trade with the People's Republic of China, which exceeded \$2 billion in 1959 and fell to less than \$50 million in 1970, increased to about \$150 million in 1971 and rose to about \$270 million in 1973.

Another 15 percent of Soviet trade is conducted with the noncommunist, developing countries and typically

consists of Soviet machinery and equipment exports, usually associated with Soviet economic aid projects, in return for agricultural raw materials, foodstuffs, and some light manufactured goods.

The rest of the trade, about \$11.4 billion, is with the developed nations of the West and is important to the U.S.S.R. as the source of equipment and technology not available elsewhere. The leading trading partners are the West European countries and Japan. Total U.S.-Soviet trade in 1974 amounted to \$959 million and consisted primarily of U.S. exports (\$609 million) of crude materials, chemicals, and nonelectric machinery in return for imports from the U.S.S.R. (\$350 million) of raw materials (chrome ore, diamonds, and palladium) and semi-finished products.

Agriculture

The U.S.S.R. has about 2 million square miles of arable land and pasture. Because of its northern latitude, however, much of the arable land would be considered marginal by Western standards. The actual sown area is about 10 percent of the total land area.

In the countryside agriculture is organized into collective farms (*kolkhozy*) and state farms (*sovkhozy*). State farms are run as "agricultural factories" on which farm workers are paid wages. Collective farms, however, are still the dominant form of agricultural organization. On collective farms the peasants are guaranteed the personal use (but not ownership) of "private plots." These plots comprise only about 4 percent of the total sown area but account for almost 33 percent of gross agricultural production. They are particularly important in the production of milk, meat, eggs, and vegetables.

Under the "new lands" program initiated in 1954 by Khrushchev, 100 million acres of new grain-growing areas were opened to cultivation, mainly in Kazakhstan. Although the new lands have produced good crops, the generally low rainfall and short growing season in Kazakhstan make it risky to depend upon a good crop from that area.

In March 1965 a new agricultural program was promulgated which called for sharply increased investment in the agricultural sector as well as higher prices and stable state procurement targets for agricultural commodities. The improved agricultural performance during 1966-71 is attributable largely to these measures combined with favorable weather. But improvement is by no means guaranteed, as was amply demonstrated by the near crop failure in 1972 which necessitated unprecedentedly large food and feed grain imports from the West, mainly from the United States, causing a temporary but severe strain on the Soviet balance of payments. Harvests in subsequent years have been at record levels but the balance of climate and technology is delicate and the Soviet Union remains a potential large-scale importer of grain.

Industrial Growth

A deceleration in the rate of industrial growth which began in the late 1950's has been a major source of concern for the Soviet leadership. After having expanded at an average rate of more than 10 percent from 1950 to 1958, the rate of industrial output growth gradually declined to about 7 percent in 1969 and to 6.5 percent by 1974. Contributing to the general decline were the slow progress of the technological modernization program, which is the main factor behind the sluggish growth of labor productivity; shortfalls in investment; and slow rates of retirement of obsolete machinery and equipment.

Additional problems include low product quality; wasteful use of productive resources; hoarding excessive inventories of materials and machinery by enterprises; resistance to change and innovation, which has acted as a brake on the regime's large-scale technological modernization program; and delays in completing and activating new investment projects, resulting in unproductive "freezing" of resources for long periods of time. The Soviet leadership hopes that the current economic reform program and imports of Western technology will solve these and other problems.

Military

The maintenance of a large military establishment places a heavy burden on the economy and limits potential growth of both the standard of living and the economy as a whole. It is estimated that the Soviet defense effort of 25 billion rubles in 1973 was the equivalent of about \$80 billion.

The armed forces of the U.S.S.R. number more than 4 million members. In addition to modern mechanized ground forces, the Soviets possess an air force equipped with supersonic interceptors and long-range strategic bombers and a navy with cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, many of them nuclear powered and armed with missiles. The Soviets also possess a full range of rockets including intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Soviet strategic doctrine envisions that any major war with the West will be fought with strategic atomic weapons, although since the overthrow of Khrushchev the doctrine of the flexible response seems to be increasingly popular.

The Warsaw Pact, established in 1955, is a Soviet-dominated military alliance joining the U.S.S.R. and its East European communist allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic. The pact has a joint command, headed by a Soviet officer, which coordinates war plans and carries out joint maneuvers.

In peacetime, operational control of the Soviet Armed Forces is in the hands of the Minister of Defense, who is a military officer. Political control is exercised by the party Secretariat through its main political administration. Party control extends downward throughout the military organization through a parallel system of command. Commanders at each echelon have "political" deputies responsible for the indoctrination and political loyalty of the men in command.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Soviet foreign policy has undergone an evolutionary process in the post-World War II period. This process has been manifested in the three major

fields of Soviet foreign policy:

1. Within the communist world, the monolithic character of international communism has dissipated as nationalism gained ground over ideology. Communist-ruled countries have become more resistant to, and in some cases defiant of, Soviet authority and control, and nonruling communist parties are less subservient to Moscow's direction. At the same time, in this détente era, Moscow has been successful in pressing for closer political, economic, and military ties with socialist countries.

2. In the Third World, Moscow has moderated its advocacy of communist-led revolutionary struggles and attempted to establish and maintain good state-to-state relations with the governments of the individual countries.

3. In relations with the West, including the United States and Japan, the Soviet Union has mitigated its attitude of hostility and sought to normalize relations with the highly industrialized countries and gain access to their trade and technology.

Moscow's major objectives remain largely unchanged: they are the maximization of the power of the Soviet state at home and expansion of its influence and authority abroad. But if the objectives remain the same, important changes of strategy and tactics have occurred.

The Communist World

Eastern Europe. In the years immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union established communist regimes subordinate to its control in the East European countries liberated by the Red Army and in Czechoslovakia with the help of a Soviet-inspired coup d'état in February 1948. Yugoslavia, which was liberated by indigenous communist forces, resisted Moscow's control, maintained its independence, and was isolated from the Soviet-led bloc with its expulsion from the Cominform in late 1948.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 and his successors' efforts to find a more flexible and productive relationship with the communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe only encour-

aged these countries to a more assertive manifestation of their national interests and aspirations. The formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 as a security and control mechanism did not halt this trend. In addition to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet-controlled system of East European states in 1948, Moscow has been confronted with a series of incidents of national disaffection, alienation, or domestic turbulence in Eastern Europe: the Berlin uprising on June 17, 1953 (suppressed by Soviet troops); the rise to power of the Polish nationalist leader Gomulka in 1956; the Hungarian uprising in October-November 1956 (suppressed by Soviet troops); the defection of Albania from the Warsaw Pact in 1960-61; Romania's assertions of national independence from 1962 on; the Czechoslovak "spring" of 1968 led by nationalist leader Dubcek (suppressed by Soviet troops); and the Polish "worker's revolt" of December 1970.

As the record shows, the Soviets have not hesitated, when feasible, to use armed force to contain what they regarded as extreme manifestations of nationalism in Eastern Europe, but they have reacted with less harsh measures either when expressions of nationalism were less dramatic or when constrained by circumstances. The Soviet Union has two principal concerns with the maintenance of loyal communist regimes in Eastern Europe: the security of the approaches to the U.S.S.R.'s borders in the West; and the ideological compulsion to demonstrate that the communist system is viable and the wave of the future.

Sino-Soviet Relations. Moscow hailed the advent of the Chinese communists to power in October 1949 as a major accretion to the strength of international communism and moved quickly to cement relations with the new regime in Peking with the conclusion on February 14, 1950, of a treaty of alliance and friendship for a period of 30 years. However, the newly formed alliance, although never formally abrogated, was, in practice, relatively short-lived. The regime in Peking found the policy modifications

introduced by Stalin's successors not to its liking, and differences between the two communist giants began to be discernible in the late 1950's. In April 1960 their differences broke into the open with a thinly veiled Chinese theoretical attack on the new international communist strategy formulated by the Khrushchev regime at the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956. Throughout the rest of the decade there was open and intense rivalry between Moscow and Peking for influence throughout the world, particularly in communist-ruled countries, national communist parties, and in the Third World. Sino-Soviet relations reached a nadir in March 1969 when the two countries clashed on a disputed island on their common border. Efforts to negotiate disagreements over demarcation of the 4,200-mile Sino-Soviet border, begun as early as 1964, have made no visible progress in the decade since.

In the 1970's a new dimension was added to the Sino-Soviet conflict when both began to compete for improvement of relations with the highly industrialized countries of the West and Japan. President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972 stimulated this trend.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has had far-reaching ramifications for the Soviet Union's international position and further weakened the cohesion of the communist-ruled countries and the international communist movement.

International Communism

Since Stalin's dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 to placate allied fears, the international communist movement has become an increasingly amorphous and progressively less pliable instrument in the hands of the Soviet leadership for the promotion of its policies.

Traditionally an important symbol of Soviet revolutionary legitimacy, the international communist movement extended its influence throughout the world in the years since 1945, but at the cost of ideological and organizational cohesion. This growth period reached its peak in the late 1960's when Moscow claimed for the movement a membership of 89 parties

comprising close to 50 million members. This expansion, however, was largely due to increases in membership in the 14 ruling communist parties while membership in the remainder (75 nonruling parties) has remained virtually stationary for almost a decade.

The numerical and territorial expansion of the international communist movement has not increased its effectiveness. Protracted conflict between Moscow and a number of communist parties, ruling and non-ruling, has characterized interparty relations now for over a decade. Initially sparked by the Sino-Soviet dispute, this quarrel has pitted the Yugoslavs, Romanians, Italians, Spanish, Japanese, and British among others against Moscow as they resist adamantly persistent Soviet attempts at hegemony in the world communist movement.

Moscow's repeated efforts at tightening organizational ideological discipline in the international communist movement have shown declining success as is evident from the world communist meetings that convened in 1960 and 1969. The 1960 meeting barely managed to contain the incipient Sino-Soviet dispute, and the 1969 conclave provided ample evidence of the deep fissures that had plagued the movement in the intervening years. Seventeen communist parties, including five ruling parties, absented themselves, and 14 participating parties dissented from parts of the final conference document.

Nevertheless, Moscow apparently has not been deterred from endeavoring to organize another world meeting in the hope of reasserting its preeminence in what has become a rather truncated movement and in the face of increasingly assertive communist parties' intent in pursuing their own interests.

The Third World

Outside the communist sphere, post-Stalin foreign policy changes were most readily apparent in the Third World, the developing countries and nations emerging from colonial rule. Under Stalin and the "two-camp" philosophy that prevailed in his time, these countries were lumped with the "imperialist" powers of the West as

targets of communist struggle and subversion. This doctrine justified Moscow's advocacy of communist armed struggle in the Third World countries, including the use of guerrilla warfare, by the Huks in the Philippines and by communist forces in Indochina, and the Indonesian Communist Party's abortive attempt at a coup d'etat in 1948. The culminating point of this phase was reached during the launching of the Korean war in June 1950. The successful U.N. defense of South Korea became a major factor prompting the subsequent Soviet change of strategy. Moscow during this period (through 1953) did not even maintain diplomatic relations with most Third World countries, and the formal relations it did have with a few were strained and cool.

Stalin's successors changed these policies almost immediately. They chose the Third World as the area where the U.S.S.R. could break out of the isolation imposed on it by Stalin's policies. Before the year of his death was over, his successors had announced Soviet readiness to render economic assistance to the developing countries. Moscow began recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with the newly emerging nations, and in November-December 1955 Soviet party and government leaders traveled in India for their first post-World War II state visit outside the communist bloc.

The 20th Soviet Party Congress in 1956 laid the theoretical justification for this policy: Now, instead of seeing the Third World states as natural allies of the Western "imperialists," Moscow perceived the Third World as a "zone of peace" and the political leaders there as "progressives" deserving of Soviet support, especially in encouraging radical, nationalist, anti-Western sentiment. Communist parties were advised to direct their efforts into the political arena in order to avoid embarrassing Moscow in its efforts to establish good relations with Third World governments.

Moscow has never ceased to give at least vocal support to "national liberation struggles" and in certain cases, most notably in Indochina, has rendered them substantial amounts of

economic and military assistance. But the major thrust of Soviet policy has turned to the establishment of political and economic relations, in many cases buttressed with shipment of military assistance, with established governments almost regardless of their political leanings. Cumulative Soviet economic and military aid programs actually delivered to Third World countries from 1954 through 1974 had amounted to an estimated \$21 billion, divided about evenly between military and economic assistance.

The Middle East

The Middle East is an example of trends in Soviet Third World policies. The region is of major political, economic, and strategic importance to Moscow since it lies close to the U.S.S.R.'s southern border, flanks countries of NATO, and has the world's largest proven reserves of oil.

The Arab-Israeli conflict provided the opportunity for Soviet entry into the area, which Moscow took advantage of in the mid-1950's by inaugurating a military and economic assistance program to Egypt. Exploitation of this regional conflict has remained the key element in Moscow's growing presence and influence in the area throughout the three Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973. The Soviet Union has been the major supplier of arms and economic assistance to the major Arab belligerents, as well as to other states in the area, and has when necessary ignored the anti-communist propensities of many of the Arab governments there.

While Soviet policy has been one-sided in support of the Arab cause, Moscow has maintained an important basic balance by insisting on Israel's right to exist as a state within its 1967 boundaries. The Soviets also urge a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and their support of the Arabs has been characterized by some restraint in the types of armaments they have been willing to deliver and by caution when an escalation of the conflict seemed to threaten to involve the great powers.

Cuba

The Cuban question deserves separate mention because of the special

role it has played in U.S.-Soviet relations. The well-known surreptitious Soviet effort in 1962 to install offensive weapons in Cuba (missiles, bombers, and almost certainly nuclear weapons) represented an attempt to gain a quick and quantum improvement in Moscow's strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. This most serious confrontation since World War II was not resolved until the Soviets, at President Kennedy's insistence and under pressure of a U.S. naval blockade of the island, withdrew the weapons from Cuba. Moscow's subsequent achievement of relative parity with the United States in strategic weapons development has largely obviated any strategic advantage it might derive from emplacing such weapons in Cuba.

Politically the Cuban issue as an irritant in U.S.-Soviet relations has also declined in importance. Moscow initially supported, or at least acquiesced in, Castro's subversive activities against other Latin American regimes. But as Moscow's normal political/economic relations with established governments began to develop throughout Latin America, and Castro-supported subversion failed to produce results, the two communist powers seemed to have agreed on a more restrained, conventional political effort to promote the communist cause in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Industrialized Countries

The normalization and improvement of Soviet relations with the highly industrialized countries, including Japan, proceeded more gradually and perhaps with less dramatic developments than those which characterized the evolution of Soviet policy within international communism and toward the Third World. The trend has nevertheless been a steady one since Stalin's death, despite occasional setbacks.

The post-Stalin leaders of the Soviet Union recognized the necessity of restraint in the nuclear age, as well as the advantages of gaining access to Western technology and trade in order to stimulate the sluggish pace of Soviet domestic development. The restora-

tion, with U.S. help, of strong, independent political/economic systems in Western Europe and Japan after World War II contributed to Moscow's adjustment to a more productive relationship.

Berlin/Germany. No problem has more bedeviled East-West relations than the division of Germany and the Four-Power control arrangement in Berlin, located over 100 miles inside the communist-controlled portion of Germany. Berlin has been a constant focal point of East-West crises because of Soviet attempts to use it for political pressure against the West. These crises have included Stalin's almost 1-year blockade of the Western powers' ground access to Berlin in 1948-49; Khrushchev's threats in the late 1950's and early 1960's to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East German Communist regime, the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), which would terminate the West's rights in Berlin; and intermittent Soviet harassment and interruption of Western traffic on access roads to Berlin.

By the late 1960's both sides were ready to make efforts to defuse this area of crisis and confrontation. In mid-1969 the three Western powers, with the Federal Republic of Germany's (F.R.G.) support, approached the Soviet Government with a proposal for negotiations to alleviate the situation. The negotiations, begun in March 1970, resulted in a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in September 1971 which was brought into effect in June 1972. This agreement embodied Soviet commitments to permit unhindered access to Berlin, to provide for improved travel and communications within the city, and to acknowledge F.R.G. ties with West Berlin and the F.R.G.'s right to represent West Berlin abroad. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was supplemented by other agreements between the F.R.G. and the Soviet Union, the F.R.G. and the G.D.R., and the F.R.G. and Poland. These agreements acknowledged border changes in Central Europe which had been brought about by World War II and began the process of regularizing relations between the two German states.

Although implementation of the Berlin agreement has not been without difficulties and disagreements, it has to date resulted in containment of Berlin as a crisis issue and thus served as a major contribution to the East-West détente relationship of the 1970's.

Relations With Japan. Soviet relations with Japan have improved despite failure of efforts to conclude a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Moscow participated in the San Francisco conference in September 1951 but refused to agree to the Japanese peace treaty concluded there by other allied powers. Soviet efforts to negotiate a bilateral peace treaty with Japan in 1956 reached an impasse over the Northern Territories issue: Japan insisted that the treaty provide for the return of the southernmost islands of the Kurile chain. Renewed talks on the subject begun in 1971 have remained stalemated because of this issue.

The Japanese have nevertheless been willing to separate economic relations from the peace treaty/Northern Territories issues, and it is the economic field that has witnessed the biggest improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. In particular, the Soviets achieved considerable success in securing large-scale Japanese involvement in the exploitation and consumption of Siberian natural resources.

European Security Conference

The U.S.S.R. has long been interested in an "all-European" conference. Progress in East-West relations, particularly the Four-Power Berlin Agreement and the F.R.G.-U.S.S.R. Non-Aggression Treaty, opened the way to the convening in 1973 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The final act was signed by the heads of all European countries except Albania, as well as the United States and Canada, on August 1, 1975, in Helsinki, Finland. Among the subjects covered by the document which are of particular interest to the West are "confidence building measures" concerning military maneuvers; cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and environmental areas; and freer human contacts and exchanges of information. If carried into practice, it is

hoped that the recommendations in these documents will contribute to the further progress of détente.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Overall U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R., which has come to be labeled "détente" or "relaxation of tensions," is to minimize the risk of confrontation by cooperating with the Soviet Union where our interests coincide and by fostering consultation and negotiation where our interests differ.

Détente is a continuing and sometimes uneven process of easing tensions and expanding our relations to the benefit of both countries. It is not based upon some newly discovered compatibility between our system and that of the U.S.S.R. Improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is necessary precisely because in the nuclear age, when both we and the Soviet Union possess the military capability to obliterate each other and a good part of the rest of mankind, we remain divided on many fundamental issues. It is these very differences which compel any responsible U.S. administration to make a major effort to create a more stable and constructive relationship.

We judge U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics but by progress in resolving concrete problems and by evidence of responsible international conduct. We recognize that the process of détente is not without risk and therefore requires that the United States maintain an effective military capability. We are convinced, however, that the risks inherent in a return to confrontation, high tension, and an unlimited and unstable arms race would be vastly greater.

Proceeding from these considerations, we have worked to normalize U.S.-Soviet relations in many ways. The May 1972 Moscow summit resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. It produced a declaration of basic principles of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a number of specialized agreements in such fields as outer space cooperation and protection of the environment.

General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States in 1973 led to the conclusion of an agreement on prevention of nuclear war; guidelines for negotiations on strategic offensive weapons; and specific accords on peaceful uses of atomic energy, agriculture, civil aviation, cultural exchanges, oceanography, transportation, and tax questions.

During the Moscow summit in the summer of 1974, agreement was reached on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and nuclear weapons tests, and bilateral exchanges were expanded to include such fields as energy, housing, and artificial heart research. The November 1974 working meeting in Vladivostok provided an opportunity for President Ford to discuss the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations with General Secretary Brezhnev and gave essential impetus to our strategic arms limitation negotiations.

In short, the current phase of U.S.-Soviet relations is characterized by unprecedented consultation between leaders and a wide spectrum of contacts and negotiations aimed at dealing with the dangers of the nuclear age and expanding bilateral cooperation to our mutual benefit. These accomplishments do not guarantee peace, but they have served to diminish the tensions of the past and offer hope for a better future.

Arms Control and Disarmament

The spiraling arms buildup which developed during the cold war period has presented one of the greatest dangers and the most compelling challenges to the normalization of East-West relations. It is an area where concrete progress has been made despite the sensitivity of the issues, which directly concern the national security of the states involved. The strategic arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—two powers in a class by themselves since no other country has the prospect of matching their strategic weapons development—has been the crux of the problem. Efforts to prevent the spread of this competition and to contain it bilaterally began to bear fruit in the 1960's.

As a result of U.S.-Soviet agreement, several multilateral arms control measures have been adopted by the international community: the 1961 Antarctic Treaty which provides for use of that area for peaceful purposes only and for inspection to insure the treaty is being observed; the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibits tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater; an October 1963 U.N. resolution which prohibits the stationing in outer space of any objects carrying nuclear weapons and which was elaborated in treaty form in January 1967; a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which was signed on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970; a treaty which bans emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds, entered into force in May 1972; and an international convention which bars the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and toxins which was signed in April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975.

U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Accords

Efforts to contain the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic arms buildup did not bear fruit until the early 1970's. Throughout the post-World War II period, beginning with the "Baruch plan" in 1946, U.S. arms limitation proposals had been designed to freeze the existing situation. It became clear that the Soviet Union would not agree to such proposals, and after the failure of their Cuban missile deployment, the U.S.S.R. launched a strategic weapons program which brought the Soviet Union to a position of rough parity with the United States by 1970. This new situation paved the way for the first strategic arms limitation talks (SALT One), which began in November 1969 in Helsinki at the initiative of the United States.

These talks resulted in the signing of the first two strategic arms limitation agreements on May 26, 1972, during President Nixon's visit to Moscow: a treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems of both sides and an interim agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms for a period of 5 years. These agreements set the stage

for the second round of SALT, which began in November 1972 in Geneva.

At the Vladivostok summit meeting in November 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev provided further impetus for the phase two SALT talks when they reached agreement in principle on an overall numerical ceiling to be placed on all the existing strategic arms systems of both sides for a 10-year period. These guidelines, when embodied in a final agreement including key provisions on verification, are to be followed by further negotiations aimed at reducing strategic armaments.

A SALT Two agreement will be a major milestone in strategic arms limitation between the United States and U.S.S.R. since it will place a cap on the strategic weapons program of each side on the basis of equality and give impetus to efforts to reduce, as opposed to only limiting, their strategic armaments.

Exchanges and Cooperative Agreements

The numerous exchange and cooperative agreements we have signed with the Soviet Union are an important element in relations between the two countries. Beginning in 1958, we have signed 2-year cultural exchange agreements which provide for the distribution of official magazines, *Amerika* and *Soviet Life*, and exchanges of many graduate students, performing arts groups, exhibits, and athletic groups. The most recent cultural exchanges agreement, signed at the June 1973 Washington summit meeting, is valid for 4 years, instead of 2, and establishes minimum levels for

exchanges of graduate students, research scholars, exhibits, performing arts groups, and education seminars, rather than maximum targets as in the past. Although the 1973 agreement provides for the exchange of at least 40 graduate students, in the 1974-75 academic year 50 graduate students were exchanged. The agreement also provides for the exchange of senior scholars and, for the first time, university lecturers. The current agreement also provides for the reciprocal distribution of 62,000 copies of *Soviet Life* and *Amerika* magazines with the understanding that both sides will examine the possibility of increasing the reciprocal distribution of the magazines to 82,000 copies by the end of 1976.

At the 1972 Moscow summit, and growing out of the exchanges conducted earlier under the 2-year cultural agreements, it was agreed to expand mutual contacts in scientific and technical areas. As a result since 1972 we have signed agreements to cooperate in science and technology, outer space, medical science and public health, environmental protection, atomic energy, agriculture, oceanography, transportation, energy, housing and other construction, and in the research and development of an artificial heart. At the present time approximately 140 projects have been selected as topics for joint work.

The agreements are being carried out through a structure of joint committees of policy-level officials from both sides which meet once a year in each other's countries to review the work of the preceding year and to

consider approved projects for the coming year. In addition to the joint committees, working groups of specialists meet periodically to work out the details of the projects. Participants both in the working groups and joint committees on the U.S. side include government officials and representatives of private industry or the academic world. In 1974 some 900 persons from each side took part in the exchanges of visits in connection with implementing the agreements.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Minister/Counselor—Jack F. Matlock
Counselor for Political Affairs—
Marshall Brement
Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs—Noble Melencamp
Counselor for Administration—
Thomas Train
Counselor for Cultural Affairs—
Raymond Benson
Defense Attaché—Brig. Gen. James W. Wold
Army Attaché—Col. Graham Vernon
Naval Attaché—Capt. Ronald J. Kurth
Counselor for Consular Affairs—
Clifford Gross
Counselor for Scientific Affairs—Egon Loebner
Director, Commercial Office—Thomas M. T. Niles

Leningrad

Consul General—Joseph W. Neubert
Deputy Principal Officer—Gary Mathews

The U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union is located at Ulitsa Chaikovskovo 19/21/23, Moscow.

APPENDIX K

U.S.S.R.

LAND

8,600,000 sq. mi.; 9.3% cultivated, 37.1% forest and brush, 2.6% urban, industrial, and transportation, 16.8% pasture and natural hay land, 34.2% desert, swamp, or waste

Land boundaries: 12,595 mi.

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi.

Coastline: 29,000 mi. (incl. Sakhalin)

PEOPLE

Population: 253,277,000, average annual growth rate 1% (current)

Ethnic divisions: 74% Slavic, 26% among some 170 ethnic groups

Religion: 70% atheist, 18% Russian Orthodox, 9% Muslim, 3% other

Language: more than 200 languages and dialects (at least 18 with more than 1 million speakers); 76% Slavic group, 8% other Indo-European, 11% Altaic, 3% Uralian, 2% Caucasian

Literacy: 98.5% of population (ages 9-49)

Labor force: civilian 129 million (1974), 27% agriculture, 73% industry and other non-agricultural fields, unemployed not reported, shortage of skilled labor reported

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Type: Communist state

Capital: Moscow

Political subdivisions: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 krais, 120 oblasts, and 8 autonomous oblasts

Legal system: civil law system as modified by Communist legal theory; constitution adopted 1936; no judicial review of legislative acts; legal education at 18 universities and 4 law institutes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Council of Ministers (executive) Supreme Soviet (legislative), Supreme Court of U.S.S.R. (judicial)

Government leaders: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Nikolay V. Podgornyy, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet

Suffrage: universal over age 18; direct, equal

Elections: to Supreme Soviet every 4 years; 1,517 deputies elected in 1970; 72.3% party members

Political parties and leaders: Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) only party permitted

Voting strength (1970 election): 153,237,112 persons over 18; claimed 99.96% voted

Communists: 15,000,000 party members

Other political or pressure groups: Komsomol, trade unions, and other organizations which facilitate Communist control

Member of: CEMA, Geneva Disarmament Conference, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, ITU, Seabeds Committee, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, Warsaw Pact, WHO, WMO, Universal Copyright Convention

ECONOMY

Agriculture: principal food crops — grain (especially wheat), potatoes; main industrial crops — sugar cotton, sunflowers, and flax; degree of self-sufficiency depends on fluctuations in crop yields; given normal yields, U.S.S.R. is self-sufficient; caloric intake, 3,000-3,200 calories per day per capita in recent years

Fishing: catch 9.0 million metric tons (1973); exports 260.4 thousand metric tons (1973), imports 15.0 thousand metric tons (1972)

Major industries: diversified, highly developed capital goods industries; consumer goods industries comparatively less developed

Shortages: natural rubber, bauxite and alumina, tantalum, tin, and tungsten

Crude steel: 140 million metric ton capacity as of January 1974; 131 million metric tons produced in 1973, 524 kilograms per capita

Exports: fuels (particularly petroleum and derivatives), metals, agricultural products (timber, grain) and a wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods); \$21.300 million (f.o.b. 1973)

Imports: specialized and complex machinery and equipment, textile fibers, consumer manufactures, and any significant shortages in domestic production (for example, wheat imported following poor domestic harvests); \$20,925 million (f.o.b., 1973)

Major trade partners: \$42.3 billion (1973); trade 58% with Communist countries, 27% with industrialized West, and 15% with less developed countries

Official monetary conversion rate: 0.7573 rubles = US\$1; 1 ruble = US\$1.3205 (October 1974)

Fiscal year: calendar year

(From: National Basic Intelligence Factbook. Washington, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, January 1975.)

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 84,642 mi.; 82,441 mi. broad gage. 2,201 mi. narrow gage; 58,810 mi. broad gage single track; 21,475 mi. electrified; does not include industrial lines (1973)

Highways: 845,620 mi.; 128,340 mi. paved, 188,855 mi. gravel, crushed stone, 528,425 mi. improved or unimproved earth (1973)

Inland waterways: 90,000 mi. navigable, exclusive of Caspian Sea (1974)

Pipelines: crude oil, 26,500 mi.; refined products, 6,300 mi.; natural gas, 51,000 mi.

Ports: 63 major (most important: Leningrad, Murmansk, Odessa, Novorossiysk, Ilichevsk, Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Arkhangel'sk, Zaliv, Strelok, Riga, Tallinn, Liepaja, Ventspils, Klaypeda, Vostochnyy, Nikolayev, Sevastopol); 116 selected minor (1974)

Freight carried: rail — 3,663.0 million short tons, 2,023.3 billion short ton/mi. (1973); highways — 19.6 billion short tons, 192.1 billion short ton/mi. (1973); waterway — 435.4 million short tons, 123.3 billion short ton/mi. (1972)

Airfields: over 3,280 total; 572 with permanent-surface runways; 30 with runways over 12,000 ft., 427 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft., 787 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.

APPENDIX L

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

National Political Status: Date of last election - June 14, 1970.

Bloc of Communists and Non-Party Peoples

Council of the Union: 152,771,739 votes (99.74% of total vote)
767 deputies (100%)

Council of Nationalities: 152,843,228 votes (99.79% of total vote)
750 deputies (100%)

Non-Communist Opposition

Council of the Union: 396,343 "no" votes, 420 invalid ballots

Council of Nationalities: 320,633 "no" votes, 411 invalid ballots

Communist Party Membership: 15 million (September 1973)

Leading Party Figures and Positions: The dominant party figures all hold seats on the Politburo:

BREZHNEV, Leonid - General Secretary

KOSYGIN, Aleksey - head of government

PODGORNY, Nikolay - chief of state

SUSLOV, Mikhail - party's leading ideologist

KIRILENKO, Andrey - party administrator

Principal Publications:

Pravda - party daily

Izvestiya - government daily

Kommunist - party theoretical journal

Areas of Communist Activity: The party is "the leading core of all organizations--both public and state," in reality and according to the Soviet Constitution. All sectors of Soviet political, economic, and public life

(From: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations - 1973.
Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, 1973.)

are controlled by this disciplined, hierarchical, and all-pervasive political organization. Broad acquiescence to CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) policies is the rule, but strong popular support for the party, as opposed to attachment to the "motherland," is not believed to be widespread. However, the CPSU remains universally recognized as the ruling organ of Soviet society and rarely is challenged directly.

The CPSU periodically undertakes membership drives to increase the worker percentage of its followers and thereby dilute the tendency toward predominantly white-collar membership. In the pre-1917 period the party was dominated by revolutionary intellectuals, but now the influx of top-level managers, professionals, and intellectuals is spurred by the requirement of party membership as a prerequisite to professional advancement. In turn, the desire for advancement by the better-educated and the opportunists enhances this tendency.

As a result, more than 200,000 "intellectual workers" join the CPSU annually, and more than half of all scientific workers are party members, part of a total of 6.2 million specialists in various fields of knowledge.

The question of the quality and activity of the CPSU members undoubtedly was behind the decision announced in 1971 at the 24th Congress to exchange old party cards for new ones in 1973-74 and in the process to review each member's record. Inactive and "unworthy" members are being dropped, and those with black marks on their record are being looked at closely. As of November 1973, 6 million party members had received new party cards. This campaign, plus a slower rate of recruitment, has caused party membership to level off at around 15 million. And the possibility always exists that partisan political considerations may affect the exchange of party cards, especially in Soviet Georgia and the Ukraine, where former party leaders have been ousted and criticized.

While workers and collective farmers together constitute 55.4 percent of the party membership and 69 percent of new members, the party is predominantly urban, male, and white-collar. One of every six adult males more than 19 years of age is a party member, whereas only one of every 30 adult women is a member. Women account for almost 54 percent of the population but only 21 percent of the party, and only 2 percent of the Party Central Committee (396 members). None is on the Politburo or Secretariat, and only one sits on the Council of Ministers. The rural population constitutes 42 percent of the total population, but only 14.8 percent of the party membership is rural. Moreover, rural members are drawn chiefly from the rural labor "aristocracy"--farm managers and machine operators. At present, 64 percent of new admissions come from the *Komsomol*, the Communist youth organization numbering 34 million.

Slavs predominate in the CPSU, accounting for 80 percent of the total membership, while they make up 76 percent of the total popula-

tion. In contrast, the peoples of Central Asia and the peoples in areas annexed by the U.S.S.R. during World War II are underrepresented in the party; but the placement of Communists in all of the important posts in those areas ensures party dominance.

The pyramidal structure of the ruling hierarchy is illustrated by the number of party activists at the various levels. There are 380,000 primary party organizations (the lowest level), 2,810 rural rayon committees, 448 urban rayon committees, 760 city committees, 10 okrug committees, 142 oblast committees, 6 kray committees, 14 union-republic committees, one Central Committee, one Secretariat, and one Politburo.

These organs have an elected membership of 3.6 million: 325,000 hold seats at the rayon and city level; 25,200 hold seats on the oblast, kray, and republic committees; and 241 are full members and 155 are candidate members of the Central Committee (elected April 1971). The Politburo, apex of the power structure, has 16 members and 7 candidate members; and the Secretariat has 10 members all but three of whom are full or candidate members of the Politburo.

There are further but unformalized status groupings within this interlocking leadership; the senior members include Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, Mikhail Suslov, Andrey Kirilenko, and Nikolay Podgorny. Two full Politburo members--A. N. Shelepin, and D. S. Polyanskiy--have received career setbacks and now occupy lesser posts though still holding on to their Politburo seats, but their Politburo future also appears to be clouded. Two former Politburo members--P. Ye. Shelest and G. I. Voronov--were retired at the April 1973 plenum. Three new members were added: KGB Chief Yu. V. Andropov, Defense Minister A. A. Grechko, and Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko.

The leadership's historic inability to accomplish political succession through orderly constitutional processes was last illustrated in 1964 by the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev as leader of party and government. There is no statutory term in office or popular mandate for the supreme party leaders; ambitious contenders must act when the occasion seems propitious, a condition which is conducive to political tensions and uncertainties.

While pursuing a moderate foreign policy of detente, the Soviet leadership has been moving in a characteristically cautious and restrained manner in domestic affairs, and its increasingly conservative bent has largely disillusioned the more liberal wing of the scientific, intellectual, and artistic community. Although the number of active dissenters is quite small, the current leadership has behaved as if they pose a real threat to its rule and has resorted increasingly to legal and pseudo-legal repressions in its determination to suppress criticism and heterodoxy. In recent years there has been a significant outpouring of underground or "samizdat" literature, with an accompanying effort by the regime to suppress it.

Appeals for more freedom, relaxation of official controls--including those on Jewish emigration, and more truth in portraying the past are the stuff of dissent. One of the motives for glossing over the blacker pages of the past and portraying certain aspects of Stalin's rule in a more positive light is the leadership's awareness of the need to improve its public image and to safeguard its historical legitimacy.

Public awareness of the gap between official statements and the realities of life, the minimal participation of the ordinary citizen in decisionmaking, and the Soviet practice of defaming the record of ousted leaders have contributed to a strong sense of public cynicism.

To engender public support, the regime devoted massive propaganda efforts in 1967 to the 50th anniversary of Soviet rule, in 1970 to the centennial of Lenin's birth, and in 1972 to the 50th anniversary of the formation of the U.S.S.R.

The elections at the last party congress saw the present leadership confirmed for another five years in office, although it seems likely, for reasons of age and health, that the more aged members will not be around for the 25th Party Congress (Brezhnev is 67, Kosygin 70, and Podgorny and Suslov 71). The most striking political development since the 24th Congress has been the buildup accorded Brezhnev as the national spokesman not only for party affairs but also in state negotiations with the leaders of West European countries and the United States.

There has been no alleviation of Sino-Soviet antagonism. Border talks, which began shortly after the 1969 incidents heightened tensions between Moscow and Peking, apparently remain deadlocked. The confrontation has extended to the international scene, where the Soviets and Chinese have differed on issues ranging from the Indo-Pakistan situation to the convening of a world disarmament conference.

In Asia, the protracted rivalry between the U.S.S.R. and China has had the effect of weakening the ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy and of increasing Soviet interest in detente policies. With many Communist parties no longer responsive to Soviet guidance, Moscow has sought friendly relations with most Asian states regardless of their political complexion. Moscow portrays China as a subversive and military threat to its neighbors and has revived the proposal for a system of Asian collective security, originally put forth by Brezhnev in 1969.

Brezhnev's reference in March 1972 to the possibility of placing Sino-Soviet relations on the basis of "peaceful coexistence"--a formula reserved theretofore for relations with capitalist states--implied that the U.S.S.R. no longer regarded Maoist China's leadership as Marxist-Socialist. This position allowed Moscow, on the one hand, to isolate China by mobilizing opinion within the Communist movement against Maoism and, on the other hand, to seek to stabilize and even improve


bilateral relations with Peking on the state level by suggesting that both sides could profit by applying the detente principle to their relationship.

With regard to moves by Washington and Peking to normalize their relations, the Soviets have taken the position that they do not oppose this development, provided that it does not injure third-party interests. In practice, however, Moscow remains sensitive to any evidence of joint Sino-U.S. interests, and this concern has acted as one of the factors pushing the U.S.S.R. toward detente and the development of more stable relations with the United States.

APPENDIX M

**ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
AND NATO COUNTRIES, SELECTED YEARS, 1938-1985 (STATISTICAL TABLE)**
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX N



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APPENDIX O

**USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

APPENDIX P

**USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX R

CPSU POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY (CHART)
(LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX T

EASTERN EUROPE

Regional Survey

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

Geographically Eastern Europe includes all of Europe east of a line running generally along the Finnish-Soviet border, the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, and from the southwest corner of the Baltic Sea to the northeast corner of the Adriatic. Politically it comprises all of the European nations with Communist governments. Since the USSR is both the largest state geographically and the most important politically in this region, the coverage of this chapter also includes all Soviet territory in Asia. The non-Communist nations, Finland, Greece, and Turkey, are included in the chapter on Western Europe.

Within this vast region there are three major sub-regions, each with numerous distinct geographical areas. The sub-regions are: North European and Russian plains; the Carpathian-Balkan mountain complex; and Asiatic Russia.

The plains and steppes of North Europe and Russia are characterized by hot, dry summers, and bitterly cold winters. These extremes are only slightly ameliorated in the south by the tempering effect of the nearby Black Sea. In the center of the sub-region, and throughout its northern extent, there are great swamps, seriously interfering with military movement in summer but easily traversed in winter. There are many broad rivers, creating difficult obstacles, generally to east-west movement. There are extensive forests through much of this region. The road net is relatively limited, compared to Western Europe.

The Carpathian-Balkan region is an essentially mountainous peninsula extending southward from the heart of Europe, and cut by the generally broad and fertile Danube basin and a number of smaller river valleys. Inhospitable terrain, shortages of raw materials (and resultant lack of industrialization) and too-numerous independent nations in a relatively small area, all combine to make this the least-developed region of Europe in economic terms. Despite its general ruggedness, two factors have made this sub-region a traditional highway of war: proximity to the westernmost tip of Asia, in the area of the Turkish Straits; and the traversibility of the river valleys, facilitating commerce and other east and west transit, not only across the Straits, but between Central Europe and South Russia.

Soviet Asia includes practically every type of terrain except tropical: rocky and sandy deserts, steppes, tundra, lofty mountains, great expanses of forests, and a varied assortment

of temperate zone farming areas. This tremendous region extends across the entire northern half of Asia; even without European Russia of which it is an extension, it comprises the largest single political territory in the world. It includes the bulk of the Heartland area of Sir Halford J. Mackinder's geopolitical concept of political and spatial relationships.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The first, and possibly most impressive, strategic consideration relating to this region is the geopolitical fact noted above. This region is a combination of Mackinder's Heartland and Eastern Europe, and requires consideration of Mackinder's famous thesis: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island [Eastern Hemisphere]; who rules the World Island commands the World. Whether or not one agrees with its validity, the idea cannot be ignored.

All except two of the countries of Eastern Europe are solidly within the Soviet orbit, and are members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact (see below). The two exceptions are Yugoslavia and Albania. The extent of Soviet domination over the other six nations of the region (often referred to as Soviet satellites) varies from country to country. There is no question, however, that such domination exists; this was amply reaffirmed by the 1968 invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet satellites of East Central Europe are a strategic protective belt, garrisoned by Soviet and satellite ground forces, within which the Soviet advanced air defense system functions. This belt also encompasses some of the formidable defense obstacles noted above, including the Carpathian Mountains, and the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula Rivers. Moreover, politically this belt helps to insulate Russia's population from Western influence, and at the same time affords an advanced base for penetration of Western Europe by Communist intelligence, subversion and propaganda. It also provides an advance base that would be militarily useful in war. It projects the Soviet military frontier 750 miles westward and 400 miles southward from Russia's pre-World War II border. The Rhine would be the first serious natural obstacle in the path of Soviet armies attacking West Germany.

REGIONAL ALLIANCES

Warsaw Pact. This is an alliance of the Soviet Union and six

(Reprinted with permission from: *The Almanac of World Military Power*, by Col. T. N. Dupuy, US Army, Ret, Col John A. C. Andrews, US Air Force, Ret., and Grace P. Hayes. 3rd ed. Dunn Loring, Virginia T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1974.)

of the other Communist states of East Europe: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. It was established as a 20-year mutual-defense alliance in May 1955 in a conference called at Warsaw in response to the ratification (March 1955) of West Germany's admittance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Albania was represented at the conference, and was one of the original Pact members. However, Albania has been excluded from all Warsaw Pact activities since 1962, after that nation aligned itself with Communist China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Albania formally withdrew from the Pact in September, 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

East Germany also participated in the conference, but was not officially admitted to the Pact until 1958, after it became obvious that Communist-bloc pressures would not reverse the rearmament of West Germany.

The Warsaw Pact established a joint command and defense staff for the combined armed forces of the seven participants. This staff is located in Moscow; the Commander in Chief is a Soviet marshal. Each other member of the alliance provides a General Staff mission, headed by a senior officer. The Pact also maintains permanent military staff missions, composed of Soviet officers only, in the capitals of each of the other member nations. There is also a political Consultative Committee, consisting of the foreign ministers of the participating nations, under the chairmanship of the Soviet Foreign Minister. In the terms of the treaty creating the Pact, armed attack in Europe on a member state will oblige all other members to come to its assistance.

Other Alliances. The USSR has 20-year bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, renewable on expiration, with each of the other members of the Warsaw Pact. These treaties broaden the terms of assistance in war to specify an attack by any state or combination of states, whether in Europe or not. There are similar bilateral treaties among the other members. Additionally there are status of forces treaties with all Pact countries where Soviet troops are stationed.

In 1949 the USSR established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, or CEMA). Members were the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Albania left in 1961, and Mongolia joined in 1962. Cuba became the ninth member in 1972. It was originally stated to be a consultative, cooperative body to facilitate through joint action the economic development of all, but the USSR soon assumed dominance in all matters. By 1962 no national mid-range (3- or 5-year) plan, nor its annual fulfillment plan or budget, could be put in effect without USSR approval; items and quantities in international trade were virtually dictated, as were the categories of goods to be produced in each country.

RECENT INTRA- AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICTS

There have been a few major conflicts or incidents within the region involving the use, or threatened use, of armed forces. In addition to the two Berlin crises noted below, there have been several others of only slightly lesser significance. There have also been two major incidents outside the region in which Soviet armed forces have been directly involved. No attempt is made here to assess the extent to which Soviet influence may have been involved, directly or indirectly, in other incidents or conflicts outside the region.

The major incidents are:

1968	Warsaw Pact (less Romania) occupation of Czechoslovakia
1969	Sino-Soviet border engagements along frontiers with Manchuria and Sinkiang (these were only the most publicized of many border incidents since 1961)
1970	Civil disturbances in northern Poland resulting in major changes in Party and Government leadership

APPENDIX U

—PRC TRADE WITH MAJOR PARTNERS, SELECTED YEARS¹
[Dollar amounts in millions of U.S. dollars]

Country	1959		1961		1966		1970		1973		1974 ²	
	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)	Trade	Share of PRC trade (Percent)
Japan	\$23	0.5	\$46	1.5	\$631	14.9	\$855	19.9	\$2,021	20.5	\$3,330	24.3
United States	140	3.3	116	3.8	380	9.0	354	8.3	796	8.9	1,082	7.9
Hong Kong	195	4.5	81	2.7	217	5.1	270	6.3	487	8.1	890	6.5
West Germany	90	2.1	63	2.1	145	3.4	190	4.4	460	4.9	650	4.7
Malaysia/Singapore	124	2.9	153	5.1	215	5.1	176	4.1	409	4.7	(*)	(*)
Canada	2,055	47.9	915	30.3	178	4.2	212	4.9	340	3.4	575	4.2
United Kingdom	39	1.4	159	1.0	320	7.5	45	1.0	270	2.7	329	2.4
USSR	58	1.3	159	5.8	196	4.6	109	2.5	265	2.7	420	3.1
Romania	58	1.3	159	5.8	196	4.6	109	2.5	265	2.7	420	3.1
Australia	48	1.1	48	1.6	113	2.7	154	3.6	231	2.3	348	2.5
France	48	1.1	48	1.6	113	2.7	154	3.6	231	2.3	348	2.5
Italy	48	1.1	48	1.6	113	2.7	154	3.6	231	2.3	348	2.5
Total of above	2,836	66.1	1,829	60.6	2,545	60.0	2,671	62.3	6,598	66.8	(*)	(*)
PRC Total Trade	4,290	100.0	3,020	100.0	4,245	100.0	4,290	100.0	9,870	100.0	13,715	100.0

¹ Data on trade refer to the combined volume of PRC exports to and imports from various countries.
² Preliminary.

(From: China - A Reassessment of the Economy. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975 (94th Congress, 1st Session, Joint Committee Print).)

APPENDIX V

**USSR AND ADJACENT AREAS ADMINISTRATIVE MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

APPENDIX W

USSR POLITICAL MAP AND PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION MAP

**(MAPS LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)
(Included with permission by the National Geographic Society.)**

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**USSR SUMMARY MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

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**USSR ECONOMIC REGIONS MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

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**MAJOR SOVIET PETROLEUM DEPOSITS AND PIPELINE SYSTEMS MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)**

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PERMAFROST REGIONS IN THE USSR MAP (MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX AB

CHINA-USSR BORDER: WESTERN SECTOR MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX AC

CHINA-USSR BORDER: EASTERN SECTOR MAP
(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

APPENDIX AD


**"GULAG"—SLAVERY, INC., THE DOCUMENTED MAP
OF FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN SOVIET RUSSIA**

(MAP LOCATED IN BACK OF MANUAL)

(Reprinted with permission by: AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Committee)

APPENDIX AE

THE KGB'S PRIVATE RAILROAD MAP



THE KGB'S PRIVATE RAILROAD

The railroad running from Potma to Barashevo which is depicted on the above map (a small segment of the concentration camp map of the Soviet Union) does not appear on any official map of the Soviet Union. It is a railroad run by the KGB for the purpose of servicing the numerous concentration camps on both sides of the track. It runs north from Potma, on the Moscow-Saransk-Kuybishev line, or a distance of some 60 kms.

(Reprinted from: U.S.S.R. Labor Camps. Hearings Before the Subcommittee to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session, February 1, 1973, Part 1. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1973.)

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BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

PAUL T. SMITH
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

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CofEngrs (5)	AFSC (10)
TJAG (3)	USAWC (10)
SAPA-CI (3)	USACGSC (5)
CMH (5)	USMA (5)
CNGB (3)	USAIMA (5)
MilPerCen (3)	
DARCOM (5)	

ARNG & USAR: None.

For explanation of abbreviation used, see AR 310-50.

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 O-225-525

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Chairmen

CHEKA-VCHEKA- GPU-OGPU	DZERZHINSKIY , Feliks Edmundovich	12/20/1917- 7/1926	MVD
VCHEKA	PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich	7/1917-8/1917	MGB
OGPU	MENZHINSKIY , Vyacheslav Rudolfovich	7/1926-5/1934	MGB
NKVD	YAGODA , Genrikh Grigoryevich	7/1934-6/1936	MVD
NKVD	YEZHOV , Nikolay Ivanovich	9/1936-8/1938	MVD
NKVD	BERIYA , Lavrentiy Pavlovich	8/1938-2/1941	KGB
NKGB	MERKULOV , Vsevolod Nikolayevich	2/1941-7/1941	KGB
NKVD	BERIYA , Lavrentiy Pavlovich	7/1941-7/1945	KGB
NKVD	KRUGLOV , Sergey Nikiforovich	7/1945-3/1946	KGB
NKGB	MERKULOV , Vsevolod Nikolayevich	4/1943-3/1946	KGB

Deputies

VCHEKA	ALEKSANDROVICH , Vyacheslav	12/1917-7/1918	NKVD
	PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich	1917-1919	NKVD
	LATSIS , Martyn Yanovich	1918-	NKGB
	PANYUSHKIN , Vasily Lukich	1918-	NKGB
	ZAKS , Grigoriy	1918-	NKVD
	YEVSEYEV , D. G.	1918-	NKVD
	KSENOFONTOV , Ivan Ksenofontovich	1919-1920	NKVD
	BRENNER , M. V.	1920-	NKVD
	PETERSON , Karl Andreyevich	1920-	NKGB
VCHEKA-GPU- OGPU	UNSHLIKHT , Iosif Stanislavovich	1921-1923	NKVD
OGPU	MENZHINSKIY , Vyacheslav Rudolfovich	1923-1926	NKVD
OGPU	TRILISSER , Mikhail Abramovich	1926-1930	NKVD
OGPU	YAGODA , Genrikh Grigoryevich	1926-1934	MVD
OGPU	MESSING , Stanislav Adamovich	-1931	MGB
OGPU	AKULOV , Ivan Alekseyevich	1931-1932	MGB
OGPU	BALITSKIY , Valerian Apollonovich	1931-	MGB
OGPU-NKVD	AGRANOV , Yakov Saulovich	1933-1936	MVD
NKVD	PROKOFYEV , Georgiy Yevgenyevich	-1936	KGB
NKVD	BELSKIY , Lev Nikolayevich	1934-1937	KGB
NKVD	RYZHOV , Mikhail Ivanovich	1934-1937	KGB
NKVD	MIRONOV , Lev G.	1936-	KGB
NKVD	FRINOVSKIY , Mikhail Petrovich	1936-1937	KGB
NKVD	BERMAN , Matvey Davydovich	1936-1937	KGB
NKVD	BULANOV , Pavel Petrovich	1936-1938	KGB
NKVD	ZAKOVSKIY , Leonid Mikhaylovich	1938-	KGB
NKVD	ZHUKOVSKIY , Semen Borisovich	1938-1939	KGB
NKVD	FILARETOV , G.	1939-	KGB
NKVD	MASLENNIKOV , Ivan Ivanovich	1939-	KGB
NKVD	MERKULOV , Vsevolod Nikolayevich	1939-1941	KGB

Chairmen

MVD	KRUGLOV , Sergey Nikiforovich	3/1946-3/1953
MGB	MERKULOV , Vsevolod Nikolayevich	3/1946- 1950
MGB	ABAKUMOV , Viktor Semenovich	1950- 1951
MGB	IGNATYEV , Semen Denisovich	1951-3/1953
MVD	BERIYA , Lavrentiy Pavlovich	3/1953-6/1953
MVD	KRUGLOV , Sergey Nikiforovich	6/1953-3/1954
KGB	SEROV , Ivan Aleksandrovich	3/1954-12/1958
KGB	SHELEPIN , Aleksandr Nikolayevich	12/1958-11/1961
KGB	SEMICHASTNYY , Vladimir Yefimovich	11/1961-4/1967
KGB	ANDROPOV , Yuriy Vladimirovich	4/1967-

Deputies

NKVD	ABAKUMOV , Viktor Semenovich	1941-
NKVD	CHERNYSHOV , Vasily Vasilyevich	1941-1952
NKGB	GRIBOV , Mikhail Vasilyevich	1941-
NKGB	KOBULOV , Bogdan Zakharovich	1941-
NKVD	KRUGLOV , Sergey Nikiforovich	1941-1945
NKVD	OBRUCHNIKOV , Boris Pavlovich	1941-
NKVD	SAFRAZAN , Leon Bogdanovich	1941-
NKVD	SOKOLOV , Grigoriy Grigoryevich	1941-
NKGB	SEROV , Ivan Aleksandrovich	1941-1954
NKVD	SVINELUPOV , Mikhail Georgiyevich	
NKVD	NEDOSEKIN ,	-1942
NKVD	APOLLONOV , Arkadiy Nikolayevich	1942-1944
NKVD	ZAVENYAGIN , Avraamiy Pavlovich	1944-1946
MVD	BOGDANOV , Nikolay Kuzmich	1945-
MGB	OGOLTSOV , Sergey Ivanovich	1951-
MGB	YEPISHEV , Aleksey Alekseyevich	1951-1953
MGB	RYUMIN , Mikhail D.	1952-1953
MVD	LUNEV , Konstantin Fedorovich	1953-1959
KGB	TIKUNOV , Vadim Stepanovich	1958-1961
KGB	BELCHENKO , Sergey Savich	1958-1965
KGB	IVASHUTIN , Petr Ivanovich	1962-1963
KGB	ZAKHAROV , Nikolay Stepanovich	1962-
KGB	ROGOV , Mikhail Stepanovich	1966-
KGB	PANKRATOV , Lev Ivanovich	1967-
KGB	PEREPELTSYN , Aleksandr Ivanovich	1959-1967
KGB	TSVIGUN , Semen Kuzmich	1967-
KGB	MALYGIN , Ardalion Nikolayevich	1968-
KGB	CHEBRIKOV , Viktor Mikhaylovich	1969-
KGB	PIROZHKO , Vladimir Petrovich	1971-
KGB	TSINEV , Georgiy Karpovich	1971-
KGB	YEMOKHONOV , N. P.	1974-

Secretariat

Chiefs

PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich	1917
GZHELISHCHAK , Frantischek	1917-1918
KSENOFONTOV , Ivan Ksenofontovich	1918
LEVITAN ,	1918
ILIN , Ivan Ilich	1918
MESHCHERYAKOV , N.	1919
CHUGURIN , Ivan Dmitriyevich	1919-1921
SAVINOV , V. I.	1920
URALOV , Sergey Gerasimovich	1920
SAVINKOV ,	1921
GERSON , V. L.	1922

MAMULOV , Stepan Solomonovich	1938
BERZIN , Eduard Petrovich	1922
ABAKUMOV , Viktor Semenovich	1941
CHERNYSHOV , Vasiliy Vasilyevich	1941
GRIBOV , Mikhail Vasilyevich	1941
KOBULOV , Bogdan Zakharovich	1941
GBRUCHNIKOV , Boris Pavlovich	1941
SVINELUPOV , Mikhail Georgiyevich	1942
CHERNOV , I. A.	1946-1947
Deputy	
BROVERMAN , Ya. M.	

Presidium

AVERIN , Vasiliy Kuzmich
KSENOFONTOV , Ivan Ksenofontovich
ORDZHONIKIDZE , Grigoriy Konstantinovich
PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich
PETERSON , Karl Andreyevich
TRIFONOV , Valentin Andreyevich
YEVSEYEV , D. G.

First
Presidium
1918

AVERIN , Vasiliy Kuzmich	1918-
BOKIY , Gleb Ivanovich	1918-
CHERNOV ,	1918-
CHUGURIN , Ivan Dmitriyevich	1918-
DZERZHINSKIY , Feliks Edmundovich	1918-1926
EYDUK , Aleksandr Vladimirovich	1918-
FOMIN , Vasiliyevich Vasilyevich	1918-
ILIN , Ivan Ilich	1918-
KEDROV , Mikhail Sergeyeich	1918-1924
KRASIKOV , Petr Ananyevich	1918-
KSENOFONTOV , Ivan Ksenofontovich	1918-1921
LATSIS , Martyn Yanovich	1918-
MEDVED , Filipp Demyanovich	1918-
ORDZHONIKIDZE , Grigoriy Konstantinovich	1918-
PANYUSHKIN , Vasiliy Lukich	1918-1919
PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich	1918-1937
PETERSON , Karl Andreyevich	1918-
POLIKARPOV ,	1918-
SHCHUKIN , S. Ye.	1918-
STASOVA , Yelena Dmitriyevna	1918-

TRIFONOV , Valentin Andreyevich	1918
TRILISSER , Mikhail Abramovich	1921
UNSHLIKHT , Iosif Stanislavovich	1918
URALOV , Sergey Gerasimovich	1918
URITSKIY , Moisey Solomonovich	1918
YAKOVLEVA , Varvara Nikolayevna	1918
YEVSEYEV , D. G.	1918
ZAKS , Grigoriy	1918
AVANESOV , Varlaam Aleksandrovich	1918
MOROZ , Grigoriy Semenovich	1918
SAVINOV , V. I.	1919
VALOBUYEV , Konstantin Maksimovich	1919
VASILYEV-YUZHIN , Mikhail Ivanovich	1919
ZHUKOV , Nikolay Aleksandrovich	1919
BELENKIY , Abram Yakovlevich	1920
KADOMTSEV , Erzam Samuilovich	1920
KORNEV , Vasiliy Stepanovich	1920
LEONOV ,	1920
MANTSEV , Vasiliy Nikolayevich	1920
MESSING , Stanislav Adamovich	1920
SAMSONOV , Timovey Petrovich	1920
ZIMIN ,	1920
YAGODA , Genrikh Grigoryevich	1920
ARTUZOV , Artur Khristianovich	1921
MENZHINSKIY , Vyacheslav Rudolfovich	1923
REDENS , Stanislav Frantsevich	1921
VALITSKIY , V. A.	1923
MOGILEVSKIY , Solomon Grigoryevich	1923
VOLYNSKIY , S. G.	1929
BLYUMKIN , Yakov Grigoryevich	
MININ , Sergey Konstantinovich	1936
KASHIRIN , Ivan Dmitriyevich	

FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE
(Formerly Foreign Department)

Chiefs

DAVTYAN , Yakov Khristoforovich	1918-1919
MOGILEVSKIY , Solomon Grigoryevich	1919-1920
LIFSHITS , Yakov	1920-
TRILISSER , Mikhail Abramovich	1920-1930
MESSING , Stanislav Adamovich	1930-
ARTUZOV , Artur Khristianovich	-1935
SLUTSKIY , Abram Aronovich	1935-1938
SHPIGELGLAS , Aleksandr	1938-1939
DEKANOZOV , Vladimir Grigoryevich	1939-
FITIN , Pavel Mikhaylovich	1943-1944
PITOVVRANOV , Yevgeniy Petrovich	1944-
SAVCHENKO , Sergey Romanovich	1952-
KOBULOV , Bogdan Zakharovich	-1953
RYASNOY , Vasilii Stepanovich	1953-
PANYUSHKIN , Aleksandr Semenovich	1953-
SAKHAROVSKIY , Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	1965-

Deputies

LOGINOV ,	1930-
BERMAN , Boris Davydovich	-1937
SHPIGELGLAS , Aleksandr	1937-1938
ZUBILIN , Vasilii Mikhaylovich	1947-1948
FEDOTOV , Petr Vasilyevich	1948-
KOROTKOV , Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	-1954

Secretary

LEBEDINSKIY ,	1930-
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Treasurer

KLYUCHAREV , Ivan	1921-
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EXECUTIVE ACTION DEPARTMENT
(Also Known as Operative Department)

Chiefs

ARTUZOV , Artur Khristianovich	1919-
---------------------------------------	-------

SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Chiefs

FEDOTOV , Petr Vasilyevich	19
GRIBANOV , Oleg Mikhaylovich	19

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
(KRO)

Chiefs

LATSIS , Martyn Yanovich	19
ARTUZOV , Artur Khristianovich	19
OLSKIY , Ya.	19
VOLYNSKIY , S. G.	19

Deputies

STYRNE , Vladimir Andreyevich	19
PUZITSKIY , Sergey Vasilyevich	19
PILYAR , Roman Aleksandrovich	19

DEPARTMENT D
(Disinformation)

Chief

AGAYANTS , Ivan Ivanovich

Deputies

SITNIKOV , Vasilii Romanovich	1
KONDRASHEV , Sergey Aleksandrovich	1

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
(SPO)

Chiefs

PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich
KEDROV , Mikhail Sergeyevich
SKRYPNIK , Nikola Alekseyevich
YAKOVLEVA , Varvara Nikolayevna

HEADQUARTERS

THIRD CHIEF DIRECTORATE

(i.e., Military Counterintelligence)
(Formerly Extraordinary or Special Department—
Osobyy Otdel (OO))

Chiefs

KEDROV , Mikhail Sergeevich	1919-
PAVLUNOVSKIY , Ivan Petrovich	1919-
DZERZHINSKIY , Feliks Edmundovich	1919-1920
MENZHINSKIY , Vyacheslav Rudolfovich	1920-
POPOV ,	1920-
BOKIY , Gleb Ivanovich	1921-1923
YAGODA , Genrikh Grigoryevich	1923-1930
FIRIN , Semen Grigoryevich	1930-
GAY , Mark I.	1935-1937
MOLCHANOV , Georgiy Aleksandrovich	1937-1939
SHEVELEV , Ivan Grigoryevich	-1941
GLADKOV , Pytr Andreyevich (Smersh, Navy)**	1942-1946
CHERNYSHOV , Vasiliy Vasilyevich (Smersh, Army)**	1942-1943
ABAKUMOV , Viktor Semenovich (Smersh, Army)**	1943-1946
CHERNYSHOV , Vasiliy Vasilyevich	1946-
FADEYKIN , Ivan Anisimovich	1967-

Deputies

PAVLUNOVSKIY , Ivan Petrovich	1919-1920
BUDNIKOV , Vladimir	1921-
LYUBIMOV ,	1936-
SHEVELEV , Ivan Grigoryevich	1941-
CHERNYSHOV , Vasiliy Vasilyevich	1943-1946
BELKIN ,	1946-
FADEYKIN , Ivan Anisimovich	-1967

CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF

(GUPVO
(Including Internal Troops
1947-195

Chiefs

MOKASEY-SHIBINSKIY, G.
SHAMSHEV, S. G.
FROLOV, Vladimir D.
FEDOTOV, Petr Frolovich
MUKOMOL, Ya. V.
OLSKIY, Ya.
KATSNELSON, Zinoviy Borisovich
VELEZHEV,
VORONTSOV,
BYSTRYKH, N. M.
FRINOVSKIY, Mikhail Petrovich
MASLENNIKOV, Ivan Ivanovich
STAKHANOV, Nikolay Pavlovich
APOLLONOV, Arkadiy Nikolayevich
STAKHANOV, Nikolay Pavlovich
ZYRYANOV, Pavel Ivanovich
MATROSOV, Vadim Aleksandrovich

Deputies

KOGAN,
BOBRYSHEV,
YATSENKO, Nikolay Ivanovich
PETROV, Gavriil Aleksandrovich
BANNYKH, Stepan Anisimovich
REZNICHENKO, Yakov Terentievich
IONOV, Petr Ivanovich
VLASENKO, Grigoriy Ivanovich
DALMATOV, N.

Field Commanders

KRUCHINKIN, N. K.
KOVALEV, Aleksandr Antonovich
SOKOLOV, Grigoriy Grigoryevich

Deputy Field Commanders

KRUCHINKIN, N. K.
SOKOLOV, Grigoriy Grigoryevich
VOYTENKOV,
APOLLONOV, Arkadiy Nikolaevich

Chiefs of Staff

VCHEKA JOINT COMMISSION

Chief

EIGHTH CHIEF DIRECTORATE

(Formerly Road and Transportation Department, also
Railways and Sea Transportation Department)

Chiefs

ROSTOVTSEV, F. V.	1918-
FOMIN, Vasiliy Vasilyevich	1919-
ZHUKOV, Nikolay Aleksandrovich	1920-
KARYAKIN,	1923-
BLAGONRAVOV, Georgiy Ivanovich	1923-1927
SHANIN, Aleksandr	1935-
FEDOROV, Vsevolod Tikhonovich	1941-
LYALIN, Serafim Nikolayevich	1967-

Deputies

SLYUSARENKO,	1920-
NIKOLSKIY, Lev	1936-

INVESTIGATION SECTION

Chiefs

KINGISEPP, Viktor Eduardovich	1918-
LUKASHIN, Sergey Lukyanovich	1918-
GALBANIS, Robert	1918-
MOROZ, Grigoriy Semenovich	1920-
GORB, Mikhail	-1937
LEONOV, A. G.	1946-1951
RYUMIN, Mikhail D.	1951-1953
VLODZIMIRSKIY, Lev Yemelyanovich	-1953
PARAMONOV,	1953-
VOLKOV, Aleksandr Fedorovich	1970-

Deputies

VALESKALN, Peteris	1920-
KOMAROV, V. I.	-1953
LIKHACHEV, M. T.	

PRISON DEPARTMENT (GULAG)

Chiefs

NINTH CHIEF DIRECTION

Chiefs

AVANESOV, Varlaam A.
BYKOV, Fedor A.
BERZIN, Eduard P.
NIKITIN, I. I. (Chief)
BORISOV, Ilya I. (Commissar)
BELENKIY, Abram Ya. (Also sp
assistant to chairman of C
PAUKER, Karl Viktorovich
PAVLOV,
GULST, Venyamin N.
VLASIK, Nikolay Sidorovich
KAPANDZE, Andrey P.
KUZNETSOV, Aleksandr K.
RAKOV, Aleksandr M.
SHADRIN, Dmitriy Nikolayevich
VLASIK, Nikolay Sidorovich
IGNATYEV, Semen Denisovich
MARTYNOV,
NOVIK, Nikolay P.
KUZMICHEV, Sergey F.
LENEV, Aleksandr M.
USTINOV, Vladimir Ivanovich
ZAKHAROV, Nikolay Stepanovich
TSVIGUN, Semen Kuzmich

Deputies

CHERTOK,
VALOVICH, Vladimir V.
VLASIK, Nikolay Sidorovich
LYNKO, Vladimir Semenovich
GORYSHEV, Serafim Vasilyevich
GRISHKOV,

Kremlin Commandants

MALKOV, Pavel Dmitriyevich
PETERSON, Rudolf Avgustovich
TKALUN,
ROGOV,
SPIRIDONOV, Nikolay K.
VEDENIN, Andrey Ya.
SHORNIKOV, Sergey S.

NINTH CHIEF DIRECTORATE

Chiefs

AVANESOV , Varlaam A.	1917.
BYKOV , Fedor A.	
BERZIN , Eduard P.	1917-1918
NIKITIN , I. I. (Chief)	1918-1921
BORISOV , Ilya I. (Commissar)	
BELENKIY , Abram Ya. (Also special assistant to chairman of OGPU)	1918-1926
PAUKER , Karl Viktorovich	1926-1935
PAVLOV ,	1935-1938
GULST , Venyamin N.	1941.
VLASIK , Nikolay Sidorovich	1941.
KAPANDZE , Andrey P.	1946.
KUZNETSOV , Aleksandr K.	1946-1947
RAKOV , Aleksandr M.	1947.
SHADRIN , Dmitriy Nikolayevich	1947.
VLASIK , Nikolay Sidorovich	1947-1952
IGNATYEV , Semen Denisovich	1952.
MARTYNOV ,	1952-1953
NOVIK , Nikolay P.	1953.
KUZMICHEV , Sergey F.	1953.
LENEV , Aleksandr M.	1953-1954
USTINOV , Vladimir Ivanovich	1954-1957
ZAKHAROV , Nikolay Stepanovich	1957-1967
TSVIGUN , Semen Kuzmich	1967.

Deputies

CHERTOK ,	1936.
VALOVICH , Vladimir V.	
VLASIK , Nikolay Sidorovich	1947
LYNKO , Vladimir Semenovich	1947-1952
GORYSHEV , Serafim Vasilyevich	1947-1952
GRISHKOV ,	1947-1950

Kremlin Commandants

MALKOV , Pavel Dmitriyevich	1917-1920
PETERSON , Rudolf Avgustovich	1920-1935
TKALUN ,	1935-1937
ROGOV ,	1938-1939
SPIRIDONOV , Nikolay K.	1939-1953
VEDENIN , Andrey Ya.	1953-1967
SHORNIKOV , Sergey S.	1967.

CHIEF DIRECTORATE FOR RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION CAMPS***

Chief

SAFRAZYAN, Leon Bogdanovich 1941.

Deputies

BUYANOV, Leonid Sergeyevich 1941.
KHUDYAKOV, Pavel Vasilyevich 1941.

CHIEF DIRECTORATE FOR MINES AND STEEL WORKS***

Chief

ZAKHAROV, Petr Andreyevich 1943.

CHIEF DIRECTORATE FOR AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION***

Chief

SAFRAZYAN, Leon Bogdanovich 1941.

Deputies

PACHKIN, Vasily Alekseyevich 1941.
PAVLOV, Nikolay Ivanovich 1941.
VASILYEV, Nikolay Pavlovich 1941.

ANTI-SPECULATION DEPARTMENT

Chief

FOMIN, Vasily Vasilyevich 1918.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEPARTMENT

Chiefs

VANYUKOV, Aleksandr Alekseyevich 1921.
VORONTSOV, I. 1922-1928

MANAGERIAL AND SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

Chiefs

BOGOREVSKIY, Matvey S.

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
(SPO)

EXECUTIVE ACTION DEPARTMENT
(Also Known as Operative Department)

Chiefs

ARTUZOV , Artur Khristianovich	1919-
PLYAT ,	-1923
KSENOFONTOV , Ivan Ksenofontovich	1923-
KAUL , Aleksandr Iosifovich	1929-
PAUKER , Karl Viktorovich	1935-1937
VOLOVICH , Z. I.	1937-
RAYKHMAN , Leonid Fedorovich	1941-

Deputies

VOLOVICH , Z. I.	-1937
NOVIKOV ,	1944-

EXECUTIVE ACTION SECTION

Chiefs

SUDOPLATOV , Pavel Anatolyevich	1942-1953
STUDNIKOV , L. I.	1953-1954
RODIN , Nikolay Borisovich	1962-

PASSPORT SECTION

Chief

MYULLER , George	1936-
-------------------------	-------

PRESS SECTION

Chiefs

KLYAVIN , Yan Yuryevich	1918-1922
KRAVCHENKO , Vladimir Fedorovich	1970-

Chiefs

PETERS, Yakov Khristoforovich
KEDROV, Mikhail Sergeyevich
SKRYPNIK, Nikola Alekseyevich
YAKOVLEVA, Varvara Nikolayevna
ATARBEKOV, Georgiy Aleksandrovich
MUKOMOL, Ya. V.
LATSIS, Martyn Yanovich
MENZHINSKIY, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich
SAMSONOV, Timofey Petrovich
MESHCHERYAKOV, N.
DERIBAS, Terenty Dmitriyevich
MOLCHANOV, Georgiy Aleksandrovich
FEDOTOV, Petr Vasilyevich

Deputies

TUCHKOV, A. N.
ROMANOVSKIY,
ANDREYEVA,
SYUNNERBERG, S. K.
LYUSHKOV, Genrikh Samoylovich

Secretary

GERSON, V. L.

SECTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY

Chief

SHAPIRO, Isaak Ilich

RECORDS SECTION

Chief

FOMIN, Vasily Vasilyevich

*The data are recorded as they appear in open publications. Additional information may be included from other public sources. Complete accuracy cannot, of course, be achieved without access to official records from the Soviet Union.

**SMERSH -- Smert Shpionam (Death to Spies), April 1942 - March 1946. Created as an extraordinary department directly subordinate to the Soviet Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

***During war years (1941-1945) only.

INT

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1923-
1934-1936

VCHEKA JOINT COMMISSION

Chief
STUCHKA, Petr Ivanovich
Deputy
IKHNOVSKIY,
Board Members
SVIDERSKIY, Aleksey Ivanovich
AVANESOV, Varlaam Aleksandrovich
NIKOLAYEV, V. M.
SHMIDT,
TER-GABRIYELIAN, Saak Mirzoyevich

AGENT SECTION

Chief
KATS, 1923-

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Chiefs
PETERS, Yakov Khristoforovich 1922-1928
TRIANDOFILOV, V. 1928-
DYAKOV, 1928-

SOKOLOV, G.
Deputy Field C
KRUCHINKIN
SOKOLOV, G.
VOYTENKOV,
APOLLONOV,
Chiefs of Staff
YATSENKO, N.
SEKRETAREV
MATROSOV, V.

INTER

(A separate chief
Commanding Of
POPOV, D.
VALOBUYEV, M.
KORNEV, Vasil
STUDINKIN, P.
KADOMTSEV, I.
APLOK,
GOLUBEV, Alek
PROKOFYEV, G.
APOLLONOV, A.
GERBATYUK,

Deputies
SPILNCHENKO
MOGILSKIY, B.
YATSENKO, N.
KIRYUSHIN, I.
GREBENNIK, K.
BUNKOV, Stepa
YAKOVLEV, I. K.

ADMIN

Chiefs
CHAYVANOV, V.
MOROZOV,

(From: Soviet Intelligence and Security Services. Volume II: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with some Additional Titles from Other Sources. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1975. (94th Congress, 1st Session, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Committee Print).)

PETERSON , Rudolf Avgustovich	1920-1935
TKALUN ,	1935-1937
ROGOV ,	1938-1939
SPIRIDONOV , Nikolay K.	1939-1953
VEDENIN , Andrey Ya.	1953-1967
SHORNIKOV , Sergey S.	1967-
Assistant Commandants	
MARTINOV , Mikhail I.	1918-1920
KOSYNKIN , Petr Ye.	1941-

PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT

Chief	
FOMIN , Vasiliy Vasilyevich	1918-

REGISTRATION DEPARTMENT

Chief	
ROTSEN ,	1920-

TRAINING DEPARTMENT

Chief	
SAVINOV , V. I.	1919-

TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT

Chief	
GORYANOV ,	1931-

MANAGERIAL AND SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

Chiefs	
POGREBINSKIY , Matvey S.	-1922
AMBAYN , Z. I.	1922-
SIDOROV ,	1925-

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (INFO)

Chiefs	
PETERS , Yakov Khristoforovich	1918-
ANTIPOV-LEVYY ,	1923-
ALEKSEYEV ,	1928-
Deputy	
ZAPOROZHETS , Ivan V.	1928-

FINANCE DEPARTMENT (FINO)

Chiefs	
BERZIN , R.	1920-
ULRIKH , Vasiliy Danilovich	1920-
DIETS ,	1923-
LURYE , A. Ya.	-1938

SPECIAL SECTION (SPEKO)

Chiefs	
TER-GABRIYELIAN , Saak Mirzoyevich	1919-
BOKIY , Gleb Ivanovich	1923-1937
MESHIK , Pavel Yakovlevich	1953-

11

A black and white photograph of a woman in traditional costume. She is smiling and looking towards the camera. She wears a large, ornate headpiece with a wide, flat top and a decorative band. Her hair is styled in a braid. She is wearing multiple strands of pearls around her neck. Her costume includes a light-colored, puffed sleeve top and a dark, patterned vest or bodice. Her hands are clasped in front of her.

MELVIN M. PAYNE, PRESIDENT

MELVILLE BELL GROSVENOR, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF


GILBERT M. GROSVENOR, EDITOR.

WILLIAM T. PEELE, CHIEF CARTOGRAPHER

DAVID W. COOK, ASSOCIATE CHIEF CARTOGRAPHER

WASHINGTON: FEBRUARY 1976

SCALE 1:12,000,000 OR 189 MILES TO THE INCH



Design by John F. Dorr

Map Compilation by Donald A. Jaeger

Paintings by Sherry Wolf and Tibor G. Toth

Research by Susan Day Fuller

Principal Consultant: Prof. Edward Allworth, Columbia University

Picture sources from Novost Press Agency and

Tass, Moscow; Sovphoto, New York, and
National Geographic, p. 51.

National Geographic staff

With the indomitability characteristic of the Slavic peoples, the Russians fought off invaders through the centuries and built their state into one of the world's greatest empires. Under the czars, they ranged from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific, their culture enriched by the Eastern Orthodox faith and Western intellectual ideas. Their character was indelibly engraved by artists such as Tolstoy, Pushkin, and Tchaikovsky. With the Soviet system and the growth of an industrialized society, religious influence has waned. Russians, who make up just over half the Soviet Union's population, today can be found throughout the nation—bureaucrats, agriculturalists, factory workers, educators, technicians.



Map of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union showing ethnic distribution. Major ethnic groups labeled include Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Moldavian, Polish, Czech, Armenian, Georgian, and others. The Carpathian Mountains and Crimean Peninsula are highlighted. The map is titled "Map of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union".

Sprawling across eleven time zones and comprising a sixth of earth's land surface, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics embraces more than a hundred ethnic strains. This National Geographic map illustrates 24 of these peoples. Most were chosen on the basis of their population and territorial importance, others to highlight the tremendous cultural diversity of the Soviet Union. In the 1970 census, 22 ethnic groups claimed more than a million members, while a few, such as the Aleuts of the far northeast, counted fewer than 500. More than 70 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s inhabitants are Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians. Their birthrate has leveled off; that of Asian peoples has soared.

The map colors, keyed to specific language groups (lower right), show the concentrations as well as the intermingling of all the Soviet peoples. Figures in native costumes further illustrate the variety of cultures. Though traditional dress has largely yielded to contemporary attire (above) in the western republics and in larger cities, such dress still appears in isolated regions and on festive occasions.

The map colors, keyed to specific language groups (lower right), show the concentrations as well as the intermingling of all the Soviet peoples. Figures in native costumes further illustrate the variety of cultures. Though traditional dress has largely yielded to contemporary attire (above) in the western republics and in larger cities, such dress still appears in isolated regions and on festive occasions.

To speak of the Soviet peoples is to speak of a history of conquest, suffering, and revolution. The Soviet Union's extraordinary mosaic of peoples and cultures began to take shape in the 15th century, as Moscow grew from a log-hut village beside a slow-moving river into the seat of a dynamic and expanding Russian state. To the east lay its first new territory — the Upper Volga's fertile farmlands, with Finnic and Turkic inhabitants, and the wooded arctic wilderness beyond. As the 16th century waned, fur traders and cossacks extended the hand of the czars into the vast stretches of Siberia, home to scattered tribes of nomads and hunters. During the 17th and 18th centuries Russia's rulers turned west to the plains of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltic. In the 19th century the peoples of the Caucasus were brought into the empire, and the Moslem domains of Central Asia were penetrated.

Czarist Russia collapsed during World War I, leaving a bewildering patchwork of peoples to the new leaders in the Kremlin. In 1917 the Bolsheviks set up a Communist state in Russia; five years later the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established, with the inclusion of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Transcaucasians. Some of the nations that had gained independence with the fall of the czar — most notably Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — were declared Soviet republics early in World War II.

Enormous changes have overtaken the population in the past generation. Some groups express a heightened interest in their cultural heritage; others, often smaller groups of peoples, find themselves adopting the language and adapting to the traditions of their neighbors. Throughout the Soviet Union a homogenization of society is taking place. Movement of workers from villages to cities, farms to factories, has created an urban majority — 60 percent. Soviet citizens from Leningrad to Verkhoysk listen to Moscow radio and TV broadcasts beamed via satellites launched from the plains of Central Asia.

And yet, as Tolstoy wrote in an epilogue to *War and Peace*, "The subject of history is the life of peoples and of humanity. To catch and pin down in words — that is, to describe directly the life, not only of humanity, but even of a single people, appears to be impossible."



MOLDAVIAN

Their wines bearing the heavy sweetness born of rich soil and golden days, their grains a fullness nurtured by constant care and a long growing season, the Moldavians cling to a slice of black earth wedged between the Ukraine and Romania. Tracing their ancestry and their tongue to Roman settlers in the first century A.D., they have close cultural ties to Romania. Inhabitants of the Soviet Union's most rural yet most densely populated republic, Moldavians now bolster a farm economy with fast-developing light industry.




BYELORUSSIAN

Their land the gateway, or the obstacle, to Moscow in World War II, Byelorussians suffered the full force of Nazi invasion — one of every four people in the republic perished. It took more than thirty years to regain the prewar population level. The word *bye/o* connotes either white or free, and the "White Russians" have various explanations for their name: their once predominantly white clothing, their fair coloration, their freedom from foreign domination. In a developing industrial economy, Byelorussians now manufacture such goods as tractors and motorcycles.



UKRAINIAN

Second only to the Russians as the Soviet Union's largest ethnic group, the hard-working Ukrainians proudly maintain their colorful folk culture and their distinctive literary tradition. Kiev, seat of a powerful medieval state called Rus, today is the U.S.S.R.'s third largest metropolis, after Moscow and Leningrad. Long-term ties with Poland and a cossack heritage contribute to the Ukrainian identity. In the 19th century the impassioned writings of such Ukrainian poet heroes as Taras Shevchenko fostered a nationalistic ferment and self-awareness that continue today. Ukrainians suffered heavy losses in World War II. Today they harvest grain and vegetables from collective farms and man factories that process millions of tons of iron and steel.



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
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
TATAR

Bursting out of Central Asia, the fabled Mongol Horde galloped across Russia in the 13th century and held the land in thrall for 250 years. Today the Tatars, Islamic descendants of the horde and the tribes it conquered, form the second largest bloc (after the Uzbeks) of non-Slavic peoples in the Soviet Union. Recently Tatar writers have aroused new interest in their rich heritage. The Kazan Tatars are centered in the oil-rich Tatar Republic; Tatars from the Crimea are found in Central Asia, where they were exiled in 1944, accused by Stalin of having collaborated with the Nazis; the Soviet Government officially exonerated the group in 1967.



Arctic Ocean

Franz Josef Land




MORDVIN

Scattered across the plains and forests that border the Upper Volga, Mordvins have recently developed their own distinctive literature, despite the use of two dissimilar regional dialects. Mordvins are famed as master beekeepers. Largely a farming people, with grains and vegetables their main crops, they now also work in factories manufacturing electrical components.

JEW

Highly educated and professionally advanced, today's Soviet Jews make a significant contribution to the nation's arts and sciences. Although an autonomous region was set aside for them in the Soviet Far East, nearly all Jews reside in the cities of the western U.S.S.R. Once, half the world's Jews lived in the czarist empire, but wars, pogroms, and forced movements have sharply reduced the population. Today some Soviet Jews, like members of other minorities, seek more liberal emigration policies and greater rights within the U.S.S.R.



New Siberian Islands

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TURKMEN

Crouched by fires that warded off the chill of desert nights, Turkmen storytellers of old told a favorite legend: When God created the world and distributed land, the nomadic Turkmen were the first to receive a vast territory full of sun. But when He distributed water, they were the last. What God withheld, the Turkmen supplied for themselves, collecting snowmelt in a web of irrigation canals. Millions of acres of the Kara Kum desert will soon be watered by a new 900-mile canal. The Turkmen, noted for their frontierlike spirit, now raise large quantities of cotton and breed the sheep that produce "Persian lamb."



AZERBAIJANIAN

ing coveted radios to local disc jockeys. rbaijanians in Turkish-style coffeehouses listen he haunting tones of Middle Eastern music. ough still influenced by Persian culture, family-oriented, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanians n new ways through universal education; women, ously restricted by Moslem custom, play a wing role in their nation's economy. Many rbaijanians farm cotton; others work in the nsive oil and gas fields. The republic's itutes and academies have trained highly lified petroleum scientists and technicians.



TAJIK

With improved methods of cotton cultivation, the development of a textile industry, and increased opportunities for learning, Soviet Tajiks today present a striking example of modernity to kinsmen in neighboring Afghanistan. Largest Iranian-speaking group in the U.S.S.R. and perhaps the most conservative of all Central Asian peoples, the Moslem Tajiks hold fast to many traditional ways.




UZBEK

From the vast cotton collectives of Uzbekistan, Turkic-speaking farmers reap the "white gold" that dominates the economy of their Central Asian republic. Improved health care and the Uzbek's love of large families swelled this Islamic people's strength by nearly 50 percent between 1959 and 1970; today they are the third largest ethnic group in the Soviet Union. The fabled cities of Samarkand and Tashkent now provide a base for a strong new Central Asian intelligentsia.

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EVENK

Foiled by the sound of the Evenk huntsman's birchbark horn, wild stags bound through the northern forest expecting to find a mate—and instead end up over the dinner fire. Hunters, reindeer herders, and cattle and horse breeders, the semi-nomadic Evenks receive tutelage in modern events from instructors in traveling "Red Tents" that carry the word of Moscow to their camps. Widely dispersed throughout Siberia, many Evenks have settled in permanent communities, tend plots of grain and vegetables, and farm pelt-bearing animals. Modern medicine has made great strides in overcoming endemic diseases such as tuberculosis, trachoma, and smallpox.



ETHNO-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

On this map of the Soviet Union, 53 administrative units are bordered in brown. Most have their own national identity. Fifteen major units, including the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Russian S.F.S.R.) and other Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.) are named in brown. Administrative subdivisions—Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (A.S.S.R.), Autonomous Oblasts (A.O.), and Nationality Okrugs (N.O.)—are numbered in brown, following the list below.

ARMENIAN S.S.R.

AZERBAIJAN S.S.R.

- 1 Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.
- 2 Nagorno Karabakh A.O.

BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R.

ESTONIAN S.S.R.

GEORGIAN S.S.R.

- 3 Abkhaz A.S.S.R.
- 4 Adzhar (Ajar) A.S.S.R.
- 5 Yugo Ossetian A.O.

KAZAKH S.S.R.

KIRGIZ S.S.R.

LATVIAN S.S.R.

LITHUANIAN S.S.R.

MOLDAVIAN S.S.R.

RUSSIAN S.F.S.R.

- 6 Bashkir A.S.S.R.
- 7 Buryat A.S.S.R.
- 8 Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.
- 9 Chuvash A.S.S.R.
- 10 Dagestan A.S.S.R.
- 11 Kabardin-Balkar A.S.S.R.
- 12 Kalmyk A.S.S.R.
- 13 Karelian A.S.S.R.
- 14 Komi A.S.S.R.
- 15 Mari A.S.S.R.
- 16 Mordovian A.S.S.R.

17 Severo Ossetian A.S.S.R.

18 Tatar A.S.S.R.

19 Tuva A.S.S.R.

20 Udmurt A.S.S.R.

21 Yakut A.S.S.R.

22 Adygey A.O.

23 Aga Buryat N.O.

24 Chukchi N.O.

25 Evenk N.O.

26 Evrey (Jewish) A.O.

27 Gorno Altay A.O.

28 Karachay-Cherkess A.O.

29 Khakass A.O.

30 Khanty-Mansi N.O.

31 Komi-Permyak N.O.

32 Koryak N.O.

33 Nenets N.O.

34 Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) N.O.

35 Ust' Orda Buryat N.O.

36 Yamal Nenets N.O.

TADZHIK (TAJIK) S.S.R.

37 Gorno Badakhshan A.O.

TURKMEN S.S.R.

UKRAINIAN S.S.R.

UZBEK S.S.R.

38 Karakalpak A.S.S.R.



Commander Islands
ALEUT-
RUSSIAN

CHUKCHI

"The moon is putting on his furs." Chukchi tribesmen murmur as they watch the moon haze over in the bitter Siberian night. Numbering a mere 13,000, they are dispersed among shoreline villages and the tundra. On their reindeer farms Chukchis tend 10,000 to 20,000 head. Chukchi herdsmen count their antlered charges in groups of 20—the total of a man's fingers and toes. Their word for "man" also means twenty.

Pacific Ocean


YAKUT

Surviving for uncounted generations on the milk of their horses and cattle and on fish from fast-moving streams, Siberian Yakuts have recently begun sowing wheat that is highly resistant to cold. In their ice-age domain, rivers form the main channels of travel. The Yakuts pursue a traditional love of learning. Graduates from their own university and scientific research institutes hold key administrative and educational positions in the region.





sowing wheat that is highly resistant to cold. In their ice-age domain, rivers form the main channels of travel. The Yakuts pursue a traditional love of learning. Graduates from their own university and scientific research institutes hold key administrative and educational positions in the region.



BURYAT

Buddhists in the east, shamanists in the west, the Buryats once spent their lives in hunting and cattle herding. Now with changes wrought by collective farming and industry, few remember how to distill the vodka-like *tarasun* once drunk with so much ceremony in mountain encampments. But one thing remains unchanged—the love of learning bequeathed by the lamas. Buryats have achieved a high level of education that helps equip many for work in regional industries such as aircraft manufacture.




KIRGIZ

The snow-cruised Tien Shan, coners on horseback release th for prey in the blue skies above stures. The mountains long rchal Kirgiz, reinforcing the heir Turkic tongue. Their literature was oral, with wandering bards st glory to assembled herdsmen; written until the 1920's, contains lines. Kirgiz shepherders now il pastoralism with modern f improved grazing techniques.

KAZAKH

Moslem in religious heritage, the Turkic-speaking Kazakhs have for centuries been admired as skilled horsemen. Recent, intensive development of the region's "virgin lands" has brought an influx of Slavic farmers. The Kazakhs, who now number only about 35 percent of their republic's population, find their age-old traditions colored by their contact with ideas from the West: A visitor may hear a Mozart rondo played on a *dombira*, a lutelike Eastern instrument. Some of the semi-nomadic people still live in yurts, circular tents of felt.



TUVAN


Ringed by winter snowfields, the Tuvans were journeying cross-country on fur-wrapped skis centuries before ski lifts and resort villages. The fur lay flat when propelled forward, then gripped and held to keep the skis from sliding backward. The Turkic-speaking Tuvans were introduced early to the advantages of education through the teaching of Buddhist missionaries. Their homeland long formed a province of China. Traditionally pastoral nomads, many Tuvans have settled and now raise stock on improved pastureland. Others in remote regions receive guaranteed prices for the pelts and meat they sell.


A KEY TO ETHNO-LINGUISTIC GROUPS


ALTAIC Mongolian Buryat, Kalmyk Tungus-Manchu Even, Evenk, Nanay, Negidal, Oroch, Orok, Udegey, Ulch Turkic Altay, Azerbaijani, Balkar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Dolgan, Gagauz, Karachay, Karaim, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Khakass, Kirgiz, Kumyk, Meskhetian Turkish, Nogay, Shor, Tatar, Tofa, Turkmen, Tuvan, Uighur, Uzbek, Yakut	Slavic Byelorussian Russian Ukrainian Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Slovak Other Indo-European Albanian, Armenian, German, Greek, Gypsy, Jewish (Yiddish) PALEO-SIBERIAN Chukchi, Itelmen, Ket, Koryak, Nivkh, Yukaghir URALIC Finnno-Ugric Finnic: Estonian, Finnish, Izhor, Karelian, Komi, Komi-Permyak, Lapp (Saami), Mari, Mordvin, Udmurt, Veps Ugric: Hungarian, Khanty, Mansi Samoyed Nenets, Nganasan, Selkup OTHERS Ainu, Arabic, Assyrian, Dungan, Korean Mixtures of people Uninhabited, or sparsely populated as indicated by gray names.
CAUCASUS Dagestan: Agul, Avar, Dargin, Lak, Lezgin, Rutul, Tabasaran, Tsakhur North Caucasus: Abaza, Adygey, Chechen, Circassian (Cherkess), Ingush, Kabardin Transcaucasus: Abkhazian, Ajar, Georgian, Udi ESKIMO-ALEUT Aleut, Eskimo INDO-EUROPEAN Baltic Latvian, Lithuanian Iranian Afghan, Baluchi, Iranian (Persian), Kurdish, Ossetian, Tajik, Talysh, Tat Romance Moldavian, Romanian	

For additional information on the groups listed in this key, see the New Columbia Encyclopedia, 1975 edition, and the English language translation of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, third edition.

Copies of this map on heavy chart paper or plastic, rolled, may be purchased from the National Geographic Society, Washington, D. C. 20036. Write for complete map list.









ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of public, each colored separately on the map. Ten of the subdivided into Oblasts (Regions), Krays (Territories), Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, or Autonomous Oblasts. In the largest republic—the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic—some of the Oblasts are further subdivided into Autonomous Oblasts and Nationality Okrugs (Districts). Where space on the map does not permit naming of the administrative units, the following list are used.

- | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|
| ARMENIAN S.S.R. | 7 Mogilev Obl. |
| AZERBAIJAN S.S.R. | 8 Vitebsk Obl. |
| 1 Nakhichevan A.S.S.R. | ESTONIAN S.S.R. |
| 2 Nagorno Karabakh A.O. | GEORGIAN S.S.R. |
| BYELORUSSIAN S.S.R. | 9 Abkhaz A.S. |
| 3 Brest Oblast | 10 Adzharia (Ajara) |
| 4 Gomel Oblast | 11 Yugo Ossetia |
| 5 Grodno Oblast | KAZAKH S.S.R. |
| 6 Minsk Oblast | Akt'yubinsk |

★ NORTH POLE

SOVIE

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National

MELVILLE

NATIONAL G

MELVILLE

GILBERT

WILLIAM

DAVID W. COC

WASH


SCALE 1:10,140


KILOMETERS 0 100 200
STATUTE MILES 0 100

Railroads ——— Roads ——— Airports — Canals —
Oil Fields — Oil Pipe Lines — Passes —
Desert — Arctic Tundra — Swamp — Glacier —
Intermittent Lake — Dry Salt Lake — Below Sea Level —
Elevations in Feet 15584 Soundings in Fathoms 3299

ARCTIC OCEAN

LAPTEV SEAS





- 12 Alma Ata Oblast
13 Chirchik Oblast
Dzhambul Oblast
Dzhezkazgan Oblast
Guryev Oblast
14 Karaganda Oblast
Kustanay Oblast
Kyzyl Orda Oblast
Mangyshlak Oblast
Pavlodar Oblast
Sempalatinsk Oblast
16 Severo Kazakhstan Oblast
Taldy Kurgan Oblast
Tselinograd Oblast
Turgay Oblast
Ural'sk Oblast
Vostochno Kazakhstan Oblast
KIRGIZ S.S.R.
17 Issyk-Kul Oblast
18 Naryn Oblast
19 Osh Oblast
LATVIAN S.S.R.

- LITHUANIAN S.S.R.
MOLDAVIAN S.S.R.
RUSSIAN S.F.S.R.
Altay Krai
Gorno Altay A.O.
Amur Oblast
Arkhangelsk Oblast
Nenets N.O.
20 Astrakhan Oblast
Bashkir A.S.S.R.
21 Belgorod Oblast
22 Bryansk Oblast
Buryat A.S.S.R.
23 Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.
24 Chelyabinsk Oblast
Chita Oblast
25 Aga Buryat N.O.
Chuvash A.S.S.R.
Onghestan A.S.S.R.
26 Gorkiy Oblast
Irkutsk Oblast
27 Ust' Orda Buryat N.O.
28 Ivanovo Oblast

- 29 Kabardin-Balkar A.S.S.R.
30 Kalinin Oblast
31 Kaliningrad Oblast
Kalmik A.S.S.R.
32 Kaluga Oblast
Kamchatka Oblast
Koryak N.O.
Karelian A.S.S.R.
Kemerovo Oblast
Khabarovsk Krai
Evrey (Jewish) A.O.
33 Kirov Oblast
Komi A.S.S.R.
34 Kostroma Oblast
Krasnodar Krai
35 Adygey A.O.
Krasnoyarsk Krai
Evenk N.O.
Khakass A.O.
Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) N.O.
36 Kurgan Oblast
37 Kursk Oblast
38 Kuybyshev Oblast

- 39 Leningrad Oblast
40 Lipetsk Oblast
Magadan Oblast
Chukchi N.O.
Mari A.S.S.R.
Mordovian A.S.S.R.
41 Moscow Oblast
42 Murmansk Oblast
43 Novgorod Oblast
Novosibirsk Oblast
Omsk Oblast
44 Orel Oblast
45 Orenburg Oblast
46 Penza Oblast
Perm Oblast
Komi-Permyak N.O.
Primor'ye (Maritime) Krai
47 Pskov Oblast
48 Rostov Oblast
49 Ryazan Oblast
Sakhalin Oblast
50 Saratov Oblast
51 Severo Ossetian A.S.S.R.

- 52 Smolensk Oblast
Stavropol' Krai
53 Karachay-Cherkess A.O.
Sverdlovsk Oblast
54 Tambov Oblast
Tatar A.S.S.R.
Tomsk Oblast
55 Tuva Oblast
Tuva A.S.S.R.
Tyumen Oblast
Khanty-Mansi N.O.
Yamal-Nenets N.O.
Udmurt A.S.S.R.
56 Ulyanovsk Oblast
57 Vladimir Oblast
58 Volgograd Oblast
Vologda Oblast
59 Voronezh Oblast
Yakut A.S.S.R.
60 Yarovsk Oblast
TADZHIK (TAJIK) S.S.R.
61 Kulyab Oblast
62 Leninabad Oblast

- 63 Gorno-Badakhshan A.O.
TURKMEN S.S.R.
Ashkhabad Oblast
Chardzhou Oblast
Krasnovodsk Oblast
Mary Oblast
Tashauz Oblast
UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
64 Cherkassy Oblast
65 Chernigov Oblast
66 Chernovits Oblast
67 Dnepropetrovsk Oblast
68 Donetsk Oblast
69 Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast
70 Khar'kov Oblast
71 Kherson Oblast
72 Khmel'nitskiy Oblast
73 Kiev Oblast
74 Kirovograd Oblast
75 Krym (Crimea) Oblast
76 Lvov Oblast
77 Nikolayev Oblast
78 Odessa Oblast

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
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
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
Isometric Projection

160 MILES TO THE INCH





USSR and Adjacent Areas, ADMINISTRATIVE MAP 1:8,000,000





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
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Published by D. Mil Survey, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, 1974

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This map must NOT be considered an authority on the delimitation of international boundaries.

PROJECTION

Conical orthomorphic projection with standard parallels 46° and 63°N
Spheroid: Bessel
Scale Factor: Unity

Note: North of 70°N, there is some distortion from a true conical orthomorphic projection, it is mainly in a northerly direction and increases towards the pole

GLOSSARY OF RUSSIAN ABBREVIATIONS

Bukh	bukhta	bight, bay
G	gora, gory	mountain(s)
Khr	khrebet	mountain range
Lag	laguna	lagoon
M	mys	cape, headland
O	ostrov	island
O-va	ostrova	islands
Oz	ozero	lake
P-ov	poluostrov	peninsula
Prol	proliv	strait
Vdkhr	vodokhranilishche	reservoir
Zal	zaliv	bay, gulf

Alphabetical index to names and full glossaries are published separately

Revised by Ordnance Survey in 1958 from medium and small scale mapping dated 1953-58. Administrative information, railways, town classification and names in the USSR fully revised with important additions only to water detail. Full revision to names in Poland and China. Names in Russia transliterated in accordance with the BGN/PCGN system. Further revision to administrative information, reservoirs and town names in the USSR by SPC RE in 1969. Revision to administrative information, railways and water features within the USSR with minor amendments of place names in adjacent areas by Ordnance Survey in 1974

Physical Map of the
Administrative Map
Administrative Map
Europe and Asia 1:4
Europe 1:1 M GSGS2
Asia 1:1 M GSGS2
Asia 1:1 M AMS 52
Asia 1:1 M HIND
Weltkarte 1:1 M G
Hedin/Zentralasien
Spitzbergen [Svalb
Norveg
World Aeronautical








- MOSKVA
- SMOLENSK
- PSKOV
- Khmel'nitskiy

Railway, broad or standard gauge
" narrow gauge or light
" under construction or projected
" status uncertain
Pipe line

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
Other administrative areas of the U.S.S.R.:—
KRAY, OBLAST, ASSR and Autonomous
Oblast directly subordinate to SSR




- ① MOSKVA
- ② SMOLENSK
- ③ PSKOV
- ④ Khmel'nik
- ⑤ Vorkuta
- ⑥ Polno


- Railway, broad or standard gauge
- " narrow gauge or light
- " under construction or projected
- " status uncertain
- Pipeline
- River, lake
- Canal
- Well
- Limits of unnavigable ice, Summer
- " Winter

- UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
- SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
- Other administrative areas of the USSR —
- KRAY, OBLAST, ASSR and Autonomous Oblasts directly subordinate to USSR
- Other Autonomous Oblasts and National Oirats
- Country other than the USSR
- De facto boundary
- Division of sovereignty applies to land areas only
- Administrative divisions within China


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







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




ORGANIZATION



USSR ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE



UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX M

ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES
SELECTED YEARS, 1938-85

Country	Prewar Boundaries	Present Boundaries											1985
	1938	1938	1945	1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	
Total Communist Countries	801	804	819	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,187
USSR	168.7	188.5	175.0	180.1	196.1	214.2	218.0	221.5	224.8	227.8	230.6	233.1	235.6
Eastern European Communist Countries	111.3	94.5	89.0	88.5	92.8	96.5	97.2	97.8	98.6	99.4	100.1	100.6	101.1
Bulgaria	6.2	6.7	6.9	7.3	7.5	7.9	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.4
Czechoslovakia	15.3	14.5	14.2	12.4	13.1	13.7	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.3
East Germany	26.1	16.6	17.9	18.4	17.8	17.0	16.9	16.9	16.9	17.0	17.0	17.1	17.2
Hungary	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.2	10.3
Poland	34.7	31.9	25.0	24.8	27.2	29.6	30.0	30.3	30.7	31.2	31.5	31.7	32.0
Rumania	19.8	15.6	15.7	16.3	17.3	18.4	18.6	18.7	18.8	18.9	19.0	19.1	19.2
Far Eastern Communist Countries	499	499	533	571	634	713	725	737	751	768	785	803	821
Communist China	476	476	510	547	611	686	698	709	723	738	755	772	790
North Korea	8.9	8.9	9.2	9.2	8.9	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.2	12.6	13.0
North Vietnam	13.7	13.7	14.2	14.7	14.9	16.0	16.4	16.8	17.2	17.6	18.1	18.5	19.0
Other Communist Countries	21.5	22.0	22.1	23.8	25.8	27.5	27.9	28.3	28.7	29.2	29.7	30.1	30.6
Albania	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
Cuba	4.4	4.4	5.0	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.5
Mongolia	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2
Yugoslavia	15.4	15.9	15.2	16.3	17.5	18.4	18.6	18.8	19.1	19.3	19.5	19.7	20.0
Total Communist Countries	801	804	819	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,187
Total NATO Countries	373	372	392	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	520
United States	130.0	130.0	140.5	152.3	165.9	180.7	183.8	186.7	189.4	192.1	194.6	196.9	199.2
Other NATO Countries	242.8	242.4	251.0	266.0	279.4	295.2	298.5	302.4	306.1	309.7	313.4	316.9	320.8
Belgium	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.6	8.9	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.6
Canada	11.5	11.5	12.4	13.7	15.7	17.9	18.3	18.6	18.9	19.3	19.6	20.1	20.6
Denmark	3.8	3.8	4.0	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.9
France	42.0	42.0	39.7	41.7	43.4	45.7	46.2	47.0	47.9	48.4	48.9	49.4	50.0
West Germany	39.8	39.8	43.8	47.8	50.2	53.2	54.0	54.8	55.4	56.1	56.8	57.5	58.2
West Berlin	2.7	2.7	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3
Greece	7.1	7.1	7.3	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7
Iceland	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Italy	43.6	43.0	45.0	46.6	48.2	49.6	49.9	50.2	50.6	51.1	51.6	52.0	52.5
Luxembourg	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Netherlands	8.7	8.7	9.3	10.1	10.8	11.5	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.1	12.3	12.5	12.7
Norway	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.9
Portugal	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.4	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4
Turkey	16.9	17.1	18.8	20.8	23.9	27.5	28.2	28.9	29.6	30.4	31.1	31.9	32.7
United Kingdom	47.5	47.5	49.2	50.6	51.2	52.6	52.9	53.5	53.8	54.2	54.6	54.9	55.3
Total NATO Countries	373	372	392	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	520

*These figures have been agreed to by interested agencies of the Government as representing accurate estimates for past dates and reasonable projections for future dates. Those for the Far Eastern Communist Countries are based on the latest available data from the countries concerned. Those for the United States are based on the Census of the US Department of Commerce, and any questions as to sources and methods used should be directed to the Chief, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, code 183, extension 300.

(Prepared by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, Bureau of the Census, The US Department of Commerce)

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX M

ED AND PROJECTED POPULATION OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND NATO COUNTRIES*
 SELECTED YEARS, 1938-85

May 1969

Midyear Population in Millions

Present Boundaries																
	1950	1955	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985
45	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,188	1,210	1,232	1,255	1,379	1,522	1,682
5.0	180.1	196.1	214.2	218.0	221.5	224.8	227.8	230.6	233.1	235.6	237.8	240.2	242.5	254.6	267.5	281.4
9.0	88.5	92.8	96.5	97.2	97.8	98.6	99.4	100.1	100.6	101.1	102.0	102.8	103.6	108.1	112.8	117.2
8.9	7.3	7.5	7.9	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.2	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.8	9.1	9.3
4.2	12.4	13.1	13.7	13.8	13.9	14.0	14.1	14.2	14.2	14.3	14.4	14.4	14.5	14.8	15.2	15.4
7.9	18.4	17.8	17.0	16.9	16.9	16.9	17.0	17.0	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.1	17.2	17.4	17.6
9.3	9.3	9.8	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.3	10.3	10.3	10.5	10.7	10.8
5.0	24.8	27.2	29.6	30.0	30.3	30.7	31.2	31.5	31.7	31.9	32.2	32.5	32.8	34.5	36.4	38.3
5.7	16.3	17.3	18.4	18.6	18.7	18.8	18.9	19.0	19.1	19.3	19.7	20.1	20.4	22.2	24.0	25.7
3	571	634	713	725	737	751	768	785	803	821	839	858	877	982	1,105	1,244
0	547	611	686	698	709	723	738	755	772	789	806	824	843	944	1,061	1,195
9.2	9.2	8.9	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.2	12.6	13.0	13.4	13.8	14.2	16.3	18.8	21.8
4.2	14.7	14.9	16.0	16.4	16.8	17.2	17.6	18.1	18.5	18.9	19.3	19.7	20.1	22.2	24.5	27.2
2.1	23.8	25.8	27.5	27.9	28.3	28.7	29.2	29.7	30.1	30.5	31.0	31.3	31.7	34.0	36.6	39.5
1.1	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3
5.0	5.5	6.1	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.7	7.8	8.4	9.2	10.3
0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.1
5.2	16.3	17.5	18.4	18.6	18.8	19.1	19.3	19.5	19.7	19.9	20.2	20.4	20.6	21.7	22.8	23.9
9	863	949	1,051	1,068	1,085	1,103	1,124	1,145	1,166	1,188	1,210	1,232	1,255	1,379	1,522	1,682
2	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	519	524	530	535	566	600	637
0.5	152.3	165.9	180.7	183.8	186.7	189.4	192.1	194.6	196.9	199.1	201.2	203.6	206.0	219.4	235.2	252.9
1.0	266.0	279.4	295.2	298.5	302.4	306.1	309.7	313.4	316.9	319.9	323.0	326.1	329.3	346.3	364.5	384.5
3.3	8.6	8.9	9.2	9.2	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.7	9.8	10.1	10.4	10.8
2.4	13.7	15.7	17.9	18.3	18.6	18.9	19.3	19.6	20.1	20.4	20.8	21.2	21.6	23.7	26.0	28.5
1.0	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.6
9.7	41.7	43.4	45.7	46.2	47.0	47.9	48.4	48.9	49.4	49.9	50.3	50.8	51.3	53.7	56.2	58.9
3.8	47.8	50.2	53.2	54.0	54.8	55.4	56.1	56.8	57.5	57.7	58.0	58.4	58.7	60.5	62.3	64.1
1.7	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
7.3	7.6	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.8	8.9	8.9	9.3	9.6	9.8
0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
5.0	46.6	48.2	49.6	49.9	50.2	50.6	51.1	51.6	52.0	52.4	52.8	53.2	53.6	55.6	57.8	60.0
0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
9.3	10.1	10.8	11.5	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.1	12.3	12.5	12.6	12.7	12.9	13.0	13.8	14.6	15.4
3.1	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.4
8.0	8.4	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	9.6	9.7	10.2	10.7	11.2
8.8	20.8	23.9	27.5	28.2	28.9	29.6	30.4	31.1	31.9	32.7	33.5	34.4	35.2	39.9	45.1	51.0
9.2	50.6	51.2	52.6	52.9	53.5	53.8	54.2	54.6	54.9	55.2	55.5	55.7	56.0	57.7	59.5	61.8
2	418	445	476	482	489	496	502	508	514	519	524	530	535	566	600	637

as representing accurate estimates for past dates and reasonable projections for future dates. Those for the Far Eastern Communist countries, however, are less reliable. The figures have been prepared by the
 as to sources and methods used should be directed to the Chief, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, code 183, extension 38675. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
 ic Analysis Division, Bureau of the Census, The US Department of Commerce.)

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USSR: ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE. 1976 EDITION.(U)
1976


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APPENDIX O

COMMISSION OF PRESIDUM FOR FOREIGN
ECONOMIC QUESTIONS
Vladimir Nikolayevich **Novikov**

ALL-UNION MINISTRIES

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich **Tarasov**

AVIATION INDUSTRY
Petr Vasil'yevich **Dement'yev**

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Leonid Arkad'yevich **Kostandov**

CHEMICAL & PETROLEUM
MACHINE BUILDING
Konstantin Ivanovich **Brekhov**

CIVIL AVIATION
Boris Pavlovich **Bugayev**

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
INDUSTRY
Erlan Kirikovich **Pervyshin**

CONSTRUCTION OF PETROLEUM &
GAS INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES
Boris Yevdokimovich **Shcherbina**

CONSTRUCTION, ROAD, & MUNICIPAL
MACHINE BUILDING
Yefim Stepanovich **Novoselov**

DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Sergey Alekseyevich **Zverev**

FOREIGN TRADE
Nikolay Semenovich **Patolichev**

GAS INDUSTRY
Sabit Atayevich **Orudzhev**

GENERAL MACHINE BUILDING
Sergey Aleksandrovich **Afnas'yev**

HEAVY, POWER, & TRANSPORT
MACHINE BUILDING
Vladimir Fedorovich **Zhigalin**

INSTRUMENT MAKING, AUTOMATION
EQUIPMENT & CONTROL SYSTEMS
Konstantin Nikolayevich **Rudnev**

MACHINE BUILDING
Vyacheslav Vasil'yevich **Bakhirev**

MACHINE BUILDING FOR
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND
FODDER PRODUCTION
Konstantin Nikitovich **Belyak**

MACHINE BUILDING FOR LIGHT
& FOOD INDUSTRY
& HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES
Vasily Nikolayevich **Doyenin**

MACHINE TOOL & TOOL
BUILDING INDUSTRY
Anatoliy Ivanovich **Kostausov**

MEDICAL INDUSTRY

MEDIUM MACHINE BUILDING
Yefim Pavlovich **Slavskiy**

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Valentin Dmitriyevich **Shashin**

PULP & PAPER INDUSTRY
Konstantin Ivanovich **Galanshin**

RADIO INDUSTRY
Petr Stepanovich **Pleshakov**

RAILWAYS
Boris Pavlovich **Beshchev**

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Boris Yevstaf'yevich **Butoma**

TRACTOR & AGRICULTURAL
MACHINE BUILDING
Ivan Flegontovich **Sinitsyn**

TRANSPORT CONSTRUCTION
Ivan Dmitriyevich **Sosnov**

SR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRESIDIUM

CHAIRMAN

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin

FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov

DEPUTY CHAIRMEN

in Vasil'yevich Arhipov
kolay Konstantinovich Baybakov (Chmn. State Planning Committee)
niamin Emma Jilovich Dymshits (Chmn. State Committee for Material & Technical Supply)
adimir Al'yevich Kirillin (Chmn. State Committee for Science & Technology)
khail Avksent'yevich Lesechko (Chmn. Commission for CEMA Affairs)
natiy Trofimovich Novikov (Chmn. State Committee for Construction Affairs)
adimir Nikolayevich Novikov (Chmn. Commission for Foreign Economic Questions)
a Nuriyevich Nuriyev
onid Vasil'yevich Smirnov (Chmn. Military-Industrial Commission) - - VPK
kolay Aleksandrovich Tikhonov

COMMISSION OF PRESID
Mikhail Avksent

UNION REPUBLIC MINISTRIES

AGRICULTURE

Dmitriy Stepanovich Polyanskiy

FISH INDUSTRY

Aleksandr Akimovich Ishkov

LIGHT INDUSTRY

Nikolay Nikiforovich Tarasov

CINEMA

Filipp

COAL INDUSTRY

Boris Fedorovich Bratchenko

FOOD INDUSTRY

Vol'demar Petrovich Lein

MEAT & DAIRY INDUSTRY

Sergey Fedorovich Antonov

CONSTRUCTION

Ignat

COMMUNICATIONS

Nikolay Dem'yanovich Psurtsev

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko

NONFERROUS METALLURGY

Petr Fadeyevich Lomako

FOREIGN

Semen

CONSTRUCTION

Georgiy Arkad'yevich Karavayev

GEOLOGY

Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Sidorenko

PETROLEUM REFINING & PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Viktor Stepanovich Fedorov

Geor

CONSTRUCTION OF HEAVY INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES

Nikolay Vasil'yevich Goldin

HEALTH

Boris Vasil'yevich Petrovskiy

POWER & ELECTRIFICATION

Petr Stepanovich Neporozhniy

INVENTION

Yury

CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS INDUSTRY

Ivan Aleksandrovich Grishmanov

HIGHER & SECONDARY SPECIALIZED EDUCATION

Vyacheslav Petrovich Yelyutin

PROCUREMENT

Grigoriy Sergeyevich Zolotukhin

CULTURE

Petr Nilovich Demichev

INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION

Aleksandr Maksimovich Tokarev

RURAL CONSTRUCTION

Stepan Dmitriyevich Khitrov

MA

S
Veniam

DEFENSE

Andrey Antonovich Grechko

INSTALLATION & SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION WORK

Fuad Borisovich Yakubovskiy

TIMBER & WOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY

Nikolay Vladimirovich Timofeyev

EDUCATION

Mikhail Alekseyevich Prokof'yev

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Nikolay Anisimovich Shchelokov

TRADE

Aleksandr Ivanovich Struyev

Committee)
for Material & Technical Supply)
for Science & Technology)
CMA Affairs)
for Construction Affairs)
Foreign Economic Questions)
al Commission) - - - VPK)

COMMISSION OF PRESIDUM FOR CEMA AFFAIRS
Mikhail Avksent'yevich Lesechko

PUBLIC MINISTRIES

FISH INDUSTRY
Andr Akimovich Ishkov

FOOD INDUSTRY
Demar Petrovich Lein

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
y Andreyevich Gromyko

GEOLOGY
Andr Vasil'yevich Sidorenko

HEALTH
s Vasil'yevich Petrovskiy

HIGHER & SECONDARY
SPECIALIZED EDUCATION
eslav Petrovich Yelyutin

INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION
Andr Maksimovich Tokarev

INSTALLATION & SPECIAL
CONSTRUCTION WORK
Borisovich Yakubovskiy

INTERNAL AFFAIRS
y Anisimovich Shchelokov

JUSTICE
mir Ivanovich Terebilov

LAND RECLAMATION
WATER RESOURCES
Yevgen'yevich Alekseyevskiy

LIGHT INDUSTRY
Nikolay Nikiforovich Tarasov

MEAT & DAIRY INDUSTRY
Sergey Fedorovich Antonov

NONFERROUS METALLURGY
Petr Fadeyevich Lomako

PETROLEUM REFINING &
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Viktor Stepanovich Fedorov

POWER & ELECTRIFICATION
Petr Stepanovich Neporozhniy

PROCUREMENT
Grigoriy Sergeyevich Zolotukhin

RURAL CONSTRUCTION
Stepan Dmitriyevich Khitrov

TIMBER & WOOD PROCESSING
INDUSTRY
Nikolay Vladimirovich Timofeyev

TRADE
Aleksandr Ivanovich Struyev

CINEMATOGRAPHY (GOSKINO)
Filipp Timofeyevich Yermash

CONSTRUCTION AFFAIRS (GOSSTROY)
Ignatiy Trofimovich Novikov

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Semen Andreyevich Skachkov

FORESTRY
Georgiy Ivanovich Vorob'yev

INVENTIONS & DISCOVERIES
Yury Yevgen'yevich Maksarev

LABOR & WAGES

MATERIAL & TECHNICAL
SUPPLY (GOSSNAB)
Veniamin Emmanuilovich Dymshits

STATE COMM

PLANNING (GOS
Nikolay Konstantinovich

PRICES

PUBLISHING HOUSES, PRINTING
AND THE BOOK TRADE
Boris Ivanovich Stuk

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Vladimir Alekseyevich

STANDARDS
Vasily Vasil'yevich

TELEVISION & RADIO BROADCASTING
Sergey Georgiyevich

VOCATIONAL & TECHNICAL
EDUCATION
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich

STATE COMMITTEES

CINEMATOGRAPHY (GOSKINO)
Filipp Timofeyevich **Yermash**

CONSTRUCTION AFFAIRS (GOSSTROY)
Ignat'y Trofimovich **Novikov**

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Semen Andreyevich **Skachkov**

FORESTRY
Georgiy Ivanovich **Vorob'yev**

INVENTIONS & DISCOVERIES
Yury Yevgen'yevich **Maksarev**

LABOR & WAGES

MATERIAL & TECHNICAL
SUPPLY (GOSSNAB)
Veniamin Emmanuilovich **Dymshits**

PLANNING (GOSPLAN)
Nikolay Konstantinovich **Baybakov**

PRICES

PUBLISHING HOUSES, PRINTING PLANTS,
AND THE BOOK TRADE
Boris Ivanovich **Stukalin**

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Vladimir Alekseyevich **Kirillin**

STANDARDS
Vasily Vasil'yevich **Boytsov**

TELEVISION & RADIO BROADCASTING
Sergey Georgiyevich **Lapin**

VOCATIONAL & TECHNICAL
EDUCATION
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich **Bulgakov**

OTHER AGENCIES

ALL-UNION ASSOCIATION
"SOYUZSEL'KHOZTEKHNIKA"
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich **Yezhevskiy**

BOARD OF THE STATE BANK
(GOSBANK)
Mefodiy Naumovich **Sveshnikov**

CENTRAL STATISTICAL ADMINISTRATION
Vladimir Nikonovich **Starovskiy**

COMMITTEE OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL
Aleksey Mikhaylovich **Shkol'nikov**

COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY (KGB)
Yuriy Vladimirovich **Andropov**

ARMENIAN SSR
Grigoriy Agafonovich **Arzumanyan**

AZERBAIDZHAN SSR
Ali Ismailovich **Ibragimov**

BELORUSSIAN SSR
Tikhon Yakovlevich **Kiselev**

ESTONIAN SSR
Val'ter Ivanovich **Klauson**

GEORGIAN SSR
Givi Dmitriyevich **Dzhavakhishvili**

KAZAKH SSR
Bayken Ashimovich **Ashimov**

KIRGIZ SSR
Akhmatbek Suttusayevich **Suyumbekov**

LATVIAN SSR
Yuriy Yanovich **Ruben**

LITHUANIAN SSR
Iosif Antonovich **Manyushis**

AGENCIES OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WITHOUT MINISTERS

ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS
Mikhail Sergeyevich **Smirnyukov**

COMMITTEE FOR LENIN & STATE
PRIZES IN LITERATURE, ART,
& ARCHITECTURE
Nikolay Semenovich **Tikhonov**

MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF GEOGRAPHY
& CARTOGRAPHY (GUGK)
Il'ya A. **Kutuzov**

ADMINISTRATION FOR FOREIGN
TOURISM
Sergey Sergeyevich **Nikitin**

COMMITTEE FOR LENIN & STATE
PRIZES IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Mstislav Vsevolodovich **Keldysh**

MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL SERVICES
Yuriy Antonivich **Izrael'**

ALL-UNION BANK FOR
FINANCING CAPITAL INVESTMENTS (STROYBANK)
Mikhail Semenovich **Zotov**

COMMITTEE FOR PHYSICAL CULTURE
& SPORTS
Sergey Pavlovich **Pavlov**

MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
MICROBIOLOGICAL INDUSTRIES
V. D. **Belyayev**

COMMISSION
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF PERSONAL PENSIONS

COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
Vladimir Alekseyevich **Kuroyedov**

MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR
SAFEGUARDING STATE SECRETS IN
(GLAVLIT)
Pavel Konstantinovich **Romanov**

uyumbayev

MOLDAVIAN SSR
Petr Andreyevich **Paskar'**

TURKMEN SSR
Oraz Nazarovich **Orazmukhamedov**

RSFSR
Mikhail Sergeyevich **Solomentsev**

UKRAINIAN SSR
Aleksandr Pavlovich **Lyashko**

TADZHIK SSR
Rakhman N. **Nabiyev**

UZBEK SSR
Narmakhonmadi Dzhurayevich **Khudayberdyev**

MATERIAL STATUS

OF GEODESY
(GUGK)

MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF STATE
MATERIAL RESERVES
Aleksandr Akimovich **Kokarev**

STATE COMMITTEE FOR SUPERVISION
OF SAFE WORKING PRACTICES IN
INDUSTRY & FOR MINE SUPERVISION
Leonid Georgiyevich **Mel'nikov**

ON OF
VICES (GUGMS)

MAIN ARCHIVES ADMINISTRATION
Filipp Ivanovich **Dolgikh**

STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION
OF ATOMIC ENERGY
Andronik Mel'konovich **Petrosyants**

OF THE
DUSTRY

STATE BOARD OF ARBITRATION
(GOSARBITRAZH)
Yevgeniy Vasil'yevich **Anisimov**

TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY OF THE
SOVIET UNION (TASS)
Leonid Mitrofanovich **Zamyatin**

ON FOR
TS IN THE PRESS

STATE COMMISSION FOR STOCKPILING
USEFUL MINERALS

HIGHER CERTIFICATION
COMMISSION (VAK)
Viktor **Kirillov-Ugryumov**

omanov

	TURKMEN SSR Oraz Nazarovich Orazmukhamedov
	UKRAINIAN SSR Aleksandr Pavlovich Lyashko
	UZBEK SSR Narmakhonmadi Dzhurayevich Khudayberdyev
STATE	STATE COMMITTEE FOR SUPERVISION OF SAFE WORKING PRACTICES IN INDUSTRY & FOR MINE SUPERVISION Leonid Georgiyevich Mel'nikov
ATION	STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY Andronik Mel'konovich Petrosyants
ION	TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY OF THE SOVIET UNION (TASS) Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin
PILING	HIGHER CERTIFICATION COMMISSION (VAK) Viktor Kirillov-Ugryumov

A (CR) 75-12
(Supersedes A (CR) 74-34)
March, 1975

CPSU POLITBURO AND S

POSITIONS AND RESPONSES

	NAME	AGE	TOTAL YEARS TENURE (Approx.)		PRESENT POSITION (Date of Election or Appointment)	
			As Voting Member	As Nonvoting Member		
POLITBURO VOTING MEMBERS	Yu. V. Andropov	60	2	6	Chmn, KGB (May 67)	Security, Inte
	L. I. Brezhnev	68	17	2	General Secretary (Oct 64)	General Sup
	A. A. Grechko	71	2	0	USSR Minister of Defense (Apr 67)	Defense
	V. V. Grishin	60	4	10	Moscow City First Secretary (Jun 67)	Moscow Part
	A. A. Gromyko	65	2	0	USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs (Feb 57)	
	A. P. Kirilenko	68	13	4	Party Secretary (Apr 66)	Party Organi
	A. N. Kosygin	71	19	5	USSR Premier (Oct 64)	Economic Ad
	F. D. Kulakov	57	4	0	Party Secretary (Sep 65)	Agriculture
	D. A. Kunayev	63	4	5	Kazakh First Secretary (Dec 64)*	Kazakh Party
	K. T. Mazurov	61	10	8	USSR First Deputy Premier (Mar 65)	Industrial Ad
	A. Ya. Pel'she	76	9	0	Chmn, Party Control Committee (Apr 66)	Party Discipl
	N. V. Podgornyy	72	15	2	Chmn, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (Dec 65)	Legislative A
	D. S. Polyanskiy	57	15	2	USSR Minister of Agriculture (Feb 73)	Agricultural
POLITBURO NONVOTING MEMBERS	V. V. Shcherbitskiy	57	4	7	Ukrainian First Secretary (May 72)	Ukrainian Pa
	M. A. Suslov	72	19	0	Party Secretary (Mar 47)	Ideology, Lig
	P. N. Demichev	57	—	10	Minister of Culture (Dec 74)	Culture
	P. M. Masharov	57	—	9	Belorussian First Secretary (Mar 65)	Belorussian
	B. N. Ponomarev	70	—	3	Party Secretary (Oct 61)	
	Sh. R. Rashidov	57	—	13	Uzbek First Secretary (Mar 59)	Uzbek Party
	G. V. Romanov	52	—	2	Leningrad Oblast' First Secretary (Sep 70)	Leningrad O
SECT MEMBERS (NON-POLITBURO)	M. S. Solomentsev	61	—	3	RSFSR Premier (Nov 71)	RSFSR Econo
	D. F. Ustinov	66	—	10	Party Secretary (Mar 65)	Defense Ind
	V. I. Dolgikh	51	—	—	Party Secretary (Dec 72)	Heavy Indust
	I. V. Kapitonov	60	—	—	Party Secretary (Dec 65)	Party Staffin
	K. F. Katushev	47	—	—	Party Secretary (Apr 68)	

* Excludes a previous stint in this position.

SECRETARIAT FUNCTIONALITIES

GENERAL POLICY RESPONSIBILITIES **

DOMESTIC

FOREIGN

Secondary duties shown in gray

Intelligence
Defense, Security

Intelligence
General Supervision, Communist Party Liaison, US, Europe
Foreign Military Support

Supervision

(Unknown)
General Foreign Relations

Administration, Industrial Management
Administration & Finance, Defense

Communist Bloc Economy, Latin America
General Foreign Relations and Trade, Near East, Scandinavia, Canada

Supervision
Administration, Science, Education

(Unknown)
(Unknown)
Economic Aid Programs

Agencies, Local Economy, Defense
Administration

General State Relations, Southeast Asia
(Unknown)

Supervision
Industry

Eastern Europe
International Communism (Including China)

Supervision

East Germany and Poland
Relations with Non-Ruling Communist Parties, Foreign Relations

Supervision
Communist Party Supervision
Administration & Finance
Defense and Space, Security

Military Aid

Communist Bloc Liaison

A(CR) 75-20
Supersedes A(CR) 74-35
12 May 1975

** Only approximate—does not show overlapping of duties among several leaders.

APPENDIX P

USSR MINIST

GROMYKO,

FIRST

KUZNETSOV

DEP

FIRYUBIN, Nikolay Pavlovich (1957)
KOVALEV, Anatoliy Gavrilovich (1971)
PEGOV, Nikolay Mikhaylovich* (1971)
SEMENOV, Vladimir Semenovich** (1971)

SEC

CHERNYAK

OTHER

BONDARENKO, Aleksandr Pavlovich (1971)
KAPITSA, Mikhail Stepanovich (1971)
KORNIYENKO, Georgiy Markovich (1971)
SOLDATOV, Aleksandr Alekseyevich (1971)
SYTENKO, Mikhail Dmitriyevich (1971)

*Voting member, Co
**Non-voting member
Foreign Minister Group

GEOGRAPHIC DEPARTMENTS

FIRST AFRICAN
SHVEDOV, Aleksey Alekseyevich (1965)

SECOND AFRICAN
KARAVAYEV, Boris Ivanovich (1965)

THIRD AFRICAN
USTINOV, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich (1972)

FIRST EUROPEAN
DUBININ, Yuriy Vladimirovich (1971)

SECOND EUROPEAN
SUSLOV, Vladimir Pavlovich (1973)

THIRD EUROPEAN
BONDARENKO, Aleksandr Pavlovich (1971)

FOURTH EUROPEAN
SELYANINOV, Oleg Pavlovich (1970)

FIFTH EUROPEAN
SIKACHEV, Nikolay Nikolayevich (1970)

FIRST FAR EASTERN
KAPITSA, Mikhail Stepanovich (1970)

SECOND FAR EASTERN
SHPED'KO, Ivan Fadeyevich (1970)

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Unknown

MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES
MININ, Viktor Ivanovich (1973)

NEAR EASTERN COUNTRIES
SYTENKO, Mikhail Dmitriyevich (1969)

SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES
BELOKHVOSTIKOV, Nikolay Dmitriyevich (1967)

SOUTH ASIAN
STEPANOV, Valentin Pavlovich (Acting, 1974)

SOUTHEAST ASIAN
NEMCHINA, Sergey Sergeyevich (1970)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
KORNIYENKO, Georgiy Markovich (1966)

OTHER DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
VOL'SKIY, Yuriy Ivanovich (1973)

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
Unknown

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT
NESTERENKO, Aleksey Yefremovich (1968)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT
ISRAELYAN, Viktor Levonovich (1973)

PRESS DEPARTMENT
SOFINSKIY, Vsevolod Nikolayevich (1973)

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT
NIKIFOROV, Dmitriy Semenovich (1973)

TENTH DEPARTMENT
ZHEREBTSOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (1959)

TREATY AND LEGAL DEPARTMENT
KHESTOV, Oleg Nikolayevich (1965)

BUREAU OF TRANSLATIONS
PASTOYEV, Vsevolod Vladimirovich (1970)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Officials)

MINISTER

Andreyevich* (1957)

DEPUTY MINISTER

Vasil'yevich* (1955)

MINISTERS

IL'ICHEV, Leonid Fedorovich (1965)

KOZYREV, Semen Pavlovich (1966)

RODIONOV, Nikolay Nikolayevich* (1970)

ZEMSKOV, Igor' Nikolayevich (1973)

DEPUTY GENERAL

Yuriy Nikolayevich (1973)

COLLEGIUM MEMBERS

DUBININ, Yuriy Vladimirovich (1972)

KHLESTOV, Oleg Nikolayevich (1973)

LAVROV, Vladimir Sergeevich (1973)

SUSLOV, Vladimir Pavlovich (1973)

TITOV, Fedor Yegorovich (1971)

Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

same.

is also a member of the Politburo.

ADMINISTRATIONS

ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS

DUCHKOV, Boris Ipat'yevich (1967)

ARCHIVES ADMINISTRATION

KHARLAMOV, Mikhail Averkiyevich (1968)

CONSULAR ADMINISTRATION

MOLYAKOV, Nikolay Ivanovich (1966)

CURRENCY AND FINANCE ADMINISTRATION

RYBIN, Viktor Antonovich (1973)

ADMINISTRATION FOR FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING

KOVALEV, Anatoliy Gavrilovich (1971)

ADMINISTRATION FOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

ADAMISHIN, Anatoliy Leonidovich (1974)

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

LAVROV, Vladimir Sergeevich (1973)

ADMINISTRATION FOR SERVICING THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS

KUZNETSOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich (1974)

SCHOOLS

HIGHER COURSES OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES (VKIYa)

LIFANOV, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (1954)

HIGHER DIPLOMATIC SCHOOL (VDSH)

POPOV, Viktor Ivanovich (1968)

MOSCOW STATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MGIMO)

SOLDATOV, Aleksandr Alekseyevich (1971)

Note: Dates in parentheses are the earliest known year of the incumbent's current assignment in the post.

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

POLITBURO

MEMBERS

Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev
Andrey Antonovich Grechko
Viktor Vasil'yevich Grishin
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko
Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko
Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin
Fedor Davydovich Kulakov

(Chairman, USSR Committee for State Security (KGB))
(General Secretary, CPSU Central Committee)
(USSR Minister of Defense)
(First Secretary, Moscow City Party Committee)
(USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs)
(Secretary, CPSU Central Committee)
(Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers)
(Secretary, CPSU Central Committee)

Dinnukhamed Akhmedovich Ku
Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov
Arvid Yanovich Pel'she
Nikolay Viktorovich Podgornyy
Dmitriy Stepanovich Polyanskiy
Vladimir Vasil'yevich Shcherbitskiy
Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov

CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Petr Nilovich Demichev
Petr Mironovich Masherov
Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev
Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov

USSR Minister of Culture
(First Secretary, Central Committee, CP of Belorussia)
(Chief, International Department, CPSU Central Committee)
(First Secretary, Central Committee, CP of Uzbekistan)

Grigoriy Vasil'yevich Romanov
Mikhail Sergeyevich Solomentsev
Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov

SECRETARIAT

GENERAL SECRETARY
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev

OTHER MEMBERS

Vladimir Ivanovich Dolgikh
Ivan Vasil'yevich Kapitonov
Konstantin Fedorovich Katushev
Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko

(Chief, Organizational Party Work Dept, CPSU Central Committee)
(Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee)

Fedor Davydovich Kulakov
Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev
Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov
Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov

SCHOOLS

ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Mikhail Trifonovich Iovchuk

HIGHER PARTY SCHOOL
Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Chekharin

INSTITUTE OF MARXISM-LLENINISM
Anatoliy Grigor'yevich Yegorov

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Fedor Danilovich Ryzhenko

ADMINISTRATION OF AFFAIRS
Georgiy Sergeyevich Pavlov

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS
Nikolay Ivanovich Savinkin

AGRICULTURE
Fedor Davydovich Kulakov

CADRES ABROAD

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Viktor Mikhaylovich Bushuyev

CONSTRUCTION
Ivan Nikolayevich Dmitriyev

CULTURE
Vasilii Filimonovich Shauro

DEPARTMENTS

DEFENSE INDUSTRY
Ivan Dmitriyevich Serbin

GENERAL
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko

HEAVY INDUSTRY

INTERNATIONAL
Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev

LIAISON WITH COMMUNIST &
WORKERS' PARTIES OF
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

LIGHT & FOOD INDUSTRY
Fedor Ivanovich Mochalin

MACHINE BUILDING
Vasilii Semenovich Frolov

ORGANIZATION
Ivan V

PLANNING

SCIENCE & EDUCATION
Sergey I

TRADE &
Yakov

TRANSPORT
Kirill S

* Officials in the departments of the CPSU Central Committee's administrative apparatus are not necessarily members of the Central Committee. The Central Committee itself, not shown on this chart, consisted of 241 members and 155 candidates following elections at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971.

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE *

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS

POLITBURO

MEMBERS

Committee for State Security (KGB)	Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunayev	(First Secretary, Central Committee, CP of Kazakhstan)
ary, CPSU Central Committee)	Kirill Trofimovich Mazurov	(First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers)
of Defense)	Arvid Yanovich Pel'she	(Chairman, Party Control Committee)
Moscow City Party Committee)	Nikolay Viktorovich Podgornyy	(Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet)
of Foreign Affairs)	Dmitriy Stepanovich Polyanskiy	(USSR Minister of Agriculture)
Central Committee)	Vladimir Vasil'yevich Shcherbitskiy	(First Secretary, Central Committee, CP of the Ukraine)
Council of Ministers)	Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov	(Secretary, CPSU Central Committee)
Central Committee)		

CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Culture	Grigoriy Vasil'yevich Romanov	(First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast' Party Committee)
Central Committee, CP of Belorussia)	Mikhail Sergeyevich Solomentsev	(Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers)
nal Department, CPSU Central Committee)	Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov	(Secretary, CPSU Central Committee)
Central Committee, CP of Uzbekistan)		

SECRETARIAT

GENERAL SECRETARY

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev

OTHER MEMBERS

ional Party Work Dept, CPSU Central Committee)	Fedor Davydovich Kulakov	(Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee)
ro, CPSU Central Committee)	Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev	(Chief, International Dept, CPSU Central Committee)
	Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov	(Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee)
	Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov	(Candidate Member, Politburo, CPSU Central Committee)

DEPARTMENTS

ITION OF AFFAIRS ergeyevich Pavlov	DEFENSE INDUSTRY Ivan Dmitriyevich Serbin	ORGANIZATIONAL PARTY WORK Ivan Vasil'yevich Kapitonov	PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE Arvid Yanovich Pel'she
RATIVE ORGANS anovich Savinkin	GENERAL Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko	PLANNING & FINANCE ORGANS	
RICULTURE vydovich Kulakov	HEAVY INDUSTRY	PROPAGANDA	
ES ABROAD	INTERNATIONAL Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev	SCIENCE & EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Sergey Pavlovich Trapeznikov	
CAL INDUSTRY aylovich Bushuyev	LIAISON WITH COMMUNIST & WORKERS' PARTIES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES	TRADE & DOMESTIC SERVICES Yakov Ivanovich Kabkov	
STRUCTION ayevich Dmitriyev	LIGHT & FOOD INDUSTRY Fedor Ivanovich Mochalin	TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS Kirill Stepanovich Simonov	
CULTURE imonovich Shauro	MACHINE BUILDING Vasilii Semenovich Frolov		

Departments of the CPSU Central Committee's administra-
necessarily members of the Central Committee. The
elf, not shown on this chart, consisted of 241 members
ollowing elections at the 24th Party Congress in

A(CR) 75-19
Supersedes A(CR) 74-38
June, 1975





LEGEND—The forced labor colonies, each are part of the GULAG System. The individual

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GULAG—the Soviet Slave Labor Trust—is an abbreviation of *Glavnoye Upravleniye Lagerei*, or Department of Penal Labor Camps, a division of the MVD, the Ministry of the Interior (formerly known as the NKVD—Russian equivalent of the Gestapo.)

There are over 14,000,000 forced laborers in GULAG, scattered through scores of penal colonies, each a Devil's Island at its worst. This state monopoly in expendable human flesh is a chief source of revenue for the Soviet regime. Incontrovertible proof of the existence of GULAG and its vast ramifications is presented here. Nearly 14,000 affidavits, assembled by the High Command of the Polish Army during the last war,


served as the Association of Prisoners of War Federation Nations. It has been estimated that every 100 men in the prison man submerged

"GULAG"—SLAVERY, INC.

THE DOCUMENTED MAP OF FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN SOVIET RUSSIA

New Edition (1951) Prepared for the Free Trade Union Committee
of the American Federation of Labor





LEGEND—The forced labor colonies, each a sprawling area comprising a constellation of concentration camps under a separate administration, are part of the GULAG System. The individual concentration camps under control of local authorities are indicated by the Hammer and Sickle.


an abbreviation of *Glavnoye Upravleniye* a division of the MVD, the Ministry of the in equivalent of the Gestapo.)
in GULAG, scattered through scores of orst. This state monopoly in expendable e Soviet regime. Incontrovertible proof of nations is presented here. Nearly 14,000 of the Polish Army during the last war,


served as the basis of this map, supplemented by recent data supplied by the New York Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps and by the American Federation of Labor Consultants to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

It has been established that the average mortality rate in GULAG exceeds 12% a year, i.e., every eight years its total population perishes and is constantly replenished with prison manpower. All the territory controlled by GULAG, if consolidated, would make a submerged empire the size of Western Europe.

The 175 penal colonies and concentration camps a divisions of GULAG known to exist in the Soviet U denote every type of industry operated by GULAG. employed in the construction and maintenance of roa iron, gold and other mines; in the building of airfields the timber and pulp industries; in brickworks, quarrie and the manufacture of wood products; and in the co works, and other military projects.

*Presently K





concentration camps under a separate administration, authorities are indicated by the Hammer and Sickle.


plied by the New York and by the American Council of the United

exceeds 12% a year, ntly replenished with idated, would make a

The 175 penal colonies and concentration camps shown here do not exhaust all the divisions of GULAG known to exist in the Soviet Union today. Nor is it possible to denote every type of industry operated by GULAG. We do know that forced labor is employed in the construction and maintenance of roads, railways, and canals; in coal, iron, gold and other mines; in the building of airfields and underground installations; in the timber and pulp industries; in brickworks, quarries, fisheries, canneries, tanneries, and the manufacture of wood products; and in the construction of fortifications, harbor works, and other military projects.

*presently KGB (Committee for State Security)


China-USSR Border: Eastern Sector



Chimnaya / Hei-hsia-tzu Island Area



China-USSR Border: Western Sector





Map of Siberia: Oil and Gas Infrastructure

Geographical Features: Kara Sea, East Siberian Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin, Sea of Japan, Japan.

Major Cities and Regions: Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, Chita, Ulan-Ude, Irkutsk, Angarsk, Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo, Achinsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Brodskiy, Raychikhinsk, Svobodnyy, Skovorodino, Aldan, Yakutsk, Ust-Vilyuy, Sredne-Vilyuy, East Siberian Lowland, West Siberian Lowland.

Legend:

- Petroleum area:** Major oil refinery (indicated by a refinery symbol).
- MAJOR FIELDS:** Natural gas (indicated by a cloud symbol), Crude oil (indicated by a circle symbol).
- PIPELINES:**
 - in operation:** Solid line.
 - planned or under construction:** Dashed line.
- Capacity:**
 - Natural gas:** 1020/23.3 (diameter in millimeters / capacity in million cubic meters per day).
 - Crude oil:** 1220/1000 (diameter in millimeters / capacity in thousand barrels per day).

Scale: 1 inch = 200 miles.

Economic Regions of the Soviet Union, 1975




I Northwest
 II Central
 III Central-Chernozem
 IV Volga-Vyatka
 V North Caucasus
 VI Volga

VII Ural
 VIII West Siberia
 IX East Siberia
 X Far East
 XI Baltic
 XII Southwest

XIII Donets-Dnepr
 XIV South
 XV Transcaucasus
 XVI Kazakhstan
 XVII Central Asia
 XVIII Belorussia

Moldavia is administered as a separate economic region.





POPULATION

100,000

100 to 3,000,000

1 to 1,000,000

100,000 to 300,000

METALLURGY


- Ferrous
- Copper
- Aluminum
- Other nonferrous

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.



ETHNIC GROUPS

- | | |
|---|--|
| SLAVIC PEOPLES | TURKIC PEOPLES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Russians □ Ukrainians □ Belorussians | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs ■ Uzbeks ■ Turkmen, Azerbaijanis ■ Other Turkic peoples |
| OTHER INDO-EUROPEAN PEOPLES | OTHER URALIC AND ALTAIC PEOPLES |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Lithuanians, Latvians, Armenians, Moldavians, Tadjiks, Ossetians × Germans △ Jews | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Estonians, Karelians, Mordvins, Udmurts, Khanty, Nentsy, Evenki, Eveny, Nganasany |



ELECTRICITY

- MAIN POWERLINES**
- In operation
- - - Under construction

NORTH



ETHNIC GROUPS

TURKIC PEOPLES

- Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz
- Uzbeks
- Turkmen, Azerbaidzhani
- Other Turkic peoples

CAUCASIAN PEOPLES

- Georgians, Chechens, Ingush, peoples of Dagestan

PALEO-SIBERIAN PEOPLES

- Chukchi, Koryaks, Nivkhi

OTHER URALIC AND ALTAIC PEOPLES

- Estonians, Karelians, Mari, Komi, Mordvins, Udmurts, Mansi, Khanty, Nentsy, Buryats, Kalmyks, Evenki, Eveny, Nganasany


- ESKIMOS
- KETS

- Uninhabited or sparsely settled



PRINCIPAL

- Gr
- Li
- Li
- Da
- Im
- Fr



ELECTRIC POWER

IN POWERLINES

- In operation
- Under construction

POWERPLANTS

- Hydro
- Thermal
- Over 2,000,000 kilowatts
- 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 kw
- 100,000 to 1,000,000 kw

Symbols represent single plants or groups of plants. Open symbols represent major stations under construction.

- Nuclear plant
- Nuclear plant, under construction

PETROLEUM REFINING AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

- Petroleum refining
- Synthetic rubber
- Mineral fertilizers
- Various chemicals

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.





PETROLEUM REFINING AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

- Petroleum refining
- Synthetic rubber
- Mineral fertilizers
- Various chemicals


The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.





MACHINE BUILDING AND METALWORKING

- Tractors, farm equipment
- Automobiles and trucks
- Other transport equipment
- Other machine building and metalworking

The larger symbols within a category denote the more important producers.






• 100,000 to 1,000,000 kw. •


Symbols represent single plants or groups of plants.
Open symbols represent major stations under construction.

⚙ Nuclear plant
⚙/c Nuclear plant, under construction



U.S.S.R. SUMMARY MAP

- AUTONOMOUS OBLASTS IN
1. Adygeyskaya
 2. Karachayskaya
 3. Kabardin
 4. Severo-Osetinskaya
 5. Chechenskaya
 6. Yugo-Osetinskaya
 7. Adzharskaya
 8. Nagorno-Karabakh
 9. Nakhichevanskaya



FUELS & METALLIC MINERALS

- Coal
- Brown coal
- Crude oil
- Natural gas
- ▲ Iron
- Manganese
- Chromite

The larger symbols will denote the more important basins.



ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

BOUNDARY

CENTER

Union Republic (S.S.R.)

Oblast, Kray, or Autonomous Republic (ASSR)

Autonomous Oblast (AO) or National Okrug (NO)

All Union Republic administrative centers are shown. The only other centers shown are for oblasts having the same name as their center.

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. The United States government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS IN THE CAUCASUS

1. Adygeyskaya AO
2. Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya AO
3. Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR
4. Severo-Osetinskaya ASSR
5. Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR
6. Yugo-Osetinskaya AO
7. Adzharskaya ASSR
8. Nagorno-Karabakhskaya AO
9. Nakhichevanskaya ASSR (to Azerbaijan S.S.R.)

